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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 18 July 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2014-404-000025 [2014] NZHC
1681
Hearing: 23 June 2014
Appearances: A R Galbraith QC and D R Kalderimis for Applicant/Defendant
D Goddard QC and J H Stevens for Respondent/Plaintiffs
Judgment: 17 July 2014
JUDGMENT OF VENNING J
This judgment was delivered by me on 17 July 2014 at 5.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High
Court Rules. Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date...............
Solicitors: Chapman Tripp, Auckland
Bell Gully, Auckland
Copy to: A R Galbraith QC, Auckland
D Goddard QC, Wellington
DANONE ASIA PACIFIC HOLDINGS PTE LTD v FONTERRA CO-OPERATIVE GROUP LTD [2014] NZHC
1681 [17 July 2014]
Application
[1] Fonterra Co-Operative Group Limited (FCGL) seeks an order staying
this proceeding until further order of the Court, together
with associated
orders.
Factual background
[2] The first plaintiff, Danone Asia Pacific Holdings Pte Ltd (Danone AP), manufactures and supplies baby nutritional products (baby formula). On 1 January
2011 Fonterra Limited (Fonterra) and Danone AP entered a supply
agreement (supply agreement) pursuant to which Fonterra
agreed to supply dairy
derived nutritional base powder products (product) to Danone AP for use in its
baby formula.
[3] On 2 February 2012 a foreign matter contamination occurred at
Fonterra’s Hautapu plant during the manufacture of whey
protein
concentrate (80 per cent) (WPC80), a nutritional food product used in a variety
of consumable end products, including baby
formula.
[4] On 20 February 2012 Hautapu sent a product disposal request
relating to the WPC80 to the regulatory authority Asure Quality.
Asure Quality
declined the initial request. Hautapu then sent a revised request to Asure
Quality. It sought approval to wet rework
the WPC80 or, if required, to dispose
of it as stock food. Asure Quality approved Hautapu’s revised product
disposal request
on 11 April 2012. The rework plan did not address
necessary cleaning procedures for the piping used in the process.
Between 17 March 2012 and 22 May 2012 Hautapu reworked the product (the affected
WPC80).
[5] Hautapu sent 13.5 tonnes of the affected WPC80 to Altona, Victoria
for use by Fonterra Australia Pty Ltd (Fonterra Australia)
in the production of
product for Fonterra to supply to Danone AP.
[6] Between 1 March 2013 and 18 March 2013 Fonterra Australia manufactured product using the affected WPC80.
[7] On 18 March 2013 testing carried out as part of the product
manufacturing at Fonterra Australia showed elevated sulphite
reducing clostridia
(SRC) levels for some of the final product. Fonterra Australia began
investigating the elevated SRC levels.
[8] Between 27 March 2013 and 3 April 2013 the testing and
trace back confirmed that the affected WPC80 was the
likely cause of the
elevated SRC levels. Between 11 and 15 April 2013 Fonterra Research and
Development Centre (FRDC) tested the
SRC levels in the affected WPC80 to
establish whether or not the organisms were clostridium perfringens. Under
the supply
agreement Danone AP had a specification requirement that the product
be tested for clostridium perfringens when high SRC levels were
present. FRDC
confirmed that the affected WPC80 contained clostridia sporogenes and bacillus
licheniformis.
[9] Fonterra and Danone AP had a conference call on 23 April to discuss
the issue and a report Fonterra had prepared on 22 April.
In that call and in
other communications between then and 7 May, the parties sought to address the
issues raised by the elevated
SRC levels in the product. Fonterra sought Danone
AP’s agreement to accept product that did not meet the specification.
Danone
AP advised that, save for 12.6MT of product to be used for growing up
milk powder, it would not accept out of specification product
but would accept
product within specification even if it contained elevated SRC
levels.
[10] On 7 May 2013 Fonterra Australia downgraded the out of
specification product not accepted by Danone AP to stock
food.
[11] On 20 June 2013 the Waitoa plant owned and operated by Fonterra
(Waitoa), which produced nutritional products for other customers
(but not for
Danone AP), was alerted to the possibility of elevated SRC levels in its
product. Waitoa had also received deliveries
of the affected WPC80. Testing of
the Waitoa product confirmed elevated SRC levels.
[12] On 19 July 2013 initial testing by AgResearch indicated that SRC levels within the affected WPC80 were more comparable with clostridium botulinium than
with clostridium sporogenes. A mouse bioassay was required to confirm the
absence or presence of clostridium botulinium.
[13] On 26 July 2013 the product containing the affected WPC80 in
Fonterra’s control was put on hold. By 30 July 2013
AgResearch mouse
bioassay testing showed some toxic effects but with results to be confirmed. On
31 July 2013 the AgResearch mouse
bioassay testing showed a strongly positive
result for toxin (a mouse died).
[14] On 1 August 2013 Fonterra began contacting customers, including
Danone
AP, that it believed had been sent product containing the affected WPC80.
At
9.53 am on 2 August 2013 Fonterra communicated with Danone AP. It provided
written details of the affected product and requested
a meeting to discuss.
Shortly after that, at 11.29 am, a preliminary report from AgResearch confirmed
that all samples were shown
to be toxigenic with isolates likely to be
clostridium botulinum. Between 2 August and 18 August Fonterra provided Danone
AP with
updated data for the product containing the affected WPC80.
[15] In light of the information, Danone AP and the other plaintiffs
pursued a comprehensive recall of potentially affected baby
formula.
[16] Finally, on 31 August 2013, the Ministry for Primary Industries
released a report detailing the full diagnostic results of
further testing
conducted in both New Zealand and the United States concerning the affected
WPC80. The results were all negative
for clostridium botulinium. The organism
was confirmed as clostridium sporogenes.
