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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 1 July 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND HAMILTON REGISTRY
CIV-2016-419-000155 [2016] NZHC 1326
BETWEEN
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CAMBRIDGE NEWS LIMITED
Plaintiff
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AND
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MARK MEDIA COMPANY LIMITED First Defendant
MARK STEFAN NOGAJ and TE RANGI MARIA CHRISTINE NOGAJ
Second Defendants
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Hearing:
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2 June 2016
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Counsel:
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KI Bond and M Meier for Plaintiff SJ Rawcliffe for First Defendant MD
Branch for Second Defendants
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Judgment:
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17 June 2016
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JUDGMENT OF ASHER J
This judgment was delivered by me on Friday, 17 June 2016 at 4 pm pursuant
to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
Registrar/Deputy Registrar
Solicitors:
Whitfield Braun Ltd, Hamilton.
Harkness Henry, Hamilton.
CAMBRIDGE NEWS LTD v MARK MEDIA COMPANY LTD [2016] NZHC 1326 [17 June 2016]
Introduction
[1] The plaintiff, Cambridge News Ltd (Cambridge News), publishes a
weekly community newspaper in the Cambridge area called
Cambridge News. It
purchased the business of the newspaper from the first defendant, Mark Media
Company Ltd (Mark Media), approximately
a year ago on 29 May 2015.
[2] Cambridge News now alleges that Mark Media and its principals Mark
Nogaj and Te Rangi Nogaj are breaching restraint of trade
clauses that were part
of the agreement by publishing a newspaper, Biz Hamilton. It seeks an interim
injunction effectively restraining
the publication of Biz Hamilton within a 30
kilometre radius of central Cambridge. This would include publication in most of
Hamilton.
[3] Mr Nogaj as the principal of Mark Media had commenced
publishing Cambridge News in 2008. The negotiations to
purchase Cambridge News
between him and Mr Prichard commenced in March 2015. On 30 March 2015 Mark
Media and Kim Prichard who ultimately
became the principal of Cambridge News,
signed an Auckland District Law Society form of agreement for sale and purchase.
It recorded
that the purchase price was $280,000, being $275,000 for intangible
assets and $5,000 for tangible assets. The intangible asset
can be assumed to
have been largely goodwill.
[4] The standard form part of the agreement contained a restraint of
trade clause as follows:
7.0 Restraint of trade
7.1 In consideration of the purchase price the vendor hereby agrees with the
purchaser that the vendor will not during the vendor’s
restraint of trade
period stated on the front page of this agreement either directly or indirectly
carry on or be interested either
alone or in partnership with or as manager,
agent, director, shareholder, financier or employee of any other person in any
business
similar to the business within the radius from the premises stated on
the front page of this agreement.
7.2 If the vendor is an incorporated company it will on or before the possession date procure its shareholders and its directors, other than any shareholders or directors specifically excluded from this provision in terms of Schedule 2 to this agreement, to enter into a deed of covenant with the purchaser binding themselves to like effect, such deed of covenant to be prepared by and at the expense of the purchaser and
tendered to the vendor or the vendor’s lawyer for execution a
reasonable time before settlement.
[5] At the front of the agreement for sale and purchase a
vendor’s restraint of
trade was referred to as follows:
Three years after the possession date within your Cambridge News distribution
area and two years within a radius of 30 kilometres
(a maximum of three years in
total).
[6] In addition the law firm acting for Mark Media and Cambridge News
(they used a common lawyer) prepared a deed of covenant
in restraint of trade.
It was between Mark Media and Cambridge News and did not include the
Nogajs as parties, despite
the fact that they were directors of Mark Media and
would have fallen under the ambit of cl 7.2. I record that on my assessment
of
the overall evidence it seems likely that both sides assumed that the Nogajs
were bound by the restraint of trade.
