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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 19 February 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-3512 [2014] NZHC 3393
BETWEEN
|
VERTOL SYSTEMS COMPANY
INCORPORATED Plaintiff
|
AND
|
O M HOLDINGS LIMITED Defendant
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Hearing:
|
1 December 2014
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Appearances:
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K M Quinn and V Kumar for the Plaintiff
C Shannon the Defendant
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Judgment:
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22 December 2014
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JUDGMENT OF WOODHOUSE J
This judgment was delivered by me on 22 December 2014 at 2:30 p.m. pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules 1985.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
..........................................
Solicitors:
Mr K M Quinn, Barrister, Auckland
Mr D Compton (plaintiff ’s instructing solicitor), Heimsath Alexander, Solicitors, Auckland
Ms A Foote and Mr C Shannon, Duncan Cotterill, Solicitors,
Christchurch
VERTOL SYSTEMS COMPANY INCORPORATED v O M HOLDINGS LIMITED [2014] NZHC 3393 [22
December 2014]
[1] The plaintiff (Vertol) has applied for an order setting aside a
protest to jurisdiction of the defendant (OMH).
[2] The application is made under r 6.29(1)(a) of the High Court Rules.
This requires Vertol to establish four matters. These,
and OMH’s
position on each of them, is as follows:
(a) Vertol must establish that it has a good arguable case that the
claim falls wholly within one or more of the paragraphs
of r 6.27, being the
rule prescribing circumstances when a document may be served out of New Zealand
without leave. Mr Shannon,
for OMH, accepted that there is a good arguable
case to this effect.
(b) There must be a serious issue to be tried on the merits. This was
accepted for OMH.
(c) Vertol must establish that New Zealand is the appropriate forum for
the trial. This is the principal matter in
contention between the
parties.
(d) Vertol may also establish any other relevant circumstance
which supports “an assumption of jurisdiction”.
Mr Quinn, for
Vertol, referred to one matter under this heading.
Background
[3] Vertol is a company incorporated in Oregon in the United States of America. Vertol operates and leases a large fleet of fixed wing aircraft and helicopters throughout the world. The evidence is that some of those aircraft have been purchased in, or operated in, New Zealand, or both, but my understanding is that Vertol does not have business premises in New Zealand. Vertol does have an office in Port Moresby, in Papua New Guinea (PNG).
[4] OMH, trading under the name Central Aviation, operates a fleet of
fixed wing aircraft and helicopters out of Kagamuga Airport
in PNG. OMH does
not have any business operation in, or other connection with, New
Zealand.
[5] The dispute between the parties arises out of a lease and purchase agreement for a P-750 Xstol fixed wing aircraft. I will refer to this as “the lease”. The lease is dated 20 November 2011.1 Final negotiations for the lease were conducted between the owner and CEO of Vertol, Mr James Montgomerie, and the general manager of Central Aviation, Mr Geoffrey Calder. These negotiations were in Auckland. The aircraft was manufactured in Hamilton. The lease document was signed by Mr
Montgomerie for Vertol in Auckland. It was signed for OMH in
PNG.
[6] Under the lease OMH was required to pay Vertol a deposit of
US$279,300. Vertol is entitled to use this deposit, and other
sums required to
be paid in advance, in whole or in part, in satisfaction of any sums due to
Vertol by OMH under the lease “or
otherwise”.
[7] OMH is required to pay what is described as a “Lease
Rate” of US$855 per
flight hour per month. The US$855 is for three items: (a) A lease payment of US$550.
(b) A capital payment of US$130 to be held by Vertol and applied as a credit
to the purchase price if OMH exercised its option to
purchase.
(c) A maintenance provision of US$175 to be used for scheduled
maintenance as required.
[8] OMH has a right to purchase the aircraft during the term of the lease and a further right to purchase at the expiry of the term. Provisions are made for, amongst other things, credits to OMH for any accrued capital payment, unused maintenance
provision and unused deposit.
1 An affidavit of Mr Montgomerie, CEO of Vertol, states that the lease was entered into on 15
December 2011. The date on the lease is 20 November 2011. Nothing turns on the precise date.
[9] Clause 33 makes provision for delivery up of the aircraft by OMH on
expiry or termination of the lease if it has not exercised
its right of
purchase. Delivery is to be made by OMH in Hamilton, New Zealand, at
OMH’s cost and OMH is required to register
the aircraft on the New Zealand
Aircraft Register.
