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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 20 May 2014
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND TAURANGA REGISTRY
CIV-2011-470-997 [2014] NZHC 853
BETWEEN
|
SUISSE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Plaintiff
|
AND
|
BEVERLEY JEAN MONK Defendant
|
Hearing:
|
21-23 October 2013
|
Counsel:
|
A M Swan for Plaintiff
P F Dalkie and D A Watson for Defendant
|
Judgment:
|
29 April 2014
|
JUDGMENT OF GODDARD
J
This judgment was delivered by me on 29 April 2014 at 3.30 pm, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Jesperson and Associates, Auckland for Plaintiff
Reid Law, Auckland for Defendant
SUISSE INTERNATIONAL LIMITED v MONK [2014] NZHC 853 [29 April 2014]
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff’s claim has been reduced to two causes of
action, the plaintiff having abandoned two of the original
four causes of action
during the course of the hearing. The original claims were for money had and
received, fraudulent breach of
trust, deceit, and unlawful means conspiracy.
Only the first and third causes of action have survived to this
point.
[2] For the plaintiff, Mr Swan identified the issues as being: first,
whether the defendant was entitled to $500,000 she received
from Suisse
International Limited (Suisse); if not, whether Suisse’s claim is outside
the limitation period under the Limitation
Act 1950.
[3] The $500,000 was paid to Mrs Monk on 21 November 2002. The case
for
Suisse is that its director, Mr Reginald Watt, only discovered in July 2007
that the
$500,000 had been paid to Mrs Monk out of certain deposits received from the
sale of a property in Willis Street (but unusually) before
settlement. The
plaintiff says it did not know the debt for which the $500,000 was paid had in
fact already been satisfied on 30
August 2002. Had it known this, it certainly
would not have paid Mrs Monk the same sum of money again.
[4] The plaintiff claims the $500,000 was money had and received by Mrs
Monk to which she was not entitled and may have been
paid on a mistaken basis
and should be returned; or the money was paid in response to a knowingly false
representation made by Mrs
Monk upon which the plaintiff relied.
[5] As is clear from the critical dates, the claim is statute barred by
virtue of s 4(1)(a) of the Limitation Act 1950, unless
s 28 of the Limitation
Act 1950 applies.1
[6] Section 28 of the Limitation Act 1950 provides:
28 Postponement of limitation period in case of fraud or
mistake
Where, in the case of any action for which a period of limitation
is prescribed by this Act, either—
(a) The action is based upon the fraud of the defendant or
his agent or of any person through whom he claims or his agent; or
(b) The right of action is concealed by the fraud of any such person as
aforesaid; or
(c) The action is for relief from the consequences of a
mistake,—
the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the
plaintiff has discovered the fraud or the mistake, as the case
may be, or could
with reasonable diligence have discovered it:
[7] The defendant’s case is that s 28 of the Limitation Act 1950
does not apply and the claims are therefore statute barred;
and that, in any
event, the $500,000 was owed by the Watt group of companies to Mrs Monk’s
companies and the payment was duly
authorised by the plaintiff.
[8] For reasons I shall shortly give, both of the plaintiff’s
claims are baseless, being fatally flawed on the facts.
The plaintiff has
proved neither money wrongly had and received by overpayment or otherwise,
mistake or deceit. On that basis,
the causes of action are also statute
barred.
The claim
[9] In its statement of claim, the plaintiff has traversed the detail
of its entering into an agreement for sale and purchase
of a property at 8-14
Willis Street with a third party for $10,280,000, with settlement to
occur on 5 December 2002. Settlement
of this property subsequently occurred
on or about 28 January 2003.
[10] The plaintiff claims it was not until around July 2007 that it (that
is, Mr Watt)
discovered that Mrs Monk, without its knowledge or consent, had
been paid
$500,000 on 21 November 2002 by its solicitor, Mr Bhanabhai, from the deposit
held in trust by his firm, Dyer Whitechurch, on behalf
of the plaintiff and
prior to settlement of the sale of the property. The allegation is that both
the fact of the payment and the
nature of it were concealed by Mrs Monk and/or
Mr Bhanabhai. Specifically the plaintiff pleads that:
The defendant had never advanced any money to the plaintiff and/or was not owed any money by the plaintiff and was therefore not entitled to payment of the above sum.
