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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 27 March 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-004867 [2014] NZHC 72
UNDER the Unit Titles Act 2010 and Part 19 of the
High Court Rules
IN THE MATTER of an application for the settling of a scheme in respect of
the Endeans Building
BETWEEN CBD INVESTMENTS (NZ) LIMITED Applicant
AND BODY CORPORATE 095035
First Respondent
RONG YU CHANG, KAN HSIN HUNG CHANG and KENNETH AH KEN KOO Second
Respondents
MARK DANIEL WATSON Third Respondent
JAMES TIMOTHY JEPSON, RHONDA CHANTELL HELLENA NGAPOKO MAKAPELU and WRMK TRUSTEES (2013) LIMITED
Fourth Respondents
ROGER HAMILTON STEWART Fifth Respondent
JANE ELIZABETH MANTELL and JONATHAN MARCHANT MANTELL Sixth
Respondents
DOMUS PROPERTY INVESTMENT LIMITED
Seventh Respondent
JING GANG WANG Eighth Respondent
MARK FRANCIS SMITH, BRIDGETTE ANN FRANKLIN and DOMINION LAW TRUSTEE COMPANY LIMITED
Ninth Respondents
CBD INVESTMENTS (NZ) LIMITED v BODY CORPORATE 095035 [2014] NZHC 72 [5
February 2014]
BARRY MARSH Tenth Respondent
CLAYTON JOHN HILLS and MICHELLE YVETTE WILSON Eleventh Respondents
LLOYD MARK GILMORE and GRANT JAMES FOX
Twelfth Respondents
RICHARD FRED ACKE Thirteenth Respondent
MARILYN LOIS REYNOLDS Fourteenth Respondent
PROPERT-ABILITY LIMITED Fifteenth Respondent
MUHAMMAD SHAHRIR BIN MUHAMAD ARIFF and GEOK LEE YEO
Sixteenth Respondents
JONOTHAN NORRIS BRISCOE and PATRICIA ANNE BRISCOE Seventeenth
Respondents
IAN ASHSLEY PAUL MILLS and ANNETTE JOAN MILLS Eighteenth Respondents
VANESSA JEANNE JEANDIN Nineteenth Respondent
HARRY ROY LAW and SUK CHING LIAUW
Twentieth Respondents
ANNE ELIZABETH MOLLOY and
BRIEN HERBERT CREE Twenty-first Respondents
LINDA MARGARET BRADY and
BARRY MARSH
Twenty-second Respondents
DARCEY ROSE and WARREN NEIL HARGREAVES
Twenty-third Respondents
NOEL ALLAN PLAYLE and MARGARET PLAYLE Twenty-fourth Respondents
PATRICIA ANNE NELSON Twenty-fifth Respondent
FLOTSAM LIMITED Twenty-sixth Respondent
MICHELLE JOY O'HALLORAN and
KELVIN HILL
Twenty-seventh Respondents
MALCOLM CRAIG SMELLIE, ROBERT PHILIP SMELLIE and LYNDSAY ANN SMELLIE
Twenty-eighth Respondents
TAN CORPORATE TRUSTEE LIMITED Twenty-ninth Respondent
GABRIELLE THERESE WILSON, MICHAEL ERIC MARRIS and TRUSTS SB LIMITED
Thirtieth Respondents
ROSS NEVIN JOHNSON Thirty-first Respondent
Hearing: 29 January 2014
Appearances: S A Grant and B R Saldanha for Applicant
M Marris for 17th and 27th to 30th
Respondents
Judgment: 5 February 2014
INTERIM JUDGMENT OF VENNING
J
This judgment was delivered by me on 5 February 2014 at 4.00 pm, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High
Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date...............
Solicitors: Macky Roberton, Auckland
Copy to: S A Grant, Auckland
B R Saldanha, Auckland
M Marris, Auckland
Introduction
[1] This case is the latest in a number of cases that have been brought
to this
Court concerning the Endeans Building at 2 Queen Street, Auckland (the
Building).
[2] The applicant, an owner of several ground floor units of the
Building, seeks an order settling a scheme under s 74 of the
Unit Titles Act
2010 (UTA 2010) governing the reconstruction and future management of a verandah
to the Building.
