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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 4 March 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV-2013-485-7137 [2014] NZHC 3317
UNDER
|
Section 174 of the Companies Act
|
IN THE MATTER
|
of an application for (inter alia)
rectification of the records of a company
|
BETWEEN
|
JANETTE YVONNE OKKERSE AND DAVID JOHN CHAPMAN
Plaintiffs
|
AND
|
AOTEAROA ENTERPRISES LIMITED First Defendant
RICHARD HUDSON CAUGHLEY AND MATTHEW PETER WHIMP
Second Defendants
|
Hearing:
|
28, 29 and 30 October 2014
|
Counsel:
|
G J Toebes and J W Grant for Plaintiff
J B M Smith QC and M J Ferrier for Defendants
|
Judgment:
|
19 December 2014
|
JUDGMENT OF GODDARD J
This judgment was delivered by me on 19 December 2014 at 10.00 am, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
J T Law, Wellington for Plaintiffs
Luke Cunningham Clere, Wellington for Defendants
OKKERSE v AOTEAROA ENTERPRISES LIMITED [2014] NZHC 3317 [19 December 2014]
Introduction
[1] It is axiomatic that every case turns on its facts. This case is no exception. Ultimately, its outcome depends on determining who was entitled to the benefit of dividends declared by Aotearoa Enterprises Limited (Aotearoa) for the financial years ending 31 March 2007 and 31 March 2008 and credited to the current accounts of its shareholders. The dividends declared in those respective years were
$2,067,200 and $172,584. Both dividends derived from success fees earned by
two companies, Building Solutions Limited (BSL) and Barnes
Street Properties
Limited (BSPL). BSL and BSPL were wholly owned by the two directors of
Aotearoa, Mr R J Burrell and Mr G S Wilkinson.
Neither BSL or BSPL had any
connection with the business of Aotearoa, but on advice from Price Waterhouse
Coopers (PWC), Aotearoa
was nominated to receive the success fees earned by BSL
and BSPL. This was achieved by generating invoices for “management
fees” in each case, although no management services were provided. The
management fees were declared as revenue by Aoteoroa,
so that the success fees
could be paid out as dividends. The dividends declared were then credited pari
passu to the accounts of
the three shareholders of Aoteoroa: 50 per cent to Mr
Wilkinson’s trust, the GS Wilkinson No 1 Trust (50 fully paid shares);
25
per cent to the predecessor of Mr Burrell’s investment trust, the Taranaki
No 2 Trust (25 fully paid shares); and 25 per
cent to the predecessor of the
Janette Okkerse Family Trust (JOFT) (25 fully paid shares).
[2] In 2008, the accounts were adjusted and the 25 per cent share of
the dividend derived from the BSL Success Fee and credited
to the JOFT in 2007
was transferred to the Taranaki No 2 Trust. In 2009 the accounts were again
adjusted and the 25 per cent share
of the dividend derived from the BSPL Success
Fee and credited to the JOFT in 2008 was similarly transferred to the Taranaki
No 2
Trust. The defendants say these current account adjustments were made with
the knowledge and consent of the shareholders of Aoteoroa;
and that the
financial statements of Aoteoroa for each of those financial years were formally
approved by all shareholders.
[3] At issue is whether there was ever any intention that Ms Okkerse, or the JOFT, would have beneficial entitlement to the 25 per cent share of the dividends derived from the success fees and channelled through the JOFT current account.
The pleadings
[4] Ms Okkerse and her co-trustee, Mr Chapman, sue Aotearoa and
alternatively the trustees of the Taranaki No 2 Trust. Neither
Mr Wilkinson or
Mr Burrell are parties to the proceeding.
[5] The claim is for an order under s 174 of the Companies Act 1993 as
against Aotearoa for rectification of the financial records
of Aotearoa to show
as credits in the JOFT current account the sums of $505,196 and $52,939,
representing the dividends transferred
out of the JOFT to the Taranaki No 2
Trust in 2008 and 2009.
[6] The submission is that the transfers required the consent or
approval of the trustees of the JOFT made on an informed basis,
drawing on the
decision in Hansard v Hansard.1
[7] It is said that Aotearoa’s financial accounts incorrectly
reflect the JOFT credit position because of the ‘unauthorised’
transfers and that a credit in a shareholder’s current account represents
a debt due by the company to that shareholder. Aotearoa
declared the payments
as dividends to its shareholders, resulting in a credit balance in each
shareholder’s current account.
