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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 26 February 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2014-485-001474 [2014] NZHC 213
UNDER the Judicature Amendment Act 1972
IN THE MATTER of an Application for Judicial Review
BETWEEN TELCO TECHNOLOGY SERVICES LIMITED
Applicant
AND MINISTRY OF EDUCATION Respondent
Hearing: 17 February 2014
Counsel: V L Heine and B A Davies for Applicant
A Williams with C Fleming and R Wanigasekera for
Respondent
Judgment: 19 February 2014
JUDGMENT OF COLLINS J
Introduction
[1] Telco Technology Services Ltd (Telco) has applied for an interim
injunction. The interim injunction seeks to prevent the
Ministry of Education
(the Ministry) from giving effect to its decision to appoint another
company to be solely responsible
for implementing the final phase of The
Schools’ Network Upgrade Project (the project).1
[2] I have decided to grant an interim injunction because Telco has
established:
(1) There is a serious question to be tried in relation to its application
for judicial review.
1 Referred to in the contract documents as the SNUP
project.
TELCO TECHNOLOGY SERVICES LIMITED v MINISTRY OF EDUCATION [2014] NZHC 213 [19
February 2014]
(2) An interim injunction is necessary to preserve Telco’s
position.
(3) The overall justice of the case favours the granting of an interim
injunction.
[3] Telco has established that it is seriously arguable it tendered on
the basis that the Ministry’s Request for Proposals
(RFP) said it intended
to appoint two or three suppliers to complete the final phase of the project.
After the tender process concluded
the Ministry advised Telco only one supplier
would be appointed. The basis on which Telco would have costed its proposal is
likely
to have been significantly different had it known the Ministry was
willing to appoint one supplier. There is a serious question as
to whether or
not the Ministry’s RFP for the project created a procedural expectation
that if only one provider was going to
be appointed Telco would be given the
opportunity to amend its proposal to reflect this change.
[4] Telco is likely to suffer from the lack of opportunity to have
tendered for the final phase of the project on the basis
that the Ministry was
willing to appoint one supplier.
[5] Issuing an interim injunction will cause some delay, uncertainty and
inconvenience. However, I am satisfied these consequences
can be mitigated
appropriately and that the overall justice of the case favours the granting of
an interim injunction.
Context
[6] Telco provides information, communications and technology services to schools in New Zealand. Since 2010 Telco has been one of two companies appointed by the Ministry to deliver the first five phases of the project which is designed to provide 97.7 per cent of schools in New Zealand with ultrafast broadband by December 2015. Telco’s contract under the first five phases of the project is due to expire during the course of 2014.
[7] On 26 August 2013 the Ministry issued its RFP for the delivery of
the final phase of the project. It is estimated that
approximately 6002
schools will be provided with the technology systems and services to
be integrated into the ultrafast broadband system by
December
2015.
[8] Telco was one of several companies invited by the Ministry to
provide a proposal by 24 September 2013 for the final phase
of the
project.
[9] The Ministry’s RFP contained the following
provisions:
(1) Clause 1.1 Purpose of this RFP
...
The Ministry intends to select two to three PM3 Services
providers for the final phase of the SNUP project.
(2) Clause 1.5.3 Geographic Coverage
...
The Ministry expects to select more than one project management services
suppliers. When answering questions related to capacity
Tenderers should
answer on the basis of a maximum 50 per cent of the available schools.
(3) Clause 2.1.4 Format of Proposals
The format for proposals is detailed in Section 4.0 of this RFP. The
Ministry reserves the right not to accept proposals
that do not
provide the requested information, or do not follow the response format.
(4) Clause 2.1.7 Non-Compliance
Each Tenderer should carefully read this RFP to ensure its proposal complies
with the Ministry’s procedural instructions and
the terms of this RFP.
The Ministry is not required to accept any proposal for evaluation, and may
elect not to evaluate any proposal,
that does not comply with such procedural
instructions and/or terms.
(5) Clause 2.2.3 Evaluation Criteria
Each proposal that passes the initial assessment will be evaluated against
the following SNUP evaluation criteria.
2 Telco says there are 595 schools involved in the final phase of the project. Some of the
Ministry’s evidence refers to 605 schools.
3 Project Management.
...
(a) organisation offers a credible solution to the Ministry.
...
