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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 22 December 2015
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2015-404-1218 [2015] NZHC 3311
UNDER
|
the Companies Act 1993
|
IN THE MATTER OF
|
the liquidation of VICTORIA STREET WEST LIMITED (IN LIQUIATION)
|
BETWEEN
|
NEVILLE MCCLUTCHIE BAKER SAM KAHUI
SIR NGATA LOVE
REBECCA ELIZABETH MELLISH KURA MOEAHU TOARANGATIRA POMARE
TE RIRA PUKETAPU HOKIPERA RUAKERE MORRIS TE WHITI LOVE
HOWARD KEVIN TAMATI AND MARK TE ONE
AS TRUSTEES OF THE PORT NICHOLSON BLOCK SETTLEMENT TRUST
Plaintiffs
|
AND
|
JOHN MICHAEL GILBERT Defendant
|
Hearing:
|
15 December 2015 at 10:00am
|
Appearances:
|
G J Toebes for Plaintiffs
A R Nicholls for Defendant
|
Judgment:
|
18 December 2015
|
JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE R M BELL
This judgment was delivered by me on 18 December 2015 at 3:00pm.
Pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Solicitors:
.............................................................
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
JT Law (GJ Toebes) Wellington, for Plaintiffs
Edward Clark Dickie (AR Nicholls) Auckland, for Defendant
Grove Darlow (TJG Allan) Auckland for Plaintiffs
BAKER & Ors v GILBERT [2015] NZHC 3311 [18 December 2015]
[1] This case concerns a dispute about who should be the liquidator of
Victoria Street West Ltd (in liquidation). John
Gilbert, an Auckland
accountant, is the incumbent. He was appointed by a shareholders’
resolution putting the company
into liquidation under s 241(2)(a) of the
Companies Act 1993. He says that his appointment was confirmed at a meeting of
creditors
held under s 243 of the Companies Act on 8 May 2015. The plaintiffs,
unsecured creditors, initially challenged the confirmation
on two grounds,
insufficient notice given to creditors (Companies Act, Schedule 5, cl 2) and a
tainted result because of the voting
of related entities (s 245A of the
Companies Act), but withdrew the first ground. They ask the court to appoint
liquidators of their
choice.
[2] Mr Anthony Gapes is an Auckland property developer and investor.
He is the director and shareholder of Victoria Street
West Ltd. In the way of
such people, he has a complex web of companies. He often changes the names of
his companies. He cannot,
however, change the number under which the company is
registered at the Companies Office. Victoria Street West Ltd is the company
registered under the number 1838672. When it was incorporated on 10 July 2006
it was called Redwood Corporate Trustee Ltd. It was
renamed Redwood Group Ltd
on 1 September 2006. On 2 October 2014, Redwood Group Ltd changed its name to
R W Corporate Trustee
Ltd. On 8 April 2015, R W Corporate Trustee Ltd changed
its name to Victoria Street West Ltd.
[3] It is necessary to distinguish that company from another Gapes company, with registered number 1203552. That was incorporated as Barnaby Property Ltd on
12 April 2002. It changed its name to Redwood Group Ltd on 2 October 2014.
It changed its name to Victoria Street W Ltd on 7 April
2015 and on 8 April 2015
it was renamed Redwood Group Ltd. The company with registered number 1203552 is
not in liquidation. Mr
Gapes is also its sole director and shareholder. The
point to note is that until 2 October 2014 Redwood Group Ltd was the name of
the
company numbered 1838672, but that since that date it has been the name of the
company numbered 1203552.
[4] The plaintiffs are the trustees of the Port Nicholson Block Settlement Trust. They are creditors of Victoria Street West Ltd for $731,474.68. In 2010 the trust
had paid a deposit of $750,000 to buy a property at 83 Waterloo Quay, Wellington. The trust assigned the benefit of the agreement for sale and purchase to Victoria Street West Ltd. Under the assignment, Victoria Street West Ltd was required to reimburse the trust for the deposit by 31 March 2011, together with interest. While the company made some payments, it did not pay in full. The trust issued a statutory demand which the company contested. That led to the parties entering into a deed of covenant on 17 October 2014, under which the company undertook to repay
$731,474.68 by 4:30pm on Friday 10 April 2015. The deed provided that if
the company defaulted, the company would take no steps
to delay, frustrate or
oppose on any basis whatsoever any application by the trust for orders to
appoint liquidators. The company
would be estopped from taking any steps to
oppose, delay or frustrate any such applications.