The disposition of that credit balance was
a matter for each shareholder and it was a matter for the JOFT to draw upon
those dividends,
or direct the payment thereof and was not a matter that
Aotearoa could “unilaterally undertake”.
[8] The plaintiffs say the JOFT did not request, authorise, make, direct or incur any obligation to make the payments to Taranaki No 2 Trust recorded in those shareholder current accounts for the years ending 31 March 2008 and 31 March
2009.
[9] The defence position is that, acting on PWC advice to both BSL and to Aotearoa, Aotearoa was simply to be a conduit; no relevant services were provided by Aotearoa to earn the management fees invoiced for each of the success fees; and
there was never any intention to deliver to the JOFT (or any predecessor
of the
1 Hansard v Hansard [2014] NZCA 433 at [44] and [57].
JOFT) a “windfall gain” of a quarter share of the Optimation
Success Fee or of the Barnes Street Success Fee. To grant
the relief sought by
the plaintiffs would procure the unjust enrichment of the JOFT.
[10] Furthermore, the defence say that the JOFT trustees cannot recover any portion of the Optimation Success Fee because they are precluded by agreement, and/or are estopped from doing so on a number of bases. In relation to the Barnes Street Success Fee, the defence position is similar. Again, the submission is that it was never the intention of the arrangements that were put in place as between BSPL and Aotearoa to deliver to the JOFT (or any predecessor) a windfall gain in respect of the Barnes Street Success Fee and the channelling of that success fee through Aotearoa was with the knowledge and consent of all three shareholders of Aotearoa, did not reflect any financial interest by the JOFT in the Barnes Street Success Fee, and the fee was held by the JOFT as a bare trustee for the benefit of Taranaki No 2
Trust in accordance with well-understood arrangements. Granting the relief
sought would again procure the unjust enrichment of the
JOFT.
[11] As an alternative cause of action against the second defendants, the plaintiffs allege that the inter-trust transactions in issue were loans, relying on a reference to inter-trust loans between Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell by PWC in a letter of 17 May
2011 to Ms Okkerse, during the course of responding to queries she had
raised.
[12] Whilst the second defendants admit that the statement in the pleaded
letter dated 17 May 2011 made reference to inter-trust
loans, they deny that
trust loans were in fact created between Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell or that such
loans are repayable on demand.
[13] A third cause of action seeks an order from the Court under s 147 of the Companies Act directing a change of residential address of Mr Burrell be notified to the Companies Office. That cause of action is of no consequence to this proceeding and plays no part in the judgment.
The relationships
Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell
[14] Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell were married but separated in April 2003.
Part of the agreement reached in relation to division
of their assets was the
establishment of new family trusts to replace their existing mirror trusts
(the Richard Burrell Family
Trust (RJBFT) and the JY Family Trust (JYBFT)) and
the resettlement of assets from those mirror trusts on their respective new
trusts,
the Taranaki No 2 Trust and the JOFT, both established in 2004.
Resettlement of the assets on the new trusts was achieved in November
2005 and
included transfer of the 25 per cent of Aotearoa shares paid into the mirror
trusts.
[15] Agreement on the final division of their relationship property was
not reached by Mr Burrell and Ms Okkerse until 17 May
2005, on which date they
executed a Separation, Financial Support and Property Deed pursuant to s 21
(Relationship Property Agreement).
In fact, they had reconciled shortly prior
to that date and began living together again in about mid-June 2005. The
Relationship
Property Agreement continued in force however and was expressed to
be in full and final settlement of all or any claims which either
party had
against the other and despite their reconciliation. Ms Okkerse made it
clear in her evidence that, following
reconciliation, she remained at pains
to maintain her assets as her separate property in order to protect them. She
acknowledged
that Mr Burrell, however, chose to merge his funds in spending on
their joint lives during the period of their reconciliation.
[16] In 2009 Mr Burrell and Ms Okkerse again separated. A second round
of property settlement apparently took place and the
marriage is now
dissolved.