[7] The relevant clause of the restraint of trade read as
follows:
In consideration of the Purchaser accepting the nomination to perform the obligations under the Agreement with the Vendor, the Vendor covenants that he will not during the period that ends on 29 May 2018 within the Your Cambridge News distribution area and during the period that ends on
29 May 2017 within a radius of 30 kilometres from 55 Victoria
Street, Cambridge, either directly or indirectly carry on or
be interested
either alone or in partnership with or as manager, agent, director, shareholder,
financier or employee of any other
person in any business similar to the
Business.
[8] Mr Nogaj had discussed his future plans with Mr Prichard in the
course of negotiations. He was proposing to start a men’s
magazine. Mr
Prichard understood this would be a magazine that customers would have to
purchase, and that it would not be specific
to the Cambridge area, and was not
troubled by that proposition.
[9] Mr Prichard duly settled and his company Cambridge News Ltd took
over Cambridge News. It has targeted advertisers from
outside Cambridge and the
first year’s turnover showed an increase from $400,000 at the time of sale
to $500,000.
[10] In the meantime it seems as if Mr Nogaj’s men’s magazine
was not a success
as a hardcopy publication, although he deposes that it is available online. It seems
that following the purchase he decided to set up a new publication, Biz
Hamilton, which would be a fortnightly Hamilton free newspaper,
focusing on
businesses in the wider Hamilton region.
[11] Mark Media published its first Biz Hamilton issue on 9 May
2016. A quantity of copies were distributed in the
Cambridge area. The next
day Cambridge News’ solicitors wrote to Mark Media requesting an
undertaking that all publications
cease. Mark Media through its solicitors
refused to provide that undertaking. These proceedings were filed on 19 May
2016.
[12] In accordance with the approach to interim injunctions established
in New Zealand I first consider whether there is a serious
question to be tried.
I will then proceed to consider the balance of convenience and overall
justice.1
Serious question to be tried
Is there a breach of the restraint of trade clause?
[13] Both restraint of trade clauses in the agreement and the deed
prohibit the vendor from carrying on a business within
the restraint
areas “similar to the business”. It was argued for Cambridge
News that the businesses of Biz Hamilton
and Cambridge News were similar. This
was denied by the Mark Media and the Nogajs.
[14] Ms Rawcliffe for Mr Nogaj argued that they were distributed to
entirely different groups. I do not accept that. On the
material before me
both publications are distributed to businesses, although I accept that there is
no evidence that Biz Hamilton
is deliberately distributed to
householders.
[15] An examination of the advertisements shows that some of those in
Cambridge News are advertisements that would appeal to businesses, and some
of those in Biz Hamilton are advertisements that would
appeal to householders.
There
1 American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] UKHL 1; [1975] 1 All ER 504 (HL), and Klissers Farmhouse
Bakeries Ltd v Harvest Bakeries Ltd [1985] NZCA 70; [1985] 2 NZLR 129 (CA).
have in fact been some common advertisements in the two publications of
Biz
Hamilton that have taken place so far with those in Cambridge
News.
[16] There is some similarity in the editorial format in that they both
feature a chatty personalised style. Both of the newspapers
share details of
appearance and presentation. They are on newsprint and feature colour
photographs and advertisements. It is
significant that in the opening editorial
comment in the first Biz Hamilton issue it was stated that the publication was
for all
Hamilton businesses. It went on to say that Hamilton was an amazing and
fast growing city and warranted “its own dedicated
regular publication to
highlight news, politics, events, advice, opinions, developments, businesses,
industry bodies, business groups,
organisations, people and
more”.
[17] While I accept that Biz Hamilton was predominantly focussed on
businesses, the newspaper has a community feel about it and
the quoted editorial
comment shows the wide range of its content, much of which would appeal to any
resident in the local Hamilton
area.
[18] The interpretation of the word “similar” must involve a
question of degree. Slight similarity will not be enough.
However, the
publications clearly do not need to be identical. In my view there is a
sufficient number of features that both share
to make them
“similar”. I have already set out what those shared features
are.
[19] In my view there is a serious question that the two
newspapers are sufficiently similar for the restraint of
trade clause to be
invoked. Therefore it is entirely arguable that the publication of the
newspapers within the Cambridge News
circulation area for three years, and
within the 30 kilometre radius for two years from the date of the agreement, is
a breach of
the restraint.