General Background to the Building
[3] I gratefully adopt the background concerning the Building and the
verandah largely from the reserved judgment of Ellis J
delivered on 14 July 2011
(the first decision).1
The Building and the land
[4] The Building was first constructed in 1905. It was rebuilt after the original building was razed by fire in 1912. Further alterations were done in 1922, 1934 and
1967. Historical photographs suggest that a verandah was part of the
original structure although it has never been shown on any
title plan to the
building. Prior to its redevelopment in 1994, the building had been divided
into ground floor shops and offices
on the other six levels.
[5] The land upon which the Building is situated was, at the time of
construction, owned by the Auckland Harbour Board (AHB).
For most of the
twentieth century, the land was leased by AHB to the mining entrepreneur John
Endean and (later) to Endeans Building
Ltd.
[6] On 15 April 1982, the land was subdivided into leasehold strata
titles and the
Body Corporate was thereby
established.
1 Body Corporate 95035 v Chang & Ors [2011] 3 NZLR 132; (2011) 12 NZCPR 947.
[7] In 1983, a Mr John Stubbs was one of the lessees of office space on
the first floor. Through his company, J Stubbs Investments
Ltd, he applied for
and obtained a building consent to refurbish both the ground and first floor
areas.
[8] In the early 1990s a property developer, Mr Arthur Morgenstern,
sought to freehold the Building through his company Allrich
Investments Ltd. Mr
Stubbs (or entities associated with him) agreed to sell to Mr Morgenstern (or
entities associated with him)
his leasehold interest in the first floor and to
purchase the ground floor commercial units once freehold unit titles had been
issued.
[9] On 27 April 1994:
(a) the land was transferred to Allrich Investment Ltd (58 per cent
shares)
and Stubbs Investments Ltd (42 per cent shares);
(b) an application was registered under s 44 of the Unit Titles Act
1972 (UTA 1972) to deposit Unit Plan 95035 (the Unit Plan)
and issue strata
titles for the units on the plan;
(c) under s 31 of the UTA 1972 the strata leasehold estates merged with
the reversionary estate in the land;
(d) the existing certificates of title were cancelled and new
certificates of title for strata estates in freehold were issued;
and
(e) a change in the rules of the Body Corporate was registered.
[10] Units C to I are the seven commercial units on the ground floor (the
GFUs). The applicant owns six of the GFUs, namely D
to I. Thirty residential
units (the RFUs) are located on floors one to six.
[11] The auxiliary units, which include for example a large atrium area, are jointly owned (in equal shares) by the RFUs only. Thus the auxiliary units have been constituted as a de facto form of common property owned by all unit holders other than the GFUs.
[12] For present purposes, it is relevant to note that the atrium light
well which constitutes Auxiliary Unit Seven (AU7) is owned
in this way, namely
by the RFUs in equal shares of 1/30 each.
The verandah
[13] The verandah fronted onto Queen and Quay Streets and extended out
from and was attached to Units D, E, F, G, H and I. No
part of Unit C, which is
also on the ground floor but on the Tyler Street side of the building, was
appurtenant to the verandah.
A small portion of the verandah also adjoined that
part of the external wall of AU7.
[14] Because the Building is built to the edges of the land comprised in
the Unit Plan, the verandah extended beyond the Unit
Plan’s boundaries.
It overhung the footpaths on both Quay and Queen Streets.
[15] The verandah was removed after the first decision following the
issue by the
Auckland Council of a Dangerous Building Notice under s 124 of the Building
Act
2004 in relation to the verandah.
Procedural background
[16] In the first decision Ellis J declined to make a declaration then
sought by Body Corporate 095035 (the Body Corporate) as
to the ownership of the
verandah. Importantly in the course of the first decision Ellis J found that the
verandah:
(a) was not common property;
(b) was rather owned by the registered proprietors of the units to
which it was attached;
(c) was affixed to the stratum estate in freehold created by the operation of the UTA 1972 upon the deposit of the unit plan in 1994 and was part of the freehold in the units to which it was attached; and
(d) was subject to the residual oversight and control by the
Body Corporate as provided for in the Body Corporate’s
amended rules (or
the default rules to the extent that any amended rules were ultra
vires).
