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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 12 August 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY
CIV 2015-485-875 [2016] NZHC 1859
UNDER
|
Judicature Amendment Act 1972
|
IN THE MATTER OF
|
An application for judicial review
|
BETWEEN
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SERCO NEW ZEALAND LIMITED Plaintiff
|
AND
|
THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CORRECTIONS
First Respondent
|
AND
|
THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS Second
Respondent
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Hearing:
|
15-16 February 2016
|
Counsel:
|
H J P Wilson and L Clark for Plaintiff
M R Heron QC and J K Gorman for First and Second
Respondent
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Judgment:
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11 August 2016
|
JUDGMENT OF CLARK J
I direct that the delivery time of this judgment is
2.15 pm on the 11th of August 2016
SERCO NEW ZEALAND LIMITED v THE CHIEF INSPECTOR OF CORRECTIONS [2016] NZHC 1859 [11
August 2016]
Table of Contents
Para No
Introduction [1] Serco’s application for judicial review [7] The legislative setting [12] The Chief Inspector’s investigative process
A. The terms of reference [21]
B. Fact-gathering [25] C. Engagement with Serco [27] D. The interviews [34] E. Summary of Chief Inspector’s report [39] Natural justice
A. Applicable principles [43]
B. Serco’s claims of breach of natural justice [49] Was there a proper basis for the Chief Inspector’s findings? [56] Did Serco have a proper opportunity to respond? [74] Conclusions on breach of natural justice [91]
Error of law [92] A. Failure to take account of relevant considerations? [98] B. Irrelevant considerations taken into account? [102] C. Error of law — conclusion [111] Unreasonableness [114] Summary [120] Result [123]
Introduction
[1] Footage uploaded to YouTube showing fighting between
prisoners at Mt Eden Corrections Facility (MECF) came to the
attention of the
Department of Corrections in July 2015. The footage indicated the presence of
an organised “fight club”
at MECF which had, since April 2011, been
managed under contract by Serco New Zealand Ltd (Serco).
[2] The Department took steps. On 23 July 2015 the Chief Executive of
the Department of Corrections announced that he had
asked the Chief Inspector
of Corrections to investigate a series of serious allegations involving the
operation of the facility
including assaults among prisoners. On 24 July the
Department decided to invoke the “step-in” clause under the prison
management contract so that it could place a management team into the prison to
oversee operations.
[3] By terms of reference dated 27 August 2015 the Chief
Inspector was instructed to conduct a full investigation
into the possible
existence of a “fight club” at MECF and prisoners’ access to
contraband, in particular, cell
phones.
[4] The Chief Inspector completed his investigation and, on 16 December
2015, produced his report.
[5] The report made a number of findings critical of Serco’s
operation of MECF. One of the findings was that the YouTube
footage provided
irrefutable evidence that organised fighting was occurring at MECF. The Chief
Inspector was of the opinion that
organised fighting was occurring at least once
a week during certain periods in the months to which his investigation
related.
[6] Prior to the completion of the investigation Serco filed an application for judicial review and for interim orders restraining the Department from taking further steps to finalise the report or publish it pending further orders of the Court. Undertakings to that effect were given and remain in place until delivery of this judgment.
Serco’s application for judicial review
[7] Serco accepts the majority of the Chief Inspector’s
recommendations and has already taken steps to implement change
in anticipation
of the recommendations being published. Serco draws a distinction, however,
between the recommendations and the
body of the report.
[8] Serco’s position is that the report has been finalised in
breach of natural justice and its finalisation is in error
of law and
unreasonable. The breach of natural justice is said to arise, in particular,
because the Chief Inspector did not provide
information which would allow Serco
to identify and provide comment on the incidents referred to in the
report.
[9] The relief Serco seeks includes:
(a) an order quashing the report;
(b) a declaration that the Chief Inspector should provide to Serco the
notes of the interviews which the Chief Inspector conducted;
and
(c) declarations that the report should not be finalised or published
until Serco has copies of the notes of all interviews
undertaken in the
course of the investigation and Serco has been provided with a reasonable period
of time to review the additional
information and respond to the Chief Inspector
and that response has been adequately considered.