(u) the degree to which a proposal offers innovation that would
deliver additional benefits and/or value, which may include
addressing the
opportunities identified within this RFP, and other ideas or mechanisms for
achieving the desired outcomes.
(6) Clause 3.1.11 Ministry’s Rights
...
The Ministry reserves the right to:
...
amend the closing date, or any other date in the RFP process
by the issue of a written amendment notice before or after the closing
date;
amend this RFP or any associated documents or any
condition or procedure in the RFP process, by the issue of a written amendment
notice;
...
consider or reject any alternative proposal at the Ministry’s
sole discretion;
...
negotiate and conclude any number and type of contracts with
any Tenderer(s) to the exclusion of others, in respect of any of the
Requirements (on the basis of the proposal or any alternate basis);
...
run this RFP in such manner as the Ministry may see fit. (7) Clause 3.1.16 Amendments and Clarifications
Where the Ministry amends any date in the RFP process, this RFP or any
associated documents, it may issue any amendment to this RFP
by way of written
amendment notice. A copy of each amendment notice will be given to each
affected Tenderer.
[10] The RFP also asked tenderers to answer 28 questions set out in cl 5.2
under
the heading “Project Manager Questions”. Questions [25] and [27] asked:
[25] What additional information not previously provided do you believe
enhances the value of your proposal?
...
[27] Would you be willing to take a primary role in the SNUP upgrades,
organise all subcontractors, provide and manage all warranties,
in return for
exclusive 2 year’s SNUP work and for 3 years beyond?
[11] On 24 September 2013 Telco submitted its proposal in which it
confirmed it had the capacity to deliver the services sought
by the Ministry to
50 per cent or more of the schools that were to be upgraded in the final phase
of the project.
[12] Telco explained in its proposal that its pricing for the project was
based on it receiving a minimum of a 50 per cent share
of the schools covered by
the final phase of the project and that its proposed minimum 50 per cent
share:
(1) would contain an even allocation of schools based on geographic
distribution; and
(2) would contain an even allocation of schools based on pupil
numbers.
[13] Mr Mitchell, the managing director of Telco, has explained that
Telco needed to make some assumptions about the size, location
and existing
infrastructures of the schools which were to be allocated under the final phase
of the project. This is because a
school’s geographical location, size
and its existing infrastructures could significantly impact on the cost of
providing schools
with the services the Ministry was seeking. The cost and risk
to a provider would increase if that provider were allocated a smaller
number
of schools. Conversely, the greater the number of schools allocated to
a provider, the lower the costs and risks
to the provider for each school.
Therefore, both the price per school and the overall tender price were
dependent on the total
number of schools allocated to a tenderer.
[14] In response to Questions [25] and [27] in cl 5.2 of the RFP, Telco
said:
(1) There was no further information it wished to provide to enhance its proposal.
(2) That it would consider a primary role in the project upgrades
nationwide as the sole exclusive national provider.
[15] On 4 November 2013 the Ministry sent Telco nine additional
questions designed to seek clarification of aspects
of Telco’s proposal.
Those questions appear to have been predicated on the successful tenderer being
allocated either 33 per
cent or 50 per cent of the schools affected by the final
phase of the project.4
[16] Telco responded to those nine questions on 14 November
2014. In its response Telco referred to its having assumed
a 50 per cent
allocation of the remaining schools in each region and an equitable allocation
based on school role size.
[17] Telco also said on 14 November 2013 that the final phase of the
project provides a “swings and roundabouts” opportunity
under which
the tenderer is dependent upon a range of large and urban schools in order for
the total service delivery to be profitable.
If the allocation of the majority
of smaller schools in non- urban areas was unfairly weighted then the delivery
of the project
would be uneconomic. Telco emphasised the equitable allocation
of schools did not need to be precise or scientific so long as it
was undertaken
in good faith and was fair to the project providers.
[18] Telco also said on 14 November 2013 that it was bearing large overheads and if less than 50 per cent of the schools were allocated or if the more profitable larger schools were not equally allocated, then its overheads would be absorbed across fewer schools resulting in an increased price per school. Telco said the inverse was also true, if significantly more than 50 per cent of the schools were allocated to Telco it would be reasonable to expect a reduction in the price per school, particularly for
very large and extra large schools in urban
locations.
