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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 28 August 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2015-404-708 [2015] NZHC 1819
UNDER
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the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the
Judicature Amendment Act 1972
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BETWEEN
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JOSEPH ROBERT KINGI Plaintiff
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AND
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NGÄ MANA WHENUA O TAMAKI MAKAURAU TRUST
First Defendant
TE RARAWA RUNANGA TRUST Second Defendant
................................./continued
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Hearing:
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30 July 2015
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Counsel:
Appearance:
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AJ Nelder for second and third defendants
AJ Allan for fourth defendant
A Milosavljevic for fifth defendant
PF Majurey, given leave to appear in respect of the named first
defendant
JR Kingi, plaintiff in person
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Judgment:
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4 August 2015
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JUDGMENT OF FAIRE J
This judgment was delivered by me on 4 August 2015 at 12 noon, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Date...............
Kingi v Ngä Mana Whenua O Tamaki Makaurau Trust [2015] NZHC 1819 [4
August 2015]
TE ROPU O TUHORONUKU INDEPENDENT MANDATED AUTHORITY
Third Defendant
ATTORNEY-GENERAL Fourth Defendant
CROWN FORESTRY RENTAL TRUST Fifth
Defendant
The application
[1] The second, third, fourth and fifth defendants apply to
strike out the plaintiff’s proceedings. They
all allege that the
statement of claim alleges no reasonably arguable cause of action. Several
also assert that the proceedings
are frivolous and vexatious, are an abuse of
process and cause prejudice and delay.
Directions for the hearing
[2] The proceeding was called before Ellis J on 14 May 2015. Her
Honour’s minute of the matters discussed at that time
gives a helpful
background to why the plaintiff has filed the proceeding. It also gave
directions for the taking of steps and the
setting up of this
fixture.
[3] Her Honour recorded:
[1] Mr Kingi has a number of concerns related to the conduct of the
Wai 1941 claim in the Waitangi Tribunal, including as to
funding and hearing
time allocated. He also has concerns (as I understand it) about the conduct of
Te Ropu o Tuhoronuku Independent
Mandated Authority, which is the body mandated
to settle Ngapuhi’s historical Treaty claims with the Crown.
[2] Mr Kingi has attempted previously to have the Wai 1941 claim stayed by way of originating application to this Court but that was struck out on 11 February 2015 by Muir J. The previous day, it had been suggested to Mr Kingi by Duffy J that the proceedings might be more appropriately brought as a claim for judicial review. These proceedings appear to have been the result.
[3] Each of the respondents named in the claim for judicial review
have filed, or will shortly file, an application to strike
out the claim. I
attempted to explain to Mr Kingi what that entailed. I urged him to seek legal
advice, if he is able; there certainly
appears to be some difficulty with his
claim as drafted.
Compliance with her Honour’s directions
[4] Mr Kingi has filed documents however, they do not comply with the
court’s requirements for a notice of opposition
and as prescribed by r
7.24 of the High Court Rules. The applicant’s have all filed detailed
submissions in support of the
strike out applications as directed by her Honour.
Mr Kingi has not filed any memorandum or submission which addresses the matters
raised by counsel’s submissions.
The court’s approach to strike out applications
[5] Rule 15.1 of the High Court Rules provides:
15.1 Dismissing or staying all or part of proceeding
(1) The court may strike out all or part of a pleading if it—
(a) discloses no reasonably arguable cause of action, defence, or case
appropriate to the nature of the pleading; or
(b) is likely to cause prejudice or delay; or
(c) is frivolous or vexatious; or
(d) is otherwise an abuse of the process of the court.
(2) If the court strikes out a statement of claim or a counterclaim under
subclause (1), it may by the same or a subsequent order
dismiss the proceeding
or the counterclaim.
(3) Instead of striking out all or part of a pleading under subclause (1),
the court may stay all or part of the proceeding on such
conditions as are
considered just.
(4) This rule does not affect the court’s inherent
jurisdiction.
[6] The general principles to be applied in a strike out application are well known. They were confirmed in Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner where the
Court of Appeal said:1
1 Attorney-General v Prince and Gardner [1998] 1 NZLR 262 (CA) at 267.
A striking-out application proceeds on the assumption that the facts pleaded in the statement of claim are true. That is so even although they are not or may not be admitted. It is well settled that before the Court may strike out proceedings the causes of action must be so clearly untenable that they cannot possibly succeed (R Lucas & Son (Nelson Mail) Ltd v O’Brien [1978]
2 NZLR 289 at pp 294-295; Takaro Properties Ltd (in receivership) v
Rowling [1978] 2 NZLR 314 at pp 316-317); the jurisdiction is one to be exercised sparingly, and only in a clear case where the Court is satisfied it
has the requisite material (Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis [1983] NZLR
37 at p 45; Electricity Corporation Ltd v Geotherm Energy Ltd [1992] 2
NZLR 641); but the fact that applications to strike out raise difficult questions of law, and require extensive argument does not exclude
jurisdiction (Gartside v Sheffield, Young & Ellis).