[10] OMH places some emphasis on clause 39 of the lease which requires
the parties to act in good faith. It is the third provision
in a section headed
“Failure to pay Lease Instalments or any other Moneys”. Clause 39
is as follows:
During the term of this Agreement, the parties shall act in good faith to the
other. In exercising any of the rights contained in
this Agreement the non-
defaulting party shall act reasonably and, where reasonably possible, shall give
notice of a breach to the
defaulting party and give the defaulting party an
opportunity to remedy any such notified breach.
[11] Clause 50 was given emphasis by Mr Quinn on behalf of Vertol. It
provides:
Jurisdiction
This Agreement shall be construed in accordance with the laws of New
Zealand (“NZ”), and for the purpose of legal proceedings this
Agreement shall be deemed to have been made in NZ and to
be performed there, and
the Courts of NZ shall have jurisdiction over all disputes which may arise under
this Agreement, provided
always that nothing herein contained shall prevent the
Lessor [Vertol] from proceeding, at its election, against the Operator in
the
Courts of any country.
[12] On 30 November 2011, before delivery of the aircraft, OMH paid the
deposit to Vertol. The total paid was US$282,939.15.
(The difference between
this sum and the sum stated in the lease itself may simply arise from exchange
rate fluctuations.)
[13] OMH took delivery of the aircraft in New Zealand on 5 April 2012 and
flew it to PNG.
[14] On 1 July 2013 Vertol, by email from its CEO, Mr Montgomerie, to Mr Kenneth Vincin, general manager of OMH, gave notice terminating the lease and purchase agreement with a demand for delivery of the aircraft. This was for failure to pay a sum of US$72,208.50 for May flight hours due on 20 June 2013. Before the notice of termination was given Vertol had notified the Papua New Guinea Civil Aviation Safety Authority, presumably purporting to act as owner of the aircraft, that
OMH’s air operator’s certificate, being its commercial transport
licence, was to be
withdrawn from OMH in respect of the aircraft.
[15] OMH claims that, on the date that Vertol gave notice of termination,
Vertol was holding what amounted to security from
OMH in a total of,
at least, US$409,906, being the original deposit of US$282,939 plus capital
reserve deposits of US$126,967.
On 5 July 2013 OMH paid Vertol the sum of
US$72,208.50 for the May flight hours.
[16] On or about 4 July 2013 Vertol sought the assistance of Papua New
Guinea Police to recover possession of the aircraft. It
is relevant to the
jurisdiction issue that Vertol, in its statement of claim in this proceeding,
has expressly pleaded these events,
as follows:
17. On or about 4 July 2013, the Plaintiff informed the Papua New
Guinea Police that the Aircraft had been unlawfully retained
by the
Defendant.
18. On 5 July 2013, members of the Plaintiff’s staff and officers
of the Papua New Guinea Police Force travelled
in another of the
Plaintiff’s aircraft from Port Moresby to Mount Hagen, where the Aircraft
was located.
19. On 6 July 2013, when the Plaintiff’s representatives and the
police attempted to reclaim the Aircraft, they were assaulted
by persons under
the direction of the Defendant. These person were armed with clubs and knives
and were successful in preventing
the Plaintiff from recovering the
Aircraft.
20. On 9 July 2013, the Plaintiff’s representatives and the
police took a commercial flight from Port Moresby to Mount
Hagen, intending to
reclaim the Aircraft.
21. After arriving in Mount Hagen it was discovered that the Defendant
had moved the Aircraft to Tabubil, a remote village near
the Indonesian
border.
22. On 11 July 2013, the Assistance Commissioner of Police (Highlands Divisional Headquarters) issued a written order that the Aircraft be impounded and returned to Port Moresby for safekeeping (the “11
July Order”).
23. On 12 July 2013, the Plaintiff’s representatives and members of the police travelled from Mt Hagen to Tabubil using another aircraft belonging to the Plaintiff and seized the Aircraft pursuant to the 11
July Order.
24. While refuelling at Kiunga during the journey from Tabubil to Port
Moresby, the Plaintiff’s representatives and Police
on board the Aircraft
were assaulted once more by persons under the direction of the
Defendant.
25. On the evening of 12 July 2013, the Aircraft was chained down and
put under police guard at Jackson International Airport
in Port Moresby.
26. On 13 July 2013, persons under the direction of the Defendant flew
to Port Moresby, attacked the police guard and unsuccessfully
attempted to take
the Aircraft.
27. On the evening of 17 July 2013, persons under the direction of the
Defendant returned to Port Moresby and again attempted
unsuccessfully to take
the Aircraft using physical force.
