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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 5 December 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND GREYMOUTH REGISTRY
CRI 2014-018-220 [2014] NZHC 1583
REGINA
v
JORDAN NATHANIEL MCGRATH
Hearing:
|
7 July 2014
|
Appearances:
|
H R Bodle for Prisoner
M N Zarifeh for Crown
|
Judgment:
|
7 July 2014
|
SENTENCING REMARKS OF MANDER J
[1] Jordan McGrath, you appear for sentence this morning, having
pleaded guilty to charges of manslaughter, dangerous driving
causing
injury and driving with excess blood alcohol, being a third or subsequent
offence.
[2] Those offences arise out of your conduct on the evening of 24
January this year, when you consumed alcohol, drove a vehicle
at speed and
sought to avoid apprehension by the Police. Your actions culminated in you
losing control of the vehicle, crashing
into a house, injuring your passenger,
Kori Jeffcote, and killing Judd Hall.
[3] Mr McGrath, the first serious and ultimately fatal error of judgment that you made that night was volunteering yourself to drive you and Mr Jeffcote into Kumara. By that time you had consumed approximately a third of a bottle of whiskey. You
decided to go into town to purchase more alcohol and to pick up some
friends.
REGINA v JORDAN NATHANIEL MCGRATH [2014] NZHC 1583 [7 July 2014]
[4] In Kumara, you consumed beer at a local pub before
continuing on to Greymouth where you purchased alcohol.
You then drove to
Runanga where you picked up Mr Hall.
[5] On the return trip to Greymouth, you were observed by members of
the public driving at excess speed on the Cobden Bridge.
You were travelling
well over the speed limit and you passed another motorist in the middle of the
bridge. It is apparent by this
stage that you were driving in a dangerous and
reckless manner. You came up behind another vehicle in a 50 km/h area. You
began
to tailgate this vehicle, flashing your lights and indicators. You
forced the driver of the other vehicle to pull over.
[6] While travelling through Greymouth at 100 km per hour in a limited
speed zone, you passed a stationary Police patrol. Despite
the built-up area in
which you were travelling, you responded to the Police’s red and blue
flashing lights by accelerating,
reaching a speed of some 142 km per hour over
the course of an 850 metre straight. You approached a moderate left hand curve.
You
lost control of the vehicle. Initially, your vehicle slid into the oncoming
lane, causing another motorist to take evasive action.
Your vehicle then
crossed the roadway and grass verge. It travelled through the air and crashed
into a residential dwelling.
[7] The force of the impact destroyed the front of the house and
shifted it off its piles, such was the force. Fortunately,
no one was sleeping
in the bedroom where your vehicle impacted. The occupant had fortuitously moved
out of that room earlier the
same day.
[8] Mr Hall died at the scene of the crash from high velocity impact
injuries and positional asphyxia. Mr Jeffcote suffered
extensive rib and spine
injuries. You also were seriously injured, including being impaled through the
stomach by a piece of wood
from the house.
[9] Upon your admission to hospital after the crash, a blood sample returned a reading of 100 milligrams per 100 millilitres of blood. Calculations of your blood
alcohol level at the time of the crash put it between 130-160 milligrams per
100 millilitres of blood.
[10] When you were able to be spoken to by Police, you stated you had
no memory of the crash or the events leading up to it,
although you did
acknowledge drinking the whiskey prior to driving and knowing that you were
likely to be over the legal limit to
drive.
[11] You have two previous convictions for driving with excess breath
alcohol, entered in March 2007 and June 2003.
Victim impact statements
[12] I have read the victim impact statements of Judd’s mother, Mrs
Hall, and his father, Mr Durbridge, together with those
of his sisters, Shiloh
and Sarah Hall. They have endured the grief and pain of the loss of their loved
son and brother. The impact
of the death of Judd and the stress and damage to
the emotional wellbeing of family members are all too predictable and no doubt
will be enduring. As you have heard yourself this morning, Mr Durbridge has
addressed the Court directly about the raw pain and
emptiness caused by
Judd’s death.