[7] The principles referred to above were endorsed in Couch
v Attorney- General.2
[8] The court can have regard to affidavit evidence either put
forward in opposition or support of the application
provided it does not
contradict that which is pleaded in the statement of claim: Attorney-General
v McVeagh.3
[9] Caution is required, particularly where the case involves
allegations of duties of care in novel situations. That
has to be
measured against the position that defendants should not be subjected
to substantial costs by defending
untenable claims: Queenstown Lakes
District Council v Charterhall Trustees Ltd.4
An amended statement of claim
[10] Counsel were served with document entitled Amended statement of claim. I could not find it on the file however a copy was made available to me at the hearing. Mr Kingi and counsel invited me to proceed on the basis that the pleading under challenge is, in fact, the amended statement of claim. Assuming that to be the case, the original statement of claim is treated by the court as no longer existing and the
matter is therefore determined on the basis of the latest amended
statement of claim.5
2 Couch v Attorney-General [2008] NZSC 45; [2008] 3 NZLR 725.
3 Attorney-General v McVeagh [1995] 1 NZLR 558 (CA) at 566.
4 Queenstown Lakes District Council v Charterhall Trustees Ltd [2009] NZCA 374; [2009]
3 NZLR 786 at [16].
5 Price Waterhouse v Fortex Group Ltd CA179/98, 30 November 1998 at 17.
The grounds proposed for striking out the proceeding
[11] The first and principal ground advanced in these strike out
applications is that the pleadings are inadequate and do not
identify the
necessary components of any recognisable cause of action. The pleadings do not
comply with rr 5.26 and 5.27 of the
High Court Rules. Neither statement of
claim is sufficiently intelligible to properly inform any of the defendants of
the case
against them and do not provide anything that would enable a sensible
response to the claim to be made. To the extent that the
claim purports to be
an application for judicial review, the pleadings fail to indentify a relevant
statutory or public power of
decision that was exercised which could be the
subject of judicial review. Further, they do not provide a pleading
of
a remedy that would be available to the plaintiff on judicial
review.
[12] This is a case where the pleading is so bad that the court should
not allow an opportunity for any amendment.
[13] I canvassed with Mr Kingi as to whether he was likely to obtain
legal advice and he indicated that he may well do so. If
there is any proper
basis for a claim, a matter which is not identified by Mr Kingi, then it would
be over to the person filing such
claim to present a document which contains a
recognisable cause of action and pleads a remedy which, in law, is recognised as
flowing
from such a cause of action.
[14] The deficiencies of this statement of claim and the amended
statement of claim were clearly signalled in advance to Mr Kingi
by the
submissions filed on behalf of the second to fifth defendants. It is
regrettable that Mr Kingi made no attempt to address
the substance of those
submissions. The result is that I have been presented with no theoretical basis
for some cause of action
that he might have which might justify and order for
stay as opposed to strike out whilst a proper pleading is prepared.
[15] Counsel’s very careful submissions drew attention to the other grounds justifying an order striking out a statement of claim which are set out in r 15.1 of the High Court Rules. It is unnecessary that I review those other grounds because the first ground for an order striking out the statement of claim is very clearly made out in this case.
The position of the first defendant
[16] No application is made on the first-named defendant’s behalf.
Mr Majurey submitted from the Bar that the named entity
did not exist. I am not
in a position on the material placed before me to determine whether, factually,
that submission is correct.
Be that as it may, the inadequacies of the
pleadings, in my view, justify the striking out of the whole proceeding,
including the
references to the first defendant because the documents presented
to the court are plainly inadequate and provide in their content
no
justification for further consideration by the court. They fail to identify a
reasonable cause of action. It is for that reason
that I intend making an order
dealing with the entire proceeding.
Costs
[17] Counsel reported that this was not the first occasion when Mr Kingi
had filed a proceeding allegedly to cover the matters
that he identified in a
discussion with Ellis J in respect of which I have recorded her Honour’s
reference to what she was
told. Understandably, some counsel have sought orders
for increased or indemnity costs.
[18] I can understand the frustration of the parties who have taken steps
here and why, in the circumstances, they invite the
court to engage that part of
Part 14 of the High Court Rules dealing with increased and indemnity costs.
Nevertheless, I have concluded
that at this early stage of this proceeding, and
because I determine that finality of all matters arising out of this proceeding
is in the interests of all parties, costs should be fixed by a strict
application for Category 2 Band B in respect of each of the
defendants’
applications to strike out.
[19] In the case of the second defendant’s application, no
allowance should be made for hearing because counsel responsibly
did not appear,
but invited counsel for the third defendant to speak on its behalf.
Orders
[20] Accordingly, I order that:
(a) this proceeding be struck out in its entirety. That includes that
part of the pleadings which refer to the first defendant;
(b) the second, third, fourth and fifth defendants are awarded costs
based on Category 2 Band B together with disbursements
as fixed by the Registrar
and having regard specifically to the clarification that I have made in respect
of the second defendant;
and
(c) no order for costs is made in respect of the entity named as the
first defendant and in favour of whoever instructed Mr
Majurey to
appear.
JA Faire J
Solicitors: Russell McVeagh, Auckland Crown Law, Wellington Buddle Findlay,
Auckland
To: PJ Majurey, – Atkins Holm Majurey Ltd, Auckland
JR Kingi, Auckland
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