Mr Burrell, Mr Wilkinson and their companies
[17] Mr Burrell and Mr Wilkinson are longstanding business partners. At all material times they owned a group of companies, referred to as the Burrell Wilkinson Group in equal shares and trading under the name “Building Solutions”. BSL was incorporated in 1991. Together Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson constituted its board
of directors. As already noted, both are also the directors of Aoteoroa.
Acting on advice received in 2005, BSL decided to use Aotearoa
as the
Group’s banker for receipt of significant payments received by
it.
[18] BSPL was incorporated on 20 June 2005 and was a 50 per cent joint
venture with another company. At all material times Messrs
Burrell and
Wilkinson were the directors of BSPL, together with trustees representing their
joint venture partners. For the same
reasons and based on the same advice,
Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson decided to again nominate Aoteoroa for receipt of
their 50 per
cent share of the success fee earned by BSPL in 2006.
Mr Archer
[19] Mr Graham Archer, formerly a partner in PWC, provided accountancy and financial advice to Mr Burrell and Ms Okkerse for many years, as well as to the various trusts and companies associated with them. He was a trustee of their predecessor mirror trusts. Mr Archer did not however become a trustee of the new JOFT or the Taranaki No 2 investment trust when these were settled in November
2005, as Mr Burrell and Ms Okkerse had separated by then. He did however continue to act as accountant for Ms Okkerse’s successive trusts until the end of the
2009 financial year. Of this, he said:
In addition to general accountancy services, I provided advice to Richard and
Janette about the most effective structuring of their
assets, for reasons
including wealth growth, asset protection and estate planning. This
involved, on my advice, Richard
and Janette holding personal assets in various
trusts, separate from their business assets which were generally held through
trading
companies.
The success fees
The Optimation Success Fee
[20] The success fee earned by BSL was the result of a sale and purchase agreement entered into by BSL with a company styled Property Fund Thirty-One Limited (PF31) for the sale of a commercial property known as Optimation House. The agreement provided for BSL to be contracted by PF31 over a three-year period, from March 2001 to March 2005, to work on improving the net rent income and
weighted average lease term for Optimation House. If BSL were successful in
achieving this, it would be entitled to share in the
increased capital value by
way of a rental growth fee, referred to as the “Optimation Success
Fee”.
[21] In late March 2005, at the end of the agreed three year
term, BSL successfully achieved a success fee. Although
the agreement had
provided for the quantum of the fee to be calculated as at each anniversary of
the settlement date, it was not
until the third and final anniversary in March
2005 that the calculation was made. Thus the fee “hung in the
balance”
until the very end of the agreed term. Mr Burrell said it was
only at the last minute and following a number of fraught negotiations
that a
fee was finally achieved. Even then, there was uncertainty about the amount due
and this was not determined until 20 June
2005, at which time it was agreed that
a fee in the sum of $2,480,000 would be paid to BSL in July 2005.
The Barnes Street Success Fee
[22] The BPSL success fee was earned through the development of a
commercial property at Barnes Street, Seaview by Messrs Burrell
and Wilkinson
and their joint venture partners. The associated profit from the development
was $700,000 in total, which was split
equally between the partners. On advice,
the same methodology was utilised by Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson to channel
their $350,000
share in the success free through Aotearoa. Aotearoa was
nominated to receive the payment, an invoice generated for a management
fee in
the amount of $350,000 and the invoice was paid on 23 November 2006. Once
again, no actual management services were provided
by Aotearoa to
BPSL.
[23] The evidence of both Mr Burrell and Mr Archer, and also Mr Whimp,
was that, despite the Barnes Street Success Fee being channelled
through
Aotearoa, it was never intended that Ms Okkerse or any trust associated with her
would have a beneficial interest in it.
The relationship property agreement
[24] While this case has not been pleaded as a claim for relationship property; nor as an action to set aside the Relationship Property Agreement entered into by
Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell on 17 May 2005, it has essentially been argued as
such and much of the evidence was directed towards
relationship
property issues. Mr Toebes’ submissions also reflected this to an extent.
Thus it is necessary to set out the
position in relation to that.