Question 9 asked: “Regarding your response to TD15 ... that your pricing is based on a minimum 50 per cent share of the total school numbers please state what your pricing would be if you were offered approximately one-third of the remain schools. If your pricing changes, please explain why it would need to change.”
[19] On 29 November 2013 the Ministry told Telco it had been shortlisted
for the project, that the Ministry had also shortlisted
a number of other
tenderers and that it was seeking to explore a range of options. These options
would be considered at a meeting
that was to be held on 10 December
2013.
[20] On 4 December 2013 the Ministry sent Telco an agenda for the 10
December meeting, including a number of questions for discussion
at the
meeting.
[21] There is a dispute between the parties as to what precisely was said
at the
10 December meeting. That dispute will probably need to be resolved at the
hearing of the substantive proceeding. Suffice for present
purposes to note
that Telco maintains it was not requested to provide a price based on receiving
a 100 per cent allocation of all
remaining schools. The Ministry says that the
recollections of Telco’s representatives at that meeting are not
correct.
[22] On 19 December 2013 Telco provided the Ministry with further
information explaining its pricing for “large”,
“very
large” and “extra large” schools. Telco did not provide a
costing on the basis of a 100 per cent allocation
of the available schools. Mr
Mitchell has explained Telco did not do so because it had received no suggestion
from the Ministry
that it intended to allocate the schools in the final phase of
the project on the basis of a 100 per cent allocation to one
provider.
[23] On 20 December 2013 the Ministry advised Telco that its proposal had
been rejected.
[24] Since notifying Telco that it was not successful, the Ministry has
entered into contract negotiations with a single preferred
tenderer on the basis
that tenderer will receive a 100 per cent allocation of all remaining schools.
It is anticipated that these
contract negotiations will be completed by the end
of February 2014.
Causes of action
[25] Telco has pleaded two causes of action, namely: (1) Judicial review; and
(2) Equitable estoppel.
Judicial review
[26] Telco’s claim for judicial review is based on its contention
that the Ministry breached Telco’s legitimate procedural
expectation that
the Ministry would issue an amendment to the RFP if the Ministry was considering
appointing only one supplier to
complete the final phase of the project.
Telco’s case is that:
(1) The Ministry clearly stated Telco’s proposal should be
prepared on the basis that two or three providers would be
appointed to complete
the final phase of the project.
(2) The Ministry would follow a fair procedure by notifying all
tenderers of any material changes to the appointment of suppliers
for the final
phase of the project. Procedural fairness required the Ministry to give Telco
and other tenderers the opportunity
to submit a proposal based on the
possibility one supplier would be appointed.
(3) Telco reasonably expected and relied upon the Ministry to comply
with fair processes when considering the tender process.
(4) Telco suffered by not being given the opportunity to submit a
tender based on the possibility only one supplier would be
appointed.
Equitable estoppel
[27] Telco pleads that it is unconscionable for the Ministry to be permitted to resile from its representations about the basis on which tenderers for the final phase of the project would be considered and that the Ministry should now be estopped from appointing a single supplier.
Ministry’s position
[28] The Ministry opposes the issuing of an interim injunction. The
Ministry says there is not a serious question to be tried
in relation to either
of the causes of action pleaded by Telco.
[29] In relation to Telco’s claim for judicial review the Ministry
says:
(1) Telco’s dispute arises in the context of commercial dealings
between the Ministry and tenderers for the final phase
of the project and as
such there is limited scope for judicial review.
(2) It said it only “intended” to appoint two or three providers,
not that it
would appoint two or three providers.
(3) It “did not represent that it would not appoint a single
provider”.5
(4) It represented it would consider all tenderers provided on the
basis of a 50 per cent share of schools in the final phase
of the project. The
fact that the final decision was awarded to one supplier does not mean that all
tenderers were not compared
on the basis of a 50 per cent allocation of
schools.
(5) The RFP gave it considerable flexibility to appoint one supplier.
In particular, the Ministry says cl 3.1.11 of the RFP6 reserved the
right to consider alternative proposals and to negotiate and conclude any number
and type of contracts with any tenderer(s).
(6) It expressly asked in Question [27] of the RFP7 whether tenderers would be willing to be an exclusive supplier and Telco answered this
question in the affirmative.
