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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 5 June 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2013-404-4995 [2015] NZHC 1150
UNDER
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s 244 Property Law Act 2007
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IN THE MATTER
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of an application for cancellation of Deed of Lease dated 22 January 2011
and possession
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BETWEEN
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STYLO MEDICAL SERVICES LIMITED Applicant
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AND
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HUM HOSPITALITY LIMITED Respondent
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Hearing:
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24 April 2015
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Appearances:
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R O Parmenter for Applicant
S Abdale for Respondent
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Judgment:
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27 May 2015
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JUDGMENT OF WHATA J
This judgment was delivered by Justice Whata on
27 May 2015 at 11.30 p.m., pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date:
Solicitors:
Winston Wang & Associates, Auckland
Foy & Halse, Auckland
Copy to:
R O Parmenter, Auckland
S Abdale, Auckland
STYLO MEDICAL SERVICES LIMITED v HUM HOSPITALITY LIMITED [2015] NZHC 1150 [27 May
2015]
[1] Stylo Medical Services Ltd (Stylo) and Hum Hospitality Ltd
(Hum) are locked in a long-running battle concerning
a leasehold of a grand
villa in Parnell. This will be the sixth judgment dealing with the dispute in 24
months.1
[2] In this judgment I must resolve:
(a) Whether I should cancel the deed of lease for noncompliance with
covenant of repair;
(b) Whether I should cancel the lease for non payment of rent in
January this year;
(c) Whether I should grant a stay preventing Stylo from commencing
further proceedings against Hum, pending resolution of an
appeal by Stylo
against my judgment of November last year.2
Background
[3] The full background to this matter is thoroughly essayed
in previous judgments. For present purposes it is sufficient
for me to borrow
from the third cancellation decision:3
[5] The immediate background to the lease assumes significance in
light of Hum’s claim that, contrary to representations
made by
Stylo’s director, Dr Ooi, the buildings foundations were not fit for
purpose.
[6] Stylo purchased the villa in 2008 located at 123 Grafton Road, Auckland. It was in a state of considerable disrepair. Dr Ooi says that
$22,000 was spent on repiling and relevelling the building. He also says that
Code of Compliance (CoC) “was issued and said it should last for 50 years”.
I could not find a copy of the CoC in the morass of paper filed with
the
1 See Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2013] NZCHC 2114 [first cancellation decision]; Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2014] NZHC 1587 [second cancellation decision]; Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2014] NZHC 2029 [the consolidation decision]; Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2014] NZHC
2428 [third cancellation decision]; Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2014] NZHC 2723 [fourth cancellation decision].
2 Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2014] NZHC 2723 [fourth cancellation decision]. In that judgment I resolved to extend the time in which Hum was required to pay all outstanding rentals ($53,995.50) by one working day. Stylo appeals that decision to the Court of Appeal.
3 Stylo Medical Services Ltd v Hum Hospitality Ltd [2014] NZHC 2428 [third cancellation decision].
applications, but I assume he is referring to a CoC for the repiling. A
resource consent to operate a café was also obtained,
apparently at a
cost of about $30,000. Dr Ooi then avers:
6. .... Based on the original consent too, only building consent is
needed which would not take long at all to get as most
of the detail has been
submitted for the resource consent and I have full support from the heritage
counsellor Ian Grant and heritage
architect, Antony Matthews. I mention that
the resource consent only lasts for 5 years, so we have lost a good part of that
period
already.
[7] Stylo, it appears, had no further money to repair the villa and
went searching for a tenant. Dr Ooi was introduced to
Ms Armitage, director and
shareholder of Hum. The best evidence of the outcome of their negotiations are
the agreements to lease
and the executed lease to which I will now turn.
...
The lease
[13] As I observed in my previous judgment, cl 46.1 provides the rent
holiday, though the length of holiday is extended from
28 to 36 months. Clauses
48.1 to 48.7 deal with tenants’ fitout and other work and effectively
replicates the second agreement
to lease. Given their significance, I include
the operative clauses for present purpose here:
48.1 The Landlord agrees to provide the tenant full access to the
premises upon this agreement is declared unconditional.
48.2 Before the commencement of the Tenant’s business the
tenant shall, at the tenant’s cost complete the following
work:
48.2.1 Repaint and repair (if necessary) the exterior of the
building;
48.2.2 Repair the roof (if necessary);
48.2.3 Fence around the balcony;
48.2.4 Landscaping.
48.2.5 fitout all floors by painting, flooring, installation of toilet
and kitchen.