Is the restraint reasonable?
[20] In the context of this interim injunction application the question must be whether there is a serious question to be tried that this is a reasonable restraint of trade clause.
[21] My approach in assessing reasonableness is influenced by the fact that this restraint of trade clause arises in the context of an agreement for sale and purchase of a business involving a very significant payment towards goodwill. In fact, as I have said, almost the entire purchase price was for goodwill. On its face, therefore, the purchaser having paid for goodwill should be able to enjoy the fruits of that purchase in accordance with a restraint of trade clause. However, some restraint of trade clauses can be unreasonable even in the context of an agreement for purchase of goodwill. A long restraint in relation to a geographic area or type of business that had nothing to do with what was purchased could well be unreasonable. The higher the price that is attributable to goodwill, the slower the Court will be to release the
purchaser from his side of the bargain.2
[22] I have no doubt the three year restraint in relation to
the Cambridge distribution area was reasonable, on a
serious question to be
tried basis. Any competition from a similar publication of the vendor in the
purchaser’s distribution
area would damage the goodwill. The position in
relation to the 30 kilometre two year restraint is more problematic, extending
as
it does beyond the distribution area of Cambridge News. At the time of the
purchase (which is the time when reasonableness is assessed),
the advertisers
for Cambridge News were drawn from the Cambridge area. Given this factor, and
the lack of any distribution in the
wider Hamilton area, it is far from obvious
that a reasonable restraint of trade should extend to Hamilton itself where
Cambridge
News is not distributed.
[23] To this Mr Bond for Cambridge News submitted that Mr
Prichard had deposed that he had planned to expand the business
by attracting
Hamilton advertisers, and that this in fact had happened. He also pointed out
that the extension to Hamilton was the
result of hard negotiation, and part of
the purchase price, and could be seen as relating to it.
[24] In response Mr Branch for the second defendants submitted that Biz Hamilton is prepared to undertake not to contact any advertising customers that were customers at the time of sale, and in addition, having gone through the current
advertiser list for Cambridge News, would undertake not to contact
approximately
2 Brown v Brown [1980] 1 NZLR 484 (CA) at 490.
90 per cent of all those advertisers, specifying which particular businesses
it wished to be free to continue to contact. He provided
a schedule setting out
those he would not contact. His point was that while the existing restraint
could extend to all the paid
for goodwill, it should not act as a barrier to a
vendor moving to different publication in a new area, albeit one which falls
under
the restraint.
[25] In the end I do not have sufficient information to reach a final
view on the reasonableness of the second aspect of the restraint
of trade
clause, and nor do I need to do so given that this is an interim injunction. I
consider that there is a serious question
to be tried that the whole restraint
of trade clause is reasonable, but I recognise that the second aspect of the
restraint extending
to attracting Hamilton advertisers is less strong, and that
the plaintiff might fail to satisfy a Court that this aspect of the restraint
is
reasonable.
[26] A final determination may turn on the view the Court might ultimately take of the evidence that is being offered by Mr Prichard and Mr Nogaj. Mr Prichard says he made it clear that he wished to expand the business and attract Hamilton advertisers, and that is one of the reasons why he paid such a large amount for the goodwill. There is some support for that proposition in the fact that there was a distinction made between trading in the Cambridge area and trading within the
30 kilometre radius, with the 30 kilometre radius restraint being for only
two years, as against three years for the smaller area.
[27] The difference between the parties on this point is important when
it comes to assessing the overall justice of the situation.
The claim against the second defendants
[28] On the face of the contracting documents the second defendants are
not bound by the restraint of trade. They are not parties.
The plaintiff says
this was an error made by the single firm of lawyers employed by both parties,
and that it was always envisaged
that both the Nogajs personally, and Mark
Media, would be bound.
