NZLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

High Court of New Zealand Decisions

You are here:  NZLII >> Databases >> High Court of New Zealand Decisions >> 2012 >> [2012] NZHC 936

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Decisions | Noteup | LawCite | Download | Help

Wells v Verisure Investigations Limited [2012] NZHC 936 (4 May 2012)

Last Updated: 22 June 2012


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY

CIV-2012-404-0660 [2012] NZHC 936

UNDER the Companies Act 1993

BETWEEN NEIL EDWARD WELLS Plaintiff

AND VERISURE INVESTIGATIONS LIMITED

Defendant

Hearing: 4 May 2012

Appearances: Mr Neutze for Plaintiff/Respondent

Ms Haden for Defendant/Applicant

Judgment: 4 May 2012

ORAL JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE DOOGUE

Counsel:

Brookfields, P O Box 240, Auckland – neutze@brookfields.co.nz

Copy:

Grace Haden, Auckland – grace@verisure.co.nz

WELLS V VERISURE INVESTIGATIONS LIMITED HC AK CIV-2012-404-0660 [4 May 2012]

[1] This judgment is concerned with whether Ms Grace Haden should be permitted to appear as advocate for the defendant company.

[2] It is clear that the starting position is as determined by the Court of Appeal in Re G J Mannix Limited [1984] 1 NZLR 309. That decision was to the effect that companies have no right to be represented in Court proceedings other than by a barrister and solicitor. Ms Haden has picked up in her latest memorandum, in the quote from the Tritonia case (which I assume to have been correctly cited from) that the purpose of restricting representations to barristers and solicitors is that they are subject to professional discipline and therefore the standards of conduct to be expected from them can be enforced and also they have familiarity with the procedures of the Court.

[3] Ms Haden has sought to persuade me that this is an exceptional case which takes matters outside Mannix. She has referred to the fact that she has previous experience as a police prosecutor which is not in dispute. I deal with that matter first. While I have no doubt Ms Haden has considerable experience in that area. That is in the area of criminal prosecution and in that area by statutory enactment “lay people” (in the form of police staff) are granted an exemption to appear in Courts representing the police. It is not in my view to be regarded as an assurance that such persons will be suited or equipped for conducting civil litigation.

[4] The second point concerns the fact that Ms Haden says the company cannot afford to retain counsel to represent it in these proceedings. It is my experience, as it is most other judges, I imagine, that there are numerous cases where parties are unable to afford legal counsel, both in a litigation involving companies and litigation involving natural persons. It is well known too that there is little or no resource available by way of legal aid assistance in the current environment but that, in my view, is not something that can be compensated for by permitting the rules requiring professional counsel only to appear in cases to be relaxed. If that was a legitimate reason, one would have expected that it would have been recognised in appellate cases and by way of statutory amendment. In my view the reasons why professional counsel only are entitled to appear in the courts is not about the resources of the

individual litigants but is about the maintenance of proper standards of procedure in the courts.

[5] Ms Haden says that her litigation is essentially in the public interest in that she seeks to expose corruption in certain quarters. That may be her perception of matters and maybe her motive but the reality is that this present litigation concerns a judgment which was issued in the District Court by Judge Joyce, that judgment while attacked by the defendant company has not been set aside. It is a judgment in other words that must be respected and given effect to by the Court. So that these proceedings are not about opening up factual enquiries of the kind that Ms Haden suggests they are restricted to the relatively straightforward matter of deciding whether or not the defendant has complied with a judgment of a New Zealand Court. Therefore I do not accept that there is some wider public interest to be served by granting to Ms Haden a relaxation of the principle in Mannix. For these various reasons I am of the view that it would not be appropriate to extend to Ms Haden the right to appear as the representative of the defendant company. I will now hear from the plaintiff as to what its intentions are from this point. In the light of what I am told I will make a decision about whether the defendant company should be given one final opportunity to retain counsel.

(the Court resumes)

[6] Mr Neutze advises that it is the intention of the plaintiff to now advertise the liquidation proceeding.

[7] The proceeding is adjourned to 15 June 2012 when it will be called at 10.45 a.m. I direct that advertising is not to take place before 4 June 2012.

J.P. Doogue

Associate Judge


NZLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2012/936.html