[11] The first cause of action for money had and received pleads that the defendant wrongly and/or dishonestly deprived the plaintiff of the use of the
$500,000.
[12] The third cause of action for deceit pleads that:
The defendant on or before 21st November 2002 dishonestly and/or falsely represented to the plaintiff orally, in discussions with the plaintiff’s solicitors DWB, that she was owed $500,000 by the plaintiff notwithstanding that the defendant was not owed any money by the plaintiff whatsoever (“the false representations”);
That the false representations were made orally or implied by conduct:
Particulars:
(i) Following those discussions, on 21st November 2002 the defendant
instructed the plaintiff in writing, through the plaintiff’s
solicitors
DWB, to pay her the sum of $500,000 as per the
“discussions”.
(ii) On 21st November 2002 the plaintiff, through DWB paid the
defendant $500,000.
The defendant made the false representations with the intention that they
would be relied on by the plaintiff and the plaintiff through
its solicitors did
rely on same.
On 21 November 2002 the defendant received and accepted the sum of
$500,000 from the plaintiff knowing that she was not entitled to same and
utilised the money for her own benefit.
That by reasons of the defendant’s false representations the plaintiff
suffered loss and damage in the sum of $500,000.
[13] The opening submission on behalf of the plaintiff was that Mrs
Monk:
never lent any money to Suisse personally. The best that could be said is
that one of the defendant’s companies, Richelieu Investments
Limited, had
collateral security over a property owned by Suisse in Willis Street,
Wellington. That security was satisfied on or
about 30 August 2002 ...
The defendant ... took the stance that the $500,000 paid to her by Suisse, was to satisfy two loans her companies had allegedly made to an entity called Beresford Apartments Limited of $260,000 and $200,000 respectively
...
...
... It was discovered that Beresford was not one of the Watt Group of
Companies. It was incorporated in April 2002 by Mr Sharma.
[14] The important features of the plaintiff’s case were
highlighted by Mr Swan as follows, the fundamental plank being
that Mrs Monk did
not personally advance any money to Suisse and neither did her companies and
thus Mrs Monk was not owed any money
by Suisse:
Important Features of the $500,000 Payment
(a) No money was ever advanced to Suisse, by Ms Monk, Richelieu and/or
Monk Investments;
(b) All monies advanced to the various companies, were advanced by
Richelieu and/or Monk Investments and not by Ms Monk personally; (c) Ms Monk had no registered security over the plaintiff’s property;
(d) The collateral mortgage was an unregistered mortgage Richelieu had taken, giving a priority sum of $500,000 which was collateral to other advances to other entities ... Those collateral securities related to advances by Richelieu or Monk Investments of $252,000 and
$274,000 and were both repaid on 30th August 2002 before the
$500,000 was paid in November 2002.
(e) Ms Monk was paid $500,000 into her personal bank account on
21 November 2002 following a two line instruction to DWB to pay her;
...
(h) Ms Monk was under no circumstances entitled to the
$500,000 payment from the plaintiff in satisfaction of monies
that might have
been owed to her or Richelieu or Monk Investments by Beresford a non
“Watt” company;
...
... whether money was owed by other entities, is of no
consequence. Ms Monk was not owed any money by the plaintiff.
She had no right
to demand or receive $500,000 in her own name on this basis or on the basis that
she was owed by other entitles.
...
Ms Monk was paid $500,000 on a simple two line instruction to DWB. ... she
had a discussion with Mr Sharma wherein she represented
she was owed money and
to which Mr Sharma agreed she could have $500,000 out of the deposit monies held
on the purchase by the plaintiff.
Ms Monk knew at that time she was not owed
any money by the plaintiff.
By instructing DWB to pay her the $500,000 when she knew it was not owing was unlawful. Mr Bhanabhai facilitated the payment when he would have known it was unlawful to pay the money not only because it wasn’t owing but it was in contravention of the agreement for sale and purchase, and DWB’s undertakings.
[15] The reference to the $500,000 being paid out of deposit
monies in contravention of the agreement for sale and
purchase and Dyer
Whitechurch & Bhanabhai’s undertakings, is a reference to the
following clause in the agreement for
sale and purchase:
18. Deposits
a) The deposit shall be held by the vendor solicitors until
settlement and all caveats are withdrawn and evidence of the same
is provided to
the purchasers solicitors.