[29] Clause 7.2 of the agreement for sale and purchase placed on the
purchaser
(Cambridge News) the obligation of forwarding a deed of covenant binding the
directors of the vendor, and this was never done. While this may have been
an error on the part of their solicitors that is not relevant
to this
proceeding. It is to be noted that the Nogajs signed the deed of restraint
themselves.
[30] Support for this proposition that the Nogajs were bound can be drawn
from the plain fact that a restraint of trade that did
not bind the Nogajs
personally would be of little use, as they could easily have started another
company and commenced trading in
direct competition.
[31] There were various possible ways in which the Nogajs could be bound
by the restraint of trade. The Court might find that
despite the fact that
they were not parties to the deed, they were nevertheless contractually bound by
an oral contract, where, as
Mr Prichard has deposed, they personally agreed to
the restraint.
Rectification
[32] The principles that govern rectification in New Zealand can be
treated as summarised by the statement of Peter Gibson LJ
in the English Court
of Appeal decision of Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties
Ltd:3
(a) the parties had a common continuing intention whether or not
amounting to an agreement in respect of a particular matter
and the instrument
to be rectified;
(b) there was an outward expression of the accord;
(c) the intention continued at the time of the execution of the instrument
sought to be rectified;
(d) by mistake, the instrument did not reflect that common
intention.
[33] In my view it is entirely arguable that if the parties had a common intention that a related person be a party to a contract and there was an outward expression of that accord continuing to the time of execution, but that because of an error the restraint of trade failed to record the parties as personally liable, a Court would order
rectification to include the parties mistakenly left out. In
Swainland Builders Ltd v
3 Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd [2002] EWCA Civ 560; [2002] 2 EGLR 71 at [33].
Freehold Properties Ltd the Court appeared to be prepared to allow a
management company that was not a party to be treated as a party. It was
held:4
... the inclusion of the management company was simply part of the mechanics
by which the court, having decided that the common intention
had not been given
effect to by the transfer, rectifies the transfer so as to achieve the common
intention.
[34] Thus, in my assessment it is reasonably arguable that the Nogajs
could be joined as parties by virtue of the doctrine of
rectification. In the
end, however, there will have to be an assessment of common intention which will
involve a close analysis
of the facts.
Fair Trading Act
[35] The Fair Trading Act also, relied on by Mr Bond, is unlikely to avail Cambridge News, and this submission seems to me to be misconceived. A promise about the future cannot be misleading at the time it is made unless the person giving the promise had no intention to carry it out.5 There was nothing to show that when Mr Nogaj made the statements he allegedly made about there being no intention on his part to compete in the Hamilton area, that this was a misrepresentation as to his belief at that time. There was no evidence on which it could be assumed that
Mr Nogaj was deliberately misleading Mr Prichard when he allegedly said
this.
Other approaches
[36] There are other possible approaches that a Court might adopt. In United Pukekohe Ltd v Grantley6 in relation to the sale and purchase of a business, it was held that it was open to rational argument that the parties must have intended that there be a no competition clause, even if there was no formal restraint.7 In Henare v Te Puke Box and Pallet Co Ltd8 there was again no restraint of trade covenant entered into on the sale of a business with a significant payment for
goodwill. Nevertheless, Gallen J followed the English case of Trego
v Hunt9 as
4 Swainland Builders Ltd v Freehold Properties Ltd, above n 3, at [47].
5 Muollo v Creative Engineering Design Ltd [2005] NZCA 403; (2006) 8 NZBLC 101,675 (CA) at [24]–[26].
6 United Pukekohe Ltd v Grantley [1996] 3 NZLR 762.
7 United Pukekohe Ltd v Grantley, above n 6, at 766.
8 Henare v Te Puke Box and Pallet Co Ltd HC Rotorua A213/84, 21 November 1984.
9 Trego v Hunt (1896) AC 7.
authority for the proposition that where the goodwill of a business is sold
without any specific restraint of trade term, the vendor
of the business is
nevertheless not entitled to solicit the customers of the business sold. This
would constitute a derogation
from the grant and would be clearly dishonest, the
vendor having sold the goodwill. Gallen J noted that in Chitty on
Contracts10 it is stated that the principle of Trego v Hunt
extends to the executors of a vendor who are executing a contract for the
sale of the goodwill. He observed: “By analogy,
the director of a
company might well qualify.”11 He concluded that it
was arguable that the principle in Trego v Hunt might properly apply
to the situation where a restraint of trade was sought against the directors of
a vendor.