28. As a result of the Defendant’s unlawful actions, the
Plaintiff has needed to engage full time security to secure the
Aircraft and to
protect its staff.
[17] Amongst particulars of loss claimed by Vertol there are the
following:
• Loss of revenue from the use of one of the plaintiff’s
aircraft when it was redeployed to travel to Mount Hagen and
remain on standby
for recovery of the aircraft, full particulars of which are yet to be
calculated.
• The cost of returning the aircraft from Tabubil to Port Moresby,
full particulars of which are yet to be calculated.
[18] On 12 July 2013 OMH commenced a proceeding in the National Court of
Papua New Guinea (the National Court) against two police
officers and the State
of Papua New Guinea. Various interim orders were sought. On 12 July 2013
there were orders requiring police
to release the aircraft to OMH and various
restraining orders. On 16 July OMH applied for a further interim order against
police
and against Craig Keighley. Mr Keighley is the Chief of Operations
(Pacific) for Vertol. It appears, from an affidavit from Mr Keighley
himself
(noted below) that the order was sought against Mr Keighley because of his
involvement with PNG Police in taking possession
of the aircraft. An order was
made on 16 July by the National Court, directing Police and Mr Keighley to
release the aircraft.
[19] From this point I will outline events using the chronologies
provided for Vertol and OMH in this proceeding. I will refer
to the proceeding
in the National Court as “the PNG proceeding” and to the proceeding
in this Court as “the NZ
proceeding”.
18 July 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
|
Vertol applied to be joined in the proceeding. There is an affidavit in
support of the application from Mr Keighley. He says that
he laid a complaint
with PNG Police in relation to the aircraft because he feared “for the
safety of the asset”. Mr
Keighley said he went on 5 July with Police to
Mount Hagen and deposes to other matters which are reflected in paragraphs
17-28 of Vertol’s statement of claim in the NZ proceeding. Orders
were made on 18 July by the National Court joining Vertol
as a party, staying
the earlier order for release of the aircraft, and directing that the aircraft
be retained in the Court’s
custody.
|
19 July 2013 – NZ
proceeding:
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Vertol filed the NZ proceeding. It alleges breach of the lease for failure
to pay the May flight hours on due date, termination on
1 July, demand for
delivery of the aircraft and failure to deliver. There are then the
allegations in paragraph 17-28 recorded
above followed by particulars of
alleged loss, including those recorded above. There is a claim for
US$72,208.50 for the May flight
hours and damages in a sum to be calculated, and
not less than US$300,000, for particularised items, including those referred to
above.
|
22 July 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
|
OMH paid US$61,252 into the National Court for June flight hours. OMH
claims that inclusive of this payment, it has between
30 November 2011 and
22 July 2013 paid Vertol a total of US$627,899.65 for the deposit,
“Capital Payments” and “Maintenance
Provision”.
|
23 July 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
|
Mr Montgomerie advised Vertol’s lawyer in PNG that it was
his “preference” to pursue OMH in Court in New Zealand.
|
24 July 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
|
OMH filed an amended statement of claim with Vertol, now the fourth
defendant. There are allegations against Vertol that it, directly
or through an
agent, breached PNG civil aviation rules and a provision of the PNG Civil
Aviation Act 2000. There is a claim that
OMH would lose approximately 1.5
million kina if the aircraft was flown out of PNG, with this sum being the
amount said to have been
paid to Vertol “to secure the aircraft”.
There is a claim, apparently against all defendants, for return of the aircraft.
There is a claim for 1.5 million kina if the aircraft were to leave PNG, but
that claim is against the State of Papua New Guinea
only. There are no
allegations against Vertol in respect of the lease.
|
21 August 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
|
Vertol applied for an order that the proceeding against it be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction and for a further order that the
aircraft be released to
it. There is an affidavit from Vertol’s PNG lawyer. He annexed a copy
of the email from Mr Montgomerie
advising that Vertol preferred to proceed in
New Zealand. It appears that a copy of the statement of claim in the NZ
proceeding
was attached to this affidavit.
|
23 August 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
|
Vertol filed what is described as “conditional defence to the amended
statement of claim and its cross-claim against the plaintiff”.