[25] Essentially, the claim made under the first cause of action and the
allegation underpinning it are directed to relationship
property; the
allegation being that Mr Burrell and “his” advisors concealed the
“increased quantum of the”
Optimation Success Fee toward the end of
the Optimation House agreement’s three year term; and that this ultimately
affected
the value of BSL for relationship property purposes.
[26] In refuting this allegation, Mr Burrell was at pains to emphasise
that the Optimation Success Fee, if there were to be any,
and its quantum, was
by no means certain until very late in the piece and long after the valuations
of the relationship property
had been finalised.
[27] Under cross-examination, Ms Okkerse acknowledged that she was
well aware of what Mr Smith described as “an
urgent drive by Mr
Burrell and Mr Wilkinson” to earn the fee during the closing stages of
the three year term of the Optimation
House agreement; and aware that it had
been “a considerable focus for the two men at the time;” and that
there was “considerable
anxiety as to whether” a fee would
ultimately be achieved.
[28] However, although Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson, through BSL,
undertook a great deal of work, both personally and through
employed staff, to
achieve the Optimation Success fee, and Ms Okkerse had no involvement in either
BSL or in its efforts to achieve
the fee, the possibility that Mr
Burrell’s share of that fee (if earned) would form part of the
relationship property pool
was clearly contemplated by the parties.
[29] The fee was valued by PWC on a future contingent basis for relationship property purposes in December 2004 as nil. There was at that time no certainty that any fee would be achieved, let alone certainty as to what the quantum of such a fee might be. In the event, the fee was not earned until late March 2005; and then not
finally quantified until June. It was paid out in July 2005, well after the
parties had reconciled and had executed their Relationship
Property
Agreement.
[30] The possibility of a future fee had however been the subject of
specific focus and discussion during the relationship
property
negotiations. The issue of Ms Okkerse’s participation in such a fee
had been raised by her solicitors well
prior to finalisation of PWC’s nil
valuation. The solicitors had suggested that it “may well be appropriate
for an agreement
to be reached between Janette and Richard for her to share to
some extent in any payment when received”. The solicitors were
in turn
advised by Mr Burrell’s solicitors that PWC considered the fee irrelevant
to the valuation, then still in draft.
They were invited to contact
Mr Archer for clarification. Correspondence then took place between PWC and
an independent
accountant engaged by Ms Okkerse. That correspondence
included express reference to the Optimation Success Fee. Notwithstanding,
PWC’s valuation of the fee as nil was ultimately issued without
amendment.
[31] The Relationship Property Agreement was then prepared based on
PWC’s valuations. The value attributed to Mr Burrell’s
shareholdings in the Burrell Wilkinson Group was $1,213,365.00, of which Ms
Okkerse was entitled to a half share. The valuation
attributed to the agreement
between PF31 and BSL was nil, based on its contingent and uncertain status at
the time. A copy of PWC’s
valuation was attached to the Relationship
Property Agreement, which was executed by the parties on the advice of
their legal
advisers. It is not insignificant that the Matrimonial
Settlement Agreement was expressed to be “in full and final
settlement of
all or any claims or rights which Janette and Richard may have against each
other”, and that it remained binding
despite their reconciliation. Each
party to the Agreement acknowledged that “he or she was estopped against
the other from
all or any claim or demand in respect of the property of any
nature whatsoever”. Each agreed to bind his or her trusts to
the
agreement’s terms, as well as any successor trusts, which included the
JOFT.
[32] Notwithstanding, Ms Okkerse in her evidence, in support of her claim to a share of the Optimation Success Fee, said:
It is without doubt that the assessment of the value of the Burrell Wilkinson
Group would have been increased if the quantum given
to the Optimation House
success fee was more than “nil”. Any increased quantum of the
success fee would have increased
the value of Richard Burrell’s 50%
interest in the Burrell Wilkinson Group; and by half of that increased figure,
the sum that
Richard would have been required to pay to me in settlement of my
relationship property claim.
As I record later on in this statement of evidence there was never any advice
to me of the increased quantum of the success fee, or
any discussion, suggestion
or agreement that neither I nor JOFT would be entitled to a share of such
increased quantum. Now that
I have seen all the material on discovery, it has
become clear to me that there was no way that Richard Burrell, or his advisors,
were ever going to advise me (or JOFT) of the increased quantum of the
Optimation House success fee, because that would have led
immediately to almost
a doubling of my entitlement under my relationship property claim.
