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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 30 June 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2014-404-003297 [2015] NZHC 1101
UNDER
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the Property (Relationships) Act 1976
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IN THE MATTER
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of an appeal against a decision of the
Family Court at North Shore
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BETWEEN
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JAMES STEWART HISLOP Appellant
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AND
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PUBLIC TRUST AS PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE ESTATE OF SUZANNE HEAVEN
(FORMERLY KNOWN AS SUZANNE WYATT) Respondent
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Hearing:
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20 May 2015
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Appearances:
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A E Ashmore for the Appellant
A Goodwin for the Respondent
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Judgment:
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21 May 2015
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JUDGMENT OF GILBERT J
This judgment is delivered by me on 21 May 2015 at 2.45 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar
HISLOP v PUBLIC TRUST [2015] NZHC 1101 [21 May 2015]
Introduction
[1] This appeal concerns the time limit under s 90 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 for commencing proceedings for the classification and division of relationship property following the death of a de facto partner. The Family Court concluded that the proceedings, which were commenced more than eight years after the date of death, were nevertheless in time because the estate was not a “small estate” as defined in s 2 of the Act and the proceedings were commenced
within 12 months after administration of the estate was granted.1
Alternatively, the
Court found that an extension of time could be granted because the
application for the extension was made before the final distribution
of the
estate.
The facts
[2] In about December 2003, the appellant, Mr Hislop, entered into a de
facto relationship with Suzanne Heaven, the deceased.
In February 2004, they
jointly purchased a property at Warkworth which became their home. In March
2005, the deceased made a Will
appointing Mr Hislop and her solicitor as her
executors and trustees. Mr Hislop was the sole beneficiary. The deceased died
on
8 April 2005 as a result of which her interest in the home was extinguished
and accrued to Mr Hislop by survivorship. The only assets
in the estate
comprised the sum of $246 in a bank account and a tax refund of $309. There was
also a debt of $1,128.
[3] The executors did not apply for probate because they took the view
that the value of the estate did not exceed $15,000 and
was therefore a
“small estate” for the purposes of the Administration Act. They
completed the administration of the
estate when they paid the tax refund to Mr
Hislop in August 2006. This was the last remaining asset to be
distributed.
[4] On 19 December 2006, the deceased’s daughter filed an application for probate and for the appointment of the Public Trust as executor of the estate. This was with a view to the Public Trust making an application under the Property
(Relationships) Act in respect of the home. If successful, this would
enable the
1 Public Trust v Hislop [2014] NZFC 9170.
deceased’s daughter to make a claim against the estate under the Family
Protection
Act 1955.
[5] The application for probate was discontinued in June 2007 without
being served. The deceased’s daughter says that
this was done without her
knowledge or authority and that she did not become aware of this until
she instructed new solicitors
in 2011.
[6] The Public Trust was appointed as the administrator of the
estate in April 2013. On 30 July 2013, the
Public Trust filed an
application in the Family Court for an order extending the time for
commencement of proceedings under
the Property (Relationships) Act. This
application was made on the basis that the estate was a small estate and the
relevant time
limit for commencing proceedings had therefore expired in April
2006, 12 months after the date of death. An extension of time was
sought on the
basis that final distribution of the estate had not occurred.
The Family Court judgment
[7] Section 90(1) of the Property (Relationships) Act
provides:
Time limits for commencing proceedings
(a) if the estate of the deceased spouse or partner is a small estate
(as defined in section 2), the proceedings must be commenced—
(i) no later than 12 months after the date of the death of the
deceased spouse or partner; or
(ii) if administration of the estate is granted in New Zealand
within that period, no later than 12 months after the
grant of
administration,—
whichever is the later:
(b) in any other case, the proceedings must be commenced no later than 12 months after administration of the estate of the deceased spouse or partner is granted in New Zealand.
[8] Despite the Public Trust’s concession in its application that
the time limit set by s 90(1)(a) of the Act for
commencing proceedings
had expired, the Judge concluded that it had not. This was because the Judge
considered that the deceased’s
former interest in the home formed part of
the estate and accordingly the estate was not a “small estate”. The
Judge
reached this conclusion relying on s 83(1) of the Act which
provides:
Relationship property defined
83 (1) If, on the death of a spouse or partner, any
property of that spouse or partner passes to the surviving spouse or partner,
whether by survivorship or otherwise (but not by succession), then unless, in
any proceedings under this Act, the Court decides otherwise,
–
(a) that property is not automatically to be treated as the
separate property of the surviving spouse or partner;
and
(b) the status of the property as relationship property or separate
property is to be determined according to the status it
would have had if the
deceased’s spouse or partner had not died.
