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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 18 November 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2014-404-000915 [2015] NZHC 2717
BETWEEN
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WATER GUARD NZ LIMITED
Plaintiff
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AND
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CYNORTIC WATER SYSTEMS LIMITED
First Defendant
MARK JAMES SULLIVAN and SUSAN MARY SULLIVAN
Second Defendants
CYNORTIC LIMITED Third Defendant
REINER GEORGE BRAGULLA Fourth Defendant
CYNORTIC INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Fifth Defendant
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Hearing:
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On the papers
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Judgment:
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4 November 2015
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JUDGMENT OF ASHER J (Costs)
This judgment was delivered by me on Wednesday, 4 November 2015 at 11 am
pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors/Counsel: M Fisher, Auckland.
Castle/Brown Solicitors, Auckland.
DG Hurd, Auckland.
B Dwyer, Christchurch.
WATER GUARD NZ LTD v CYNORTIC WATER SYSTEMS LTD [2015] NZHC 2717 [4 November 2015]
[1] I issued my substantive judgment in this proceeding on 15 September
2015.1
The decisions in relation to the first and second defendants were as
follows:2
[281] Sullivan Ltd (Cynortic Water Systems Ltd) and the Sullivans have
admitted that they should account to the plaintiff for the
loss of any profits
as a result of any sales undertaken by them in New Zealand. The sum in
question is very small, as there were
only a few sales over a short period.
Sullivan Ltd consents to an account of profits for sales by it and has nominated
a sum it will
pay. Any remaining issues as to quantum in that regard can be
dealt with at the damages hearing.
[282] However, save for this admission, no claim has been made out against
Sullivan Ltd or the Sullivans. I refuse to grant a declaration
that the first
defendant (Sullivan Ltd) has no interest in the EDA. The claims for inducement
to breach contract, conspiracy and
the Fair Trading Act claims against Sullivan
Ltd and Mr and Mrs Sullivan fail.
...
[286] I make the following orders and declarations:
...
(b) A declaration that the plaintiff is the distributor under the
EDA.
...
[2] The plaintiff seeks costs against the first and second defendants
on a 2B basis together with disbursements. In stark contrast,
the first and
second defendants seek costs from the plaintiff on a 2B basis uplifted by 50 per
cent (which as it happens would be
close to indemnity costs). They also seek
disbursements.
[3] In the proceeding before me the substantive issues were the plaintiff ’s claim against Cynortic Water Systems Ltd and the Sullivans as first and second defendants for various declarations relating to the exclusive distribution agreement (the EDA), and claims for inducement of breach of contract and unlawful conspiracy. The plaintiff obtained declaratory orders which were not ultimately opposed by the first and second defendants, and it has a notional entitlement to a very small amount of damages for what the first and second defendants accepted at the hearing was wrongful behaviour on their part in trying to sell some Water Guard units themselves
rather than through the plaintiff.
1 Water Guard NZ Ltd v Midgen Enterprises Ltd [2015] NZHC 2227.
2 At [286].
[4] There were certain broad dynamics in the case which made it
unusual. The Sullivans and their company, the first defendant,
purchased
a business which supplied water systems to Mr Morgan’s company, the
plaintiff. In a late change of direction
the Sullivans’ company did
not purchase the supplier’s core business, which was the subject of
the EDA between
the original supplier Cynortic Ltd and the original
distributor, Midgen Enterprises Ltd. The change was effected by a
document called “the addendum” which had the effect of the
Sullivans’ company not acquiring the supply rights under
the agreement
which remained with the original supplier Cynortic Ltd, and thereby losing their
ability to directly enforce the agreement
against the plaintiff.
[5] Nevertheless, the Sullivans did through their company acquire the
intellectual property and the effective manufacturing
rights for the Water Guard
units. They have through this proceeding oscillated between positions where
they have treated themselves
as a party to the EDA and not a party to the EDA.
However, I have found that they did not have any long term agenda to damage Mr
Morgan or the plaintiff.
[6] The plaintiff failed in its endeavour to obtain a declaration,
which for tactical purposes it sought, declaring that the
Sullivans had no
interest in the EDA. It also failed entirely in its tort causes of action. In
the end the only relief it obtained
was that consented to or not opposed by the
defendants.
[7] Under r 14.2(a) of the High Court Rules a party who fails in a
proceeding should pay costs to the party who succeeds. The
modern approach to
the allocation of costs is reflected in the statement of the Court of Appeal in
Packing In Ltd (in liquidation) v Chilcott where it was
stated:3
Success or failure in this context is better assessed by a realistic
appraisal of the end result rather than by focusing on who initiated
what step,
and the extent to which that step succeeded or failed.