48.2.6 any other work that at the Tenant’s opinion is necessary for the
Tenant’s business use of the premises.
Details of the work are listed in the attached schedule.
48.3 All work shall be done in a workmanlike manner and according to the New Zealand Building Code. If resource consent and/or building consent are required for any work the Tenant shall at the Tenant’s cost obtain the relevant consent before the work starts.
The Tenant shall also obtain Code Compliance certificate for any work that
building consent is required.
48.4 The tenant must obtain the Landlord written approval for the fitout
work and other work at lease 20 working days prior to
the commencement of the
work. If resource consent or building consent is required for the work the
tenant must obtain the landlord’s
written consent at least 10 working days
before the Tenant submit the application for the consent to the authority. The
tenant shall
provide the landlord with plans and specifications and other
information necessary for the landlord to approve the work. The landlord
shall
consider the work fairly and reasonably and shall make a decision within 5
working days after receiving the notice and necessary
information from the
Tenant for the approval.
48.5 The Tenant must commence the renovation of the building by 1 March 2011. The work listed in above 48.2.1 to 48.2.4 in relationship to everything downstairs, landscaping out the front, all external work on the house, front fencing, etc must be completed by
31 December 2011. All other work in relation to the gardens out the back and inside upstairs must be completed by 31 December 2012.
If any of the work is not completed by the time period stated above the landlord may give the Tenant 20 working days notice to
complete the work. If the Tenant fails to complete the work within the notice period the Landlord may terminate this agreement or the deed of lease immediately. If this agreement or the deed of lease is
so terminated all the work done by the tenant, except kitchen equipments will belong to the landlord. The landlord has no
obligation to pay any compensation.
48.6 At the expiry of the lease term or earlier termination of the lease
under this agreement or the deed of lease all work and
fitout completed other
than the kitchen equipment shall be the property of the landlord.
48.7 For the sake of clarity the Tenant acknowledges that the premises
are currently in a very poor condition. The Landlord leases
the premises to the
Tenant as it is. The Landlord gives no guarantee as to whether the premises are
fit for the business use of
the Tenant. The landlord does not warrant the
soundness of the structure, the fitout or the services of the premises either.
The
Tenant will do all the work necessary to make the premises fit for the
tenant’s business use and to comply with the requirements
of law and local
authority. The tenant will not require the Landlord to do any work or
contribute to any work that is
required for the premises to be used for the
tenant’s business use or to comply with the requirements of law or the
local authority.
[14] Clause 49.1 repeats the right of first refusal.
The [then] previous judgments
[15] The two previous judgments4 concern an alleged
breach of the covenant to repair at cl 48. Ellis J proceeded on the basis
that a breach had been established.
By the time the issue got to me, Hum claimed
it had completed all necessary works and also highlighted evidence that it had
expended
about $650,000 in repair costs. Stylo contends that the amount is more
in the order of $100,000.
[16] I was not able to reach a firm conclusion of the scale and standard
of the works completed by Hum. But I was satisfied that
Hum had made a
substantial contribution to the repair of the villa noting that even on the
evidence for Stylo, there had been almost
$100,000 expended by Hum on the
improvement of the premises. I therefore granted relief conditional on the
production of a report
by a Court appointed expert specifically assessing
whether the works specified at cl 48.5 have been completed, whether those works
have been completed in a workmanlike manner, and if not, what is required to
complete those works to that standard. I recorded that
this route to a final
outcome was suggested by Ms Abdale.
The third application
[4] The third proceeding concerned an application for cancellation and possession for non payment of rent. Hum contended that relief from cancellation should be granted because the building’s foundation had never been fit for purpose and the rent should be abated pending the completion of necessary repairs to the foundations by Stylo. The essential issue was whether I could cancel the lease or grant relief from cancellation because the claim that the building foundations were never fit for purpose in against a backdrop where Hum had undertaken substantial works to rejuvenate the building. For the purposes of the cancellation application I rejected Hum’s complaints about the building not being fit for purpose given the very clear terms of the agreements to lease and the lease that Hum was taking the lease off the building “as it is”. Ultimately I resolved to give conditional relief from forfeiture on the basis that all outstanding rent (exclusive of interest) and outgoings as at the date of that judgment were to be paid within 15 working days. It transpires that the amount was paid, albeit it one working day late. Stylo objected to the grant of an extension of time within which to make payment. I nevertheless granted that
extension and that decision has been appealed to the Court of
Appeal.