The supply agreement
[17] The supply agreement between Fonterra and Danone AP contains an arbitration clause. The parties agreed to an arbitration in accordance with UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The number of arbitrators is to be one if agreed by the parties but, failing such agreement, three. The place of arbitration is Singapore. The arbitration is to be governed by the laws of England.
[18] The supply agreement also included provisions dealing with
general and specific limitations of liability:
14.3 Liability limited: Fonterra shall have no liability to Danone
and Danone shall have no liability to Fonterra for anything, other than a breach
by
Fonterra or by Danone, as the case may be, of an express provision of this
agreement (including but not limited to negligence on
the part of Fonterra or
Danone).
[19] Clause 14.5(a) provided that Fonterra’s liability to Danone AP
was not to exceed the amount of AUD$10,000,000 per claim
or series of related
claims. Fonterra’s total liability to Danone AP for claims under or in
connection with the agreement in
any one year was not to exceed AUD$30,000,000
per annum.
[20] By notice of arbitration dated 8 January 2014 Danone AP, together
with the second to eighth plaintiffs, gave notice of a
dispute with Fonterra and
Fonterra Australia. The notice raised claims both in contract, for
breach of material provisions
of the supply agreement, and in
tort.1
[21] On 10 February 2014 Fonterra filed a response to the notice of
arbitration. Inter alia, Fonterra noted that neither Fonterra
Australia nor the
second to eighth plaintiffs were parties to the supply agreement. It submitted
that the arbitral tribunal lacked
jurisdiction to determine any claim advanced
against Fonterra Australia and by the second to eighth plaintiffs.
[22] The parties have each appointed arbitrators. The third arbitrator
has not been confirmed as the parties approached
to date have not been
able to accept appointment.
These proceedings
[23] On 9 January 2014 Danone AP and the second to eighth
plaintiffs
(collectively the Danone AP plaintiffs) issued the claim in this Court
against FCGL.
[24] The Danone AP plaintiffs raise four causes of
action:
1 Notice of Arbitration at 37.
(a) breach of s 9 Fair Trading Act 1986 (FTA); (b) breach of s 13 FTA;
(c) negligent misstatement;
(d) product liability in relation to the affected WPC80.
FCGL’s case
[25] As noted, FCGL seeks an order staying this proceeding until further
order of the Court, at least until final determination
of the arbitration
commenced by the plaintiffs in Singapore.
[26] FCGL argues the relationship at the heart of the dispute is that of
supplier and customer which is provided for by the supply
agreement between
Fonterra and Danone AP. All dealings between Danone AP and Fonterra were
governed by the terms of the supply agreement.
The plaintiffs’ tortious
and statutory claims in these proceedings derive from the supply agreement and
could, and should
be, asserted in the Singapore arbitration where they can be
considered in their proper contractual context instead of being determined
in
isolation by this Court.
[27] FCGL submits the current proceedings are a contrivance
brought to embarrass FCGL and to seek to evade the
negotiated
limitations on liability contained within the supply agreement.
[28] FCGL argues the stay is also justified on pragmatic grounds, namely
that the same documents, witnesses and evidential
inquiries will be
involved in the arbitration and in these proceedings. It would be a
significant and unnecessary strain on
both parties to be required to litigate
the same matters simultaneously in two fora. Without a stay there is also a risk
of inconsistent
factual and legal findings.
[29] FCGL says that to the extent there is any independent merit in the particular claims that cannot properly be dealt with within the arbitration (without conceding
there would be any), the claims can be pursued once the arbitration has been
concluded and in light of the findings in that arbitration.
Danone’s response
[30] The Danone plaintiffs argue that the Court should not exercise its
discretion under r 15.1 or its inherent jurisdiction to
direct a stay. A
mandatory stay is not available and in these circumstances a stay should only be
allowed in rare and compelling
circumstances. Their claims against FCGL are
genuine and they have a right of access to justice in order to have their claims
heard
and determined by the Court.
[31] The Danone plaintiffs further argue that it is incorrect for FCGL to
say it was only Fonterra that took actions and decisions
relevant to the Danone
plaintiffs in the course of the crisis which caused them loss and harm. The
employees whose actions are in
issue are employed by FCGL. FRDC, which tested
the SRC levels in the affected WPC80, is an FCGL scientific unit.
Fundamentally,
even if similar statutory claims to those advanced in this
claim against FCGL were brought by Danone AP in the arbitration the
arbitrators
could not determine the liability of FCGL as it is not a party to that
arbitration.
[32] The Danone plaintiffs also say it is too early to determine whether
an issue estoppel will in fact arise and further, it
is incorrect to assert, as
FCGL does, that this proceeding will not traverse factual territory beyond the
scope of the Singapore
arbitration. The causes of action are not co-extensive.
The conduct relied on will not be exactly the same.
Jurisdiction
[33] Article 8(1), Schedule 1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 does not apply. There is no arbitration agreement between the Danone plaintiffs and FCGL. However, the Court has a discretionary power to stay proceedings. The power is confirmed by
r 15.1(3). The Court also retains an inherent jurisdiction to stay which is
unaffected by r 15.1:2
15.1 Dismissing or staying all or part of proceeding
(1) The court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it—
(a) discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case
appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(b) is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or
(c) is frivolous or vexatious; or
(d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2) If the court strikes out a statement of claim or a counterclaim
under subclause (1),
it may by the same or a subsequent order dismiss the proceeding or the
counterclaim.
(3) Instead of striking out all or part of a pleading under subclause
(1),
the court may stay all or part of the proceeding on such conditions as are
considered just.