The business relationship between the Watt group of companies and the
defendant’s companies
[16] The manner in which the parties did business over a period of years
is of fundamental importance to this case. Also
of fundamental
importance was the manner in which Mr Watt organised and ran the Watt group of
companies. I am satisfied that
the Watt group of companies included the
company named Beresford and that it is totally implausible for the plaintiff or
Mr Watt
to contend otherwise. The history of Mr Watt, his group of
companies and the manner in which he conducted his business
through these
companies is telling.
[17] Mr Watt was in the business of a “property trader”. His
modus operandi, on sourcing a potential property for
trading, was to form a
company for that purpose. Many such companies were formed, usually with each
company owning only one property.
Each company had a different name, no doubt
relevant to the transaction concerned. Mr Watt was the sole director of all of
these
companies up until the time of his bankruptcy and the shares in each of
the companies were held by him as trustee of one of his discretionary
family
trusts; or held jointly by him and his solicitor, Mr Bhanabhai, as trustees of a
family trust. In every case Mr Watt was
the sole beneficiary.
[18] Mr Watt was adjudicated bankrupt on 25 July 2001. At the time he had creditors to whom he owed around $20 million. The day before he was made bankrupt, he took steps to appoint Mr Sharma, his finance manager, as director of all of the Watt group companies then in existence. Mr Sharma also became the shareholder of each of the companies, on the basis that he would hold the shares on
Mr Watt’s behalf until he came out of his bankruptcy. Mr
Sharma’s memory is that there were at least 20 such companies
in existence
at the time. Mr Watt’s memory is of about 25 or 26 such companies. The
trustees of the Watt family trusts became
Mr Sharma and Mr Bhanabhai, with Mr
Watt the sole beneficiary in each case. In respect of Suisse, both Mr Sharma
and Mr Bhanabhai
were the shareholders of the company and they held the shares
in trust for Mr Watt.
[19] Mr Sharma’s evidence, which I accept in its entirety, was that
after Mr Watt went into bankruptcy “nothing changed,
it was business as
usual”. Mr Sharma said Mr Watt continued to be actively involved in the
business of his companies. He
still worked in the office every day and
was paid for his services as a manager. Mr Sharma described the
continuation
of the business in this manner as
“seamless”.
[20] When Mr Watt came out of bankruptcy on 25 July 2004, he
did not immediately reappoint himself as director of
his companies, although he
accepted under cross-examination that he could have done so. It appears his
brother was appointed for
a period of time until Mr Watt elected to resume
directorship of his companies on 14 July 2006. It also appears that Mr
Watt’s
brother may not have been entirely fit for purpose. In his
evidence, Mr Watt accused Messrs Sharma and Bhanabhai of having transferred
the
directorship of Suisse to his brother because they had “problems with
GST” but there was no evidence corroborative
of this; nor did the
accusation appear to have any relevance to Mrs Monk or her companies. I also
note in passing that Mr Watt has
attempted to sue Mr Sharma unsuccessfully; and
has reported Mr Bhanabhai and Mr Somervell (who acted for Mrs
Monk’s
companies) to the Law Society in relation to complaints of theft,
which apparently found no traction.
[21] As stated, the way in which the parties conducted their business arrangements is of fundamental importance. The Watt group was run as one large single unit. Money advanced to one company for financing purposes was not necessarily repaid by that company. The money was simply repaid from whichever company was in funds at the time repayment was due or demand made. Loans were rolled over and transferred between the companies and most were heavily cross-collaterally secured. The securities changed according to whether particular companies did or did not
have assets. Internally, the Watt group transferred money around between
its own entities.
[22] In some instances, the loans were poorly recorded and little
documentation was put in evidence.
[23] The companies owned by Mrs Monk and her late husband, namely,
Richelieu Investments Limited and Monk Investments, were a
main source of
funding for the Watt group of companies, especially where second or third tier
lending was required. By the time of
Mr Watt’s bankruptcy in 2001, there
was an established relationship between Mrs Monk’s companies and the Watt
group as
lender and borrower. The loans were generally on an interest only
basis. Automatic payments for the interest were nominally to
have been made by
one particular company but that did not prove to be the rule. Interest
payments, when made, simply emanated from
whichever company in the Watt group
was in a position to make payment at the time. Thus, repayment of the loans
could come from
any company within the Watt group. The same was so with
repayments of loan capital. This pattern and the modus is crystal clear
from
the schedules of borrowing and lending over the period 2000 to
November 2002, the critical period in this case.