Restorative justice
[13] To your credit, Mr McGrath, last month you attended a restorative justice conference which was attended by Mrs Hall and Shiloh. Mrs Hall has acknowledged your acceptance of responsibility for your actions. As you are aware, Mrs Hall has told you, as your counsel has referred to this morning, that she has tried to hate you but she cannot because you have, in her words, “fronted up”. Mrs Hall’s and Mr Durbridge’s and indeed the family’s reaction to the tragedy you have caused is remarkably restrained. While acknowledging the need for you to be accountable for what you have done, both Mrs Hall and Mr Durbridge express concern for you. They want you to lead a constructive life and give something back for what you have taken from them. They do not wish to see you imprisoned, but I am afraid that is, as your counsel has recognised on your behalf, the only proper response.
Pre-sentence report
[14] You have acknowledged in the pre-sentence report the factors
identified as having contributed to the offending; your excessive
use of alcohol
prior to driving, the poor decision you made in electing to drive, the way you
succumbed to encouragement from others
to take over the driving responsibility
despite knowing you had been drinking. You are prepared to take steps to address
those issues.
[15] The pre-sentence report writer observes that being responsible for
the death of one of your best friends does appear to weigh
very heavily on you.
You went to school with Judd Hall and you had known him a long time.
You have an appreciation
that whatever sentence is imposed on you, it will
bear very little comparison with the death of Judd and the effect on his family.
You have indicated, both in the pre-sentence report and directly to Mrs Hall,
that you wish to spend your time in prison productively
to strive to become a
better person and to make a success of your life.
The principles and purposes of sentencing
[16] In sentencing you today, Mr McGrath, I must have regard to the
purposes and principles of sentencing set out in the Sentencing Act. These
include the gravity of your offending, the degree of your culpability and the
need to hold you accountable for the harm you
have caused by driving in such a
way when drunk. It is inevitable that serious motor manslaughter cases such as
this require to
be met with the imposition of stern terms of imprisonment in
order to denounce such conduct and deter others from such dangerous
offending.
[17] I will endeavour to be consistent in the imposition of a sentence comparable to that which has been imposed on those who have offended in a similar way, and I am obliged to impose the least restrictive outcome as is appropriate in the circumstances of your case. I must also take into account the restorative justice process with which you have voluntarily engaged and to recognise your rehabilitative needs.
Aggravating features of the offending
[18] Mr McGrath, the aggravating features of your offending are
stark:
(a) You were under the influence of alcohol and were between half again
to twice the legal blood alcohol limit at the time of
the crash.
(b) You deliberately elected to drive while intoxicated, knowing you
were likely to be over the limit. To that extent, your
conduct was
premeditated.
(c) You drove at excessive speed and in an aggressive fashion; passing
a vehicle in the middle of a bridge, forcing another
driver to pull over, and in
a dangerous fashion in an urban area.
(d) You drove at speed and in a reckless manner over a sustained
period.
Your counsel takes issue with that description, but your driving at speed was
at least persistent and deliberate.
(e) At the time of the crash you were seeking to avoid apprehension by
the Police. Your response to the presence of the Police
patrol was to
accelerate to a speed of 142 km per hour. Such was your extreme speed that the
Police patrol was approximately half
a kilometre behind you by the time of the
crash.
(f) You were driving in breach of the conditions of your learner
driver’s
licence.
(g) In addition to the death of Judd Hall, you caused serious injuries
to
Mr Jeffcote.
(h) When you lost control of the vehicle such was its speed that the vehicle travelled through the air and caused very significant damage to the house. It was a matter of luck that an occupant of the house was also not killed or seriously injured.
[19] I can identify no mitigating features relating to the
offending.
Starting point
[20] In assessing the appropriate starting point, the Crown has requested
that I consider whether the increase in penalties for
the separate offence of
dangerous driving causing death introduced by Parliament in 2011 from a maximum
of 5 years imprisonment to
one of 10 years should be recognised in the starting
point for manslaughter. Dangerous driving causing death only requires a
departure
from the standard of care of a reasonable and prudent driver, whereas
the offence of manslaughter applies to conduct where there
has been a major
departure or gross negligence.
