Dickie v Police [2012] NZHC 568 (30 March 2012)

Last Updated: 10 April 2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

CRI 2011-488-58 [2012] NZHC 568

ADRIAN CHARLES DICKIE

Appellant

v

THE POLICE

Respondent

Hearing: On the papers

Appearances: Appellant in person

D B Stevens for Crown

Judgment: 30 March 2012

_{JUDGMENT NO.2 of ALLAN J}

Solicitors/party:

A Dickie, Ngunguru Ford Rd, RD3, Whangarei

_{Crown Solicitor Whangarei}

DICKIE V THE POLICE HC WHA CRI 2011-488-58 [30 March 2012]

[1] Mr Dickie appeals against a judgment given by me on 22 February 2012, in which I refused his appeal against conviction on charges of using a motor vehicle with an unauthorised registration plate, using an unlicensed motor vehicle, and failing to produce a driver’s licence for inspection without delay.

[2] Applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal are governed by s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act 1957. Under s 144(3) leave may be granted only if this Court considers that there is a question of law involved in the proposed appeal which, by reason of its general or public importance or for any other reason, ought to be submitted to this Court for decision.[1]

[3] Mr Dickie’s first notice of application for leave to appeal was partly handwritten and partly typewritten. He had plainly used a template or precedent document. The form contained space under the heading “QUESTION OF LAW” for the applicant to set out the question of law in respect of which leave was sought. Mr Dickie had left that space blank.

[4] Further down the document, under the heading “UPON THE GROUNDS”, Mr Dickie had said that “The legislation was (sic) used against me is fraudulent as is the Magistrate’s Court that processed it”.

[5] I ruled that the form did not comply with the requirements of s 144 of the Summary Proceedings Act, and directed that Mr Dickie file an amended notice of application within a stipulated time. He did so. The amended application contains only one material variation from the first version. Under the heading “Question of Law” there now appears the phrase “Breach of Contract”.

[6] On appeal before me, Mr Dickie had not dealt at all with the substance of the offences with which he was charged. Rather, he had mounted a challenge to the sovereignty of Parliament, and incidentally to the jurisdiction of this Court.

_{[7] In essence his argument was that:}

(a) Queen Elizabeth II was “fraudulently crowned” because the stone on which she was crowned had been replaced when the original stone was stolen in 1950;

(b) Judges appointed with her authority have no jurisdiction;

(c) In any event, the Monarch has no ability to give the Royal Assent to any laws other than those laid down by God and found in the Bible;

(d) The legislation under which the appellant was charged and convicted was not authorised by God and is therefore legislation which is ultra vires fraudulent, null and void.

[8] I rejected that argument, citing Phillips v R.[2]

[9] In support of his notice of application for leave to appeal, Mr Dickie has lodged a letter which I take to be part of the grounds upon which his notice of application is based. In essence, the letter says that Parliament has no authority to legislate. That is because the Bible forbids “men from legislating”. He cites certain passages from Deuteronomy. Principal reliance appears to be placed on two passages in particular. The first is Deuteronomy 4:2:

Ye shall not add to the word which I command you, neither shall you diminish ought from it, that ye may keep the Commandments of the Lord your God which I COMMAND you.

[10] The second is Deuteronomy 12:32:

What thing soever I command you, observe to do it: thou shalt not add thereto, nor diminish from it.

[11] Mr Dickie’s reliance on these Biblical texts appears to replicate the third and fourth arguments addressed to me on appeal and referred to above.

[12] Challenges to the sovereignty of Parliament have absolutely no prospect of succeeding in our Courts. I endeavoured to make that plain to Mr Dickie during the

hearing of his appeal. There are numerous decisions of the appellate Courts to that effect. It is necessary to refer only to R v Mitchell,[3] where the Court said at [14]:

This Court has made it plain on a number of occasions now that arguments that are based upon an assertion that the Parliament of New Zealand was not authorised to make law affecting some or all of the persons living in New Zealand cannot succeed before it. Our courts are bound to accept the validity of Acts of Parliament, including the Land Transport Act 1998. Although this issue does involve a point of law, Mr Mitchell’s proposition has been squarely rejected on many occasions in the High Court and Court of Appeal. No useful purpose would be served in retraversing the authorities. Mr Mitchell was perfectly familiar with them, and indeed was physically in possession of some of those authorities before us, including Knowles. He just does not accept them. He is not entitled to put himself outside the law of New Zealand.

[13] That case was virtually identical to this. Mr Mitchell had been convicted of failing to produce a driver’s licence, using an unlicensed motor vehicle, and operating a vehicle on a road when it was not displaying current evidence of a vehicle inspection.

[14] Mr Dickie’s proposed appeal is completely hopeless. He has utterly failed to demonstrate that there is a question of law involved in the proposed appeal which, by reason of its general or public importance, or for any other reason ought to be submitted to the Court of Appeal for decision.

[15] I do not need to hear from counsel for the respondent. The application for leave to appeal is dismissed on the papers.

C J Allan J

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[1] See generally the discussion in R v Slater [1997] 1 NZLR 211.

[2] Phillips v R [2011] NZCA 225 at [9].
[3] R v Mitchell CA68/04 23 August 2004.