It was also the pattern and
modus that continued after November 2002, right up until late 2004/2005, during
which many more loans
were made by Mrs Monk and her companies to the Watt group
of companies and on the same basis.
[24] It is clear that, essentially, Mrs Monk and her companies operated
like an overdraft facility for the Watt group of companies:
money was requested
from her when needed and when forthcoming was applied to whichever property
trading project was currently
in train. The loans were repaid out of whichever
project was in funds at the time that any repayment or interest was due or
sought.
Mr Sharma, in his evidence, described this modus, as it related to
interest payments, as follows:
Most of the loans from Mrs Monk’s companies required interest to be paid by automatic payment. Usually, that would come from a Watt group company called Carpark 80. ... Even so, interest payments, when made, could have come from any company at all within the Watt group. It all depended on where I could get the money from. It was also quite common that if there was money in one company it would make interest payments for several other Watt group companies.
[25] Mr Sharma’s evidence in this regard reflected Mrs Monk’s
own evidence about the relationship between her company
and the Watt group of
companies.
[26] Mr Sharma said all of Mr Watt’s property interests were funded
by debt and he relied on frequent trading to generate
income and satisfied his
creditors where and when he could, from whatever source of funds were available
at the time.
Beresford Apartments Limited
[27] Beresford Apartments Limited (Beresford) was incorporated on
26 April
2002, while Mr Watt was a bankrupt. Thus he could not be appointed as a
director of
Beresford.
[28] Mr Watt prevaricated in his evidence and approach as to whether
Beresford was a Watt group company controlled by him; or
was not a Watt group
company, but belonged to Mr Sharma. His inconsistency on this matter was
reflected in the different
suits which he initiated. In his suit
against Mr Sharma, he claimed Beresford was a Watt group company. In
the
subject proceeding, he belatedly claimed that Beresford was not a company
within the Watt group of companies, although originally
he had included it as
such in his brief of evidence.
[29] The shares in Beresford were held jointly by Mr Sharma and Mr
Bhanabhai as trustees for the Watt Family Trust, of which Mr
Watt was the sole
beneficiary. That situation was never refuted at the hearing before
me.
[30] Mr Sharma’s evidence about Beresford’s
dealings with Mrs Monk’s companies was as follows:
In 2002 the Watt group (Beresford Apartments Limited) had entered into an agreement with the Auckland City Council to buy a building that required deposits to be paid in cash periodically as the contract shows. None of the companies had any money to pay the deposits. So, Beresford borrowed the money from Mrs Monk’s companies. In 2002 there were two loans, one for
$200,000.00 and another for $260,000.00. On both these loans I negotiated for Beresford that there would be no loans fees to be paid, and that they would be straight interest only. That was a good deal for Beresford because the usual loan fees were between about $7,500.00 and $15,000.00. Each of the loans was for a very short term, and repayable in early November 2002. The other thing was that since Beresford had no assets the security it could
offer was pretty much non-existent. I notice that for example the agreement
with the Council was offered to be mortgaged (that was
obviously worthless) and
there were also collateral securities such as fifth mortgages over other
property in the Watt group.
[31] I am satisfied that Beresford was a Watt group company
controlled by Mr Watt behind the scenes and that, as such,
the Watt group
received a material benefit when the payment reducing $500,000 of the
group’s indebtedness to Mrs
Monk was made.
Was the payment both duly authorised and lawful?
[32] I refer again to Mr Sharma’s evidence, he being in the best
position to advise the Court of the situation in relation
to this payment,
albeit the event occurred some time ago. Of the continuing relationship between
the Watt group and Mrs Monk’s
companies and the payment out of the
$500,000, Mr Sharma said:
There were many loans from Mrs Monk’s companies after the end of 2002
obtained by the Watt group. There were collateral securities
taken with these
loans as well. Many of them were repaid from sources other than the actual Watt
group company that had the loan
in its name, so a loan to one company was very
commonly paid out by another.
This payment of $500,000.00 was one of many transactions between the Watt
group and Mrs Monk’s companies. It occurred in about
the middle of the
period over time from about 1999 until 2005 during which the parties did
business together. It does not now sit
in my memory any more than any other
over the five or six year period.
