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Friar v Wellington City Council [2012] NZHC 1588 (5 July 2012)

Last Updated: 14 August 2012


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CRI-2012-485-44 [2012] NZHC 1588


MURRAY JOHN FRIAR

Appellant


v


WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL

Respondent

Hearing: 3 July 2012

Counsel: M F Dixon for Appellant

A M White for Respondent

Judgment: 5 July 2012

In accordance with r 11.5 I direct that the delivery time of this judgment is 4pm on the 5th day of July 2012.


RESERVED JUDGMENT OF MACKENZIE J

[1] The appellant was issued with an infringement notice alleging an offence against s 40 of the Land Transport Act 1998. This offence involved a breach of r 6.3(2) of the Land Transport (Road User) Rule 2004 of parking within six metres of an intersection. The appellant elected to defend the infringement notice and the matter proceeded to a defended hearing before two Justices of the Peace on

11 May 2012. The Court held that the offence had been proven beyond reasonable doubt, and fined the appellant the sum of $60 and ordered him to pay Court costs of

$132.89. The appellant appeals against that finding.

FRIAR V WELLINGTON CITY COUNCIL HC WN CRI-2012-485-44 [5 July 2012]

[2] On 22 December 2011, a parking warden noted Mr Friar’s car parked on Upland Road in Kelburn, Wellington, close to the T-intersection of Plunket Street and Upland Road. The car’s registration number was OA5533. The warden measured the distance as 2.42m. Rule 6.3(2) provides that:

(2) A driver must not stop, stand, or park a vehicle on any part of a road, whether attended or unattended, within an intersection or within 6 m of an intersection unless the stopping, standing, or parking is authorised by signs or markings maintained by the road controlling authority.

[3] Before the Justices of the Peace, the appellant argued that he was allowed to park in that space because the road markings implied that he could park there and there were no signs stating that parking was prohibited there. The respondent argued that the road markings that the appellant relied on were merely to guide those vehicles turning left or right out of the intersection and were irrelevant to whether parking was allowed. The Justices of the Peace agreed with the respondent and held:

[6] Mr Friar contends that he was parked within road markings that did not preclude its use as parking space by any signs. We hold that the opposite is true and that the road markings are simply to direct traffic and in no way suggest that parking is allowed. The case is proven beyond reasonable doubt.

[4] On appeal, counsel for the appellant points out that there is a broken yellow line in Plunket Street, which prohibits parking as vehicles approach the intersection with Upland Road, and an unbroken white line extending from where the broken yellow line finishes in Plunket Street around the corner into Upland Road for approximately 15m. Counsel submits that parking is permitted in Upland Road between the kerb and this white line, and that if the road controlling authority had intended that parking be prohibited where the appellant parked his car, the broken yellow line would extend around the corner. Counsel submits that the appellant’s car was parked in a position that falls within the exception to the r 6.3(2). That is, that parking is authorised by signs or markings maintained by the road controlling authority.

[5] Counsel for the appellant referred to a decision of this Court in 2009 when the appellant received an infringement notice for breaching r 6.3(1) of the Land

Transport (Road User) Rule 2004, for parking in the same area. The appellant successfully appealed his conviction in that case.

[6] Counsel for the respondent submits that the unbroken white line extending through the intersection and around into Upland Road does not authorise parking in that location but is merely a means of directing traffic through the intersection. Counsel submits there is no requirement for there to be broken yellow lines through the intersection along Upland Road. Counsel submits that had it been intended to authorise parking in the location where the appellant had parked his vehicle, the P30 sign, which is approximately five or six metres in front of where the vehicle was parked, would have been erected closer to the intersection, to include the area where the vehicle was parked. The arrow on the P30 sign points in the direction away from where the car was parked. Counsel submits that the earlier decision was based on a breach of r 6.3(1) not r 6.3(2).

[7] The sole issue in this appeal is whether parking in the location where the appellant’s vehicle was parked is authorised by signs or markings maintained by the respondent. The line relied upon by the appellant does not have that effect. The exact status of the line is not entirely clear from the evidence. I consider that it is clear that it does not authorise parking. The presence of that line is not an indication that the prohibition in r 6.3(2) does not apply. It was not necessary for the Council to extend the broken yellow line around the intersection to prohibit parking, because parking was prohibited by r 6.3(2). There is no other signage which indicates parking is permitted. The location of the P30 sign was a further indication that parking was not authorised on the intersection. The appellant’s earlier successful appeal has no relevance to the sole question in issue on this appeal, which relates to r 6.3(2).

[8] I consider that the Justices’ decision was correct. The appeal is dismissed.



Solicitors: Maxine Dixon, Barrister, Wellington for Appellant

DLA Phillips Fox, Wellington for Respondent

“A D MacKenzie J”


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