[21] The increase in the sentence for dangerous driving causing death and
driving with excess alcohol causing death resulted in
higher starting points for
offending of that type. That was the legitimate result of Parliament’s
clearly expressed intention
to increase sentences for offences of that kind.
The increase in the maximum sentence was a decisive response to public
concerns
over the road toll and concern at deaths on the road at the hands of
reckless and/or intoxicated drivers.
[22] The increase however was primarily a response by Parliament to what was considered an inadequate 5 year maximum and the resulting influence on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion when assessing the appropriate offence, manslaughter or dangerous driving causing death, to be laid in the circumstances of a particular case. As long ago as R v Grey,1 there has been recognition of the Court’s hardening attitude to this type of offending. That hardening was attributed to the continuing road toll, the repetition of personal tragedies and the growing sense of public outrage.2 In light of that sterner approach, the efficacy of laying charges under the Land Transport Act with the limited available maximum penalty when a charge of manslaughter was also available on the facts was brought into question. Manslaughter provides a maximum sentence of life imprisonment and that charge has always enabled the Court to provide an appropriate response in the
circumstances of the case before it.
1 R v Grey [1992] 8 CRNZ 523 at 525.
2 R v Whiu [2007] NZCA 591 at [20].
[23] In my view, it does not follow from the increased maximum
sentences available for dangerous driving causing death
that starting points for
motor vehicle manslaughter require to be uplifted. There has always been a
degree of overlap between the
two charges, with manslaughter reflecting the more
serious cases. Parliament’s increase in the Land Transport offences
maximum
penalty addressed the not inconsiderable difference between the level of
sentence able to be imposed for dangerous driving causing
death and motor
vehicle manslaughter where the culpability of the offender and the
circumstances of the offending did not necessarily
warrant such a difference.
While the increase in the maximum sentence can be viewed as further evidence of
the community’s
concern over deaths caused by intoxicated and dangerous
drivers, it did not reflect an anxiety that sentences for motor vehicle
manslaughter
were inadequate or that sentences imposed for that offence did
not reflect that public concern. Nor does it follow
as a matter of
principle that, with increased sentences for dangerous driving causing death,
manslaughter sentences should increase.
[24] The approach to sentencing for motor manslaughter is well-established,
following the principles set down by the Court of Appeal
as far back as in R
v Skerrett and R v Grey, and more recently in Gacitua v
R.3 Regrettably, there are all too many previous cases of
intoxicated drivers driving at excessive speed and in a dangerous manner, often
to avoid apprehension by the Police which have directly resulted in
death.4
[25] Mr McGrath, having regard to the aggravating features of the offending in these comparable cases, I have concluded that an appropriate starting point is 7 years
imprisonment.
3 R v Skerrett CA 236/86, 9 December 1986; R v Grey [1992] 8 CRNZ 523 (CA); Gacitua v R
[2013] NZCA 234; R v Locksley [2003] EWCA Crim 996; [2003] 3 All ER 40 (Crim App).
4 R v Grey above; R v Hawthorn HC Wellington, 28 May 2004; R v Whiu [2007] NZCA 591; R v Tulafano HC Auckland, 8 February 2011; R v Reihana [2013] NZHC 1273; Mika v R [2013] NZCA 648; Brook v R [2010] NZCA 13; R v Guest [2013] NZHC 2432; Ormsby v R [2013] NZCA 578.
Personal aggravating features
[26] You have previous convictions for driving with excess breath
alcohol, in
2003 and 2007. Those previous convictions in my view are relevant and, while
of some vintage, they do demonstrate that you have in
the past been prepared to
drive while affected by alcohol. It is that dangerous dis-inhibited conduct
which resulted in the death
of your friend. I consider a 5 month uplift is
appropriate.
Personal circumstances
[27] Mr McGrath, you are a 29 year old sickness beneficiary who after
working in Australia returned to this country some 18 months
ago. You suffered
significant injuries as a result of the crash which no doubt have exacerbated
the congenital spinal condition
which has prevented you from engaging in
employed work.