[33] There is no contest that Mr Sharma was at the material
time the duly appointed director of the plaintiff company
and indeed of all
companies in the Watt group. This could hardly be in issue, given Mr
Sharma’s appointments in each case
were made by Mr Watt
himself.
[34] Mr Sharma’s clear and unequivocal evidence is that he
authorised the payment of the $500,000 to Mrs Monk
on account of loans due and
owing to her by the Watt group. Beresford could not meet the payment due at
the time and so another
ready source within the group was found in accordance
with usual practice. Expressly, Mr Sharma’s evidence was:
In mid-November 2002 the two loans to Beresford were due, and Beresford could not pay them.
When the Suisse property at 8 Willis Street was sold I authorized the
$500,000.00 payment. I cannot be certain now but think it was applied against the two loans then due from Beresford with interest, and the unpaid
interest due on the $252,000.00 loan.
[35] The background events which led to the Beresford Street loans being
satisfied out of the sale of the Suisse property were
typical of how Mr
Watt’s property trading business was operated and were described by Mr
Sharma as follows:
In mid 2001 there was a loan from Richelieu Investments Limited to
Australasian Investments Proprietory Limited (“AIPL”)
for
$252,000.00 that we defaulted on. Initially, the loan was for a short term ...
That loan then got extended on June 15, 2001
after some negotiation.
...
AIPL owned a property in Wellington at 138 Victoria Street that was sold in
mid 2002. The sale price was insufficient to be able
to pay out the loan due to
Richelieu, which was the $252,000.00 loan of 15 June 2001. ... the
mortgagee, was threatening a
mortgagee sale. In addition to not having enough
money on settlement to pay out the Richelieu loan, there was also going to be
a
shortfall on the second mortgage pay out to Gold Band.
Gold Band also had collateral security over Gilmer Terrace, owned by NZ
Serviced Accommodation Limited. Gilmer Terrace was going
to be sold about the
same time as Victoria Street.
I spoke to Mrs Monk about the problem trying to get her to agree to release
her security over Victoria Street in return for taking
security over the Suisse
property at 8 Willis Street. She knew about this property because I had
mentioned it to her the year before
when we had the problem with this loan
initially, and could not repay it at the end of May. It appears as though the
discussions
went on for quite some time, but ultimately Mrs Monk agreed to
release the AIPL security in return for security over Suisse. This
appears
from the [solicitors’ letters; mortgage signed by Mr Sharma on behalf of
Suisse; deed of priority; and deed of priority
with all mortgagees of the Willis
Street property except institutional lenders].
...
At some point around this time or slightly later Mrs Monk took out the
balance due of the Gold Band mortgage. That was collateral
over both Victoria
Street and Gilmer Terrace. ...
By May 2002 Metropolis Car Parking Limited (“MCP”) had gone into receivership ... MCP’s property at Greys Avenue was sold up and settlement took place on August 28, 2002. I have been shown the last minute changes made to the settlement figures on August 28, 2002 in which the loan for $260,000.00 was taken out and replaced with the loan for
$252,000.00, but no interest was paid out on that loan. I have also been shown the actual amount paid. ...
In early September 2002 Beresford borrowed another $200,000.00 from
Richelieu.
[36] In an earlier affidavit sworn on 2 March 2004, Mr Sharma had
described with particularity how, when the Willis Street property
was sold, the
sale proceeds were distributed to the first five mortgagees of the property as
per an account prepared by Dyer Whitechurch.
Richelieu Investments had an
unregistered fifth mortgage over the property. Nothing was available for
payment out to the sixth
mortgagee.
[37] Dyer Whitechurch’s statement of account records:
“Bank transfer to B J Monk part loan repayment $500,000”.
Mr
Sharma, in his affidavit, confirms: “The fifth mortgagee, Richelieu
Investments Limited (B J Monk), was paid $500,000 of
the $540,000
due”.
[38] The documentation supporting this payment and its authorisation was produced in evidence. It was clearly preceded by a great deal of discussion between Mrs Monk and Messrs Sharma and Bhanabhai about various advances made by her companies and the repayment of those and of interest and what the state of the
‘running account’ for the Monk monies was.
[39] Mrs Monk, unsurprisingly, has no actual recollection of precisely
why she received the $500,000 from Suisse at the time.
This is to be expected,
given the passage of time between the payment out in 2002 and Mr Watt raising a
hue and cry over it following
his alleged ‘discovery’ of it in 2007.