[10] The Supreme Court’s most recent observation about the purpose
and limits of
judicial review is usefully set out at this point:1
Judicial review is a supervisory jurisdiction which enables the courts to
ensure that public powers are exercised lawfully. In principle,
all exercises
of public power are reviewable, whether the relevant power is derived from
statute, the prerogative or any other source.
The courts acknowledge limits,
however. These limits are reflected primarily in the notions that the case
must involve the exercise
of a public power, that even if the court has
1 Ririnui v Landcorp Farming Ltd [2016] NZSC 62 at [1].
jurisdiction, the exercise of power must be one that is appropriate for
review and that relief is, in any event discretionary.
[11] It is relevant also to observe in the context of this application
for review that the mere fact that a person has been criticised
by a body
amenable to judicial review does not make the criticism reviewable. The
criticism must be legally invalid before the Court
will
intervene.2
The legislative setting
[12] Understanding the statutory context in which the investigation took
place assists in a proper appreciation of the powers,
functions and
obligations of the inspectors of corrections.
[13] The Corrections Act 2004 establishes a corrections system and
principles that guide the operation of the corrections
system.3
One of the purposes of the corrections system, of which the
inspectors are a part, is to ensure that sentences of imprisonment
are
administered in a safe, secure, humane and effective manner.4 A
guiding principle of the corrections system is that people under
control or supervision are treated fairly and to that
end an effective
complaints regime must be available.5
[14] The Chief Inspector is the senior of a number of inspectors of
corrections who the Chief Executive must appoint.6 Inspectors have
broad powers of inspection and inquiry in respect of those who are subject to
sentences or other kinds of control
or supervision.7
[15] One of the powers and functions of an inspector is to inquire into any matter referred to him or her by the Chief Executive. In this case the Chief Inspector was
inquiring into a matter referred to him by the Chief Executive pursuant
to s 29(1)(e).
2 Peters v Davison [1999] 3 NZLR 744 (HC) at [84].
3 Corrections Act 2004, s 6.
4 Section 5(1)(a).
5 Section 6(1)(f).
6 Section 28.
7 Section 29(1).
[16] In instructing the Chief Inspector to investigate the Chief
Executive was acting pursuant to his powers and functions which,
among others,
are to ensure the safe custody and welfare of prisoners, to inquire into the
treatment of persons under control or
supervision, and to inquire into abuses or
alleged abuses in prison.8
[17] While the Chief Inspector’s report was prepared pursuant to a
reference and not a complaint, the complaints regime
can be seen as providing a
sense of the role of inspectors more generally. The complaints system also
has the objective of
protecting interests of prisoners. The objectives include
ensuring:9
(a) that those who wish to complain know how to, and that complaints can be
made without fear of adverse consequences.
(b) identities of complainants are disclosed only to the extent necessary to
assist in investigation of complaints.
[18] Prisoners are always entitled to an interview with an
inspector when an inspector is attending a prison for the purposes
of holding
interviews, and must not be made to disclose to those with direct control of
them why they have requested an interview
with an
inspector.10
[19] The exercise of the statutory powers that resulted in the
investigation and report are to be regarded in the context of these
office-holders’ responsibilities to ensure that those deprived of liberty
are treated with humanity and respect for the inherent
dignity of the
person,11 and to observe the prisoners’ right to not
be subjected to torture or to cruel, degrading, or disproportionately severe
treatment or punishment.12
[20] The Act focuses the role of inspectors squarely upon the wellbeing of persons subject to coercive state power. The powers and functions of the inspectorate are to
be exercised consistently with the purpose of the corrections
system and the
8 Section 8(1).
9 Section 152(1).
10 Section 158.
11 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 23(5).
12 Section 9.
principles that guide its operation. Importantly, the objectives —
including the obligation of fairness13 — which Parliament has
established in the complaints system ought not to be compromised simply because
an inspector is exercising
powers and functions beyond the complaints
regime.
The Chief Inspector’s investigative process
A. The terms of reference
[21] The initial terms of reference dated 19 July 2015 required the Chief Inspector to investigate and report on the possible existence of organised prisoner-on-prisoner fighting and the management of prisoners more generally. The Chief Inspector was to make such recommendations for the improvement of systems, procedures and
controls as might be necessary.14 The report was to
be presented to the
Chief Executive by 28 August 2015.