5 Ministry’s notice of opposition of 14 February 2014.
6 See paragraph [9](6) of this judgment.
7 See paragraph [10] of this judgment.
[30] In relation to Telco’s claim based on equitable estoppel the
Ministry says it did not promise that “it would
not select a single
provider”8 and there is no pleading to support the proposition
that the Ministry acted unconscionably.
[31] The Ministry also says that the balance of convenience does not
favour the granting of an interim injunction because:
(1) An interim injunction is not necessary to preserve Telco’s
position because it still has to deliver services to 198
schools under the
earlier phases of the project.
(2) The Ministry says issuing an interim injunction will delay
the completion of the project and that another 25 service
providers who have
been provisionally selected for the supply of services that are dependent on the
implementation of the final phase
of the project will be adversely
affected.
(3) The Ministry will incur considerable additional costs in running a
further tender process for the final phase of the project
if an interim
injunction is granted.
Reasons why there is a serious question to be tried in relation to Telco’s
application for judicial review
[32] I shall address this aspect of my judgment by answering
the following questions:
(1) Is Telco’s claim amenable to judicial review?
(2) Did the Ministry create a procedural expectation? (3) Were Telco’s expectations reasonable?
(4) Did Telco rely on the Ministry’s representations to its
detriment?
8 Ministry’s notice of opposition of 14 February 2014.
Is Telco’s claim amenable to judicial review?
[33] The Ministry submits that in Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland
District Health Board [Medlabs]9 the Court of Appeal strongly
cautioned invoking judicial review in the context of a commercial
dispute.
[34] The Court of Appeal held that the Courts may intervene by way of
judicial review in relation to contracting decisions made
by public bodies in a
commercial context in limited circumstances. The Court’s ability to
judicially review a decision hinges
on the context within which the dispute
arises.10 In my assessment, judicial review is available in a
commercial tendering context where the Crown may have breached procedural
expectations
in a material way to the detriment of a tenderer.
[35] In Medlabs, the Court of Appeal accepted that judicial review is available where an insider with information and a conflict of interest used that information to disadvantage its rivals in connection with a tender process. It held, however, that the High Court had not given proper weight to the commercial context in that case and that the District Health Boards (DHBs) were not in breach of their public law obligations because they had followed the relevant statutory procedures concerning
conflicts of interest and the use of inside
information.11
[36] The Court of Appeal wanted to avoid the imposition of onerous procedural obligations over and above the statutory framework that governed the decision- maker in that case. The Court of Appeal wished to do this to enable public authorities to have flexibility to make commercially viable decisions. The Court also noted that the statutory context was critical to determining that the DHB’s decision was not judicially reviewable because the DHBs adhered to the detailed statutory provisions relating to conflicts of interest and use of confidential information in that
case.12
9 Lab Tests Auckland Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2008] NZCA 385, [2009] 1 NZLR
776 (CA).
10 At [56]-[59].
11 Diagnostic Medlab Ltd v Auckland District Health Board [2009] NZSC 10, (2009) 19 PRNZ
217 at [5].
12 Medlabs, above n 9, at [91].
[37] In the present case, there is no obvious statutory framework which
regulated the way the Ministry was to conduct the tender
process. The
legislative provisions cited in submissions were s 4 of the Public Finance Act
1984, s 34 of the State Sector Act 1988
and the Education Act 1989. However,
those legislative provisions are of a general nature and did not specifically
govern the process
followed by the Ministry in this case. Accordingly, the
vacuum created by an absence of specific legislative provisions may be filled
by
public law principles such as natural justice and procedural
fairness.
[38] In addition, the present case does not simply involve commercial
principles. It is reasonably arguable that the Ministry
breached its
fundamental procedural obligations when it failed to give Telco the opportunity
to be assessed on a fair and equal
basis with the successful tenderer. Further,
it is also reasonably arguable Telco believed that the Ministry would assess all
tenderers
on a fair basis and relied on the Ministry’s representations to
its detriment. This is a public law concept that prevails
over the commercial
nature of this case. Any breach of procedural obligations by the Ministry may
well have produced an unfair assessment
of all tenderers in the present
case.