[17] On the basis that ownership of the verandah should reside collectively in the owners of units D, E, F, G, H, I and AU7 that reflected the relative portions of the verandah adjoining those units, Ellis J concluded the Body Corporate would have
93.1 per cent ownership and AU7 would have 6.9 per cent ownership (in turn
shared by the 30 residential owners). Ellis J compared
that to the unit
entitlements of AU7 (108/10,000), and GFUs D to I which ranged from 483/10,000
to 933/10,000.
[18] In a subsequent decision, delivered on 24 September 2012
(the second decision), Ellis J addressed the issues that
had arisen following
the removal of the verandah and, as she understood it, the requirement of
the Council that a new verandah
be constructed.2 In the second
decision Ellis J concluded that:
[54] In summary, the position seems to be as follows:
(a) It is all but certain that the Auckland Council will require a new
verandah to be constructed around the Endeans
Building.
(b) As from 15 October 2012:
(i) the relevant unit owners would be required to comply with
any directive from the Council in that respect;
(ii) the Body Corporate is, in any event (ie absent a local authority
directive) arguably obliged by s 138(2) to “renew” the
verandah;
(iii) to the extent the GFUs took it upon themselves to construct a new
verandah (which they would prima facie be entitled to
do), it seems that they
would require the consent of the Body Corporate;
(iv) once a verandah is constructed there would appear to be a shared
responsibility to maintain and repair it. The GFUs and
the owners of AU7 would
have a statutory obligation to maintain and repair it as part of their units and
the Body Corporate would
have a statutory obligation to maintain and repair it
as a building element;
2 Body Corporate 95035 v Chang & Ors [2012] NZHC 2467.
(v) the Body Corporate can levy on a unit entitlement basis for the
upfront costs involved, subject to any later reapportionment
on the basis of
substantial benefit.
(c) The GFUs are, and will continue to be, entitled to place signs on
the verandah, in accordance with the existing Body Corporate
rules (provided the
signs comply with any bylaws or other Council requirements).
[19] Ellis J considered that with the changes in the UTA 2010 responsibility for and control over the verandah would repose in the Body Corporate under s 138(2).3
However, the Judge noted that created difficulties for both the owners of the
GFUs and the RFUs. The GFUs sought recognition for
the contribution of 93 per
cent of the costs that they were prepared to make (on terms) towards the
reinstatement of the verandah.
Also, while the owners of the RFUs might
otherwise be happy for the Body Corporate to have overall oversight and control
of the
verandah:
[58] ... the principal difficulty from the [RFUs’] perspective
would be the prospect of having to contribute to the up-front
remediation cost
on a unit entitlement basis, even though that contribution may later be able to
be largely reapportioned to the
[GFUs].
[20] Ellis J was also aware that in separate proceedings Courtney J had
addressed the issue of the repairs required to the roof
and upper areas of the
building and had proposed settling a scheme for the completion of that
work.4
[21] In the circumstances Ellis J suggested:
[60] In all the above circumstances it seems to me that an application
to the Court to settle a scheme under s 48 or s 127 may well be warranted.
Ideally any scheme pertaining to the verandah would be merged or at least
co-ordinated with whatever scheme
results from Courtney J’s judgment and
would also deal with any other remedial work required. To the extent any scheme
dealt
with discrete verandah issues, it might be expected that it would contain
a mechanism whereby the GFUs would be given a say on those
issues that was
commensurate with their ownership interests and/or their financial
responsibilities. I have, however, not heard
submissions on whether it is
possible to settle a scheme in such terms and therefore express no final view
upon it.
3 Section 138(2) was repealed as from 5 December 2013. It is now provided for in s 138(1)(d).
4 Body Corporate 95035 v Chang [2012] NZHC 1512.
[22] This application has followed. On the applicant’s request it
was granted urgency. If a scheme is to be settled to
provide for reinstatement
of the verandah it is intended that the work is completed at the same time as
the other repairs are carried
out, with an attendant cost saving to all
parties.
The nature of the scheme
[23] The proposed scheme provides for both the reinstatement of the
verandah and for decisions about its future use and appearance.