[22] Modified terms of reference dated 27 August 2015
expanded the investigation to include a review of
the
Department’s monitoring arrangements and —
To investigate prisoner safety and welfare in general at MECF and review
prisoner complaints, particularly those related to serious
assaults.
[23] Phase one of the investigation was to be completed and a report
presented by
30 October 2015. The investigation was to pay particular attention to the
preceding three-month period, that is June, July and August
2015.
[24] Phase two involved a review of the adequacy of controls designed to address prisoner violence and access to cell phones operating in other New Zealand prisons.
The phase two investigation and report was to be completed by 30
November 2015.
13 Section 152(1)(c).
B. Fact-gathering
[25] The Chief Inspector and his staff conducted interviews with 48
prisoners or ex-prisoners and 42 members of Serco staff including
prison
officers, duty supervisors, senior management and the Prison Director and Deputy
Director.
[26] The fact-gathering phase included review of documentary records,
many of which remained in Serco’s custody during the
investigation. These
records included CCTV footage recorded by Serco, Serco’s incident reports,
and its operating policies,
standards and procedures. The Chief Inspector also
reviewed prisoner information held on the Department’s central database
and liaised with the Department’s Operational Intelligence Team, Contract
Management Team and the New Zealand Police. Complaints
made to the inspectorate
and those contained on Serco’s internal system were reviewed. And the
Chief Inspector placed considerable
reliance on the six videos on YouTube.
Under his oversight prisoners shown in the footage were identified and
interviewed.
C. Engagement with Serco
[27] On 8 September 2015 the Chief Inspector wrote to Serco indicating
that he would provide copies of his draft report for comment.
He established a
timeline for that process. Serco replied, agreeing in principle, although
warning:
The failure to either provide Serco with the opportunity to review the report
in its entirety prior to any public release, or
to provide Serco with the
opportunity to submit an additional response once it has seen all four parts of
the report, will be
regarded as unreasonable, unfair and a breach of natural
justice.
[28] Serco undertook a parallel investigation during this time but
declined to provide its report to the Chief Inspector.
Nor is it before the
Court.
[29] During the period between 8 September and 30 October 2015 the Chief Inspector provided the draft report in tranches. Serco saw and commented on all drafts. A draft of the full report was provided on 3 November and Serco responded within a tight three-day deadline. On 25 November 2015 Serco
responded to the final report which the Chief Inspector had
provided on
13 November 2015.
[30] Upon receiving the first tranche it was apparent to Serco
that the Chief Inspector relied upon oral evidence
including from prisoners.
In the report their evidence was presented anonymously. In its first response
Serco outlined its concern,
among many others, that the Chief Inspector was
intending to rely on such evidence.
[31] Serco requested access to the interview notes. Serco, the Chief
Inspector and the Chief Inspector’s counsel corresponded
during October
and November 2015 about provision of the interview notes. The Chief Inspector
declined to provide the interview notes
on the basis that the interviews were
subject to undertakings of confidentiality and that Serco did not need the notes
in order to
have a fair opportunity to respond to the draft report.
[32] The Chief Inspector eventually contacted the 90 interviewees seeking
their consent to the notes of their interview being
given to Serco on an
anonymised basis. Anonymised interview notes from the 15 who consented were
subsequently released to Serco.
[33] The Chief Inspector deposed that in the course of preparing the
Phase One report he personally read and considered all of
Serco’s
responses to the various drafts.
D. The interviews
[34] In his affidavit the Chief Inspector approximately outlined his 20 years experience in the inspectorate. He has been responsible for conducting 32 deaths-in- custody investigations and many other special investigations. He deposed, from his experienced perspective, that “prisoners, are extremely nervous about the possibility that any statement will be attributable to them”. That is because prisoners have reason to fear reprisal from fellow prisoners and staff alike if they are known to have provided information about the misconduct of either. There is a strong desire to avoid being labelled a ‘nark’. Also, prisoners are typically wary of authority figures
(often attributing the fact of their incarceration to a negative experience
with police interviewers).
