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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 23 August 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CIV-2016-404-001804 [2016] NZHC 1843
UNDER
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Part 32 of the High Court Rules
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IN THE MATTER
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of the bankruptcy of Sushil Kumar Sharma
(Bankrupt)
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BETWEEN
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OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY OF THE PROPERTY OF SUSHIL KUMAR
SHARMA
Applicant
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AND
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SHARMA & FAMILY TRUSTEE LIMITED
First Respondent
PAULA MARYANNE SHARMA Second Respondent
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Hearing:
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On the papers
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Counsel:
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G A D Neil for the applicant
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Judgment:
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10 August 2016
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JUDGMENT OF PALMER J
This judgment is delivered by me on 10 August 2016 at 1 pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.
..................................................... Registrar / Deputy Registrar
Counsel/Solicitor:
Meredith Connell, Auckland
OFFICIAL ASSIGNEE v SHARMA & FAMILY TRUSTEE LTD & ANOR [2016] NZHC 1843 [10 August
2016]
Summary
[1] On the application of the Official Assignee, without notice, I
grant freezing orders over property of Sharma & Family
Trustee Ltd and Ms
Paula Sharma in order to preserve from dissipation assets of Mr Shushil Sharma
who is bankrupt. I hold it is
within the High Court’s jurisdiction to
grant freezing orders in advance of substantive proceedings. Ordinarily,
it
would need to have confidence the substantive proceedings are in
prospect and the basis for the applicant’s claim is clear.
The Court may
consider tying the period of the freezing orders to those proceedings, as I do
here. I also hold that the constitutional
and legal context means that
dispensation for the Official Assignee to offer an undertaking as to damages can
be regarded as a general
default presumption as can the courts’
expectation that the Crown will meet any order as to damages made by the Court.
I consider
this is consistent with s 27(3) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act
1990.
Application
[2] Mr Sushil Sharma is bankrupt. The Official Assignee is concerned
that Sharma & Family Trustee Ltd (the trustee),
the first respondent, and Mr
Sharma’s wife Mrs Paula Sharma, the second respondent, may dissipate
assets that should be part
of the bankruptcy. The Assignee applies for freezing
orders, without notice, to prevent that.
Jurisdiction
[3] The Assignee intends to serve, on the respondents, notices of cancellation of irregular transactions which have been filed in the bankruptcy proceeding under subpart 7, part 3 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (the Act). The Assignee applies for freezing orders before that occurs, in order to prevent dissipation of assets. Once the respondents receive the notices of cancellation they will have 20 working days to raise any objection. If no objection is raised the transactions will be deemed cancelled and the Assignee will be entitled to seek substantive relief under s 207 of the Act. If objection is raised the Assignee will be required to seek an order of cancellation under s 206 of the Act and then seek substantive relief under s 207 of
the Act. Alternatively, the Assignee may seek orders setting aside the
transactions as prejudicial dispositions under s 346 of the
Property Law Act
2007.
[4] I agree that I have jurisdiction to grant freezing orders in advance of substantive proceedings. That is an implication of the application for freezing orders being able to be made by originating application under r 32.2(4) of the High Court Rules. There is no requirement in the rules for substantive proceedings to have issued before an originating application for freezing orders is made. Orders have previously been granted by the Court in such circumstances in Official Assignee v
Scott.1 Ordinarily, the Court will need to have
confidence that the substantive
proceedings are in prospect and the basis for the applicant’s claim is
clear, as I do
here.
[5] A court may consider tying the period of the freezing orders to
pending substantive proceedings, as I do here. The Official
Assignee has 30
working days to continue or renew the freezing orders through the Court.
That should provide enough time for
objection to the notices of cancellation
and for subsequent filing of substantive proceedings by the Assignee. Failure
by the Assignee
to file substantive proceedings by the time she applies for a
continuation or renewal of the freezing orders will count against such
an
application.
Law
[6] As confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Shaw v Narain, the
well-established requirements for granting freezing orders are
that:2
(a) there is a good arguable case on the substantive claim; (b) there are assets to which the order can apply; and
(c) there is a real risk that the respondents will dissipate or dispose
of
those assets.
1 Official Assignee v Scott [2012] NZHC 2579.
2 Shaw v Narain [1992] 2 NZLR 544 (CA), Bank of New Zealand v Hawkins [1989] NZHC 198; (1989) 1 PRNZ 451.
[7] I also need to consider the overall justice of the case
and balance the protection of the applicant against
prejudice or hardship to
the respondents.