(4) This rule does not affect the court's inherent jurisdiction.
[34] The discretionary power under r 15.1(3) to stay instead of striking
out must be informed by the considerations in r 15.1(1).
With perhaps the
exception of the fourth cause of action FCGL does not at present suggest the
Danone plaintiffs’ claims should
be stayed as disclosing no reasonably
arguable cause of action. FCGL says the fourth cause of action is based
on a fundamentally
incorrect premise, namely that FCGL manufactured the
WPC80 at Hautapu. Fonterra owns and operates the plant at Hautapu,
not
FCGL. But as Mr Galbraith QC accepted, to the extent that FCGL says there is no
basis for the fourth cause of action against
FCGL, the appropriate course would
be to apply to strike out rather than stay.
[35] The grounds in r 15.1(1)(b)–(d) concern the misuse of the
Court’s processes.3
It cannot be said Danone plaintiffs’ pleading will cause prejudice or
delay in the
sense that r 15.1(b) contemplates. The pleadings, whilst extensive, are
not prolix.
2 High Court Rules, r 15.1(4); and Forestry Corporation of NZ v Attorney-General (1999) 16
PRNZ 262, 269.
3 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chesterfields Preschools Ltd [2013] NZCA 53, [2013] 2
NZLR 679 at [89].
They are neither scandalous nor irrelevant. Nor will they, on the Danone
plaintiffs’
case, delay the arbitration.
[36] On the basis of the evidence before the Court at present
the key representations made by or on behalf of Fonterra
were made by people
employed by FCGL. For present purposes it is at least arguable that the
actions relied on to support the tortious
and statutory claims are properly
attributable to FCGL as it employed the people who carried out the actions. If
FCGL is a proper
defendant to the claims in that sense then these proceedings
cannot be categorised as frivolous or vexatious. It cannot be said
that such
proceedings trifle with the Court’s process or are improper in the sense
contemplated by r 15.1(3).
[37] If r 15.1(3) applies, it must be on the basis the proceedings are otherwise an abuse of process under r 15.1(d). Abuse of process in this context is not limited to the rather narrow tort of abuse of process but can apply to proceedings which, although not inconsistent with the literal application of procedural rules, are nevertheless “manifestly” or “seriously” unfair to a party.4 It will, for example, be
an abuse of process to issue duplicate proceedings involving the same
parties.5
[38] While FCGL does not go so far as to expressly say the current proceedings are not brought in good faith, that is the tenor of its submission. It says the claim is a contrivance. In this context the importance of a party’s fundamental right to access the Court is relevant. The starting point must be that a plaintiff, such as the Danone plaintiffs, is entitled to sue who he or she wishes to sue so long as the claim is bona
fide and is of substance.6
[39] Since Danone’s claim is on its face bona fide, it follows that this Court should permit it to proceed unless a stay can otherwise be justified. For the reasons that follow I am satisfied that this Court has jurisdiction either under r 15.1(d) or the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court to stay proceedings in these
circumstances, but that
5 Otis Elevator Co Ltd v Linnel Builders Ltd (1991) 5 PRNZ 72 (HC), and Australian Commercial
Research and Development Ltd v ANZ McCaughan Merchant Bank Ltd [1989] 3 All ER 65 (Ch).
6 Abraham v Thompson [1997] 4 All ER 362 at 374.
decision should only be made in rare and compelling circumstances where the
costs, convenience and the interests of justice (including
consideration of the
Danone plaintiffs’ right to access the Court) weigh in favour of a
stay.
Abuse of process/inherent jurisdiction
[40] Mr Galbraith submitted that, where a plaintiff commences
proceedings against multiple defendants, some of whom are
contractual
counterparties bound by art 8 but others are not, the Court may direct
the contractual counterparties to
arbitration and order or direct a general
stay of the Court proceedings involving the other parties. It does so to avoid
an abuse
of process arising from a duplication of
proceedings.7
[41] The cases referred to as examples of where the Court has directed a stay on that basis are, however, distinguishable to the present one. In On Line International Ltd, for example, the plaintiff (On Line International Ltd (OLIL)) and the defendant (On Line Ltd (OLL)) were parties to an arbitration agreement. Mr Hong, the second plaintiff, and Mr Kay, the second defendant, were not. The Court acknowledged that, as recognised in Kaverit Steel & Crane Ltd v Kone Corp, where the claim by Mr Hong was truly derivative on the claim by OLIL a stay of proceedings could be
ordered.8 The Court was satisfied that the claims between Mr
Hong and OLL and
Mr Kay were so closely connected with the claims in the arbitration between
OLIL and OLL that the Court should stay the proceedings
by Mr Hong pending the
outcome of the arbitration. While Mr Hong and Mr Kay could not be required to
go to arbitration, the Court
stayed the aspect of the proceedings involving them
pending the result of the arbitration between OLIL and OLL.
[42] In Montgomery Watson NZ Ltd v Milburn NZ Ltd & Ors, Montgomery Watson and Aquatec-McDow were parties to an arbitration agreement. Montgomery Watson issued proceedings against four defendants, including Aquatec-McDow.
William Young J considered that if Montgomery Watson was permitted to
pursue its
7 On Line International Limited & Anor v On Line Ltd & Anor HC Christchurch CP2/00, 11 April
2000; Montgomery Watson NZ Ltd v Milburn NZ Ltd & Ors HC Christchurch CP86/00, 9
October 2000; and Kaverit Steel et al & Crane Ltd v Kone Corp et al (1992) 87 DLR (4th) 129 (ABCA).