[33] Mr Archer, who assisted with the preparation of the PWC valuation,
said of this claim, in his evidence:
Had there been any discomfort on Janette and her advisers’
part about PWC’s valuation of this fee, then there
is no reason why this
aspect of the relationship property claim could not have been carved out of the
settlement, to be addressed
at a later date. It is noteworthy that
other items of relationship property were dealt with in this way. I refer in
particular to Richard’s share in what was known as Seaview Industrial
Park, which is dealt with in the final two bullet points
on page 5 of the PWC
Valuation. As can be seen from clauses 3.6 to 3.9 of the [Relationship
Property Agreement], Richard
was to pay Janette half of all the income he
received from this, and 50% of the net share in its assets, if certain criteria
were
met. This approach was adopted because at the time of settlement these
amounts were uncertain. If Janette and her advisers
considered she
had any entitlement to the Optimation Success Fee, she could have insisted on a
similar clause requiring Richard
to pay her a share of it, if it came to
fruition.
[34] As Mr Smith submitted, the only available inference is that Ms
Okkerse, and her advisors at the time, both knew and were
content that she had
no entitlement to participate in the Optimation Success Fee and that was
accepted.
[35] Much was made of a passing reference to the fee (in the context of Mr Burrell settling his relationship property dues) in Mr Archer’s letter of 17 June 2005 to Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson. The purpose of that letter was to give advice about Aoteoroa acting as BSL’s banker and being nominated to receive the Optimation Success Fee. Mr Archer said his principal focus in giving this advice was on how to best utilise the success fee, in light of the general strategy at the time of building as
many assets in trust for Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson as opposed to in their
trading companies. As the companies in the Group were
invariably owned by
those men personally and Aoteoroa was owned by their family trusts, it
made sense for Aotearoa to
be nominated to receive payment of the fee. He
emphasised however that “[i]t was never the intention of any party to
deliver
to RJBFT (or any successor trust, including JOFT) a windfall gain in
respect of the Optimation Success Fee”.
[36] Mr Archer continued as follows:2
That there was no intended entitlement on the part of RJBFT or any successor to any part of the Optimation Success Fee should be clear from the third bullet point under paragraph 5 in my advice: it refers to the “after tax cash amount [of the Optimation Success Fee] being split equally between the shareholders following the nomination as to $837,500 each” on “the basis of a payment of $2.5 million” (with a company tax rate of 33 percent at the time the after tax amount would have been $1.675 million, of which
$837,500 is half). The “shareholders” being referred to are clearly those of
BSL, namely Richard and George, because an equal split among the shareholders
of AEL was not possible since it [Aotearoa] was not
held in equal
shares.
The fifth bullet point below paragraph 5 in my advice is also important, and
so I set it out in full:
In regard to Richard’s half share, half each will go to the two mirror
trusts of which Richard can apply the amount to meeting
his obligations under
the matrimonial agreement to Janette. By maintaining it in a trust structure,
we also have the ability to
later resettle the trust assets (which include AEL
shares) to his new Investment Trust and secondly to Janette’s new
trust.
As can be seen, it was clearly mooted that Richard might use his share,
including that to be credited to the current account associated
with
Janette’s trust, to offset what he owed Janette under the Matrimonial
Property Settlement Agreement. As it happens, Richard
used other means to
settle with Janette, but nothing turns on that. I recall this was because
settlement became less of an immediate
priority between Richard and Janette,
after the signing of the Matrimonial Property Settlement Agreement, because they
had reconciled.
In furtherance of my advice, a Deed of Nomination was prepared by
Morrison Kent and executed by BSL and AEL.
[37] As is clearly apparent from Mr Archer’s evidence, Mr Burrell’s share of the
Optimation Success Fee, including the 25 per cent channelled into the
predecessor of the JOFT, were funds available to Mr Burrell
out of which he
could settle his share
2 Brief of Evidence of Graeme Maurice Archer, 19 August 2014, at [29]–[32].
of the relationship property, should he choose to do so. That evidence
confirms the money was his to dispose of and that there was
never any intention
for ownership of or entitlement to the money to pass to Ms Okkerse, simply
because the money was being channelled
through her trust’s current
account. Whether or not Mr Burrell ultimately chose to utilise that particular
money for settling
his relationship property dues was entirely a matter for
him.