[37] At the end of submissions Ms Rawcliffe and Mr Branch were not
seeking to argue that if I found the businesses were similar,
that Mr or
Mrs Nogaj could nevertheless publish and circulate within the Cambridge News
distribution area. I conclude that
there is a serious question to be tried in
relation to the Nogajs personally. It would be quite unconscionable for the
Nogajs to
be able to set up a directly competing newspaper in the Cambridge area
using a different company to Mark Media, and indeed, accepting
that the
distribution in Cambridge was a mistake, they have not done so.
[38] What Mr Branch definitely would not concede was that the Trego v
Hunt principle could be used to extend the restraint beyond the Cambridge
distribution area to the 30 kilometre area generally. His submission
was that
there was nothing inequitable in the Nogajs distributing a business community
newspaper in Hamilton (but not in Cambridge),
providing it did not use any
advertisers of Cambridge News Ltd. I can see considerable force in that
submission.
Summary on serious case to be tried
[39] In my assessment there is a strong case that both Mark Media and the
Nogajs personally are in breach of their contractual
or equitable obligations if
they breach
10 The current edition of Chitty on Contracts says this also. See HG Beale (ed) Chitty on Contracts
(32nd ed, Thomson Reuters, London, 2015) at [16-128].
11 Henare v Te Puke Box and Pallet Co Ltd, above n 4, at p 6.
the first part of the restraint of trade clause, prohibiting
publications in the
Cambridge News distribution area within the three year period.
[40] The case is less strong in relation to the wider 30 kilometre area,
particularly if the defendants’ undertaking not
to take business from
existing advertisers is taken into account. It may be even less strong against
the Nogajs personally in that
area, given that they never signed the
restraint.
The balance of convenience
The plaintiff
[41] At present Cambridge News is doing well. Turnover is up 25 per
cent. There is nothing before me to indicate that
the Nogajs’ two
publications so far have derogated from its business. I have no doubt their
business would be severely
damaged if the Nogajs starting publishing a similar
newspaper in Cambridge. However, while Mr Prichard was justified in being
concerned
that exactly this was happening when he discovered Biz Hamilton
newspapers being distributed in Cambridge, that appears to have been
an
accident. In any event, the balance of convenience is firmly in favour of the
granting of an interim injunction in respect of
the first aspect of the
restraint of trade clause prohibiting publications for three years in the
Cambridge News distribution area.
[42] The detriment to the defendants on the balance of
convenience will be negligible or indeed nil. The Nogajs have
said that they
never intended to publish in Cambridge or to solicit customers of Cambridge News
at the time it was sold. So the
balance of convenience favours the granting of
the first aspect of the interim injunction.
[43] Turning to the wider aspect of the interim injunction,
involving the
30 kilometre radius zone, the balance of convenience is reversed. The damage to Cambridge News will be limited to some Hamilton advertisers who might otherwise have advertised with Cambridge News, giving their advertisements to Biz Hamilton. It is unlikely that this will cause severe problems for Cambridge News, as none of the advertisers that were in existence at the time of sale will be approached, and the
majority of the existing advertisers (approximately 90 per cent) will also
not be approached. Any advertiser approached by Mark
Media will be aware that
publication is not distributed in Cambridge, and they will have to look to
Cambridge News or another Cambridge
publication for their advertising in that
area.
[44] So in my assessment the loss caused to Cambridge News should Mark
Media be able to continue to distribute its newspaper in
Hamilton (but not
Cambridge), and be allowed to approach Hamilton advertisers (but not those
existing Cambridge News advertisers
and not those listed) will be
slight.
