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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 3 October 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
CRI-2011-009-014294 [2014] NZHC 2235
GAVIN JOHN GOSNELL
v
THE QUEEN
Application:
|
22 August 2014
|
Judgment:
|
16 September 2014
|
JUDGMENT OF GENDALL J (Dealt with on the papers)
Introduction
[1] Gavin John Gosnell (Mr Gosnell) was found guilty by a jury and convicted in this Court of murder following a trial that took place between 8 April 2013 and
16 April 2013. Earlier, he had pleaded guilty to one charge of offering
indignities to a dead human body.
[2] Mr Gosnell has applied to this Court seeking access to the audio
recording of a pre-trial application hearing on 12 February
2013, and the audio
recording of his jury trial. These are effectively the notes of evidence in
audio format. The application
was made in writing to the Registrar by letter
dated 14 August 2014, though not received until 22 August 2014.
[3] This application requires determination of two issues:
(a) Does a defendant in a criminal trial have a right to access
such material?
GOSNELL v R [2014] NZHC 2235 [16 September 2014]
(b) If so, should Mr Gosnell be granted access?
Outcome
[4] I have reached two general conclusions with regard to the issues in
this application:
(a) Notes of evidence (or transcript) are documents within the meaning
of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012 and therefore form
part of the Court
record.
(b) The Court has a wide discretion to ensure that access is granted
only in appropriate circumstances, and only to appropriate
documents, on
whatever conditions are necessary to achieve this.
[5] Applied to the present case, in the absence of reasons from Mr
Gosnell supporting his application and addressing why a printout
of the
transcript in each case (which I understand he may have) is inadequate, I am not
prepared to set in motion the mechanics that
would precipitate Mr Gosnell being
furnished with the audio recordings he seeks. For clarity, I note that even
with reasons, it
is far from certain that the information would be
provided.
[6] My reasons follow.
Does a defendant in a criminal trial have a right to access the notes of
evidence?
The access regime
[7] By r 6.5(1) of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012, “[t]he
prosecutor and the defendant in a criminal proceeding, and
their lawyers, may
access the court file during or after the completion of the criminal
proceeding.” This is subject to the
discretionary qualification to that
right in r 6.5(2)(a) and the mandatory qualification in r 6.5(2)(b).
[8] The relevant definitions are provided in r 6.1:
access means to search, inspect, or copy under the supervision of an
officer of a court
court file means a collection of documents in the custody or control
of the court that relate to a criminal proceeding.
Document does not include –
(a) notes by or for a judicial officer for his or her personal use;
or
(b) any material that relates to the administration of the court
[9] From the interpretation section, three important points emerge: (a) access (including the right to copy) confers rights that are subject to supervision of an officer of the Court; (b) the court file is comprised of documents; but (c) notes that are made “by or for” a judicial officer are not documents and therefore do not form part of the Court file. Relevantly, I also observe that the rules do not require
preparation of any material not already in existence.1
[10] For completeness I record at this juncture, that by operation of the
Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 5 and the Criminal Procedure
Rules, r 1.4(2),
there can be little question that an audio recording, or more importantly the
information contained in that recording,
is a document for the purpose of the
rules.
[11] In this context it becomes immediately apparent that resolution of
the first issue turns on whether the notes of evidence
are a document, thereby
forming part of the Court record, or whether they are subject to the
exclusionary rule on the basis they
are made by or for the Judge for his or her
own personal use. If the notes of evidence are a document, then the only
question that
remains relevant is whether I ought to exercise my discretion to
refuse access.
Are the notes of evidence “documents” as defined by the 2012
rules?
[12] A plain English interpretation of the exclusion to the definition of the term document seems to support a conclusion that the notes of evidence are documents, and thereby form part of the Court record. The notes are today prepared by the National Transcription Service, not the Judge, or his or her associate. Moreover, the
purposes for which the notes of evidence are prepared are clear. A copy
is provided
1 Criminal Procedure Rules 2012, r 6.2(2).
to the Judge. Counsel for the defence and prosecution are given a copy, and
they are often disseminated to the members of the jury.