[35] Obtaining information requires, then, skilful, subtle and indirect
methods of questioning. Inspectors often take a thematic
rather than
question-based approach to interviews. Prisoners will not often tolerate
being recorded and are liable to
terminate an interview if detailed notes
are taken. Prisoners cannot usually be pressed for further explanation or
detail.
This does not mean the information is not of value but the Chief
Inspector’s evidence was that it was important to bear in
mind the nature
of evidence from prisoners when preparing the report.
[36] The upshot is that interview notes are often brief and recorded
after the interview. Assessing the credibility of an interviewee
presents a
further challenge and requires significant experience. To that end the Chief
Inspector appointed experienced personnel
to assist in the conduct of the
interviews.
[37] Beyond assessment of credibility the information obtained
needed to be treated with caution and appropriately weighted,
the Chief
Inspector deposed. Accordingly steps were taken:
(a) to ensure the prisoner was in the unit he claimed knowledge of at the
time of the events he described;
(b) to check if any medical records matched the claims made;
(c) to check if any complaint was made by the prisoner and if so whether it
was investigated and upheld;
(d) to compare prisoner statements for consistency;
(e) to cross-reference statements against other documentary information;
(f) to take into account when weighing the interviewee’s
evidence
the
possibility that a claim has been exaggerated.
[38] The Chief Inspector’s affidavit evidence was that interviews
with staff do not usually present the same challenges.
That said, with the
exception of three senior staff members, Serco staff would only speak to the
inspectorate on the basis that
their statements and details would not
be released to Serco. Following the Chief Inspector’s
approach
to interviewees for permission to release anonymised notes a large
number expressly refused.
E. Summary of Chief Inspector’s report
[39] The Chief Inspector produced a 92-page report containing 10
parts: the context and methodology; findings as to
the prevalence of organised
fighting and staff knowledge; supervision and security; contraband cell phones;
remedial action; prisoner
welfare; monitoring; findings; recommendations; and an
account of Serco’s responses.
[40] The Chief Inspector made 35 findings, some 16 of which related to
organised fighting. The remaining findings related to
aspects of the terms of
reference going beyond the issue of organised fighting.
[41] There were 21 recommendations most of which, as I have mentioned,
Serco has accepted.
[42] The Chief Inspector included a note describing the spectrum of
fighting activity relevant to his investigation and the
terminology he
used:
Serco has advised that unacceptable fighting activity exists on a spectrum
including:
(i) ‘Sparring’, consisting of pre-fight training and
rehearsing, for which injuries are less common and, where sustained,
less
serious.
(ii) ‘Contender fighting’, being organised fighting between
two participants, usually organised by a gang member, and
usually involving
willing participants. Fights are planned and take place in cells, out of
sight of prison officers and
CCTV cameras. Injuries sustained in these fights
can be serious.
(iii) ‘Fight club’, being organised fighting usually involving gangs and gang-affiliated prisoners, in which participants are either willing or unwilling. Like ‘contender fights’ these fights
usually take place in cells, out of sight of prison officers and CCTV
cameras or in an exercise yard during periods of non-supervision.
Other
prisoners housed in the same unit will usually know that a fight is to occur and
can sometimes be engaged to distract prison
officers to ensure that the fighting
is not detected. Injuries sustained in these fights can be serious.
Natural Justice
A. Applicable principles
[43] Two principles of natural justice are germane to the exercise of an investigative function such as that undertaken by the Chief Inspector in this case. First, natural justice requires that a finding be based upon evidence that has some probative value. In Re Erebus Royal Commission (Re Erebus) Lord Diplock
explained: 15
The technical rules of evidence applicable to civil or criminal litigation
form no part of the rules of natural justice. What is required
... is that the
decision to make the finding must be based upon some material that tends
to logically show the existence of facts consistent with the finding and that
the reasoning supportive of the
finding, if it be disclosed, is not
logically self- contradictory.
[44] Second, natural justice requires also that a person against whom an adverse finding might be made has notice of that possibility and an opportunity to bring relevant evidence and have that evidence fairly considered.16 Again, Lord Diplock
offered an authoritative explanation:17
... any person represented at the inquiry who will be adversely affected by
the decision to make the finding should not be left in
the dark as to the risk
of the finding being made and thus deprived of any opportunity to adduce
additional material of probative
value which, had it been placed before the
decision-maker, might have deterred him from making the finding
even though it cannot be predicted that it would inevitably have had that
result.