[45] I compare this to the damage to Mark Media and the Nogajs should the
wider injunction be granted. This will have the effect
of requiring Mark Media
to close the business that it has commenced, and keep it closed for a year. It
does not seem as if there
has been a great money investment in the new
publication, but I readily accept that there has been a major investment of Mr
Nogaj’s
time and effort. I also accept that the effect of requiring him
to close Biz Hamilton down would be to discredit him with advertisers
and in the
community, and to make it more difficult to re-open a successful community
newspaper in a year’s time. The balance
of convenience is against the
wider injunction.
Damages and adequate remedy
[46] If I do grant an injunction in relation to the first part of the
restraint, but not the second, any damages assessment will
relate to the
reduction in goodwill because of new Hamilton advertisers not being as
amenable to giving their business to
Cambridge News as they might have been
if Biz Hamilton was not being published. I accept that this will not be easy to
formulate,
but there will be a reference upon which to calculate damages, in
that there will be the records of trading at Cambridge News over
the last 12
months. Any change in profit or trends is likely to be
discernible.
[47] If the full injunction is granted against Mark Media and it is forced to close down, the damages assessment will be much more difficult. It will involve an assessment of how the business might have done if it had been allowed to develop.
That would be very speculative. Thus, a comparison of the potential
damages calculations comes out in favour of granting a
limited injunction
only.
Overall justice
[48] Mr Nogaj sought some limited legal advice before he embarked upon
his new venture. He gave a rather perfunctory description
of the type
of business he proposed, which I do not think adequately highlighted the
similarities between his proposed newspaper
and Cambridge News. The response he
received was cautious, indicating no apparent problem, but the existence of
risk. It was recommended
that he speak to Mr Prichard about his proposals
(which he did not do).
[49] This sequence of events shows perhaps a degree of carelessness and
wishful thinking on the part of Mr Nogaj, but it does
not show that he was
setting out to deliberately defy the law or trick Mr Prichard, and indeed it was
always open to him to start
the new business in the name of a different company,
which he did not do. This shows some naivety on his part, and does not show
an
intention to take the goodwill of Cambridge News.
[50] In assessing the overall justice of the case I bear in mind also
that a year has gone by since the purchase. Cambridge News
has had a period of
time in which to develop the business, and its own goodwill.
[51] On the orders that I propose it will remain protected from any type
of direct competition within its distribution area.
Any damage will be in the
fringes of its operation, by some advertisers having less of their advertising
revenue available for an
exclusively Cambridge publication. But I do not see
this as going to the heart of the successful running of the Cambridge News
business.
[52] The overall justice of the case favours an injunction, but one which
is limited as I have outlined.
Result
[53] I make orders as follows:
(a) An interim injunction restraining the defendants from being involved directly or indirectly with the publishing or distribution of Biz Hamilton or any other free publication funded by advertising content either in hard copy form or via the internet in Cambridge and the surrounding area as per the distribution map labelled “A” and annexed to the application for interim injunction, until the earlier of 29 May
2018 or a further order of the Court in the substantive
proceedings.
(b) An interim injunction restraining the defendants from targeting the
plaintiff’s advertisers and key personnel as they
were in May 2015 and
from engaging any other of the advertisers who were on the list at exhibit A in
Mr Nogaj’s affidavit of
26 May 2016, save those that have an X beside
them, until the earlier of 29 May 2018 or an order of the Court in the
substantive
proceedings, providing that this prohibition extends only to
seeking advertisers and personnel for publications in the area
within a 30
kilometre radius of Cambridge as shown in the map labelled “B”
attached to the interim injunction application
dated 18 May 2016.
[54] Given that I have not gone through this wording with counsel, I
reserve to the parties the right to seek further clarification
of these
orders.
Costs
[55] The plaintiff has succeeded in obtaining an interim injunction.
However, in many respects it reflects orders that the defendants
were prepared
to accede to either prior to or during the hearing. There is not therefore a
straightforward case for the awarding
of costs at this stage, prior to the
substantive hearing. I have not had submissions on the point and if the
parties wish to pursue
the issue they should file submissions and I will
determine costs on the papers.
...................................
Asher J
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