[9] The Judge’s reasoning was summarised in the following
paragraphs of her
judgment:
[90] The position of Mr Hislop is that s 90(1)(a) of the Act applies
because the estate of the deceased is a “small estate”.
[91] The basis of this argument appears to be on the fact that the whole
of the home property is excluded from the deceased’s
estate by virtue of
having passed to the respondent by survivorship on 2 June 2005.
[92[ As referred to above, this however is contrary to the provisions of s 83 of the Act, which specifically state[s] the contrary. There is no presumption that the jointly owned property can be treated in this way by the surviving partner. Accordingly the value of the home property must fall into the pool of the estate prior to any determination to treat it otherwise by the Court pursuant to s 83.
[10] Because administration of the estate was not granted until April
2013, the Judge considered that the proceedings had been
commenced in time in
terms of s 90(1)(b). Alternatively, the Judge considered that leave could be
granted because no final distribution
had been made:
[105] No leave is required, as s 90(1)(b) has been complied with. Even if leave were required, no final distribution has been made, so leave can be granted, at the Court’s discretion.
[106] By way of summary, as the deceased’s estate is not a
“small estate”, as it includes the home property in
accordance with
s 83, s 90(1)(b) applies. These proceedings were brought within the 12 month
period after the Public Trust was granted
administration and are therefore
within the prescribed time limits.
The appeal
[11] Mr Hislop raises two grounds in support of his appeal. He contends
that the
Judge was wrong to conclude that the estate: (a) was not a small estate; and
(b) had not been finally distributed.
Was the estate a small estate?
[12] The Judge relied on s 83 of the Act in concluding that the
deceased’s former interest in the home should be treated
as forming part
of her estate. However, this section merely regulates the approach to be taken
on an application for classification
and division of relationship property if
the statutory sharing regime under the Act is invoked. Unless and until the
Court makes
an order under the Act, ownership of the home is to be determined in
accordance with conventional property law. Because it was owned
jointly, the
deceased’s former interest in it was extinguished upon her death and
accrued to Mr Hislop by survivorship. Until
such time as the Court makes an
order under the Act, the estate has no interest in the home and it does not form
part of the estate.
Any order made under the Act would not have retrospective
effect. All that existed at the date of death was a right to make a claim
with
the prospect of an interest in the home being ordered under the Act.
[13] For these reasons, I disagree with the learned Judge. The estate did not include any interest in the home as this was extinguished upon the death of the deceased. I consider that the Public Trust was correct in recognising that an extension of time was therefore required under s 90 because the proceedings were over seven years out of time.
Had the estate been finally distributed?
[14] The Judge considered that the estate had not been finally
distributed because the home had not been dealt with as part of
the estate
assets:
[101] In this particular case, however, until the Public Trust
was appointed there has been no administrator appointed,
nor has there been any
completion of administration.
[102] ... However the trustees and executors named in the will of the
deceased have not dealt with the home property at all as
part of the estate
assets.
[15] The Judge’s conclusion on this issue is therefore
consequent on her conclusion on the first issue. In view
of my conclusion
that the deceased’s former interest in the home did not form part of the
estate, the Judge’s finding
that the estate had not been finally
distributed cannot stand. The undisputed evidence is that all assets were
distributed in accordance
with the Will by August 2006.
Conclusion
[16] For the reasons given, the appeal must be allowed. Proceedings had
to be commenced within 12 months of the date of death
because this was a small
estate and administration of the estate was not granted within that 12 month
period. The Court had no jurisdiction
to grant an extension of time because no
application for extension of time was made until nearly seven years after the
final distribution
of the estate.
Result
[17] The appeal is allowed. The decision of the Family Court is set
aside. The proceedings commenced by the Public Trust in
the Family Court under
the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 are out of time and must be struck
out.
[18] If the question of costs cannot be resolved, memoranda should
be filed.
M A Gilbert J
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