The
cross-claim is, in substance, a duplication of the statement of claim filed in
this Court. Vertol says that this document
was filed without
instructions.
|
19 September 2013
– PNG proceeding:
|
The National Court of Justice, in a reasoned decision of Hartshorn J,
dismissed an amended application of Vertol (filed on 29 August
2013) for an
order that the proceeding against it be dismissed for want of jurisdiction
and for an order for release of
the aircraft to Vertol. The Judge held that
Vertol, by the steps it had taken in the PNG proceeding, commencing with its
application
for joinder, had submitted to the jurisdiction of the
National Court of Papua New Guinea.
|
23 October 2013 –
PNG proceeding:
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The National Court ordered that the aircraft be held at the airport in Port
Moresby in the custody of the Court.
|
4 November 2013
– PNG proceeding:
|
Vertol filed an application for an order that the PNG
proceeding be stayed until final determination of the NZ proceeding.
It appears
that Vertol took no steps to pursue this application until on or just before 17
November 2014 – noted below.
|
8 November 2013
– NZ proceeding:
|
OMH filed its appearance under protest to jurisdiction.
|
22 November 2013
– PNG proceeding:
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Order releasing the aircraft to Vertol.
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26 November 2013
– PNG proceeding:
|
OMH filed a further amended statement of claim, including claims against
Vertol alleging breach of the lease. The relief sought against
Vertol is an
order restraining Vertol from removing the aircraft from PNG, an order that
Vertol specifically perform its obligations
under the lease, damages for breach
of the lease, and a declaration that Vertol was in breach of its obligations of
good faith under
clause 39 of the lease.
|
10 December 2013
– PNG proceeding:
|
Vertol, acting through new lawyers in PNG, filed a further amended
statement of defence and cross-claim under the lease.
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21 February 2014
– PNG proceeding:
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Vertol filed a list of documents. This was certified on oath by
Mr Keighley.
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11 March 2014 –
PNG proceeding:
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OMH filed a list of documents.
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5 August 2014 –
NZ proceeding:
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Vertol filed its application to set aside OMH’s protest
to
jurisdiction.
|
10 October 2014 –
NZ proceeding:
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OMH filed a notice of opposition to Vertol’s application to set
aside.
|
17 November 2014
– PNG proceeding:
|
Vertol was granted leave to discontinue its cross-claim. Vertol also
discontinued its application for stay of the
PNG proceeding
pending final determination of the NZ proceeding. There were directions that any
further affidavits for OMH were
to be filed by 6 February 2015, any further
affidavits for Vertol were to be filed by 6 March 2015, and there would be a
status conference
on 9 March 2015. A transcript of the Court hearing has been
provided. At page 9 counsel for Vertol advised the Court: “It
is not
disputing that this Court has jurisdiction. This Court will continue to
hear the matter and the applicant [Vertol]
will continue to be a party to
this proceeding to defend the claim against it.” Vertol contends that
its counsel acted without
instructions in withdrawing Vertol’s application
for a stay of the PNG proceeding. In that regard Mr Quinn, for Vertol,
referred
to an affidavit of Mr Keighley in support of the application for
discontinuance of the cross-claim. In that affidavit, at paragraph
18, Mr
Keighley recorded that Vertol disputed OMH’s right to bring proceedings in
the Papua New Guinea Court based on alleged
breach of the lease. In the course
of the hearing on 17 November Hartshorn J referred Vertol’s counsel to
paragraph 18 in
response to a statement by Vertol’s counsel that there was
no contest to the jurisdiction of the National Court.
|
Discussion
[20] On the critical question whether New Zealand is the appropriate
forum for trial, Mr Quinn referred to four factors noted
in McGechan
which, it is suggested, “should be addressed”.2
These are:
(a) It is undesirable to subject a foreigner who owes no allegiance to
New Zealand to the jurisdiction of a New Zealand court,
especially where the
dispute has little contact with New Zealand, or the claim is
dubious.
(b) Whether there are proceedings afoot in another court.
(c) Whether the New Zealand court provides the most effective relief,
or whether a foreign court is in a better position to
do so.
(d) Whether a party will suffer an unfair disadvantage if the New
Zealand court assumes jurisdiction.
Mr Quinn added the governing law of the dispute as an additional
consideration.
[21] Mr Quinn submitted that clause 50 of the lease means that there
“can be no principled objection to ‘subjecting’
[OMH] to the
jurisdiction of the New Zealand court”. I agree, if this consideration is
assessed by reference to the way in
which it is expressed in McGechan.
OMH, as Mr Quinn said in support of this point, has expressly agreed that the
lease is governed by New Zealand law and that the
New Zealand courts have
jurisdiction. Because New Zealand law does apply, pursuant to clause 50, this
is also a separate consideration
supporting Vertol’s application. Mr
Quinn also referred to the provision in clause 50 which states that “for
the purpose
of legal proceedings this Agreement shall be deemed to have been
made in was and to be performed there”.