[8] On its face the first and second defendants are entitled to costs
as the parties that were largely successful. It is true
as Mr Fisher has
pointed out, that the position
3 Packing In Ltd (in liquidation) v Chilcott [2003] NZCA 124; (2003) 16 PRNZ 869 (CA) at [6].
of the first and second defendants to the declarations made by consent did
not become clear until towards the end of the hearing.
However, little time was
spent arguing about the terms of the declarations that were ultimately consented
to, and the evidence
was much the same as it would have been if the
declarations were consented to from the outset.
[9] In my view, following the general rule that costs follow the event,
the first and second defendants are entitled to costs
from the plaintiff and I
propose making an order on that basis.
[10] There would be some reason to consider an order for increased costs.
I found
Mr Morgan’s behaviour to have been very unreasonable and
combative.
[11] However, I am not prepared to order any increased costs for two
reasons. First, the Sullivans did at one point attempt to
appoint other
distributors in New Zealand and their actions compelled the plaintiff to issue
proceedings and seek, ultimately by
consent, interim injunctive orders. They
then purported to terminate the EDA by letter dated 10 December 2014 forcing the
plaintiff
to successfully seek an interim injunction. Second, there is
something in Mr Fisher’s point that the first and second defendants
did
not make their position clear as to the substantive issues relating to the EDA
until late in the piece.
[12] Turning to the plaintiff ’s claim for costs, it fails as the
plaintiff was largely unsuccessful in the trial against
the Sullivan interests.
While the plaintiff must pay the first and second defendants’ costs on
scale for the trial, that is
not the case for the interim injunctions. The
first and second defendants were in the wrong in taking positions (from which
they
later resiled) contrary to the interests of the plaintiff, forcing the
plaintiff to bring those applications. They should not get
costs on the
interim injunctions. However, Mr Morgan’s unreasonable and bullying
behavior was such that I consider in my discretion
that the Sullivans should not
have to pay the plaintiff’s costs.
[13] As to the first injunction, the defendants admitted from the outset that their action in selling units was wrong and they immediately undertook to stop that
activity. The plaintiff continued with the injunction, and Fogarty J in a
telephone conference minute dated 1 July 2014 warned
that the plaintiff
was at risk of indemnity costs by attempting to pursue the matter further in
these circumstances. He noted
he had formed the impression that the first and
second defendants had been consistently trying to assure the plaintiff that they
had no intention of exercising any power (which they did not think they had) to
appoint further distributors. The matter was in
the end resolved by the making
of orders along the lines of the undertakings offered by the defendants at the
outset.
[14] In respect of the second injunction, the root cause of the defendant’s behaviour was Mr Morgan’s unconstructive and bullying behavior. Moreover, there is no evidence Morgan Ltd ever actually purchased Water Guard systems from Cynortic Ltd, which was a condition imposed as part of the grant of the injunctive relief. My view following the trial was that the plaintiff was plainly in breach of the EDA, and having heard Mr Morgan give evidence, that he did not intend to ever
place any orders for units or parts.4 The plaintiff cannot
obtain costs for obtaining
the second injunction when it did not comply with the conditions of the
injunction or the conditions of the EDA.
[15] Thus, in respect of the interim injunction applications there was
fault on both sides, and the costs and reasonable disbursements
relating to
those specific applications will lie where they fall.
[16] There is also an issue relating to an application for
leave to file a counterclaim. The first and second defendants
were in
essence unsuccessful on their application to file an amended counterclaim, but
were successful in the trial. The Sullivans
will not get costs on the
application to amend.
[17] The plaintiff sought further and better discovery. It does seem as if the first and second defendants’ initial list of documents was incomplete. However, it is my assessment that the plaintiff acted prematurely in applying to obtain an order. The correspondence shows that there was no attempt between counsel to discuss the
particular discovery issues and to resolve them. Ultimately as could be
expected the
4 At [245].
issues were resolved by consent. The plaintiff should have had discussions
with the defendants, as required by rr 8.2 and 8.11(1)
of the High Court
Rules.
[18] Therefore in my assessment it is fair that costs will lie where they
fall in relation to the further discovery.
[19] The end result is that the plaintiff will pay the first and second
defendants’ costs and disbursements on a 2B basis.
Excluded from this are
all costs relating to the interim injunction applications, the application to
amend the counterclaim, and
for further and better discovery. Those costs will
lie where they fall.
[20] I am unable to approve or apportion the specific items
listed in the memoranda summarising costs filed by counsel,
as it is not clear
from the notations whether and if so how they related to the interim injunction
and discovery applications. I
will have to leave that to counsel.
[21] I hope that the parties will now agree on the exact quantum of
costs. Leave is reserved to apply further.
...................................
Asher J
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