[28] Your sole income is from the benefit. You have little discretionary
spending with outstanding debts of some $10,000 with
no significant
assets.
[29] I am satisfied, Mr McGrath, that you have accepted full
responsibility for the death of Mr Hall. You have actively participated
in a
restorative justice conference; the record of which I have read. It is apparent
that you are genuinely remorseful. You have
apologised in person to Mr
Hall’s mother and sister and, as I understand it from today, also Mr
Hall’s father. I have
read letters filed by your counsel which are
supportive of you and your character. The way you drove that night does appear
to have
been out of character for you. You sustained serious injuries in the
crash and you have lost a friend. You will have to bear responsibility
for that
loss for the rest of your life.
[30] Taking all those matters into account, I allow a deduction of 9
months.
Reparation
[31] I have outlined your personal circumstances and your financial situation. Reparation is required to be ordered under the Sentencing Act unless it would result in hardship or special circumstances exist justifying its non-imposition. Here, reparation is sought in the sum of over $143,000. It relates primarily to the very
significant damage to the residential dwelling. Insufficient means and the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment do not by themselves give rise to undue hardship.5
An order for reparation however which is clearly beyond the means of the
offender is to be avoided when it presents as an act of futility.6
There needs to be a “realistic measure of confidence” that the
payment of reparation is able to be made.7 Payment of reparation
which results in instalments of more than 5 years have been recognised as
inappropriate.8
[32] In my view, the prospect of you being able to address the reparation
sought is quite unrealistic. Any order would have to
be deferred until the
completion of the prison term, and a rough calculation of the weekly rate of
payment across a 5 year period
to meet the sum sought is well beyond your means.
For those reasons and in the interests of your rehabilitation, upon your release
from prison, I am satisfied that an order for reparation would result in undue
hardship and that such an order is inappropriate in
the
circumstances.
Guilty plea
[33] Consistent with your approach to the restorative justice initiative and your demonstrated remorse, you entered early guilty pleas to these charges. The timing of the entry of those pleas confirms your acceptance of responsibility for what you have done, and I apply the maximum 25% discount accordingly. That results in a credit of
20 months for your plea and an ultimate sentence on the manslaughter charge
of 5 years imprisonment.
Minimum period of imprisonment
[34] Because I am sentencing you to a sentence of more than 2 years imprisonment, I am required to consider whether you should serve a minimum period of imprisonment. You will have heard counsel earlier discussing or making submissions to me in respect of this issue. You would be eligible for parole in the
normal course of events before the elapse of 2 years. In my view that
would not be
5 Sentencing Act 2002, s 12; R v Creek CA 199/06, 17 August 2006.
6 R v Brown CA 267/92, 26 November 1992; R v Bailey CA 306/03, 10 May 2004.
7 R v Pender [2007] NZCA 465 at [15].
8 Leighton v Police [2012] NZHC 1925; Crosland v Police [2012] NZHC 1929.
an adequate sentence having regard to the level of your culpability and the
harm you have caused.
[35] The sentence I impose must hold you accountable for the harm done
and it must denounce your conduct. Importantly, it also
must deter others from
similar offending. Deaths caused by reckless intoxicated driving are of deep
concern to the community. For
those reasons I consider a minimum period of
imprisonment of 2 years should be imposed. Mr McGrath, it would have
been
longer but for Mr Durbridge’s plea on your behalf this
morning.
Result
[36] Mr McGrath, please stand. Mr McGrath, on the charge of
manslaughter, I sentence you to a term of 5 years imprisonment with
a minimum
term of imprisonment of 2 years.
[37] On the charge of dangerous driving causing injury, I sentence you to
a term of imprisonment of 2 years.
[38] On the charge of driving with excess blood alcohol, being
a third or subsequent offence, I impose a sentence
of 6 months
imprisonment.
[39] You are disqualified from driving for 5 years.
[40] The sentences are to be served concurrently, so that your
effective end sentence is 5 years imprisonment of which
you must serve a
minimum of 2 years imprisonment.
Solicitors:
Raymond Donnelly & Co, Christchurch
H R Bodle, Greymouth
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