To do so it
provides for verandah rules separate and additional to the Body Corporate rules.
It establishes a verandah committee
made up of one representative appointed by
each of the registered proprietors of the GFUs to which the verandah is attached
(D to
I), and auxiliary unit AU7. It provides for the establishment of a
sinking fund for maintenance and repairs to the verandah, and
for contributions
by the verandah proprietors to be in shares reflecting the relative proportions
of the verandah adjoining each
verandah proprietor’s unit which are to be
the percentages determined by Ellis J of 93.1 by the GFUs and 6.9 in total by
the
30 RFUs with an interest in AU7. Importantly, it also proposes the
verandah committee will make future decisions concerning
the verandah
including its appearance and use.
The opposition
[24] The application is formally opposed by the 17th
respondent and the 27th to
30th respondents who are owners of five of the 30 RFUs. Mr
Marris filed full submissions relating to the issue which explained the position
of the respondents in opposition. He also spoke on their behalf in opposition
to the application.
[25] At the outset of his submissions Mr Marris confirmed the respondents that he represented (the opposing RFUs) accepted that, if the verandah was to be reinstated, then a s 74 scheme was an appropriate means of enabling the work to be carried out given the different interests of the residential and commercial owners within the building. The opposing RFUs do not oppose the settling of such a scheme for reinstatement in principle, rather it is the detail of the proposed scheme they object to. While they generally support a scheme for the reinstatement of the verandah they
particularly object to the proposal of a verandah committee to have
responsibility for and control over the future appearance and
use of the
verandah.
[26] The opposing RFUs also oppose the applicant’s proposal that the
costs associated with this proceeding be paid by all
owners in accordance with
the unit title entitlement assessment.
[27] The opposing RFUs propose a clause be added to any scheme endorsed
by the Court to ensure that a costs allocation between
the existing scheme
confirmed by Courtney J and any verandah scheme is put in place (a shared scheme
costs allocation). On this
point Ms Grant confirmed the applicant agreed to a
clause in the following terms could be included in the scheme:
Where the verandah scheme uses materials and processes for works related to
the NTF scheme, the project manager will identify the
relevant shared costs.
Such costs will include but not be limited to the scaffolding in place for the
NTF scheme, the hirage
cost of the footpath areas to Auckland Council and a
share of the building manager cost over the construction period. These
costs
will be proportionally allocated between the NTF scheme and the verandah
scheme.
The issues
[28] The three principal issues that emerge are:
(a) jurisdiction – whether the Court has jurisdiction to make the
orders sought;
(b) the verandah rules – whether the Court should sanction the
verandah rules proposed, or whether some other form
of rules should be
adopted; and
(c) costs – on what basis should the costs of these proceedings be borne.
Discussion
Jurisdiction
[29] Although the opposing RFUs effectively agree a scheme for
reinstatement of the verandah is required, it is still necessary
to confirm the
jurisdiction for the verandah scheme. The jurisdiction for a scheme under the
UTA 2010 is to be found in s 74 of
the Act:
Scheme following destruction or damage
(1) This section applies if any building or other improvement
comprised in any unit or on the base land is damaged or destroyed,
but the unit
plan is not cancelled.
(2) The High Court may, by order, settle a scheme on the application
of—
(a) the body corporate; or
(b) if the unit title development is in a layered unit title
development, the body corporate of the head unit title development
or any
subsidiary unit title development in that layered unit title development;
or
(c) an administrator; or
(d) the owner or one of the owners of a unit; or
(e) a registered mortgagee of a unit.
(3) A scheme under subsection (2)
may include provisions—
(a) for the reinstatement in whole or in part of the building or other
improvement; or
(b) for the transfer of units to the body corporate so as to form part
of the common property.
...
(6) On any application to the High Court under subsection (2),
the following persons have the right to appear and be heard:
(a) any person having or claiming to have any estate or interest in
any unit or in the whole or part of the base land; or
(b) any insurer who has effected insurance on the buildings or other improvements comprised in any unit or in the whole or part of the base land.