[5] On 10 April 2015 the company had not paid the debt. Instead Mr
Gapes, as shareholder, passed a special resolution for
Victoria Street West
Ltd to go into liquidation. He appointed Mr Gilbert liquidator. There
is no challenge to Mr Gilbert’s
initial appointment as liquidator. It
was effective under s 241(2)(a) of the Companies Act. There is no suggestion
that under s
280 of the Companies Act Mr Gilbert was disqualified from acting as
liquidator.
[6] Under the deed, the trustees made it clear that default in payment
would lead to liquidation. They got the liquidation,
but not the liquidator
they wanted. They regard the company as frustrating steps they would take to
have liquidators of their choice
appointed.
[7] Mr Gilbert’s first report is dated 17 April 2015. The report advised creditors that one creditor had requested a meeting. He advised that he intended to hold the meeting on Friday 8 May 2015 at his offices at Level 1, 26 Crummer Road, Grey Lynn, Auckland. The report includes a schedule of some 40 creditors. The statement of affairs shows funds in a bank account of $34,223.56, with other assets not expected to realise anything. There is said to be a floating charge debenture securing
$26,428.29. Unsecured creditors are said to come to $1,407,080.89. The report states that the company acted as a corporate trustee for the Redwood Group Trust.
[8] The plaintiffs criticise the information in Mr Gilbert’s
report. That criticism may not be fair. The report
was prepared very
shortly after Mr Gilbert was appointed. It is unlikely that he would have
had enough time to investigate
matters fully and to give a more thorough
report.
[9] The report stated that the company had not traded since
2014. It can therefore be inferred that the company
was trading up until
then.
[10] Section 243 of the Companies Act says:
243 Liquidator to summon meeting of creditors
(1) Subject to section 245 and to subsection (8), the liquidator of a
company must call a meeting of the creditors of the company
for the
purpose,—
(a) in the case of a liquidator appointed pursuant to paragraph (a) or
paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section 241, of resolving
whether to confirm
the appointment of that liquidator or to appoint another liquidator in place of
the liquidator so appointed:
(b) in the case of a liquidator appointed pursuant to paragraph (c) of
subsection (2) of section 241, of resolving whether
to confirm the appointment
of that liquidator or to make an application to the court for the appointment of
a liquidator in place
of the liquidator so appointed:
(c) in either case, of determining whether to pass a resolution for
the purposes of section 258(1)(b).
(1A) If the appointment of a liquidator under paragraph (a) or paragraph
(b) of section 241(2) is not confirmed at a meeting of
creditors and another
liquidator is not appointed in place of that liquidator, the appointment of the
liquidator under paragraph
(a) or paragraph (b) of section 241(2) continues
until another liquidator is appointed.
(2) Notice in writing of a meeting of creditors—
(a) must be given to every known creditor together with the report and
notice referred to in section 255(2)(c); and
(b) if the liquidator receives a notice under section 245(1)(b)(iii),
must be given within 10 working days after receiving
the notice.
(3) Public notice of the meeting of creditors must also be given by the liquidator not less than 5 working days before the date of the meeting.
(4) Except if subsection (2)(b) applies, a meeting of creditors must be
held,—
(a) in the case of a liquidator appointed under paragraph (a) or paragraph
(b) of subsection (2) of section 241, within 10 working
days of the
liquidator’s appointment; or
(b) in the case of a liquidator appointed under paragraph (c) of subsection
(2) of section 241, within 30 working days of the liquidator’s
appointment; or
(c) in either case, within such longer period as the court may
allow.
(4A) If subsection (2)(b) applies, a meeting of creditors must be held
within 15 working days after the liquidator receives a
notice under
245(1)(b)(iii) requiring a meeting of creditors to be called.
(5) Every meeting of creditors must be held in accordance with
Schedule 5.
(6) If at a meeting of creditors it is resolved to appoint a person as
liquidator of the company in place of the liquidator
appointed pursuant to
paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section 241, the person who
it is resolved to appoint as
liquidator shall, subject to section 282, be the
liquidator of the company.