8 On Line International Limited & Anor v On Line Ltd & Anor, above n 7 at [47].
claims against the first three defendants those defendants could be expected
to join Aquatec-McDow with the result the proceedings
would effectively run in
parallel with the arbitration agreement. He considered that that would permit
the process of the Court
to subvert the arbitration agreement between
Aquatec-McDow and Montgomery Watson.9 The Judge stayed the
proceedings.
[43] To similar effect is the Victorian case of Amcor Packaging
Australia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone.10
[44] In the above cases at least one of the plaintiffs and one of the
defendants in the proceedings before the Court were parties
to an arbitration
agreement. That is not the case with the present proceedings.
[45] The case of Reichhold Norway v Goldman Sachs
International11 is perhaps most relevant to the present
situation in that, like the present case the defendant seeking the stay was not
a party to
the arbitration agreement. Goldman Sachs had been engaged as agents
by a Norwegian company J, to advise and negotiate the sale of
one of J’s
subsidiary companies, P. J agreed to indemnify Goldman Sachs against
consequential liability. Goldman Sachs supplied
confidential business
information about P to the second plaintiff. Goldman Sachs did not disclose a
report forwarded to them by
J which showed a significant decrease in P’s
profitability. Under the agreement for sale J gave warranties as to the
accuracy
of P’s accounts. The plaintiffs’ remedy for any breach by
J was limited to damages and any dispute was to be resolved
by arbitration in
Norway. The plaintiffs gave notice to J of a claim under the agreement and
subsequently commenced arbitration
proceedings in Norway. They also began
an action in England against Goldman Sachs claiming damages for negligent
misstatement.
[46] Although Goldman Sachs was not a party to the arbitration agreement
it sought a stay of the proceedings against it pending
the outcome of the
arbitration in
10 Amcor Packaging Australia Pty Ltd v Baulderstone [2013] FCA 253.
11 Reichhold Norway ASA & Anor v Goldman Sachs International [2000] 1 WLR 173, [2000] 2 All
ER 679 (EWCA Civ).
Norway. Moore-Bick J considered that the plaintiffs’ right to sue a
defendant of their choice was subject to the Court’s
power to control the
conduct of litigation before it. Having regard to the commercial relationships
arising from the agreements between
the plaintiffs, J and the defendants, the
Judge concluded that the cost, convenience and the interests of justice weighed
in favour
of the stay sought. He directed a stay in the exercise of the
inherent jurisdiction of the Court. The plaintiffs’ appeal
was
dismissed.
[47] In the course of delivering the judgment of the Court of
Appeal Lord Bingham recorded the plaintiff’s
argument (which in part
reflects the first argument Mr Goddard QC raised for
Danone):12
Mr Carr submitted that the judge's order violated a fundamental principle
that a plaintiff making a bona fide claim, not tainted with
abuse, oppression or
any vexatious quality, may sue in the English court any defendant over whom the
court has jurisdiction. He submitted
that the court has no role to decide whom a
plaintiff may or may not sue here or, as he put it, a plaintiff does not have to
obtain
a passport from the court to sue a defendant in this country over whom
the court has jurisdiction.
[48] The plaintiff further submitted that to grant a stay may risk a flood
of applications inviting the Court to adjudicate on
matters which may be barely
justiciable. In doing so the Court would provide a charter for evasive and
manipulative defendants,
introduce uncertainty into Court processes and possibly
infringe art 6 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights
and
Fundamental Freedoms.
[49] While acknowledging those arguments, Lord Bingham confirmed the
Court had jurisdiction to stay the proceedings in rare and
compelling
circumstances:13
... I have no doubt that judges (not least commercial judges) will be alive
to these risks. It will very soon become clear that stays
are only granted in
cases of this kind in rare and compelling circumstances. Should the
upholding of the judge's order
lead to the making of unmeritorious applications,
then I am confident that judges will know how to react.
[50] It appears the stay was granted in the exercise of the
Court’s inherent
jurisdiction. In AKJ v Commissioner of Police, the England and
Wales Court of
12 At 183.
13 At 186.
Appeal also confirmed the jurisdiction for a stay in accordance with the case
management rules but in doing so noted that such a stay
would be granted only
where the party seeking the stay can point to a real risk of
injustice.14
[51] Reichhold Norway was applied in ET Plus SA v
Welter.15 Gross J stayed the claims not within the scope of the
arbitration agreement as a matter of case management. In that case, however,
the Judge was not required to consider the appropriate test as there was no
serious dispute that the surviving claims should be stayed
pending the outcome
of the arbitration.16
[52] Reichhold Norway was also applied by the English and
Wales Court of Appeal in Racy v Hawila where, in dismissing an appeal
from a judgment in which the Judge had ruled the appellant had to elect which of
two proceedings he
was to pursue, the court noted that it would be
“oppressive” to require Mr Hawila to have to face both actions
simultaneously.17
[53] I also note that in Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Genesis Power Ltd Randerson J accepted, obiter, that in a case where there was a substantial degree of overlap of factors or legal issues between the arbitration and Court proceedings it could be “inappropriate” for both to proceed simultaneously even if the matters in the Court
proceedings were not the subject of the
arbitration.18
Conclusion - jurisdiction
[54] In conclusion on this point I accept that even where the parties to the proceeding are not both parties to the arbitration (as is the case here), the Court retains jurisdiction to stay the proceedings either under r 15.1(3) or its inherent jurisdiction including for reasons of sensible case management. Parties do not enjoy