(7) In the exercise of its powers under subsections (2)
and (3),
the High Court may make any orders that it considers expedient or necessary for
giving effect to the scheme, including orders—
(a) directing the application of any insurance money; or
(b) directing payment of money by or to the body corporate or by or to any
person; or
(c) directing the deposit of an appropriate new unit plan; or
(d) imposing any terms and conditions that it thinks fit.
(8) The High Court may cancel, vary, modify, or discharge any order
made by it under this section.
(9) The High Court may make any order for payment of costs that it
thinks fit.
[30] As a preliminary point I note that as an owner of one or more of the
units in the building the applicant is entitled to bring
the
application.5
[31] The leading authority is the Court of Appeal decision in
Tisch v Body Corporate.6 Although the case concerned
s 48 of the UTA 1972, for present purposes s 74 of the UTA 2010 is
materially the same. The
pre-requisites to the Court making an order were
noted in Tisch:7
Step 1: the court must be satisfied that the building has been damaged or
destroyed.
Step 2: if so satisfied, the court must decide whether to settle a scheme.
That is, the court must decide whether a scheme is appropriate
in the
circumstances.
Step 3: if the court decides a scheme is appropriate, it must then decide
what the terms of the scheme should be.
[32] In the present case, while “building” is not defined in UTA 2010, “building elements” is.8 There can be little doubt that the verandah falls within the definition
of “building elements” which
includes:
5 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 74(2)(d).
6 Tisch v Body Corporate No 318596 [2011] NZCA 420, [2011] 3 NZLR 679.
[t]he external and internal components of any part of a building or land on a
unit plan that are necessary to... the exterior aesthetics
of the building, or
the health and safety of persons who occupy or use the building ...
[33] I accept Ms Grant’s submission the verandah is an external
component of the building necessary to the exterior aesthetics
of the building
and the health and safety of persons who occupy or use the building. Mr
Foote’s evidence confirms that the
amenities provided by the verandah
include shelter from adverse weather, lighting, protection from road, pavement,
vehicular, pedestrian
and tenancy noise and smells, as well as signage for the
residences and tenancies.9
[34] The verandah has clearly been damaged or destroyed. I note that a
scheme may include provisions for the reinstatement either
in whole or in part
of the building.10 The proposed scheme provides for reinstatement
of the verandah as part of the building.
[35] For the above reasons I am satisfied that there is formal
jurisdiction to settle a scheme for the reinstatement of the verandah
in the
present case. For the reasons that follow, I consider the real issue to be
whether there is jurisdiction for the scheme
to provide for future decisions as
to the appearance and ongoing use of the verandah.
Should a scheme be settled in this case – is it appropriate in all
the circumstances?
[36] In Tisch the Court noted the general rule that a body
corporate may only undertake tasks associated with common property and that any
departure
from that general rule should only be to the extent necessary to
achieve what is fair as between unit owners in the circumstances.11
The Court at [37] also endorsed Heath J’s observation in Fraser
v Body Corporate S6362112 that a scheme “should be
a remedy of last resort”.
[37] However, importantly for present purposes in Tisch the Court
also noted that uncertainty as to the rules and whether the Body
Corporate had jurisdiction to
9 Mr Foote is a registered valuer. His evidence was not challenged.
10 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 74(3)(a).
organise and carry out the work in issue was a factor supporting the
settlement of a scheme.13
[38] In the present case, while Ellis J suggested in the second decision
that the Body Corporate might have jurisdiction under
s 138(2) UTA 2010 on the
basis that the verandah is a building element she went on to note the difficulty
with that was that it would
require the Body Corporate to levy all unit holders
on a unit entitlement basis for the funds required, even if the contributions
might later be able to be reapportioned.
[39] In any event Ellis J was satisfied an application for a scheme should be made. I agree with that assessment particularly now that a scheme has been established for remedial work to the other parts of the building. That supports the settlement of a scheme for the reinstatement of the verandah. If a scheme is settled for the reinstatement of the verandah it should be possible for the reconstruction work of the verandah to be carried out at the same time as the other works with consequent cost
savings to all parties.14
[40] In the circumstances of this case, I am satisfied that it is
appropriate to settle a scheme for the reinstatement of the
verandah.
[41] I turn to the last step, the terms of the scheme.