(7) If at a meeting of creditors it is resolved to apply to the court
for the appointment of a person as liquidator in place
of the liquidator
appointed pursuant to paragraph (c) of subsection (2) of section 241, the
liquidator of the company must forthwith
apply to the court for the appointment
of that person as liquidator and the court may, if it thinks fit, appoint that
person as the
liquidator of the company.
(8) Nothing in this section applies to the liquidator of a company appointed pursuant to paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of subsection (2) of section 241 if, within
20 working days before the appointment of the liquidator, the board of the company
resolved that the company would, on the appointment of a liquidator under
either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of that subsection,
be able to pay its
debts and a copy of the resolution is delivered to the Registrar for
registration.
(9) The directors who vote in favour of such a resolution must sign a
certificate stating that, in their opinion, the company
would, on the
appointment of a liquidator under either paragraph (a) or paragraph (b) of
subsection (2) of section 241, as the case
may be, be able to pay its debts, and
the grounds for that opinion.
(10) Every director who fails to comply with subsection (9) commits an
offence and is liable on conviction to the penalty set
out in section
373(1).
(11) Except for subsection (5), this section does not apply if the
liquidator is appointed under section 241(2)(d).
[11] Mr Gilbert gave written notice of the creditors meeting on 1 May 2015 to all creditors. The meeting was held on 8 May 2015 at the time and place given in his
notice to creditors. A representative of the plaintiffs attended. Mr
Gilbert chaired the meeting. No minutes of the meeting have
been put in
evidence. It is, however, not disputed that at the meeting a resolution was put
that “John Michael Gilbert’s
appointment as liquidator be
confirmed.” The trustees voted against the resolution. They were the only
ones to do so. Seven
creditors voted in favour of the resolution. The value of
the debts owed to them exceeded the debt to the trustees. The evidence
does not
say whether other creditors attended in person, cast postal votes or by
proxies.
[12] Under Schedule 5 cl 5 of the Companies Act, the voting requirements
for a resolution to be passed at a meeting of creditors
are a majority in number
and value. Mr Gilbert accordingly says that the resolution was effective to
confirm his appointment.
[13] The creditors who voted in favour of the resolution were: (a) ENG Trust Ltd $31,613.32
(b) Orakei Investments Ltd $566,437.25
(c) RWG Trust $601,113.00 $1,199,163.57 (d) 62 Victoria Street Trust $27,005.88
(e) BDO Spicers $25,978.67 (f) Burton & Co $11,411.00
(g) Russell McVeagh: $17,626.07
$82.021.62
TOTAL: $1.281.185.19
[14] It is not contested that ENG Trust Ltd, Orakei Investments Ltd and RWG Trust are related entities under s 245A of the Companies Act. Mr Gapes is director of ENG Trust Ltd and Orakei Investments Ltd. He is the shareholder of ENG Trust
Ltd. Victoria Street West Ltd is the shareholder of Orakei Investments
Ltd.1 On Victoria Street West Ltd going into liquidation, Mr
Gilbert took control of the shares of Orakei Investments Ltd as an asset of
Victoria Street West Ltd. Mr Gapes has remained director.
[15] The plaintiffs are seeking alternative liquidators, because they
fear that Mr Gilbert, as Mr Gapes’ appointee, will
not carry out a
thorough investigation. They say that if Victoria Street West Ltd had
liabilities to other Gapes entities, then
those liabilities are likely to be
represented by corresponding assets (for example, the funds applied to acquire
assets to equivalent
value or greater) or those entities had assets which would
justify providing credit. An investigation might show that there are
more
assets than initially disclosed in Mr Gilbert’s first report. They point
out that the company was trading until 2014.
They refer to a website that
describes the activities of Mr Gapes in property development and investment.
According to the website,
over the years Mr Gapes’ companies have
undertaken many successful projects valued at hundreds of millions of dollars.
The
webpage includes this statement: “Redwood are currently focusing on
the Spring Park residential development, Mt Wellington,
the $120 million
five-mile retail development in Queenstown, and potential office developments
in Wellington”. That has
to be qualified. There has been a recent news
announcement that the Spring Park development has foundered. The development
company
is now in receivership. Accordingly the plaintiffs seek a thorough
investigation because they believe that there may be more substance
to the
company than might at first appear.