[45] These now familiar principles were applied most recently by the
New Zealand Court of Appeal in A v Attorney-General.18 Ms
Rebstock was asked to undertake an investigation into an apparent
unauthorised disclosure of Cabinet
15 Re Erebus Royal Commission, Air New Zealand v Mahon [1983] NZLR 662 (PC) [Re Erebus]
at 671 (emphasis in original).
16 Re Erebus, above n 15, at 671; Ali v Deportation Review Tribunal [1997] NZAR 208 (HC)
at 220.
17 At 671 (emphasis in original).
18 A v Attorney-General [2013] NZCA 289, [2013] 3 NZLR 630.
papers. Her draft report included a finding of a “strong
suspicion” that “A” may have leaked the Cabinet
papers.
Extracts of the draft report had been provided to “A” for comment
along with transcripts of his interviews and
a five-page letter from Ms Rebstock
outlining her tentative conclusion and the facts supporting it.
[46] “A” had consistently requested additional material which requests were declined. He filed an application for judicial review. The High Court held that the level of disclosure had been adequate but if the report were to be publicly released further disclosure was required. There was an appeal and cross appeal. In the course of the hearing the parties summarised their respective positions. “A” required, among other information, the “source information” from the photocopier/scanner from which the leak was said to have originated. He also requested the report of a forensic examination of two hard drives which he used and the log of the printer nearest to his workplace. The respondent maintained “A” was not entitled to this material as part of the investigation’s natural justice process. The respondent’s
position was that —19
In the context of administrative inquiries, ... expanding the natural justice
right to all source data relied on (where, as it is
submitted is the case here,
the material is adequately summarised and explained to the appellant in the
draft report) should be avoided,
even on a one-off basis.
[47] Applying Re Erebus and Daganayasi v Minister of
Immigration,20 the Court of Appeal confirmed that before an
adverse decision is made natural justice requires disclosure of the substance
of
any prejudicial content in a report and a fair opportunity to
correct or contradict that content. There was no question
that “A”
faced serious allegations and he was entitled to have clear information about
the evidence on which Ms Rebstock
based her proposed
finding.21
[48] The Court of Appeal determined that the information given to “A” provided a sufficient basis for him to know the case against him and respond to it. Natural justice did not require that “A” be given the source data so that he could check and
correct it:22
19 At [57].
20 Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration [1980] 2 NZLR 130 (CA) at 143.
21 A v Attorney-General, above n 18, at [61].
22 At [65] (emphasis added).
We do not see that as a necessary component of the obligation to meet the
principles of natural justice: what is required is that
the appellant be told of
the evidence against him so that he can respond, not so that he can second
guess the investigation.
B. Serco’s claims of breach of natural justice
[49] Serco’s case is pleaded fully in its statement of
claim. Broadly, Serco
contends that the—
Chief Inspector failed to provide Serco with any, or sufficient, information
(including specific details of time, place, and circumstances)
to enable Serco
to adequately respond to the allegations made in the Investigation
Report.
[50] More particularly, Serco strongly objects to the Chief Inspector’s partial reliance on anonymous statements by interviewees and has consistently pressed for the disclosure of notes of all interviews undertaken in the course of the investigation. As “the reports of the referee, or at least the substance of any prejudicial contents”, were required to be disclosed in Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration23 so too, Serco submits, must the notes of interviews conducted by the Chief Inspector and his staff be provided to Serco. By refusing to provide the information the Chief Inspector has failed to provide Serco with sufficient detail of the allegations
made against it and Serco has therefore been denied a fair opportunity to
respond to the allegations.
[51] Mr Wilson, counsel for Serco, submitted that the report draws
heavily on the claims made in the interviews. The interview
notes are the
“only possible source of information” about the claims and
allegations against Serco and Serco is entitled
to know more about the
information from the interviews. Mr Wilson further submitted that the report
itself—
contains no context or supporting documentation to evidence the claims made
and, to Serco’s knowledge, the Chief Inspector holds
no other supporting
evidence.