[42] In my judgment, the terms and extent of the proposed scheme are the
real issue on this present application, namely whether
the Court can, as a
matter of jurisdiction, settle a scheme which provides for the ongoing
control of the appearance and
use of the reinstated verandah. The particular
aspects the opposing RFUs object to is the establishment of a verandah
committee15 with the power to make decisions relating to the
verandah; in particular clause 4 of Schedule 3:
4. Appearance
4.1 Decisions relating to the verandah, including any decisions relating to
(but not limited to):
13 Tisch v Body Corporate No 318596, above n 6 at [34].
14 A similar consideration applied in Body Corporate 173457 v Dunn [2007] NZHC 800; (2007) 8 NZCPR 668.
(a) maintenance;
(b) colour schemes; (c) signage;
(d) property on, or affixed to, the verandah (including, but not limited to,
air-conditioning units); and
(e) affixations,
shall be made by a 66.67% majority of the Verandah Committee.
4.2 No-one is to make any addition or alteration of any sort to any
part of the verandah including installation of pipes,
conduits, wires,
cables, service ducts, or plant upon or passing through the verandah without the
consent of the Verandah Committee.
[43] In my judgment, the Court does not have jurisdiction to approve a
scheme containing the provisions in clause 4 in particular.
Relevantly, s 74(3)
confirms the scheme may include provisions for the reinstatement in whole or in
part of the [verandah]. However
neither s 74(3)(a) nor 74(3)(b) provide for
the control over future use which is contemplated by clause 4 of the proposed
scheme.
[44] Section 74(7) does not assist the applicant. First, as the Court
of Appeal confirmed in Tisch, the equivalent provision under the UTA 1972
was relevant to how the Court exercises its discretion, not to whether it
exercises
it.16 It does not and cannot provide jurisdiction if the
jurisdiction does not exist.
[45] Next, as the Court of Appeal also observed in
Tisch:17
[31] The rationale of the general rule is that unit owners
purchase knowing the property is subject to the Act. They
purchase also knowing
they are subject to the Body Corporate Rules. Those Rules are a contract between
the unit holders. The starting
point must be that unit holders should adhere to
the statutory scheme they bought into, and to the Body Corporate Rules they
agreed
to abide by. We see the scope of s 48 as limited to a situation where the
best interests of unit owners as a whole dictate a departure
from the scheme of
the Act and from the Body Corporate Rules.
[46] I also note the Court of Appeal’s comments in St
John’s College Trust Board v BC 197230:
16 Tisch v Body Corporate No 318596, above n 6, at [38].
17 Tisch v Body Corporate No 318596, above n 6, confirmed in St John’s College Trust Board v BC
197230 [2013] NZCA 35 at [20].
[24] Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction, we are satisfied
that when read as a whole s 48 was directed towards the
Court’s approval
of a plan for physical repair or reinstatement of property. Its apparent aim is
to achieve a coordinated approach
to the remediation work. While s 48 includes a
power to direct payment of money to the body corporate by any person and to
impose
such terms and conditions as the Court thinks fit, the overriding element
of the Court’s discretion is to make such orders
“as it considers
expedient or necessary for giving effect to the scheme ...”.
[25] There is nothing on the face of s 48(5) to suggest that the
discretion is to be invoked according to the touchstone of relative
benefits
or that it is to be used in a manner designed to recreate settled rights and
obligations between unit holders. The statutory discretion relating to what
is expedient or necessary to give effect to the physical scheme is much more
confined. Its focus is on what is required to ensure that the scheme can be
implemented. In our judgment s 48 does not contemplate orders of the scope
and effect proposed by the objectors.
(emphasis added)
[47] Further, it cannot be said, in any event, that it is necessary for
the scheme to contain provisions for the ongoing control
of the verandah to give
effect to the scheme for its reinstatement.18
[48] In my judgment, the proposed scheme (with the exception of clause 4) achieves the objectives of s 74 in that the GFUs who will contribute 93.1 per cent towards the cost of the reinstatement will, through the verandah committee, control the reinstatement. That is, however, a different issue to the ongoing control and management of the appearance and use of the verandah once it is reinstated. While I can understand the applicant may wish to control the future appearance and use of the reinstated verandah (as it proposes to pay 93.1 per cent of the costs of reinstatement), I note and adopt the observation of Ellis J in the second decision
that:19
(iv) once a verandah is constructed there would appear to be a shared
responsibility to maintain and repair it. The GFUs and
the owners of AU7 would
have a statutory obligation to maintain and repair it as part of their units and
the Body Corporate would
have a statutory obligation to maintain and repair it
as a building element;
...