In line with Mr Sharma’s recollection of the number of properties,
transactions
and securities that preceded the payment, set out in paragraph [30]
by way of example, Mrs Monk said of the complicated and fluid
nature of the
arrangements:
The [Australasian Investments Proprietory from Richelieu] loan was from Monk Trust, and repayable on demand ... . There was to be a caveat lodged to protect an unregistered mortgage given over its property at 140-142
Victoria Street, Wellington. There is a note I sent to Brian [Somervell] on
May 3, 2001 that records the loan was to have been repaid by about May 18
... . I do not recall any of the detail outside the note, nor do I remember the meeting with Reg Watt and Suren Sharma that I refer to. It can be seen from
the note that various loans are referred to, and there is mention made of money being lent to enable the Watt Group (Suisse) to purchase 8 Willis
Street (the Willis St property). The Willis St property is the plaintiff’s property, the proceeds of sale from which I was eventually repaid the
$500,000 which is the subject of this case. They also gave me a valuation of
that property back then, because I refer to it in my
note.
Demand was made for repayment on June 7, 2001 ... . It was extended by
variation on June 15, 2001.
This loan became very complex in terms of when it was repaid, and how it was
secured. Until I read the papers for this case, and
in particular the
documents on Brian Somervell’s file on the sale of Metropolis Carparking
Limited (“MCP”) I had
thought it was included in the $500,000
payment that I received from Suisse on November 19, 2002. But now,
having read
through the documents from Brian Somervell’s file
about the MCP settlement and the payment made to my companies by
the receiver
of MCP, I think that it was in fact paid on the MCP settlement.
Payment of the $500,000 to Mrs Monk’s companies on sale of
the Suisse property at 8 Willis Street on 21 November
2002
[40] As set out above, by mid-November 2002, the two loans to Beresford
were due and Mr Sharma authorised the payment of $500,000
from the proceeds of
sale of the Willis Street property to Mrs Monk, which he believes from memory
was applied against the loans
due from Beresford with interest. There is no
reason to disbelieve Mr Sharma in his recollection of matters, based on a
logical
reconstruction of the available documentation and his institutional
knowledge of the workings of the Watt group of companies. Nor
is there any
reason to doubt Mrs Monk’s recollection of matters, as best she has been
able to give it.
[41] Mr Sharma, as sole director of the plaintiff company, authorised the
payment out to Mrs Monk a couple of days before
the money was paid
over. The authorisation was given to Mr Bhanabhai as plaintiff’s
solicitor and he made a handwritten
file note of the instruction. In it he
records, “pay $500 to Bev Monk on a/c repayment to her of her
loans”. The file
note is dated 19/11/02.
[42] On 21 November 2002 Mrs Monk sent email instructions to Mr Bhanbhai’s legal executive confirming her bank account details (as discussed) for deposit of the
$500,000.
[43] Westpac Bank’s records show that the money was indeed
transmitted from
Dyer Whitechurch’s account on 21/11/2002, recorded as “repayment” of “Part
loan L”. Confirmation that the deposit had been lodged to Mrs
Monk’s account was faxed to her by the legal executive.
[44] Significantly, Mr Sharma said in evidence that payments were also
made from the proceeds of the sale of the Suisse property
in Willis Street to
another creditor of the Watt group of companies, in settlement of debts due to
that creditor from Watt companies
other than Suisse. He said it was just part
of the common practice. Certainly it paralleled Mrs Monk’s
situation.
[45] Of further significance was Mr Sharma’s evidence that, in
accordance with usual practice when settlement of a Watt
property trading
project was imminent, he and Mr Watt would invariably walk over to Mr
Bhanabhai’s firm together to discuss
the settlement figures. Mr Sharma
has no reason to believe that Mr Watt did not accompany him on the Suisse
settlement in accordance
with this usual practice.
Discussion
[46] The plaintiff has advanced a simplistic but totally
untenable proposition which cannot succeed. The facts support
neither of the
remaining causes of action, which are time barred as well as
meritless.
[47] The start and end point is that the plaintiff had actual knowledge
of the payment of $500,000 to Mrs Monk on 21 November
2002, the payment having
been duly authorised by its sole director, Mr Sharma. Mr Sharma was appointed
by Mr Watt and was acting
well within his responsibilities and in line with the
customary practice of the Watt group when he authorised the payment. Mr
Bhanabhai
received the authorisation as the plaintiff’s solicitor and
actioned it accordingly.