In addition, very often
they will be reviewed on appeal. The wide use to which the notes
are put is wholly commensurate
with the prima facie position that there is
nothing privileged or confidential in what passes in open
Court.2
[13] On this basis alone I am inclined to the view that the notes of
evidence form part of the Court record and are thereby amenable
to the access
regime contained in Part 6 of the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012. This view has
support.3 In this respect, if the notes of evidence were not
intended to fall within the ambit of the definition of document in r 6.1, it
would
be simple enough to have inserted a sub rule to the effect that
“document” does not include the relevant
transcript:
[14] A final supporting factor as I see it is provided by previous
iterations of the rules.4 These all point to the conclusion that
the notes of evidence do in fact form part of the Court record. Absent some
overt manifestation
of intent by the draftsperson of the 2012 rules to the
contrary, I would be slow to hold that the broad definition of Court Record
as
contained in the Criminal Procedure Rules 2012 somehow now implicitly excludes
the notes of evidence, or that the exclusion to
the definition of document now
encompasses the notes of evidence.
[15] On this aspect, I note however the words of Kós J in
Penrose v Police regarding in particular a historical analysis of the
notes of evidence taken in criminal trials:5
There is a misapprehension among criminal appellants about the status of the
record of the evidence, and submissions. What are transcribed
are the Judge's
notes of evidence. Originally this simply comprised notes taken by the Judge
himself in his notebook. If needed on
appeal, the Judge's notes would be typed
up. Then in the first decade of the twentieth century, trials came to
be
2 R v Hawkins HC Auckland T240/91, 28 April 1992 at 5, citing In Re Worswick Robson v
Worswick (1888) 38 Ch 370 at 372, as adopted in R v Philpott HC Wellington T74/90, 14
February 1991 at 4.
T74/90, 14 February 1991; Law Commission Access to Court Records (NZLC R93, 2006) at
[11].
4 Criminal Proceedings (Search of Court Records) Rules 1974, r 2(9); Criminal Proceedings
(Access to Court Documents) Rules 2009, r 3.
5 Penrose v Police [2013] NZHC 2757 at [27].
typed up by the Judge's associate, sitting beside the Judge, as the evidence
was delivered. Later, carbon copies came to be provided
for counsel. The first
Judge's associate to type evidence as it was delivered was Hubert Ostler in
1903. He later became a Supreme
Court Judge himself. The idea then caught on
among the other (male) associates. Associate-typed simultaneous transcription
continued
for the next 104 years. It was an imperfect process. Swift-speaking
counsel (and witnesses) would be barked at (often by the associate)
to
“slow down”. Every 10-15 minutes there would be a pause as new
sheets of paper (and carbon) would be loaded. But it
gave the associate's
fingers a break. As it happens I was looking at one such transcription, dating
back to 1976, on the day I heard
the present appeal. It is far from complete. It
is replete with abbreviation and numerous non-essential words are simply
omitted.
In the early 1990's associates moved onto word processors, and the days
of carbon copies, and blackened fingertips, ended. But abbreviation,
exceptions
and pauses (so the associate's fingers could rest) continued. Verbatim the notes
were not. There was no record of the
exchanges between Bench and Bar. Any record
of these was to be found only in the Judge's notebook, if at all. Since the
advent of
“For The Record” full trial recording, in about 2007, much
more accurate and complete transcriptions of evidence are
available, at the
price of a slight time lag. In this case, and unusually, it included
transcription of exchanges between Bench and
Bar, Williams J having ordered this
to be done. The extent of transcription required is a matter within the
discretion of the Court,
subject to Part 6 of the Criminal Procedure Rules
2012.
(citations omitted)
[16] I agree with these remarks of Kós J insofar as they relate to
the historical position but, with respect, disagree
to the extent they support
any proposition that the notes of evidence today belong solely to the Judge. I
think the short answer
is reflected in judgments such as that of the Court of
Appeal in R v Cunningham,6 where the following observation was
made:7
Courts must respond to advances in technology and embrace all the
opportunities which advanced methods can provide, subject in all
cases to the
underlying requirement of fairness.
[17] The undeniable reality is that today, in an era of modernity, the notes of evidence are prepared neither by the Judge nor by his or her agent. Neither are the notes of evidence prepared for the exclusive domain of the Judge. They are much more widely disseminated, on a routine basis, than was ever the case in times past. This reality is borne of the technology of which the Courts in this Country are now
possessed. The irresistible conclusion to be thereby drawn in response
to such
6 R v Cunningham [2008] NZCA 569.
7 At [39].
technological advancement is that the notes of evidence are
“documents” that
comprise a component of the Court record.