4 First Cancellation Decision, above n 1; Second Cancellation Decision, above n 2.
Current issues
[5] Hum failed to make payment of its rental on time in January 2015.
Stylo filed a further Property Law Act notice claim,
after the requisite period,
in February. The rental was paid in February and Hum lodged an application for
stay to, in short, prevent
Stylo from commencing further Property Law Act claims
while the second proceedings and the appeal to the Court of appeal remained
unresolved. Faire J directed that this application be heard together with the
second application. I considered that the most
efficient way to deal with all
outstanding matters was to await the production of the expert report as directed
by me for the purposes
of conditional relief in the second cancellation decision
and then to have all matters determined at the same time.
[6] After discussion with counsel it was agreed that the
following matters remained to be determined namely:
(a) Whether the work subject to covenant 48 has been completed and if not,
what is required to complete those works;
(b) Whether I should cancel the lease in respect of non compliance, if any,
with covenant 48;
(c) Whether I should make an order for costs and on what basis.
[7] It was also considered appropriate to take the opportunity to
resolve to the extent necessary the stay application in conjunction
with the
third rent application, the critical issues being:
(a) Has the outstanding rental been paid?
(b) If not, whether the application is an abuse of process;
(c) If the application is not an abuse of process should the lease be cancelled for non payment of rent?
[8] It transpires that the outstanding rental had in fact been paid by
the hearing date, but I was advised that the April rental
was now overdue and
the May rental was due to be paid a week after the hearing. The critical issue
in relation to this rent application
then is whether I should grant relief from
cancellation in that context.
Resolution of the second cancellation proceedings
[9] To recap I granted relief from cancellation on the basis that the
Court would appoint an expert to specifically assess whether
the work specified
at cl 48.5 has been completed, whether those works have been completed
in a workmanlike manner, and
if not, what is required to complete
those works to that standard. Mr White was appointed as the independent
expert.
[10] It transpires that the expert was unable to provide a comprehensive
analysis in terms of the questions posed. It is necessary
nevertheless to
briefly canvas the outcomes in the report in order then to resolve the second
proceeding.
[11] In accordance with cl 48.5, Mr White assessed the following
works:
(a) Repaint and repair (if necessary) the exterior of the
building (cl
48.2.1);
(b) Repair the roof (if necessary) (cl 48.2.2); (c) Fence around boundary (cl 48.2.3);
(d) Landscaping (cl 48.2.4).
[12] I turn to examine Mr White’s conclusions on each
aspect.
Repaint and repair (if necessary) the exterior of the
building
[13] Mr White concludes:
The painting to the exterior of the building is not complete. The lean-to area to the rear (western) elevation which is due to be demolished as part of the commercial renovation has been left unpainted.
[14] Mr White observes that based on available information, the existing
weatherboards were stripped of existing paint by
the application of a
special stripping agent and there are numerous photographs showing this process
in various stages. Mr
White nevertheless concludes it is unclear from the
photographs provided to what extent the rot was removed and to which location.
He was not able to say that the rot had been remediated. However, he observes
that it is clear from the before and after photographs
that a significant amount
of restoration works was undertaken.
[15] He also observes that it appears that soakers do not appear to have
been installed. He understands that the Auckland Council
has confirmed they
were happy with the heritage colours, but it is unclear as to which of the
colours was confirmed as appropriate.
[16] Mr White then observes:
The standing of the painting is reasonable and the workmanship is
fair.
[17] He also refers to a Maynard Marks’ report and the
observation that the weatherboards on the northern elevation
are poorly
fitted. He concludes that this is explained by reason that these weatherboards
are tacked in place because of an issue
with sub-floor piling work.
Repair the roof (if necessary)
[18] Mr White was unable to inspect the roof, but noted that from street
level it looked reasonable.
Fence and balcony
[19] Mr White observed that the balustrades to the verandah decks on the first and second level are incomplete on the north and west elevations. He says there are two bays on each level which have a non-compliant horizontal rail barrier in place. As to the balustrade work that has been completed, he says that they have been replicated from the original shapes. He says these appear to have been installed and suitably fixed, the spacings between the balustrades appear consistent and compliant.