[39] Medlabs can also be distinguished on another basis. The Court of Appeal found that the complexity of the issues in that case were more analogous to those in private law disputes and therefore beyond the bounds of judicial review.13 In the present case, however, the dispute is not particularly complex. The principal issue is whether the Ministry failed to abide by the procedure it set out for itself in its RFP when selecting a provider for the final phase of the project. Telco is invoking public
law to hold the Ministry accountable for what it said it would do
but which, according to Telco, it failed to do thereby
causing the Ministry to
reach a decision that was fundamentally unfair to Telco.
[40] While there is a need for considerable caution when considering an application for judicial review in a commercial context I have concluded Telco has,
nevertheless, a claim that is amenable to judicial
review.
13 Medlabs, above n 9 at [343].
Did the Ministry create a procedural expectation?
[41] Telco accepts that it must ultimately establish the existence of a
clear and unambiguous representation by the Ministry that
created an expectation
the Ministry would comply with fair processes.14
[42] I am satisfied that Telco has established a seriously
arguable case the Ministry did create a procedural expectation
that if the
tender process was changed in a material way, then all affected tenderers would
be given the opportunity to amend their
proposals to reflect the
Ministry’s changes in order to keep the tender process fair to all
tenderers.
[43] I am persuaded cls 1.1 and 1.5.3 of the RFP created the expectation
the Ministry was intending to appoint two or three providers
in relation to the
final phase of the project. I am also satisfied that cls 3.1.11 and 3.1.16 of
the RFP created an expectation
that if the Ministry was going to materially
change the basis on which the final phase of the project was to be decided, then
it
would issue an amendment to the RFP to give all tenderers an opportunity to
have their proposals considered on a fair and equal basis.
[44] In my assessment, changing the number of providers from two or three
to one single provider was a material change to the
way the final phase of the
project was to be delivered. Had Telco been informed of the material change, it
is likely that they and
the other tenderers would have made significant changes
to the way they priced their proposals.
[45] For present purposes I find that the Ministry’s submissions that it did not make a clear representation about procedural fairness are not persuasive. As the Ministry’s arguments to the contrary will need to be considered more fully at the substantive hearing, I will note for present purposes that the Ministry’s arguments which I have summarised in paragraph [29] of this judgment have not displaced Telco’s position that it is seriously arguable that the Ministry created a legitimate
procedural expectation.
14 Attorney-General of Hong Kong v Ng Yuen Shiu [1982] 2 AC 629, [1983] 2 All ER 346 at 638;
Talleys Fisheries Ltd v Cullen HC Wellington CP287/00, 31 January 2002.
[46] In my assessment, for the purposes of Telco’s interim
injunction I am satisfied there is a serious issue
to be tried as to whether
or not the Ministry clearly represented it was going to appoint two or three
suppliers to carry out the
final phase of the project. I am also satisfied
there is a serious issue to be tried that if the Ministry was only going to
appoint
one supplier it created a legitimate expectation that it would give
Telco and other affected tenderers the opportunity to amend their
proposals to
reflect the Ministry’s change so as to enable their proposals to be
assessed on a fair and equal basis.
Were Telco’s expectations reasonable?
[47] Telco has established there is a seriously arguable case that it was
reasonable for Telco to expect the Ministry would issue
an amendment to the RFP
if there was to be a material change to the basis upon which a provider was to
be appointed for the final
phase of the project.
[48] There are three reasons why I have reached this
conclusion:
(1) Mr Mitchell explained Telco’s prior experiences of tendering
with the Ministry led it to believe the Ministry would
follow the procedures set
out in the RFP and those processes “would only be changed with written
notice to all the participants”.15 Mr Mitchell’s
evidence on this point was not challenged by the Ministry.
(2) Clauses 1.1, 1.5.3, 3.1.11 and 3.1.16 of the RFP are
reasonably capable of being interpreted to mean the Ministry
was intending to
appoint two or three providers for the final phase of the project and that if
the Ministry’s intentions changed
it would issue an amendment to the
RFP.
(3) The Ministry’s questions of 4 November 2013 appeared to have
been
predicated on the basis of successful tenderers being allocated
either
33 per cent or 50 per cent of the remaining schools. This
reinforced
15 Affidavit of KFM Mitchell, 10 February 2014 at [30].
Telco’s assessment that the Ministry would amend the RFP if the
Ministry was considering appointing only one supplier for the
final phase of the
project.
Did Telco rely on the Ministry’s representations to its
detriment?