Grounds for orders
[8] The Assignee has filed a comprehensive and detailed affidavit and
exhibits by Ms Ciesta Bolivia Stoltz, the Senior
Insolvency
Officer responsible for administration of Mr Sharma’s bankrupt estate.
On the basis of Ms Stoltz’s
evidence I am satisfied that:
(a) The Assignee has a good arguable case to seek cancellation, as
gifts under ss 204 and 205 of the Insolvency Act or as dispositions
under s 346
of the Property Law Act 2007, of:
(i) forgiveness of $141,137 of debt, payment of $143,615.15 and
transfer of two motor vehicles by and from Mr Sharma to the
trustee;
and
(ii) transfer of gold valued at around $150,000 in 2014 from Mr
Sharma to Mrs Sharma.
(b) The trustee and Mrs Sharma have assets to which the orders can
apply, including the trustee’s interest in a property
at Richardson Rd, Mt
Roskill, and Mrs Sharma’s gold.
(c) There is a real risk, given Mr Sharma’s apparent
previous such actions, that the respondents may dissipate
the funds if put on
notice of the applications.
[9] I am satisfied that the balance of convenience and the overall justice of the case favour the applications being granted. I note in this regard that r 32.6(3) requires that the orders must not prohibit the trustee or Mrs Sharma from dealing with the assets restrained for the purposes of paying ordinary living expenses, legal expenses relating to the freezing order or disposing of assets or making payments in the ordinary course of business.
Undertaking as to damages
High Court Rules
[10] Rule 32.2(5) requires that “[a]n applicant for a freezing
order must file a signed undertaking that the applicant will
comply with any
order for the payment of damages to compensate the respondent for any damage
sustained in consequence of the freezing
order.”
[11] The mandatory nature of that requirement is somewhat watered down by
r 32.6(4) which provides that “[u]nless there
are special circumstances,
the court must require the applicant for a freezing order to give appropriate
undertakings, including
an undertaking as to damages.”
[12] Rule 32.6(4) should be read as qualifying r 32.2(5) due to
its greater specificity and in the interests of making
this requirement
workable.
The position of the Crown
[13] Here, the Official Assignee submits she is constrained by the Public
Finance Act 1989 from giving a guarantee or indemnity
on behalf of the Crown. I
agree that this is so.
[14] The Official Assignee for New Zealand is an officer of the Crown,
and an officer of the court, appointed under the State
Sector Act 1988 by virtue
of s 399 of the Insolvency Act 2006. The Official Assignee may sue on behalf of
the Crown in her own name,
under s 14(1)(b) of the Crown Proceedings Act 1950.
Any undertaking as to damages given by the Official Assignee would be given
on
behalf of the Crown.
[15] The Crown currently has a somewhat ambiguous status in litigation compared with other New Zealanders. Section 17 of the Crown Proceedings Act
1950 provides the Court has power to make all such orders against the Crown that it does in proceedings “between subjects” except for injunctions, specific performance or recovery of land. Section 18 of the same Act states that “the Crown shall not be required under any rule of court or order to deposit or give security for the costs of
any other party”. Section 24(4) of the same Act currently provides for
appropriation, by permanent legislative authority, of
payment of court orders
against the Crown.3
[16] Constitutionally, it is expected that the Crown will honour and
abide by orders of the Court. And s 27(3) of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act
1990 states:
Every person has the right to bring civil proceedings against, and to defend
civil proceedings brought by, the Crown, and to have
those proceedings heard,
according to law, in the same way as civil proceedings between
individuals.
[17] This suggests the Crown should be subject to the requirement to
provide an undertaking as to damages in the same way as are
others.
[18] But part 6 of the Public Finance Act 1989 sets strict limits on the
procedures and authorities by which the Crown may borrow
funds or incur
expenditure or financial obligations. They include s 65ZC which states:
Except as expressly authorised by any Act, it is not lawful for any person to
give a guarantee or indemnity on behalf of or in the
name of the
Crown.
[19] Instead, the power to give a guarantee or indemnity on behalf of the
Crown is reserved to the Minister of Finance by s 65ZD
of the Public Finance Act
or, if specified in regulations, to a department by s 65ZE. An undertaking as
to damages would constitute
an indemnity for the purposes of the Public Finance
Act.