[16] They also make the point that the $1.4 million of creditors in Mr Gilbert’s report did not include the debt of $731,000 owed to them. They point to the fact that the website refers to Mr Gapes’ property development activities under the name “Redwood Group Ltd,” the former name of Victoria Street West Ltd. That company has been seemingly reduced to an assetless shell, but business continues to be carried on under the name, Redwood Group Ltd, by the company formerly known as “Victoria Street W Ltd”. They refer to the Phoenix company provisions of the Companies Act, ss 386A-386F as matters that a liquidator could pursue in the
interests of creditors. While that might be of little interest to
related creditors such as
1 See Companies Act, s 245A(3)(d)(g) and (k) and the definition of “related company” in s 2(3).
ENG Trust Ltd, Orakei Investments and RWG Trust, it would be of interest to
external creditors, including the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs’ causes of action
[17] The plaintiffs have two causes of action:
(a) Seeking orders setting aside the resolution of 8 May confirming Mr
Gilbert’s appointment on the ground that he gave
insufficient notice. They
ask for orders under s 286 to call a fresh meeting, to bar the related creditors
from voting and to appoint
fresh liquidators;
(b) Orders under s 245A setting aside the resolution, directing a fresh
meeting and barring the related creditors from voting;
or, alternatively,
removing Mr Gilbert as liquidator and replacing him with liquidators of their
choice.
A procedural point
[18] While both causes of action seek orders against ENG Trust Ltd,
Orakei Investments Ltd and RWG Trust, they were not
named as respondents and
were not served. In my minute of 27 October, I directed them to be served.
They have been, but they have
taken no steps.
The first cause of action
[19] On the facts the plaintiffs have shown that Mr Gilbert did not give adequate notice of the meeting. Under s 243(5), every meeting of creditors under that section must be held in accordance with Schedule 5 of the Companies Act. Under Schedule
5, written notice of the meeting must be sent to every creditor entitled to attend, not less than five working days before the meeting. It is common ground that because Mr Gilbert sent notices to the creditors on 1 May, he gave notice less than five
working days before the meeting. He sent the notice four working days
before.2
Under the Interpretation Act 1999, s 35(5):
A reference to a number of days between 2 events does not include the days on
which the events happened.
[20] Mr Gilbert admits the failure to give notice on time but relies on
cl 2(3)(a) of
Schedule 5:
Any irregularity in or a failure to receive a notice of a meeting of
creditors does not invalidate anything done by a meeting of creditors
if
–
(a) the irregularity or failure is not material; or
(b) all the creditors entitled to attend and vote at the meeting attend the
meeting without protest as to the irregularity or failure;
or
(c) all such creditors agree to waive the irregularity or
failure.
[21] He also takes the procedural points:
(a) The plaintiffs cannot apply under s 286; and
(b) The plaintiffs ought to have but did not obtain leave to apply under
s
284(1).
[22] Pragmatically the plaintiffs do not press their first cause of
action. They accept that without orders under s 245A, a
reconvened meeting
called after proper notice would give the same result as the meeting of 8 May.
Even if the related creditors
were barred from voting, there would be a majority
in number for Mr Gilbert (four), and there would be a majority in value (the
plaintiffs)
against him. They say that that would be a stalemate. Whether that
is so turns on s 243(1A), a matter I deal with below.
[23] I accept Mr Gilbert’s procedural points: before the court can make an order under s 286(3) requiring a liquidator to comply with a duty, the applicant must give the liquidator a notice under s 286(2) of the failure to comply. There is no evidence
of any such notice. The matter would be better considered on an
application under s
2 Companies Act, s 2 - weekends are excluded from the definition of “working days”.
284(1)(g): to declare whether or not the liquidator was validly appointed or
validly assumed custody or control of property. Creditors
need leave to apply
under s 284, but there is no such application.
[24] Instead the case will be decided only under the cause of action
under s 245A.
The second cause of action
[25] The plaintiffs rely on s 245A:
Power of court where outcome of voting at meeting of creditors
determined by related entity
(1) This section applies if the Court is satisfied that—
(a) a resolution at a meeting of creditors was passed, defeated, or
required to be decided by a casting vote; and
(b) the resolution would not have been passed, defeated, or
required to be decided by a casting vote if the vote or
votes cast by a
particular related creditor or particular related creditors were disregarded;
and
(c) the passing of the resolution, or the failure to pass it,—
(i) is contrary to the interests of the creditors, or a class of
creditors, as a whole; and
(ii) has prejudiced, or is reasonably likely to prejudice, the interest of the creditor who voted against the resolution, or for it, as the case may be, to an extent that is unreasonable having regard to—
(A) the benefits accruing to the related creditor, or to some or all
of the related creditors, from the resolution, or from
the failure to pass the
resolution; and
(B) the nature of the relationship between the related creditor and
the company, or between the related creditors and
the company; and
(C) any other related matter.