[18] The opinion expressed above is in no way intended to derogate from
the importance of the exclusion. Materials genuinely
prepared by or for the
Judge for his or her own personal use (i.e. notes taken by him or her in the
proceeding, draft judgments,
material prepared by associates or clerks) will not
meet the definition of “document” and will thereby not form part
of
the Court record.
[19] I record for completeness that in my view in the case of a defendant
seeking a copy of the audio recording, issues of open
justice8 often
may not arise. They are participants in the process throughout and are privy to
the minutiae of the trial and any antecedent
or subsequent hearings. To them
the process is an open one by any definition of that term.
[20] The question that now remains for determination is that of
discretion. It is to this which I now turn.
Discretion
[21] The conclusion I have reached above is by no means the end of the analysis. Persons seeking access to the Court record need to bear this in mind. The Court retains a wide discretion9 pursuant to rr 6.5(2) and 6.10, which supplement and enhance the Court’s inherent supervisory jurisdiction10 to determine whether access is appropriate and, if so, whether conditions should be imposed. There are
compelling policy reasons for such an approach:
(a) The transcript of the proceedings could capture conversations that were never intended to be in the public domain. Not all words uttered in Court are part of the proceeding and there is a need to ensure that
only information intended to be so is
provided.
8 As to which refer Television New Zealand Ltd v R [2000] NZCA 354; [2001] 1 NZLR 641 (CA); Rogers v
Television New Zealand Ltd [2007] NZSC 9, [2008] 2 NZLR 277.
9 Television New Zealand Ltd v R [2000] NZCA 354; [2001] 1 NZLR 641 (CA) at [35]–[36].
10 R v Philpott HC Wellington T74/90, 14 February 1991 at 3.
(b) The transcript will often contain, or refer to, matters that
are the subject of suppression. There is a need to
ensure that there is not
advertent or inadvertent breach of suppression through the operation of the
access regime.
(c) Distribution of the record for one purpose may be wholly
legitimate, while illegitimate or inappropriate for another. Care
needs to be
taken to ensure that if access is provided, the access does not result in any
inappropriate use of the information.
(d) The nature of a transcript of Court proceedings is perceived to be
an official and determinative record of those proceedings.
However, the reality
is that the notes of evidence are transcribed by a person, fallible
like every human. In this context,
there is scope for errors of interpretation
and omission, and currently no real mechanism for review. Care needs to be
taken in
this respect.
[22] Applications for access such as this should therefore always be made
to the Registrar in accordance with r 6.5(3), and then
referred to a judge for
determination, as is the time honoured process. In this way, the right of
access contained in r 6.5(1) is
merely a presumption, subject always to the
overarching discretion of the Judge, and access in any case is by no means a
given.
[23] The factors bearing upon the exercise of that discretion will
inevitably differ according to whom is making the application
and all the
relevant circumstances. A defendant will normally have a stronger claim than
some other participant in the hearing,
and a participant in the hearing (i.e. a
complainant or witness) will often have a stronger claim than someone wholly
divorced from
the proceeding. However, in every case the judge determining the
application must bring his or her discretion to bear, viewing the
application in
the round, in order to determine whether access to the particular documents
sought is appropriate.
[24] It is my preliminary view, without determining the issue, that requests for access to audio recordings are fraught with greater difficulties than applications for
access to a transcription of the oral evidence. An applicant would have to
disclose persuasive reasons before I was moved to permit
them to listen to the
recording (such as, for example a substantiated suggestion that in some
way the typed transcript
did not properly record what was said), and even more
compelling reasons before I was moved to a point where it would be appropriate
to provide a copy of the audio. In terms of this application, Mr Gosnell has
not nearly reached that point. No reasons at all for
his request have been
disclosed.
Conclusion
[25] For all the reasons contained above, Mr Gosnell’s application
for a copy of the audio recordings is declined.
[26] That is not an end of this matter however. As I have already noted, my understanding is that Mr Gosnell may already have received typed transcripts of his trial and the pre-trial hearing in question. If however, this is not the case I direct first that Mr Gosnell is to be given a typed print out of the transcripts of his trial that took place from 8 – 16 April 2013 and the hearing of his pre-trial application on
12 February 2013, and secondly, that these are only to be used by Mr Gosnell
for his personal purposes and not disseminated to any
third
party.
..................................................
Gendall J
Solicitors:
Raymond Donnelley & Co, Christchurch
Copy to defendant
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