[49] Telco has established that it is seriously arguable that it
relied on the
Ministry’s representations to its detriment.
[50] I have reached this conclusion for the following two
reasons:
(1) Mr Mitchell’s evidence is that Telco relied on its
expectations that if the Ministry was going to materially change
the basis on
which it would appoint suppliers for the final phase of the project then Telco
and other tenderers would be notified
of this change through a written amendment
to the RFP.
(2) The change which the Ministry implemented was material. Had Telco
known that only one provider might be appointed by the
Ministry it is highly
likely Telco would have significantly changed the basis upon which it priced its
proposal.
[51] In summary, I have concluded Telco has established that it
is seriously arguable that the four key ingredients
in its claim for judicial
review can be established. It is therefore not necessary for me to consider at
this stage Telco’s
claim based on equitable estoppel.
Reasons why an injunction is necessary to preserve Telco’s
position
[52] An interim injunction is reasonably necessary16 to
preserve Telco’s position
because:
(1) The evidence at this stage suggests there is a risk Telco’s tender
may
not have been considered on the same basis as the successful
tenderer,
16 Carlton & United Breweries Ltd v Minister of Customs [1986] 1 NZLR 423 (CA) at 430 per
Cooke J.
and that Telco was denied the opportunity to compete on a fair basis for the
final phase of the project.
(2) The Ministry’s decision to appoint a single provider for the
final phase of the project means Telco will now have
to lay off staff in the
short term. Those specialist staff are unlikely to be able to be re- employed
by Telco if it is ultimately
found the Ministry’s decision to appoint a
single provider has to be quashed. At that stage Telco is unlikely to have the
resources and capacity to be able to deliver the final phase of the
project.
[53] I appreciate that issuing an interim injunction may:
(1) cause delays to the Ministry’s ability to have the project
completed by
December 2015;
(2) cause uncertainties to the currently successful tenderer;
and
(3) create problems for other companies that have been
provisionally appointed to provide services that flow from the appointment
of
the supplier of the final phase of the project.
[54] However, while these consequences are a concern, they can be mitigated
in two ways:
(1) I will do whatever I can to ensure the substantive proceeding is
heard and determined promptly. I have arranged to hear
the substantive
proceeding from 17 to 19 March 2014 inclusive. I will also provide counsel the
opportunity to seek directions from
me on 24 February in order to ensure the
parties are ready to have the substantive case heard in four weeks’
time.
(2) If it wishes to do so, the Ministry may immediately re-open the tender process and amend the terms of the RFP so that all affected tenderers have the opportunity to re-submit their proposals on the basis that the
Ministry may consider appointing one provider for the final phase of the
project.
Reasons why the overall justice of the case favours the granting of an
interim injunction
[55] I am satisfied I should exercise my discretion in favour of
Telco’s application
because the overall justice of the case favours the granting of an interim injunction. [56] My reasons for reaching this conclusion can also be succinctly stated:
(1) If after the proceeding is fully considered it is decided
Telco is entitled to relief, then the remedies that
are considered should not
be fettered by the Ministry and the current successful tenderer having continued
to implement the Ministry’s
decision to appoint a single
supplier.
(2) Issuing an interim injunction reduces the uncertainty for all
affected parties who would otherwise suffer from a period
of greater uncertainty
while they await the hearing and determination of the proceeding.
(3) The delays and costs associated with issuing an interim injunction
can be mitigated by the Ministry immediately re-opening
the tender process if it
wishes to do so and amending the RFP so as to make it clear to all affected
tenderers that the Ministry
may appoint one supplier for the final phase of the
project.
Conclusions
[57] An interim injunction is issued preventing the Ministry from giving effect to its decision to appoint another company to be solely responsible for implementing the final phase of the project.
[58] This order does not prevent the Ministry from re-opening the tender
process and amending the RFP to make it clear to affected
tenderers that the
Ministry would consider appointing a single supplier for the final phase of the
project.
[59] The hearing of Telco’s substantive proceeding will commence on
17 March
2014.
[60] Counsel have the opportunity to seek directions on 24 February 2014. If counsel wish to have a hearing in relation to pre-trial directions they should notify
the Registrar
immediately.
D B Collins J
Solicitors:
Chapman Tripp, Wellington for Applicant
Crown Law Office, Wellington for Respondent
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