[20] As to what is required to complete the works, he observes that the
balustrades will need to be completed on the north and
west elevations as
identified above.
Landscaping
[21] Mr White observes it was unclear to what extent landscaping
work was expected to be completed. He notes that
a proposed plan shows soft
and hard landscaping, but that this appears to relate to restaurant changes
which have not been undertaken
yet. He also notes that the fencing and front
hedging is not complete.
[22] In terms of the manner of the works, he notes that it appears that
the front and rear yards have been tidied up, but it is
unclear to what extent
the landscaping works are required. As he was unable to define the scope of the
landscaping work he is unable
to comment on what is required to complete those
works to that standard.
Submissions of counsel
[23] Neither counsel was particularly impressed by the report. Mr
Parmenter highlighted that the report concludes that some
works had not been
completed and to the extent that works have been completed the report does not
confirm that they have been completed
to the requisite standard in the
lease.
[24] Ms Abdale submitted that key works have been completed and that they have been completed to a workmanlike level. She also emphasised that in terms of the landscaping works, the lease is not ambiguous in that the schedule referred to by Mr White related only to “fit-out works” which were not in focus for the purposes of the assessment. She says that the landscaping that was required has been completed. As to the comments about the roof, there is ample evidence before me that substantial works have been done to the roof and that overall Mr White’s assessment is at least benign insofar as concerns Hum. There is no suggestion in the report that the works are substandard and there are references to the fact that a substantial amount of restoration work has been undertaken.
Assessment
[25] Mr White’s report has been only of limited assistance to me.
My overall impression is, however, that the repair and
painting has largely been
undertaken to a workmanlike standard. I am unable to reach any final view in
relation to the roof, save
to observe that Mr White’s examination did not
reveal any substantive defects or inadequacy (though I accept that his opinion
was based on a cursory examination only). As to landscaping, the type of
landscaping works required by the lease is linked to the
consented works
envisaged by the lease. I accept Hum’s position that the ability to
undertake the consented works is in turn
inextricably linked to an issue with
the re-piling. To the extent that the landscaping of the property does not meet
the requirements
of the schedule, there is, therefore, a reasonable explanation
for it. I should be clear that I am not expressing a final view on
where the
proper balance lies in terms of the requirement to achieve landscaping in
accordance with the consent. But for
the purposes of exercising my discretion
to grant relief, I conclude that the assessment is overall favourable to
Hum.
[26] Given the foregoing, I have come to the view that in light of Mr
White’s report and the evidence as a whole, substantial
works have been
undertaken by Hum with key aspects of it undertaken to a good workmanlike
standard. Any residual relevant breach
of cl 48.5 appears to be minor. I
therefore conclude that it is appropriate that my temporary order be made final
insofar as concerns
the complaint made by Stylo in relation to non-compliance
with cl 48 of the lease.
Non-payment of rent and relief from cancellation
[27] I have set out the relevant principles in my judgment in the third cancellation decision.5 In short, the Court has a broad discretion to provide relief from cancellation. A history of non payment of rent does not necessarily disqualify a
tenant from relief.6 However, it would be
inequitable to place a landlord in the
5 Third cancellation decision, above n 1 at [24] and [25] referring to Studio X v Mobil Oil New
Zealand Ltd [1996] 2 NZLR 697 (HC), Mulholland v Waimarie Industries ltd (2009) 10 NZCPR
590 (HC)
position where immediate defaults
would follow the granting of relief.7 Evidence of incapacity to pay
rent is therefore a relevant factor. 8
[28] As the January rent was not paid Stylo is prima facie entitled to
cancellation.9
There are numerous factors for and against relief from cancellation
including:
(a) This is the second occasion of actionable default on payment of
rent;10
(b) The delay in all of the circumstances seems small but not de minimis; (c) Hum has undertaken substantial improvements to the property over a
lengthy period involving significant financial and personal cost to the
proprietors of Hum;
(d) At the date of hearing this matter, there was no actionable default
under the Property Law Act (but I accept that the rental
for the lease for the
month up to April 2015 remains unpaid and owing together with other
outgoings).
(e) A further rental payment was due as at 1 May 2015.