(2) The court may, on the application of the liquidator or a
creditor,—
(a) order that the resolution be set aside:
(b) order that a new meeting be held to consider and vote on the
resolution:
(c) order that a specified related creditor or creditors must not vote
on the resolution or on a resolution to vary or amend
it:
(d) make any other orders that the Court thinks necessary. (3) In this section,—
related creditor
means a creditor who is a related entity of the company in
liquidation
related entity means,
in relation to the company in liquidation,—
(a) a promoter; or
(b) a relative or spouse of a promoter; or (c) a relative of a spouse of a promoter; or (d) a director or shareholder; or
(e) a relative or spouse of a director or shareholder; or (f) a relative of a spouse of a director or shareholder; or (g) a related company; or
(h) a beneficiary under a trust of which the company in
liquidation is or has at any time been a trustee; or
(i) a relative or spouse of that beneficiary; or
(j) a relative of a spouse of that beneficiary; or
(k) a company one of whose directors is also a director of the company
in liquidation; or
(l) a trustee of a trust under which a person (A) is a
beneficiary, if A is a related entity of the company in liquidation under this
subsection.
[26] For this section, ENG Trust Ltd, Orakei Investments Ltd and RWG
Trust are related creditors under s 245A(3). They are all
related entities.
That is not disputed. Nor is the plaintiffs’ standing to
apply.
[27] Under subsection (1), the section applies only if a resolution is “passed, defeated or required to be decided by a casting vote”. Given the plaintiffs’
abandonment of the first cause of action, the validity of the resolution is
no longer in issue.
[28] On the voting on the confirmation resolution Mr Gilbert obtained a
majority in number and in value. He obtained the majority
in value because the
value of the related creditors was greater than the value of the debt owed to
the plaintiffs. But for the votes
of the related creditors, the resolution
would not have passed.
[29] Section 245A was inserted in the Companies Act under s 18 of the Companies Amendment Act 2006. In Grant v CP Asset Management Ltd, the Court of Appeal noted that the purpose was to increase liquidators’ accountability to creditors and to “‘reduce the scope for company shareholders and related parties to defeat the interests of creditors at creditors’ meetings’ by allowing the court to
intervene”.3
[30] Under s 245A(1)(c), the court must determine whether the passing of
the resolution is “contrary to the interests of
the creditors, or a class
of creditors, as a whole”. In Grant v CP Asset Management Ltd the
Court of Appeal said:
[43] The legislation leaves it to the court to define a class of creditors if it thinks fit. In an insolvency context the Court normally exercises this jurisdiction to prevent injustice that may occur when the interests of some creditors differ materially from those of others. A class is
“confined to those persons whose rights are not so dissimilar as to make it impossible for them to consult together with a view to their
common interest”. The legislation does not presume that related
creditors form a separate class. It recognises rather that their interests need not differ from those of other unsecured creditors, who
depend on liquidation processes to recover as much of the money
owed to them as is reasonably possible.
...
[44] The Court must next consider whether the resolution has prejudiced,
or is reasonably likely to prejudice, the interests
of the minority creditor who
voted against it to an extent that is unreasonable having regard to (a) the
benefits accruing to the
related creditors, or some of them, from the
resolution, (b) the nature of the relationship between the related creditors and
the
company in liquidation, and (c) any other matter. This element contemplates
that although the creditors may form part of the same
class the resolution may
benefit some of them, the related creditors, while harming others. If the
preferences
3 Grant v CP Asset Management Ltd [2013] NZCA 452, [2014] NZCCLR 5 at [37].
of the minority are to prevail, the Court must find the prejudice unreasonable having regard to the benefits to the related creditors and their relationship to the company in liquidation.
[45] If satisfied of all of the matters in s 245(1), the Court may set the resolution aside, order that a new meeting be held to reconsider the
resolution, or make any other orders that it thinks necessary.