[38] Mr Whimp, in his evidence, clearly stated that his firm throughout
the relationship property negotiations was perfectly
open with Ms Okkerse
and her advisers about the Optimation Success Fee. Importantly, Mr Whimp
assisted with the preparation
of a deed of acknowledgement by the trustees of Ms
Okkerse’s trust, being Ms Okkerse and Mr Archer. The
operative
part of that deed of acknowledgement recorded that:
16.1 RJBFT [JOFT] was not entitled to benefit from the
Optimation Success Fee paid to AEL pursuant to the Optimation
House
Agreement;
16.2 they would direct AEL to pay any distributions that RJBFT would
otherwise be entitled to receive from AEL which relate to,
or to the extent that
they comprised, the Optiomation Success Fee to the trustees of JYBFT;
and
16.3 any distribution of the Optimation Success Fee to RJBFT as a
shareholder of AEL would be held by RJBFT on trust for the benefit
of JYBFT,
and the trustees of RJBFT would have no beneficial interest in those
funds.
[39] The deed of acknowledgement is said to have been signed but is now
unable to be found, for whatever reason. However, that
is of no particular
moment. The important thing is that it reflected Mr Whimp’s
instructions at the time. As
Mr Whimp said in his evidence:
I note that Morrison Kent does not hold an executed copy amongst its files,
but Richard’s brief of evidence explains that
he recalls taking
it to Ms Okkerse and them both signing it. Nevertheless, it reflects
my instructions at the time,
namely that it was never intended to deliver to
RJBFT, or any successor trust, a windfall gain in respect of the Optimation
Success
Fee.
[40] A further aspect of significance is that Mr Archer said in evidence, that prior to the second and final separation of the couple in 2009, Ms Okkerse expressed no
disquiet to him about not having a beneficial interest in either of the
success fees. He said it was not until after the final separation
that she
sought to make a claim on the fees. He also said that during the period of
reconciliation, he was aware that much of the
success fee money was expended by
Mr Burrell on extensive overseas holidays for he and Ms Okkerse, payment of
their living expenses,
a new Mercedes convertible motorcar for Ms Okkerse, house
renovations and assisting one of their children into a house property.
Mr
Burrell confirmed that this was so and in essence Ms Okkerse did not deny it
when questioned on the subject.
[41] In the end, it is the timeline of events that underscores the
reality that, even if a claim for relationship property were
being frankly
advanced, it could have no prospect of success:
• The PWC report valuing the relationship property for
division, including attributing a nil value to the Optimation
House agreement
and its contingent success fee, was finalised on 7 December 2004.
• The settlement date of the Optimation House Agreement was 31
March 2005, by which time the success fee had
been achieved. Ms
Okkerse and Mr Burrell were presumably in the process of reconciling at this
time.
• In April 2005 Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell resumed their
relationship.
• On 17 May 2005 Ms Okkerse and Mr Burrell executed their
negotiated Relationship Property Agreement, which included
a nil value
attributed to a possible Optimation Success Fee. Each acted on independent
advice.
• On 16 June 2005, agreement was reached on the quantum of the
Optimation
House Success Fee.
• Mr Burrell and Mr Whimp took advice from Mr Archer about which company should be nominated as recipient of the fee. On 17 June 2005
Mr Archer advised by email that AEL should be nominated to receive the payment.
• On 30 June 2005 the fee was received in Morrison Kent’s
Trust account and on 4 July 2005 paid to Aoteoroa on
payment of an invoice for
management services.
• On 27 June 2005 a Deed of Acknowledgement was drafted by Mr
Whimp, recording that the Optimation House fee had
been earned and
that Ms Okkerse and Mr Archer, as trustees of RJBFT, as the predecessor trust to
JOFT, acknowledged that the
Trust was not entitled to benefit from the fee.
There is evidence that the deed was executed although Ms Okkerse does not now
recollect
that and no executed copy has been located.