(f) Based on Ms Armitage’s evidence (who was untroubled by cross examination) Hum has now some regular income in the form of rental at about $1,500 per week, together with average earnings from the kiosk of about $300 per week. Other earnings from donations are estimated at $300 per week. The leasehold rental is $8337 per month. The net monthly position is therefore breakeven, although this does
not take into account the incidental lease expenses and running
and
7 QT Hospitality Ltd v Oxford Holdings Ltd HC Invercargill CIV 2007-425-178 11 May 2007, at
[16].
8 Inner City Businessmen’s Club v James Kirkpatrick [1975] 2 NZLR 636 (SC) at 644 – 645;
Harlow Finance and Leasing Ltd v Sterling Nominees Ltd HC Auckland 1262/00, 17 August
2000 at [8]; although see in contrast Tipping J’s comment that it was not the Court’s role to protect the landlord against ordinary commercial risks including the tenant’s insolvency: Guardsman Restaurant (Christchurch) Ltd v Victoria Square Estates Ltd (1987) 13 NZCPR 668 at 688.
9 Property Law Act 2007, s 245.
maintenance costs. Ms Armitage
also noted, however, that she may be able to get up to $800 a week from the
kiosk and other donations.
(g) There are other sources of income, but that these are
variable.
(h) It appears that Hum has substantial debts, but the majority of
those debts do not appear to have a fixed term, at least
from the evidence
before me.
(i) Ms Armitage gave evidence that Hum should be in a position
to regularise the payments of rent by the end of
June, but this will
depend on the input of a benefactor.
[29] Taking all of those factors into account, I am satisfied that the
balance overall favours of the grant of relief for the following
reasons:
(a) Hum has made substantial improvements to the property so that it is
now habitable. The significance of this is highlighted
by reference to the
terms of the lease and in particular emphasis on the dilapidated state of the
property at the commencement of
the lease;
(b) The amount owing at any given time (after the compliance with the
first order of the Court) is small relative to the contribution
made by Hum to
the property;
(c) Ms Armitage’s indication that Hum will be able to
regularise the rental payments from end of June onwards
is optimistic
but not without foundation based on her evidence of income deriving from the
property.
(d) This lease was premised on understanding that in exchange for the property being restored to a habitable state, Hum would be able to enjoy the leasehold over a very long term. The current insistence by Stylo on its strict legal rights is in my view discordant with this underlying premise. While Stylo is fully entitled to insist on its legal
rights, further relief from cancellation is warranted in
these circumstances.
[30] I am not however sanguine about Stylo’s vulnerability to
Hum’s financial position. We have reached the stage
where Hum must pay
its outstanding rental payments and regularise its payment of rental in
accordance with the lease. Stylo should
not have to be confronted with
ongoing non compliance with rental payments. I propose therefore to give
Hum one final
opportunity to regularise matters and put its rental payments to
Stylo on a proper footing. Accordingly, a condition of my relief
against
forfeiture is that Hum must pay all outstanding rental owing as at by 31 June
2015. If it does not do so, Stylo will have
leave to seek cancellation from me
without the need to file a further application. Hum can expect that I will then
cancel the lease
if the all relevant payments have not been made. Furthermore,
Hum cannot expect further indulgence in relation to the non payment
of rent on
time. I record my expectation, having now presided over several cancellation
applications that any further non payment
of rent on time will result in
cancellation.
The stay application and costs
[31] Given the position I have got to I do not propose to dwell
on the stay application. I simply note that while Stylo
is plainly intolerant
to any further non compliance with the lease terms, it has not abused the PLA
notice regime thus far. I am
concerned however that there is a risk that the
use of the regime could unfairly burden Hum with costs liability. I note in
this
regard that the Stylo notices are effectively pro forma documents that
require little by way of expert attention. It seems to me
therefore that if
Stylo wishes to continue with its litigious approach to the rental payments,
closer scrutiny will need to be given
to the appropriateness of costs on the
applications, particularly where any default has been very short.
[32] In relation to the present applications, I promised I would afford the parties an opportunity to submit on costs. If necessary they shall have 10 working days to file submissions.
Outcome
[33] I resolve the following:
(a) Relief from forfeiture in respect of the second cancellation
application is granted.
(b) The stay application is dismissed.
(c) Relief from forfeiture in respect of the second rental (the fourth
cancellation application) is granted, but subject to the
condition that leave is
reserved to Stylo to seek cancellation in the event that any outstanding rental
payments due and owing as
at 30 June 2015 are not made in accordance with the
lease terms by that date.
(d) The parties have 10 working days to file memoranda as to costs.
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