an unfettered right to access to the Courts; rather, the Court is
entitled to impose
15 ET Plus SA v Welter [2005] EWHC 2115 (Comm), [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 251.
16 At [91].
17 Racy v Hawila [2004] EWCA Civ 209 at [64].
18 Carter Holt Harvey Ltd v Genesis Power Ltd [2006] NZLR 794 (HC) at [61].
procedures that are appropriate in the circumstances having regard to the
nature and content of the litigation as a whole.19
[55] The jurisdiction to do so, however, should only be exercised in rare
and compelling circumstances.20 There must be a real risk of
unfairness or oppression to the defendant if the proceedings were allowed to
continue. Considerations
of cost, convenience and the interests of justice must
weigh in favour of a stay.21 The onus is on the applicant to
satisfy the Court that such circumstances exist.22
Discussion
[56] In determining whether such circumstances exist in the present case
it is necessary to consider in more detail the relationship
between the parties
to the proceeding and the arbitration and, in particular, the claims in the
arbitration and proceedings and the
issues they raise, together with other
relevant factors such as issue estoppel, the risk of inconsistent findings,
delay and cost.
[57] In doing so, I take into account the evidence before the Court by way of the affidavits filed.23 While a strike out proceeds on the basis of the pleadings, I consider that it is open to the Court to take into account such evidence on a stay application such as the present. While the Court will not attempt to resolve genuine conflicts in affidavit evidence, it is entitled to take into account relevant evidence. In the present case a significant amount of the evidence is not directly in issue. There is
also uncontroverted documentary evidence.
The relationship between the parties to this proceeding and the parties to
the arbitration
[58] On first impression, Fonterra’s position on this aspect of the
matter appears
contradictory. While FCGL argues the relationship at the heart of the
dispute is
19 Goldman Sachs International v Reichhold Norway ASA and Anor [1999] 1 All ER 40 (Comm) at
47, cited in Reichhold Norway ASA & Anor v Goldman Sachs International, above n 11 at 179.
20 Reichhold Norway ASA & Anor v Goldman Sachs International, above n 11 at 186.
21 Goldman Sachs International v Reichhold Norway ASA and Anor, above n 19 at 51-52.
22 AKJ v Commissioner of Police, above n 14 at [51].
found in the supply contract so that all claims should be
resolved in the arbitration, the Fonterra interests also rely on the strict
contractual relationship between Danone AP and Fonterra to limit the parties to
the arbitration. In its response to Danone AP’s
claim in the arbitration,
Fonterra takes the point that only Danone AP is a party to the arbitration
clause in the supply agreement.
Fonterra says the claims purported to be
pursued by the second to eighth plaintiffs in this proceeding cannot be pursued
in the
arbitration proceedings, and nor can the proposed claim against Fonterra
Australia.
[59] If Fonterra’s argument on that point succeeds in the
arbitration then the second to eighth plaintiffs at least
would not be able to
pursue any claims against Fonterra in the arbitration. If these proceedings are
stayed then the second to eighth
plaintiffs would not be able to pursue their
claims either in the arbitration or against FCGL, at least until the arbitration
between
Danone AP and Fonterra was completed.
[60] Fonterra’s response is that, if Danone AP fails in its claim
at arbitration against Fonterra, then the likelihood of
the second to eighth
plaintiffs succeeding against FCGL must be remote. On the other hand, if Danone
AP were to succeed at arbitration,
that would “most likely as a practical
matter ... resolve the essential disputes between the
parties”.
[61] I accept the force of that argument. The second to eighth plaintiffs’ claims against FCGL add little to Danone AP’s claims. They mirror the Danone AP claims. The Danone plaintiffs’ claims in these proceedings are effectively derivative from, and subsidiary to, the contractual claims Danone AP has against Fonterra. The defective product supplied to and used by the second to eighth plaintiffs was supplied by Fonterra under its supply agreement with Danone AP. The losses claimed by the Danone plaintiffs in these proceedings arise as a consequence of the supply of the affected WPC80 and the recall of the baby formula manufactured using it. The supply agreement provided for the consequences of its breach, including
costs on recall.24
24 Supply agreement, cl 9.
The claims in the arbitration and these proceedings
[62] In the background to the claims in the arbitration the Danone
claimants allege:
(a) Fonterra and Fonterra Australia knew or came to know that
the product supplied to the Danone claimants was contaminated
by the affected
WPC80.
(b) Despite being advised by its own food assurance team that the
affected WPC80 should be subjected to further testing,
Fonterra and Fonterra
Australia did not conduct a risk assessment nor trace or quarantine the affected
WPC80 pending further testing
and did not disclose the relevant circumstances to
Danone AP.
(c) To the contrary, Fonterra affirmatively represented that the product
supplied to the Danone claimants presented no risk from
a food safety
perspective and fully complied with Danone AP’s product
specifications.
(d) Fonterra and Fonterra Australia’s representations were not true at
the
time they were made.
(e) The Danone claimants relied on those representations.
(f) When FCGL announced that it had (unknown to the Danone
claimants) been testing the affected WPC80 and disclosed the results,
the Danone
claimants were required to publicly recall all products containing the
WPC80.
(g) The liability cap does not apply to the recall-related costs and does
not
apply to Fonterra’s conscious and deceptive conduct.
(h) The conduct constituted a Fonterra fault under the terms of the supply agreement entitling Danone AP to terminate the agreement.