[48] As Mr Dalkie put it:
Mr Sharma was the sole director of the company as at the date of the payment.
His authority to Mr Bhanabhai to make the payment is
clearly the action of the
company. Mr Sharma was the controlling mind of the company at the time the
payment was made.
[49] Mrs Monk was likewise entitled to regard Mr Sharma as fully authorised to act on behalf of the plaintiff in settling indebtedness owed by the Watt group to her
and her companies. Nothing turns on the fact that the payment in this
instance was to her personally and not to one of her companies.
It was one and
the same thing.
[50] Given the history of dealings between the Watt group of companies
and Mrs Monk and her companies, nothing appears unusual
about the repayment of
the particular debt at issue. It was in line with the pattern of lending,
established over the previous two-year
period and which continued for a further
two to three years, during which many more loans were made in the same manner by
Mrs Monk
and her companies to the Watt group of companies.
[51] I have already found that the Watt group of companies included
Beresford and that it is totally implausible for Mr Watt to
contend otherwise.
While Beresford may have been incorporated during the period of Mr Watt’s
bankruptcy, the evidence clearly
establishes that it was a company within the
Watt group, as acknowledged by Mr Watt in separate litigation and in his
original
brief of evidence for this proceeding, which he altered. Mr
Sharma’s evidence, which I accept, was that during
the period of his
bankruptcy, Mr Watt continued to conduct “business as usual” and was
in the office every day and being
paid as a ‘manager’. While the
shareholders of Beresford were Mr Bhanabhai and Mr Sharma jointly, the shares
were held
in trust for a Watt family trust, of which Mr Watt was the sole
beneficiary. For Mr Watt to now attempt to dissociate himself totally
from
Beresford and seek to characterise it as a “Sharma” company is, as
Mr Dalkie put it, disingenuous to say the least.
[52] The reality is that Mrs Monk and her companies lent money to Mr Watt and his group of companies as a two or three-tier lender, often at short notice and not necessarily on a secured basis. As I found earlier, the arrangement operated similarly to an overdraft facility, with a running account kept of all outstanding loans and the balance of the loans. It is not insignificant that, at the time the $500,000 was paid to Mrs Monk against indebtedness by the Watt group, there was a total of almost
$3 million owing to Mrs Monk. A schedule setting out the running account of the debt owing at that time is annexed to this judgment.
[53] The schedule reflects the pattern of dealing between the parties
over the two-year period leading up to payment of the $500,000.
Mr Sharma was
well immersed in these dealings. The $500,000 was neither authorised or paid
out by him on any mistaken basis.
The money was owing and it is immaterial
whether it was paid under a mortgage covering existing and future advances, or
whether it
was simply paid out on the authority of Mr Sharma in reduction of
Watt group indebtedness.
[54] On the facts, the allegation of deceit would have had to involve Mr
Sharma and Mr Bhanabhai as implicit in deceitful conduct
by Mrs Monk. There is,
however, no pleading that they were so involved and they are not joined as
defendants. Nor is there any
evidence to support such a contention.
[55] The claim in deceit is not only meritless, it is entirely
misconceived and verging on the vexatious.
[56] Mr Dalkie’s submission, that the plaintiff has conducted this
case as though there were only ever one transaction between
Mrs Monk and her
companies and the plaintiff and the Watt group of companies, is apt. Mr Watt
has attempted to pluck out this one
transaction from four years of similar
trading and to characterise it as fraudulent or as a mistaken blip.
[57] Mr Watt’s claim that he could not with due diligence have
discovered the payment of the $500,000 to Mrs Monk in November
2002 earlier than
2007 is a further hopeless aspect of this case. No credible basis has been
established for such an assertion.
[58] In summary, the plaintiff has failed to establish that the money was not paid to Mrs Monk in discharge of obligations owed by the Watt group of companies to Mrs Monk and her companies. The evidence is that the money was not wrongly paid out, was not paid by mistake, and was authorised by Mr Sharma in full knowledge of the situation of indebtedness between the Watt group and Mrs Monk.
Result
[59] The plaintiff’s claim is dismissed on the merits and is also
statute-barred under the Limitation Act 1950.
Costs
[60] Counsel may submit memorandum as to
costs.
Goddard J
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2014/853.html