[57] ... As I have said, however, the present rules already seem to me
to permit the GFUs considerable autonomy when it comes
to signage.
18 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 74(7).
19 Body Corporate 95035 v Chang & Ors, above n 2, at [54](b)(iv) and [57].
[49] For the above reasons I conclude that the Court does not have
jurisdiction to approve a scheme containing the proposed provision
of clause
4.
[50] Ms Grant had an alternative argument relating to jurisdiction. She
submitted that the provisions of the scheme could be
regarded as an amendment to
the Body Corporate rules. Body Corporate rules can be amended by ordinary
resolution at a body corporate
general meeting.20 A resolution in
writing signed by a majority of eligible voters is as valid as if passed at a
meeting of voters.21 Further, an eligible voter may exercise the
right to vote at a Body Corporate meeting by casting a postal
vote.22
[51] Against that statutory background Ms Grant submitted that the
resolution circulated by the Body Corporate with its letter
of 8 November
2013:
RESOLUTION
It is resolved to support the application by CBD Investments (NZ) Limited
(CBD) to reconstruct the verandah on the terms of the
application and scheme attached to this resolution and to allow CBD to
let the contract for construction of the verandah, and the Committee of the Body
Corporate
to undertake such actions as are necessary to ensure that the verandah
is built, and the rules implemented, in accordance with the
scheme
was approved by a majority of the Body Corporate members.
[52] Ms Grant submitted that 22 of the 31 unit owners (or 71 per cent)
entitled to vote supported the resolution. Two others
who supported the
resolution were not eligible to vote. Two owners could not be found. Only
the opposing RFUs (the owners of
five units) opposed the resolution.
[53] There are in my view two difficulties with that submission. First, the resolution does not expressly identify that it is proposed to alter the Body Corporate rules in relation to the ongoing control of the appearance and use of the verandah. It is focused primarily at support of the proposed application to the Court. The
offending clause is buried in Schedule 3 to the
Scheme.
20 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 106(3)(a).
21 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 104(3).
22 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 103.
[54] If the Body Corporate rules are to be amended by postal vote (rather
than at a meeting where there can be discussion and
explanation of the
resolution) the terms of the resolution should make it clear that it is
proposed to amend the Body
Corporate rules. The resolution fails to do
that.
[55] Second, s 106(4) of the UTA 2010 provides that an amendment that is
inconsistent with any provision of the UTA 2010 is invalid.
To the extent the
amendment purports to support the approval by this Court of clause 4 as part of
the settlement of a scheme under
s 74 (which I have concluded the Court does not
have jurisdiction to do) it is inconsistent with s 74 of the Act and is
therefore
invalid.
Summary
[56] The position I have reached is this. The Court would be prepared to
approve and settle the proposed scheme for the reinstatement
of the verandah on
the terms proposed, with the exclusion of clause 4 and any necessary
consequential amendments.
[57] If the applicant wishes to change the Body Corporate rules by the
addition of clause 4 or an equivalent, then that could
be done by the Body
Corporate following the procedure in s 106, by proposing a resolution
specifically addressed to the future control
of the appearance and use of the
reinstated verandah but any such resolution should be expressed as one proposing
to change the body
corporate rules as opposed to being related to the settlement
of a scheme for the reinstatement of the verandah.
[58] For the above reasons, I express this as an interim judgment and
reserve leave to the parties to apply further on 48 hours
notice.
Costs
[59] That leaves the issue of costs. On an application under s 74 as
this was, the court has a general discretion as to
costs.23
23 Unit Titles Act 2010, s 74(9).
[60] In my judgment costs associated with obtaining the Court approval of the scheme should follow the contributions proposed in the scheme for the reinstatement of the verandah, namely 93.1 per cent by the GFUs and 6.9 per cent by the
proprietors of AU7 (the RFUs).
Venning J
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