(footnotes omitted)
[31] The resolution goes to the appointment of a liquidator. It is
still relatively early in the liquidation. The question
is whether the
resolution in favour of the liquidator chosen by the shareholder should be
allowed to stand when the votes of entities
associated with the shareholder have
outvoted the major external creditor.
[32] For present purposes, it is convenient to separate creditors into internal and external creditors. By “internal creditors” I mean those companies and entities within the Gapes group. Those creditors have distinct interests. Entities within the Gapes group are unlikely to be interested in the liquidation being conducted in a way which will allow a thoroughgoing investigation of intra-group transactions with a view to clawing back assets from other entities within the group. They would, for example, be concerned at any moves a liquidator might take to obtain pooling orders under ss 271-272 of the Companies Act. On the other hand, external creditors will have the normal interest described by the Court of Appeal in Grant v CP Asset
Management Ltd:4
The creditors of a failed company are ordinarily entitled to have its affairs
thoroughly investigated to learn whether it has any
assets, or the liquidator
any rights of recourse, that might repay them. Where a creditor, or in this
case the liquidator, is prepared
to fund such investigation, the court will not
lightly deny them the opportunity that it represents.
[33] The next question is whether the appointment of Mr Gilbert is contrary to their interests. A liquidator must have the necessary qualifications, experience, independence and impartiality. When the court considers the appointment of a liquidator (for example under s 243(7), s 241AA(3) and s 283(4)) it applies the test of suspicion, so long as there is a factual foundation for that suspicion.5 Appropriate
caution is applied. A similar approach can be applied
here.
4 At [48] (footnotes omitted).
2009-404-6640, 12 November 2009 at [22]-[26].
[34] There are reasons to be concerned with Mr Gapes’
actions:
(a) His practice of changing the names of companies to keep
the Redwood name alive, while letting insolvent companies
in his group fall by
the wayside. Those not in the know stand to be misled;
(b) His putting the company into liquidation by shareholder’s
resolution when he had undertaken not to thwart the plaintiffs’
steps to
put the company into liquidation;
(c) Appointing a liquidator of his choice, not one chosen by
creditors.
That creates a concern that the liquidator of his choice may not act as hard
for the creditors as one appointed by creditors.
[35] It does not follow as a matter of course that a liquidator chosen by Mr Gapes will lack the necessary attributes. But there is one matter in the case of Mr Gilbert. While he assumed control of the shares of Orakei Investments Ltd, he left Mr Gapes as a director of that company. He could have used his control to have Mr Gapes removed as director. He did not. Mr Gapes as director of Orakei Investments arranged for that company to vote in favour of Mr Gilbert. Mr Gilbert at the least acquiesced in that arrangement which was directed at confirming his own appointment. That gives an appearance of less than the complete independence required of a liquidator in an insolvent liquidation. Ordinarily a liquidator should be neutral in any creditors’ vote on his appointment: see for example the bar on liquidators soliciting for proxies under reg 24 of the Companies Act 1993
Liquidation Regulations 1994. Here Mr Gilbert connived at the arrangement
under which Orakei voted for him. That was less than neutral.
[36] In these circumstances there is room to doubt that Mr Gilbert would
carry out his duties with the same independence
as a liquidator chosen
only by external creditors.
[37] As for the balancing under s 245A(1)(ii), having regard to the
factors (A) and
(B) - the close relationship between the related creditors and Victoria Street West
Ltd, and the interests of those creditors in having a “vanilla”
liquidation – I do not regard the interests of the
Gapes-related entities
as carrying so much weight that the prejudice to the plaintiffs in having
a liquidator appointed
by Mr Gapes is reasonable. The interests of the
Gapes entities diverge from those of the external creditors in seeing that
recovery
for external creditors of Victoria Street West Ltd should not prejudice
the interests of the wider Gapes-controlled Redwood Group.
In this liquidation
that interest cannot justify subordinating the concerns of the plaintiffs in
having the liquidation administered
by independent liquidators.
[38] Mr Gilbert did not strongly resist the argument that s 245A(1)
applied. I am relevantly satisfied under the subsection.
What orders to make under s 245A(2)?
[39] The parties differed on the orders to be made. The plaintiffs
argued for the court to appoint the liquidators they had chosen.
On the other
hand, Mr Gilbert proposed a fresh meeting to be called after appropriate notice
and with the related- creditors barred
from voting.