First cause of action; discussion
[42] The first cause of action is brought under s 174 of the Companies Act 1993. [43] Section 174 provides a two stage test:
(i) under s 174(1) the issue is whether the conduct complained of
is unjustly detrimental to the applicant shareholder;
and
(ii) under s 174(2) if the Court finds unjustly detrimental conduct, the
issue
is whether granting the relief sought would be “just and equitable”.
[44] There is clear overlap between the two issues. The leading case
remains Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd,3 which concerned the
predecessor section to s 174.4 In the context of this case, the
following statement by Richardson J is apposite:5
... the underlying concern of the subsection [is] that conduct of the company
which is unjustly detrimental to any member of the company
whatever form it
takes and whether it adversely affects all members alike or discriminates some
only [is] a legitimate foundation
for a complaint under s 209. The statutory
concern is directed to instances or courses of conduct amounting to an unjust
detriment
to the interests of a member or members of the
company.
3 Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 (CA).
4 Under the Companies Act 1950.
5 Thomas v H W Thomas Ltd, above n 3, at 693.
[45] As recorded, in their claim under s 174, the plaintiffs seek rectification of the financial records of Aotearoa to show the alleged “Correct Entries”. This claim is based on the simple proposition that the crediting of the two success fees by way of dividends declared into the JOFT’s current account in 2007 and 2008 represented debts due by Aotearoa to the JOFT; and that the transfer out of those same sums in
2008 and 2009 amounted to unauthorised transfers of those sums, thus
rendering Aotearoa’s financial accounts incorrect. The
contention is that
“correction” of the financial accounts by transfer back of those
amounts will do justice between the
parties. That, however, assumes an
automatic entitlement to the money, without regard to the surrounding
circumstances. It rests
on the one-dimensional premise that, if money is
transferred into an account, ownership automatically passes regardless of the
circumstances. On that basis, any money credited to a bank account in
error would automatically become the property of
the account holder; a
proposition that is clearly not correct.
[46] This cause of action can be shortly disposed of, when regard is had
to the evidence. The case turns on its facts and the
facts speak for
themselves.
[47] The success fees were not relationship property (for the reasons
already set out); nor is it contended they were gifts.
Nor is it tenable to
suggest the transactions can now be simply reversed, so as to
“rectify” the accounts. The source
of the dividends declared by
Aoteoroa in the 2007 and 2008 years were the success fees, which were one-offs,
the proceeds of which
have long since been expended.
[48] The evidence is that Ms Okkerse was well aware of the provenance of those particular sums of money and well aware they were being channelled through her family trust’s current account on professional advice taken by Mr Burrell for financial accounting reasons personal to him. The monies were never intended to be retained by Ms Okkerse or her family trust; and it is significant that she did not raise the issue until years later and after the final separation. It is also significant that the current account adjustments by way of transfer of the monies to Taranaki No 2 Trust in 2008 and 2009 were not unauthorised as alleged but made with the knowledge and consent of the shareholders of Aoteoroa; and that the financial statements of
Aoteoroa for each of those financial years were formally approved by all
shareholders.
[49] Pivotal to these conclusions is the fact that Ms Okkerse had both
legal and financial accounting advice on all of these matters
at the critical
times.
[50] In conclusion, on all of the evidence as adduced, there is no basis
whatsoever for concluding that Ms Okkerse, or the JOFT,
were ever intended to
obtain any beneficial entitlement to the 25 per cent share of the dividends
derived from the two success fees
and channelled through the JOFT current
account. Further, Ms Okkerse well understood that neither she nor JOFT were
intended to
obtain any beneficial entitlement to the 25 per cent share of those
dividends.
[51] Therefore, under both limbs of the s 174 test, there has been no
unjustly detrimental conduct to Ms Okkerse; and it would
not be just and
equitable to order any relief.
Second cause of action: were the payments in loans?
[52] This cause of action can be disposed of even more
shortly.
[53] It cannot be seriously contended that the 25 per cent share of the
dividends derived from the success fees and channelled
through the JOFT current
account were in the nature of loans.
[54] Although Mr Archer used the term “loan” in a letter to
Ms Okkerse dated
17 May 2011 in relation to the inter-trust current accounts, he said in
evidence that this was a simple error (or perhaps loose terminology)
on his
part. Correctly speaking, the transactions should have been reflected as
inter-trust balances. None of the contemporaneous
financial statements referred
to the transactions as loans but rather, correctly, as inter-trust
balances.