The Crown is not required to provide an undertaking as to
damages
[20] The courts have recognised, on a number of occasions, that the restrictions and obligations on the Crown constitute a special circumstance justifying dispensing with the requirement on it under r 32.6(4) to provide an undertaking as to damages when the Official Assignee or other emanation of the Crown applies for a freezing
order.4 In doing so the Courts recognise that
the Crown will meet any order that the
3 In 2015 the Law Commission recommended reform of s 17, retention of the substance of s 18 and modification of s 24(4) in Law Commission The Crown in Court: A Review of the Crown Proceedings Act and National Security Information in Proceedings (NZLC R135, 2015).
4 For example, Official Assignee v Fry HC Auckland CIV 2009-404-436, 4 February 2009 at [33]- [34]; Labour Inspector, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Civic City Ltd [2013] NZEmpC 196 at [40]- [43]; Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Dymock [2013] NZHC
3016 at [11].
Court may make as to damages.5 I agree that such dispensation
for the Crown in providing an undertaking as to damages is a reasonable limit on
the right in s 27(3)
of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990. It is
justified in a free and democratic society, in terms of s 5, by the
public
interest in public sector financial accountability.
[21] In Official Assignee v Honk Apartments Ltd Heath J stated
that dispensation from providing an undertaking as to damages should not be
regarded as a general statement of principle
and that each case will turn on its
own facts.6 However, I am satisfied that the constitutional and
legal context means that the dispensation for the Official Assignee to offer
an undertaking can be regarded as a general default presumption as can
the Courts’ expectation that the Crown will
meet any order as to damages
made by the Court.
[22] I agree that these presumptions apply here. I dispense with the
requirement on the Official Assignee to provide an undertaking
as to
damages.
Orders
[23] I order that:
(a) Sharma & Family Trustee Ltd and Paula Maryanne Sharma (the
respondents), are restrained from removing any of the assets
listed in the next
subparagraph from New Zealand or from disposing of, dealing with, or
diminishing the value of those assets,
whether they are in or outside New
Zealand.
(b) This freezing order applies to:
(i) All property of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, and includes rights,
interests, powers and claims of every kind in relation
to
5 See, for example, Labour Inspector, Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment v Civic
City Ltd at [43].
6 Official Assignee v Honk Apartments Ltd HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-6222 at [12]-[13].
property however they arise, of Sharma & Family Trustee Limited as trustee of the Paula Maryanne Sharma Trust, including but not limited to: the property situated at 348
Richardson Rd, Mt Roskill, more fully described in identifier
NA126B/667; and monies.
(ii) All property of every kind, whether tangible or intangible, real or
personal, corporeal or incorporeal, and includes rights,
interests, powers and
claims of every kind in relation to property however they arise, of Paula
Maryanne Sharma, including but not
limited to gold that was declared by Sushil
Kumar Sharma to have a value of approximately $150,000 in early
2014.
(c) This order does not prohibit the respondents from dealing with the
assets covered by the order for the purpose of:
(i) paying ordinary living expenses; or
(ii) paying legal expenses related to the freezing order; or
(iii) disposing of assets, or making payments, in the ordinary
course of your business, including business expenses incurred
in good
faith.
(d) As the freezing order was made without notice, it will have no
effect after 30 working days from the date of this order,
unless on or before
that date, it is continued or renewed by this Court. The respondents are
entitled to be heard by the Court on
any application for continuation or renewal
of the Order.
(e) I reserve leave to the respondents to make an interlocutory application to the Court to discharge or vary the order. Such an application may be filed and served, with supporting affidavits, on 3 days notice.
(f) This order does not affect anyone outside New Zealand until it is
declared enforceable by the Court in the relevant country
(in which case it
affects a person only to the extent that it has been declared enforceable)
unless the person is:
(i) a person to whom this order is addressed, or an officer of that
person, or an agent appointed by power of attorney of that
person;
or
(ii) a person who has been given notice of this order at that
person’s residence or place of business within
New Zealand; or
(iii) a person who is able to prevent acts or omissions outside the
jurisdiction of this Court that constitute, or assist, a breach
of this
order.
(g) This order does not prevent, in respect of assets located outside New
Zealand, any third party from complying with:
(i) what it reasonably believes to be the third party’s
obligations, contractual or otherwise, under the laws of
the country in
which those assets are situated or under the proper law of any contract between
the third party and a respondent;
and
(ii) any orders of the courts of that country, provided that
reasonable notice of any application for such an order
is given to the Official
Assignee’s solicitors.
[24] I reserve costs in relation to this
application.
..................................................................
Palmer J
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