[40] The plaintiffs provided a written consent with the appropriate
certificate from two insolvency practitioners from a recognised
practice. As a
late glitch it turned out that others in their practice had been appointed
receivers of the company carrying out the
Spring Park development, but I was
assured that alternative independent insolvency practitioners could be found.
The case does not
turn on that aspect.
[41] The court may make any or all of the orders provided in subsection
(2). An order setting aside the resolution of 8 May is
straightforward. The
plaintiffs resist directions for a new meeting with bans on voting by the
related creditors. I accept that
“other orders” under subsection
(2) may include appointing liquidators. The question is whether to use that
power in
this case.
[42] If I were only to order a new meeting and to bar the related creditors from voting, a possible result is that even if the plaintiffs obtained a majority in value of the votes, they would not have a majority in number. They could not get a successful
resolution appointing another liquidator. In that case under s 243(1A) Mr Gilbert would remain as liquidator, until another liquidator is appointed. In case it is thought that that is to be an interim arrangement to last only until another meeting of creditors is convened to consider the question of appointment afresh, the Court of Appeal has indicated otherwise. In Trinity Foundation (Services No 1) Ltd v
Downey and Black it said:6
Messrs Downey and Black were required, by s 243 of the Act, to summon a
meeting of the creditors. Under the Act, the creditors meeting
provides an
opportunity for the creditors to confirm or replace the liquidators chosen by
the shareholders. As it turned out, Messrs
Downey and Black were not replaced
at the creditors meeting and thus continue in office until otherwise removed,
see s 243(1)(a).
The removal of a liquidator who is not prepared to resign
requires a Court order under s 286.
...
As noted, the scheme of the legislation is that once the first meeting has
concluded without the removal of the liquidators appointed
by the shareholders,
the position of those liquidators is entrenched.
[43] For their argument in favour of the court appointing
liquidators under s
245A(2), the plaintiffs submitted that a split majority (one majority in
value, the other in number) would produce an inconclusive
result. But s 243(1A)
does provide an outcome for a split majority. When there is neither an
effective resolution confirming the
shareholders’ liquidator nor an
effective resolution appointing another in his place, the subsection directs
that the shareholders’
liquidator is to remain in office. The short
point is that to remove a shareholders’ appointee at a s 243 meeting, a
resolution
with a majority in number and value is required. The
plaintiffs’ argument relying on a gap in the legislation does not work.
A
reconvened meeting of creditors will give a result.
[44] So the question is whether the court should use the power to make
other orders under s 245A(2), when a meeting of creditors
can decide whether Mr
Gilbert should remain liquidator.
[45] The Companies Act does not give the court a general power to remove
and appoint liquidators. There is no provision comparable
to s 237(1) of the
Companies
6 Trinity Foundation (Services No 1) Ltd v Downey [2006] NZCA 310; (2006) 3 NZCCLR 401 (CA) at [13] and [21].
Act 1955 under which the court could remove a liquidator “on cause
shown”.7
Section 284(1) does not give a wide discretionary power to remove
liquidators, only the power to declare under sub-clause (g) whether
a liquidator
has been validly appointed.8 Instead certain provisions allow
the court to remove liquidators in specified circumstances:
(a) Under s 241AA(3) the court may review a shareholders’
appointment at the request of an applicant for a liquidation
order if the
liquidation application is on foot when the liquidation starts;
(b) Under s 283(4) the court may review the appointment of a successor
to a liquidator on a vacancy under that section;
(c) Under s 286(4) the court may remove a liquidator who fails to
comply with a compliance order under s 286(3) or who is or
becomes disqualified
under s 280.
(d) Under s 243(7) in a court-ordered liquidation under s 241(2)(c),
where a meeting of creditors resolves on a liquidator other
than the one
appointed by the court.
[46] Importantly, s 243 does not provide for court intervention in the appointment of liquidators in regularly conducted creditors’ meetings after a company has gone into liquidation under s 241(2)(a) and (b). Instead the matter is to be decided by a meeting of creditors. Court intervention is required only if something goes wrong, for example, non-compliance with Schedule 5. In such interventions, as when the
court is satisfied that substantial injustice has been caused,9
the court exercises its
power remedially – to set aside whatever has gone wrong and give
the opportunity to
7 The case law on the words “on cause shown” allowed the courts to remove liquidators if there was some unfitness in terms of personal character or because there was some connection with other parties, or as a result of circumstances which the liquidator became mixed up in. The case law shows that in some cases the power was used more extensively, as when the court considered that a particular person should not continue as a liquidator and someone else could do the job more effectively. See McMahon v Ah Sam [2014] NZHC 659 at [11].