[22] Mr Quinn’s submissions on the other considerations noted in
McGechan were directed to various factors pointing one way or the
other. But the critical
2 McGechan on Procedure (looseleaf ed, Brookers) at [6.29.02(3)].
underpinning for Vertol’s application as a whole is clause 50. Clause
50 is the pivot. The onus is on Vertol, and its application
is most
appropriately assessed by considering whether clause 50 outweighs other
considerations, which point firmly to a conclusion
that Vertol has not met the
onus on it to establish that New Zealand is the appropriate forum for the trial.
In my judgment clause
50 falls well short of outweighing countervailing
considerations to the extent required for Vertol to have met the onus on it.
The
prominent countervailing considerations are considered in the following
paragraphs.
[23] The first relevant action by either party which bears on the forum question, after the contract was made, was action by Vertol, not by OMH, in PNG. This occurred when Vertol decided to seek assistance of the PNG Police to advance Vertol’s private commercial interests. This, by itself, diminishes the weight that might otherwise be attached to clause 50. This is because Vertol, in spite of clause
50, did not issue proceedings in New Zealand when, on
Vertol’s case, OMH breached the lease by failing to make the
payment and
by failing to deliver up the aircraft.
[24] Vertol then intervened in the PNG proceeding. Vertol has sought to
present this intervention as a matter which should not
be taken into account, or
at least given little weight, when considering forum. This is on the basis that
this action was said to
have been forced on Vertol in order to protect its
claimed right of possession of the aircraft. I do not agree. Vertol was not
bound to intervene in the PNG proceeding. In any event, the proceeding in which
it did intervene was one arising directly from Vertol’s
own actions in
engaging the PNG Police.
[25] These two events initiated by Vertol – engaging the Police and then applying to be joined in the PNG proceeding – when related to the position taken by Vertol on the present application, by themselves substantially diminish the weight that might otherwise be attached to clause 50. Vertol’s invocation of clause 50 on this application, when contrasted with its own earlier actions, involves Vertol, in essence, wanting to have its cake and eat it.
[26] There are further important considerations weighing
against Vertol’s application. From the time Vertol
became a party to
the PNG proceeding it has, in different ways, actively engaged in it. This
includes, in particular, the filing
of the cross-claim advancing in the National
Court the same claim it is seeking to advance in this Court. Vertol has
acknowledged,
in essence, that not only does the National Court have
jurisdiction, but also that it is the appropriate forum. Issues have been
raised before me as to whether successive lawyers for Vertol have acted without
instructions or even contrary to instructions. These
are not matters this Court
can resolve. Nor should they be resolved by this Court even if all parties
concerned were before the
Court. I agree with Mr Shannon’s submission
for OMH that Vertol, at least at this point, is bound by the actions of its
agents
– the two law firms and different counsel in PNG – who have
acted for Vertol.
[27] Vertol’s contention that its lawyers, in effect,
allowed Vertol to become engaged in the substance of the
PNG proceeding
contrary to Vertol’s instructions, is in any event not easily reconciled
with steps directly taken by Vertol.
In particular there is Mr Keighley’s
affidavit certifying Vertol’s list of documents required to advance the
substantive
proceeding.
[28] The PNG proceeding, with Vertol’s active involvement,
is now well advanced. This is another factor pointing
against New Zealand as
the appropriate forum for the trial. It is a factor given added weight by the
failure of Vertol to advance
the NZ proceeding over an extended period.
OMH’s appearance under protest to jurisdiction was filed on 8 November
2013.
Vertol’s application to set that protest aside was not filed until
5 August 2014.
[29] The National Court of Papua New Guinea has made decisions of importance to the effect that it should be the forum for the trial between these parties, as well as the other parties to the PNG proceeding, and that it has jurisdiction over Vertol. Such decisions, by themselves, would not be determinative, as numbers of other cases have held. But these determinations of the National Court are ones made with the active participation of Vertol in the proceeding and they are ones made before any relevant decision of this Court. Added to this is the fact that the PNG proceeding is well advanced towards trial. There is a reasonable likelihood that there
will be judgment in the PNG proceeding at least many months before a likely
trial date in New Zealand. In this context there is
also the important
consideration, referred to in many cases, of the risk of conflicting decisions
of Courts of different countries.