[63] The contractual claim alleges Fonterra’s conduct breached
the following
provisions of the supply agreement:
(a) that Fonterra would comply with contract specifications for
the product supplied to Danone AP;25
(b) that the base powder would comply with all conditions, requirements, and
limitations imposed by licences, approvals and registrations
necessary for it to
manufacture and supply the product;26
(c) that Fonterra would not make any alteration in the composition or
to the characteristics or production methods of the products
without Danone
AP’s written consent;27
(d) that all products supplied would comply with specifications at the time
of delivery and with all laws, regulations and standards
of the country of
origin and be fit for consumption by infants;28 and
(e) that Fonterra would notify Danone AP of the existence of any
quality issue relating to the manufacture of the product
and work with
Danone AP in good faith to resolve such issues.29
[64] The claims in tort allege Fonterra and Fonterra Australia supplied the
Danone claimants with product they knew:
(a) contained unsuitable ingredients;
(b) was materially non-compliant with Danone AP’s specifications;
and
(c) should have been traced and quarantined from the supply
chain pending further testing.
25 Supply Agreement, cl 5.1.
26 Clause 5.6.
27 Clause 7.3.
28 Clause 7.5(a), (b) and (c).
29 Clause 8.4.
[65] The Danone claimants also allege that Fonterra falsely
represented the product was safe and complaint and failed
to correct that
representation.
[66] They further allege that Fonterra and Fonterra Australia breached
the duty of care owed to them:
(a) not to supply product which they knew to be unsuitable for use
pending further testing;
(b) not to make false representations about the suitability or safety of such
products and its conformity to specifications; and/or
(c) to correct such representations when they subsequently became aware they
were false.
[67] The relief sought includes damages for the costs of recall, loss of
profits, and loss of business and reputation.
The current proceedings
[68] The claim in these proceedings pleads the general background set out
at [3] to [15] hereof (although in far more detail).
Although the claim does
not refer to the supply agreement, it pleads at 33:
... Purchase orders were then placed with [Fonterra] for the Products, and at
all material times the Products were shipped by [Fonterra]
to the
plaintiffs’ manufacturing sites in New Zealand, China, Malaysia and
Thailand.
That is a direct reference to supply in accordance with the supply agreement between Danone AP and Fonterra. It is that product that contained the affected WPC80 which ultimately led to the need for the Danone claimants to recall its products resulting in the consequential losses it claims. It is of note that the Danone plaintiffs in the New Zealand proceeding allege losses of projected costs impact of €280 million and lost
sales of €350 million,30 which are exactly the same as the
amounts claimed in the arbitration.31
[69] The Danone plaintiffs place emphasis on what they refer to as the “April assurances” as supporting the FTA claims. They refer to a key document, namely a
22 April 2013 report (the report) sent to Danone AP by Anna Thomas (now Anna
Smith). Ms Thomas corresponded with Danone AP under
her FCGL email sign off.
There then followed further teleconferences and communications with FCGL’s
employees during which
the Danone plaintiffs say they were given assurances
that, in summary, there was no risk from a food safety perspective from the
use
of the affected WPC80 (the April assurances).
[70] In their first cause of action the Danone plaintiffs say that the
report, the 23
April teleconference and the April assurances were in breach of s 9 FTA as
misleading and deceptive in a variety of ways, but essentially
that FCGL had
further relevant information available to it which it did not disclose to the
Danone plaintiffs. Those allegations
and the factual basis for them are very
similar to the allegations made in the arbitration that Fonterra breached cl 8.4
of the supply
agreement that it would notify Danone AP of the existence of any
quality issue and the tortious claim that Fonterra falsely represented
the
product was safe and compliant and failed to correct that
representation.
[71] It is also relevant that the April assurances were given to Danone
AP rather than the Danone plaintiffs as a whole.32
[72] In the second cause of action the Danone plaintiffs allege that, in preparing the 22 April 2013 report, providing it to the Danone plaintiffs, participating in the 23
April 2013 telephone conference, giving the April assurances and failing to disclose subsequent relevant information FCGL made false or misleading representations in breach of s 13(a) of the FTA. Again, the conduct in issue is in connection with the supply of the affected WPC80 which was supplied under the supply agreement
between Fonterra and Danone AP.
30 Statement of claim, at 99.
31 Arbitration claim, at 38(b).
32 Statement of claim, at 48.
[73] Amongst other things, the Danone plaintiffs say that if FCGL had not
made the false and misleading representations they would
have refused to accept
the product and would have made a more orderly recall of the baby food. Again,
the refusal to accept would
have been a refusal to accept product under the
supply agreement. The costs related to or associated with the recall of such
product
are provided for in the supply agreement and form part of the claim in
the arbitration.
[74] In the third cause of action the Danone plaintiffs allege that FCGL
knew or should have known the Danone plaintiffs were
relying on it to provide
them with correct information about the safety and fitness for the purpose of
the products being supplied
to them. They allege that FCGL owed each of them a
duty to take reasonable care to ensure that the April assurances were correct
and any information necessary in order to qualify, correct or update the April
assurances was provided promptly to them. They allege
FCGL breached those
duties. Of note they plead Danone AP was receiving the April assurances
“on its own behalf for and on
behalf of the second to eighth
plaintiffs”. But on the current information before the Court, the product
supplied by Fonterra
was supplied to Danone AP.
[75] In the fourth and final cause of action the Danone plaintiffs allege
that FCGL manufactured the affected WPC80 and that in
manufacturing and
supplying the WPC80 it owed a duty to end consumers. FCGL knew or ought to have
known that some of the affected
WPC80 would be ultimately used by the Danone
plaintiffs to manufacture and supply baby formula and knew or ought to have
known that
if the Danone plaintiffs became aware of a defect in the affected
WPC80 used in making their baby formula the plaintiffs would take
steps to
prevent such harm and incur costs in doing so. They allege that the FCGL
breached the duty of care owed to the Danone plaintiffs
to take reasonable care
in manufacturing and supplying WPC80 to ensure that it was free from any defect
giving rise to a risk to
the health and safety of any consumers and was fit for
consumption and that FCGL breached the product duty of care when manufacturing
and supplying the defective WPC80.