[55] Mr Archer went on to express his expert opinion as to the character of a loan and said that neither of the dividends deriving from the success fees qualified as such. He said:
In so far as treating a transaction as a loan for accounting purposes, my
opinion is that a loan is the act of one party giving money
to another in
exchange for future repayment of the principal amount. It must follow that the
lender needs to have legal title or
right to the money lent. Given that JOFT
was holding the dividends, to the extent they derived from the Success Fees, as
a bare
trustee for Taranaki Trust, it was in no position to lend the money to
anyone, much less to Taranaki Trust. In any event, the borrowing
party would
need to acknowledge the receipt as a loan, for repayment, and the terms of the
loan would need to be agreed between the
parties.
[56] In any event, Ms Okkerse herself acknowledged in her evidence that at no stage did the JOFT agree to an inter-trust loan between JOFT and the Taranaki No 2
Trust.
[57] In summary, under this head, there is no evidence that the dividends
were ever contemplated or regarded as being in the nature
of loans. There is
no documentation to support such a claim and no evidence of any terms of
agreement or of any specified timeframe
in which to support such a
contention.
[58] The defendants do, however, accept that slightly more money was
transferred back to the Taranaki No 2 Trust than should have
been. Included, or
in addition to, the amounts equal to 25 per cent of the success fees
transferred, was a fraction of Ms Okkerse’s
attributable share of the
underlying trading income of AEL, declared and paid as a dividend. It is
conceded that this overpayment
amounts to $41,806. The exact amount requires
finalisation and will be transferred back to the JOFT accordingly.
Not just and equitable
[59] Finally, for the sake of completeness, even if I were not
correct in my findings above, there are aspects of
potential fairness or
unfairness as between Mr Burrell and Ms Okkerse that militate against allowing
any claim against the success
fees, much of the proceeds of which have been
expended on the relationship and on children of the relationship.
[60] As given in evidence, in 2007 and 2008, during the period of their reconciliation, Mr Burrell made substantial drawings from Aoteoroa, which were generated by his half share of the success fees earned by BSL and BPSL, as well as
normal dividends, and he expended these largely on his and Ms Okkerse’s
mutual
lives; on their family; and on joint living expenses.
[61] A second aspect relating to fairness comes from Mr Archer’s
evidence that, as the dividends arising from Mr Burrell’s
half
share of the success fees were necessarily credited to the current accounts
of the JOFT and the Taranaki No 2 Trust in
equal shares (rather than entirely to
Taranaki Trust), Mr Burrell’s high level of drawings would have left
Taranaki Trust’s
shareholder current account in an overdrawn position in
both the 2007 and 2008 financial years. By contrast, the JOFT’s
current
account had an artificially high credit balance. The overdrawn current
account would have required Aotearoa to charge
Taranaki Trust interest at
commercial rates, to avoid tax accruing on what is known as a deemed dividend.
That would have been an
unfair situation.
[62] In any event, as an overall proposition, Mr Archer’s evidence
was that there was nothing unfair about channelling the
success fees through
Aotearoa for the benefit of Messrs Burrell and Wilkinson; nor transferring the
credit in the JOFT’s current
account to Taranaki No 2 Trust, to avoid the
deemed dividend issues. Of this Mr Archer said: “If there was, as a
trustee,
I would not have proposed it. At all times I acted in the best
interests of both parties based on the fact that nobody intended that
Janette
would have a beneficial interest in the success fees”.
[63] He then went on to state:
By transferring these amounts between the trusts, substantial interest cost
was saved for the Burrells on what would otherwise have
been an overdrawn
Taranaki Trust current account. This was a reflection of their matrimonial
status and was in keeping with treating
them as husband and wife to achieve a
beneficial outcome.
I explained all this to Janette, and that it would be sorted out between
Taranaki Trust and JOFT at a later date ...
Result
[64] The application is dismissed. Judgment is entered for the defendants.
Costs
[65] Costs should normally follow the event. If the parties are unable to agree on the issue of costs, there will be an award in favour of the successful defendants on a
2B basis.
Goddard J
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/3317.html