8 McMahon v Ah Sam [2014] NZHC 659.
9 Companies Act, schedule 5, cl 11.
run matters correctly. It is not an occasion for the court to impose its own
views in place of the creditors’.
[47] Section 245A allows for court intervention when something has gone
wrong in a creditors meeting – when the outcome
of voting has been
determined by related creditors. The court’s powers under subsection (2)
are similarly remedial: set aside
the tainted resolution, direct a new meeting
and bar related creditors from voting. It allows for a fresh meeting to be run
without
related creditors influencing the voting, not for the court to appoint
its preferred liquidator.
[48] If Mr Gapes had ensured that his entities did not vote at the
creditors meeting on 8 May, the plaintiffs could have no complaint
under s 245A
and could not object to Mr Gilbert’s appointment under s 243(1A). If a
new meeting is convened to consider the
same resolution but without voting by
Gapes-related entities, the plaintiffs can also have no complaint if a split
majority results
in Mr Gilbert staying in office. Instead a new meeting gives
them the opportunity to share with other creditors their views as
to the merits
or otherwise of Mr Gilbert acting as liquidator and to influence other creditors
in voting on his appointment. They
cannot ask for more.
[49] The plaintiffs referred to the orders of the Court of Appeal in
Grant v CP Asset Management Ltd10 as authority for the court
to appoint liquidators on an application under s 245A. That was a case of a
court-ordered liquidation.
The court appointed liquidators on an application
under s 243(7).11 It is not authority for the court to appoint new
liquidators in the case of liquidations under s 241(2)(a) and (b) on a
successful
application under s 245A.
[50] In summary, the general policy is that on liquidations started by shareholder resolution the confirmation or removal of the shareholders’ liquidator is by resolution at a creditors meeting under s 243(1)(a), not by court order. If something
has gone wrong, as under s 245A, the usual course is to set aside the
resolution and
10 Grant v CP Asset Management Ltd, above n 3, at [67].
11 At [20].
direct a fresh meeting, but not for the court to take over the decisions
reserved for the creditors. Nothing in the circumstances
of this case requires
a different approach.
[51] As it will be for creditors to decide at a new meeting under s 243
whether to confirm or to remove Mr Gilbert, creditors
should not read into this
decision any indication as to how they should vote. The decision is theirs, not
mine.
Outcome
[52] As I am giving this decision just before Christmas, I direct a new
meeting to be held after the holiday break. I make these
orders:
(a) The resolution of 8 May 2015 confirming Mr Gilbert as liquidator is
set aside.
(b) Mr Gilbert is to summon a meeting of creditors under s 243(1)(a) to
consider a resolution to confirm his appointment as
liquidator, any resolution
to appoint another liquidator or liquidators in his place and any resolution for
the purpose of s 258(1)(b).
(c) The meeting must be held in accordance with s 243 and Schedule 5,
with the following modifications:
(i) Mr Gilbert is not to give notice before 18 January
2016;
(ii) Mr Gilbert is to give notice to all known creditors of Victoria
Street West Ltd, whether they have claimed in the liquidation
or
not;
(iii) In his notice Mr Gilbert is to identify the company as that
formerly known by the names in [2] above.
(iv) Mr Gilbert is to give a copy of this decision with the notice.
(v) Mr Gilbert is to give the notice at least ten clear days before the
meeting.
(vi) The following must not vote at the meeting on any resolution under
s 243(1)(a) and (c): Mr Gapes, Mr Gilbert, ENG Trust
Ltd, Orakei Investments
Ltd, RWG Trust and any related creditor of Victoria Street West Ltd under s
245A(3).
(d) The plaintiffs have costs on the proceeding under category 2 plus
disbursements approved by the Registrar. The costs are
expenses in the
liquidation under Schedule 7, cl 1(1)(a) of the Companies Act, but are not
payable by Mr Gilbert personally.
(e) Leave is reserved to apply further.
..........................................
Associate Judge R M Bell
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2015/3311.html