[76] The Danone plaintiffs say they have all been affected in that they have recalled branded baby formula products in New Zealand, China, Cambodia, Hong Kong and Macau, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam. In other
jurisdictions, including Australia and Myanmar, they took other steps to stop
potentially affected baby formula products reaching
consumers.
[77] Putting the identity of the defendant to one side for the moment,
the facts underlying the claims the Danone plaintiffs bring
in these proceedings
are essentially the same facts that underlie and will need to be traversed in
Danone AP’s claim in the
arbitration. At the heart of both the
arbitration and these proceedings is Danone AP’s claim to recover the
losses sustained
as a result of Fonterra supplying defective product, including
the consequential losses associated with recall, and lost sales.
In the
proceedings the losses are said to have been exacerbated in that further losses
flowed from the way FCGL responded to the
problem. That claim, however, could
be pursued against Fonterra in the arbitration. There is a significant overlap
between both
the factual basis underlying the claim in the arbitration and this
proceeding and also the legal issues that will arise in both.
The scope of the Singaporean arbitration
[78] It follows that I accept there is force in FCGL’s
argument that the Singaporean arbitration will deal with
claims arising out of
the supply contract, the associated tortious claims, and could also deal with
any associated statutory claims
including the present claims under the FTA
between Danone AP and FCGL.
[79] The Danone plaintiffs accept that the arbitration can deal with associated tortious claims. In the arbitration statement of claim the Danone claimants allege that Fonterra and Fonterra Australia owed a duty of care to them not to supply product which they knew to be unsuitable for use in baby food formula pending further testing; not to make false representations to them about the suitability or safety of such products; and importantly, to correct any such representations when it subsequently became aware they were false. The same allegations are at the heart of the FTA and negligent misstatement claims in these proceedings.
[80] It would be open to the Danone claimants to include a breach of the
FTA claims in the arbitration.33 Further, even though the supply
agreement and the arbitration is to be governed by English law, the claims under
the New Zealand FTA
can still be brought and determined in the
arbitration.34
[81] The Danone plaintiffs argue FCGL is the proper defendant for the FTA
claims because the relevant communications and assurances
were given to Danone
AP by people (such as Ms Thomas (now Ms Smith)) employed by FCGL. For present
purposes I accept the claims
are reasonably arguable on the basis that the
relevant communications supporting the April assurances were by the people
employed
by FCGL. I also accept that the actions of FRDC can be attributed to
FCGL.
[82] FCGL accepts that Ms Thomas and the other employees referred to were
employed by it. Mr Galbraith submitted that the employment
structure was
unexceptional in that it was common in large corporations that operated within a
group structure for one company within
a group, either a services company or the
group company, to employ all employees. He confirmed, however, that Fonterra
and FCGL
accepted that Fonterra was responsible for the actions of the
employees, even if they were formally employed by FCGL.
[83] The employees’ actions can properly be attributable to Fonterra. Fonterra accepts the relevant personnel were acting on its behalf in performance of Fonterra’s obligations to Danone AP under the supply agreement, and on that basis Fonterra is bound by their actions even though they were employed by FCGL. For present purposes, I accept that either under agency or at least some form of vicarious liability arising from dual control both FCGL as employer, and Fonterra as the directing
party, may be responsible for the employees’, including Ms
Thomas’ actions.35
34 Francis Travel Marketing Pty Ltd v Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd [1996] 39 NSWLR 160 at 164;
Comandate Marine Corp v Pan Australia Shipping Pty Ltd [2006] FCAFC 192, (2006) 157 FCR
45; and Collins (ed) Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflict of Laws (15 ed, vol 1, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) at [32–008] and [32–016].
[84] I conclude that in principle there
is no bar to the claims pursued by Danone AP in these proceedings being pursued
against
Fonterra in the arbitration. I also accept FCGL’s argument that
the Danone plaintiffs’ FTA claims are derivative of
Danone AP’s
claims against Fonterra.
The issue estoppel
[85] I turn to other relevant considerations. Mr Galbraith submitted the
findings in the arbitration could create an issue estoppel
binding on both the
plaintiffs and FCGL (as a privy to Fonterra).36 Mr Goddard
countered by arguing that, in the absence of full and final pleadings and
discovery it was not possible to say whether
there will be an issue
estoppel.
[86] I accept that usually the issue of whether an issue
estoppel arises is determined once there have been findings
in at least one of
the proceedings in issue. However, given the nature of the issues in this case,
I accept there is a distinct possibility
of an issue estoppel arising. While
both the arbitration and these proceedings are in their infancy I consider it
possible to draw
conclusions from the respective statements of claim as to the
likelihood of overlap between the claims and the possibility of issue
estoppel.
[87] The Danone entities are the same in both the arbitration
and these proceedings (at least at present). They and
FCGL would be bound by
relevant findings in the arbitration in these proceedings as FCGL and Fonterra
are likely to be regarded as
privies. There is a sufficient nexus or mutuality
of interest as between Fonterra and FCGL in relation to the issues raised in the
arbitration and the current proceedings for them to be privies.
[88] In Hamed Abdul Khaliq al Ghandi Co v New Zealand Dairy Board the Court of Appeal suggested it was unreal to suggest that New Zealand Milk Products (NZMP) was a separate entity to the New Zealand Dairy Board (NZDB), other than in a strict legal sense as NZMP was an operating arm attached to the body of NZDB
and subject to NZDB’s direction. NZDB had a direct and continuing
economic and
36 Hamed Abdul Khaliq al Ghandi Co v New Zealand Dairy Board (1999) 13 PRNZ 102 (CA).
financial interest in NZMP and particularly in relation to the litigation.