[30] A further consideration is that three of the defendants to the PNG
proceeding could not be, or should not be, parties in
a proceeding in New
Zealand. The first and second defendants are police officers in the Papua New
Guinea Police. The third defendant
is the State of Papua New Guinea. If
Vertol is able to advance this proceeding in New Zealand against OMH, OMH will
have to maintain
a separate proceeding against the other defendants in the Papua
New Guinea Court.
[31] The final consideration is that Vertol’s own pleading in this
Court positively indicates that the National Court
of Papua New Guinea
would be the more appropriate forum for the trial. This is the pleading set
out earlier in this judgment.
A broad thrust of Vertol’s argument on the
present application is that it involves straightforward issues of contract,
governed
by New Zealand law, and with the evidence bearing on the issues being
evidence readily provided by documents and a limited number
of witnesses on each
side. That position is not borne out by the pleading.
[32] When I raised this aspect with Mr Quinn, he implicitly recognised the difficulty it presented for Vertol by suggesting that, if OMH’s protest to jurisdiction is set aside, a condition could be imposed to limit the scope of the claim. I do not consider that that would adequately address the issue. Seeking to delineate and circumscribe the scope of a claim in advance is not easy. And experience has shown that such procedural steps not infrequently fail to achieve the desired objective. A prominent example arises when parties seek a determination on a single issue thought to be determinative. In any event, a limitation imposed on Vertol cannot be imposed on OMH. If Vertol is able to proceed with its claim against OMH in this Court, this Court cannot in advance limit the scope of any defence OMH may wish to advance, including affirmative defences, nor can it prevent OMH from filing a counter-claim. The scope of possible affirmative defences or counter-claims of OMH against Vertol is apparent enough from OMH’s amended statement of claim
against Vertol in the PNG proceeding. Vertol’s argument in this
context involves selectivity as to the issues that might be
raised in any
proceeding advanced in this Court. That is not a principled basis for
concluding that New Zealand is the appropriate
forum for the trial.
[33] Apart from clause 50, Vertol has no relevant correction with New
Zealand. Trial in New Zealand would not appear to provide
any particular benefit
to Vertol in relation to cost or convenience for witnesses, or other practical
considerations of that nature.
Vertol executives who may be required to give
evidence have places of business outside New Zealand. I was advised that some
may
own property in New Zealand, but that is not a factor to which I would
attach any weight in relation to a commercial dispute. The
Vertol executives
likely to be required to give evidence for Vertol work from business offices
outside New Zealand and, significantly,
with Mr Keighley apparently having an
office in Port Moresby. Other witnesses for the plaintiff, in dealing with
contentions of
the sort contained in paragraphs 17 to 28 of the statement of
claim, are likely to be witnesses living in Papua New Guinea. For
OMH all
witnesses are likely to be people living in Papua New Guinea.
[34] For all of these reasons I am satisfied that Vertol has not met the
onus on it of establishing that New Zealand is the appropriate
forum for the
trial.
Result
[35] Vertol’s application is to be dismissed. But I consider that
should be with leave to bring a further application
in defined circumstances.
This is because Vertol has indicated that it will, or may, bring a fresh
application in the Papua New
Guinea Court to stay the PNG proceeding. If it is
successful it should have leave to bring a further application to set aside
OMH’s
protest to jurisdiction in this Court. This proceeding can be
stayed in the meantime. In addition, I am satisfied that OMH is
entitled to
costs which should be paid in any event with payment being a further condition
of any fresh application by Vertol to
set aside the protest to
jurisdiction.
[36] There are the following orders:
(a) The plaintiff’s application to set aside the defendant’s
protest to jurisdiction is dismissed with leave granted
to the plaintiff to
bring a further application subject to the following conditions.
(b) A further application may be brought by the plaintiff to set aside
the defendant’s protest to jurisdiction provided:
(i) In the proceeding in the National Court of Papua New Guinea
between OM Holdings and Senior Constable Noki Minimbi and others,
under Court
number WS747 of 2013, there is an order staying the proceeding against Vertol
Systems Company Incorporated.
(ii) The plaintiff in this proceeding has paid the defendant’s
costs
in accordance with the following order.
(c) There is an order that the plaintiff pay the defendant’s
costs of and incidental to this application on a 2B
basis, together
with all reasonable disbursements. If there is any dispute between the parties
as to quantum the costs are to
be fixed by the Registrar.
(d) This proceeding is stayed. If no further steps have been taken by
either party by 3 July 2015 it shall be treated as
dismissed.
Woodhouse J
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