There is a similar commonality of interest between FCGL
and Fonterra. Fonterra
was formerly NZMP and is a wholly owned subsidiary of FCGL. FCGL was formed
from the merger of New Zealand
Dairy Group and Kiwi Co-Operative Dairies
together with NZDB.
[89] A related point is the practical risk of inconsistent findings of
fact and law. Given the overlap of the factual background
and the critical
events, the arbitration panel and this Court will be required to make findings
on a number of the same factual issues.
There is a risk of inconsistent findings
on major issues.
Costs
[90] There will be a duplication of witnesses, and evidence between the
arbitration and these proceedings. Important witnesses
for Fonterra on the
report of 22 April and subsequent steps will be Ms Thomas (now Ms
Smith), who managed the technical
and quality aspects of Fonterra’s
supply of product to Danone AP under the supply agreement, Mr Frost who reported
to Ms Thomas
and Mr Gradon who led the commercial account manager’s team
at Fonterra. It is inevitable that their actions and the further
tests
conducted by FRDC will be under detailed scrutiny in both the arbitration and
these proceedings. There will be an attendant
impact of increased costs, both
in terms of duplication of the time and expense of the proceedings and
arbitration but also in terms
of disruption to business.
Delay
[91] The arbitration is at a very preliminary stage. The third arbitrator is yet to be appointed. I accept that if these proceedings are stayed, then it will likely be at least two years before the arbitration is completed. It may be longer. That counts against a stay. But delay is not so much an issue in a case such as the present where the claim is for monetary compensation. The financial consequences of delay can be addressed by an award of interest at a realistic rate. I do not propose to make the stay on the precise terms sought. If the arbitration process is delayed by Fonterra, then the Danone plaintiffs can seek to have the stay lifted.
Commercial nature of the relationship
[92] Both parties are large corporate enterprises. Danone AP
and Fonterra negotiated the detailed provisions of the
supply contract
including the submission to arbitration.37 They intended that
issues between them would be resolved by arbitration not by Court process. To
the extent Danone AP says Fonterra’s
actions have caused it loss not
caught by the arbitration clauses in the supply agreement, it is open for Danone
AP to argue, as
it has, in the arbitration, that the limitation clause should
not apply.
Conclusion
[93] While I accept for present purposes that the Danone plaintiffs have
arguable claims against FCGL (at least in relation to
the first three causes of
action), that is really no different to the Goldman Sachs case where
Reichhold Norway had an arguable claim against Goldman Sachs. Nevertheless one
of the reasons the proceedings were stayed
was that Reichhold Norway also had a
claim against J which it could pursue in the arbitration. Similarly in the
present case, I
consider Danone AP’s claims in these proceedings could be
pursued in the arbitration.
[94] Given the substantial degree of factual overlap between the claims in
the Singaporean arbitration and these proceedings I
consider that it would not
be in the interests of justice for both claims to proceed in tandem. It is in
the interests of cost,
convenience and justice that the factual matters be
determined first, either in these proceedings or the Singaporean arbitration.
As noted previously, if the two were to proceed simultaneously there is a real
risk of duplication in resources by the parties and
inconsistent findings
between the two. That would be both oppressive to FCGL and might, in the end,
delay justice if differences
in factual or legal findings were to form the basis
of any subsequent appeal.
[95] To the extent there are issues not resolved in the arbitration, the Danone plaintiffs can pursue them once the arbitration is concluded. The stay is temporary,
not permanent.
37 Channel Tunnel Group Ltd v Balfour Beatty Construction Ltd [1993] AC 334 (HL) at 353 per
Lord Mustill.
[96] In my view the arbitration should go first because the parties agreed
the arbitration process was to apply to claims arising
out of the supply of
product by Fonterra to Danone AP. The central dispute in this matter lies
between Fonterra and Danone AP.
The parties negotiated the terms of the supply
agreement and provided for the consequences flowing from breach to be determined
by
arbitration. This dispute is the direct result of alleged failures by
Fonterra in quality control in breach of the supply agreement.
The tortious and
statutory claims may not be derivative in a technical sense from the supply
agreement but I am of the opinion that
they are sufficiently connected so that
it would be unrealistic to divorce them and determine the issues in tandem
without reference
to each other. Whether or not the Singaporean
arbitration ultimately determines all the issues between the Danone and Fonterra
interests, it will at the very least clarify the landscape for the remaining
issues not caught by issue estoppel.
[97] For the above reasons I am satisfied that this is one of
those rare and compelling cases where the circumstances
require a stay. In
coming to that decision I take into account the Danone plaintiffs’
entitlement to vindicate their rights
in a timely manner and to access the
Court. However, that entitlement is subject to the Court’s overriding
control of its
own proceedings to prevent abuse of process and to engage in
sensible case management when the circumstances require. In this case,
in my
judgment, to require FCGL to respond to the allegations raised by the Danone
plaintiffs would, in the circumstances where the
claims arise out of the
performance of the supply agreement by Fonterra, be oppressive to FCGL,
unnecessarily duplicative and contrary
to the interests of justice.
Result
[98] The application for stay is granted.
[99] However, as noted, I do not propose to make an order in the terms sought by FCGL. There will be an order staying this proceeding until further order of the Court, and expressly reserving leave for the Danone plaintiffs to seek to lift the stay in the event Fonterra delays the arbitration process.
Costs
[100] Costs to FCGL on a 3B basis plus disbursements as fixed by the
Registrar.
[101] I certify for second
counsel.
Venning J
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