[52] Serco also takes issue with the Chief Inspector’s various
categorisations over
time of the confidential nature of the interview process. At one point in
the process
the Chief Inspector said “strict undertakings as to
anonymity” had been given to
23 Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration, above n 20, at 143.
interviewees. The report itself states that the majority of interviewees,
particularly prisoners, asked not to be identified and
were given undertakings
that statements they made would not be attributable to them.
[53] Serco does not accept that strict undertakings as to anonymity were
given as the Chief Inspector contended.
[54] Serco’s contentions of breach of natural justice are
essentially advanced under three heads of argument:
(a) Beyond the interviews, there is no evidence to support many of
the
Chief Inspector’s findings.
(b) Natural justice requires that the interview notes be given to Serco
(which accepts the sensitivity of the information
and previously offered
to restrict access to a small group of individuals assisting Serco in its
responses (though the orders now
sought contain no such
restriction)).
(c) There is no evidence that strict undertakings as to confidentiality
were given.
[55] When I come to assess whether or not Serco wad denied a proper
opportunity to respond I will address (b) and (c) together
under that head as
they are interrelated.
Was there a proper evidential basis for the Chief Inspector’s
findings?
[56] The first of the Chief Inspector’s findings was
that:
Organised fighting in the form of ‘sparring’ occurred frequently
in full view of CCTV cameras, with 12 incidents recorded
on CCTV in the 26 days
between 18 June 2015 and 13 July 2015.
[57] Serco did not challenge that finding during the consultation process
or, in fact, in its application for judicial review.
[58] The Chief Inspector’s second finding was in the following terms:
It is likely that organised fighting in the form of ‘contender fighting’ or ‘fight club’ occurred at least once a week, during certain periods in the months the subject of this Investigation. CCTV footage, MECF documentary records, and the YouTube Footage, show five incidents, and two probable separate incidents, occurred at MECF between 11 June 2015 and 4 July 2015. Of the
12 prisoners who were prepared to comment on the frequency of this activity, one said it happened weekly, and the others said that it occurred
more frequently than that, including four who said it occurred
daily or almost every day, in the units in which they were
housed.
[59] Mr Heron QC, counsel for the respondents, submitted that Serco accepted this finding in its final consultation response but has now reversed its position. Mr Heron is quite accurate. Serco’s response to the final report was provided in a
48-page document dated 25 November 2015 to the Chief Inspector. The first
part was a 13-page letter setting out Serco’s serious
concerns about
aspects of the report including that many findings were not supported by
evidence; prejudicially selective information
had been both included and
excluded; evidence had been weighted such as to present Serco “in the
worst possible light”;
interviews were relied upon; that natural justice
required release of all of the interview notes; and, more generally, Serco
recorded
that it did not accept that the interviews, without further
information, were credible, straightforward, truthful or reliable. The
remainder of the document consisted of a 35-page table containing Serco’s
detailed responses to particular statements or findings
in the
report.
[60] In this table Serco accepted the second finding in the following
terms:
Serco accepts the finding that ‘it is likely that organised fighting
was occurring at least once a week during certain periods’,
but rejects
any expansion of this to signify that a wider, systemic problem existed at
MECF.
...
Serco accepts organised fighting occurred on a regular basis during certain
periods of time. It does not accept that organised fighting
always occurred on
a regular basis.
Serco does not accept the investigation has evidence on which to make a
certain finding as to the frequency of organised fighting. (Emphasis
added.)
[61] The Chief Inspector did not make a “certain” finding about frequency. He said “it is likely” that ‘contender fighting’ or ‘fight clubs’ occurred at least once a week during certain periods in the months under investigation. Serco does not agree that the prisoner statements can be relied on to draw even this conclusion as to the
frequency of organised fighting and indeed objected to the use of anonymous
statements for any purpose.
[62] This stance persistently overlooks that the Chief Inspector relied
on primary evidence for his conclusions and that the prisoner
interviews were
corroborative. The Chief Inspector emphasised this throughout his report.
Because of its importance I reproduce
in full the bases for the Chief
Inspector’s finding:
2.2.4 Overall conclusions on frequency of organised
fighting
88. MECF’s records of organised fighting are in my view
most consistent with a prevalent underlying organised
fighting problem, of which
most incidents were not detected or recorded by Serco.
...
90. As to ‘contender fighting’ and ‘fight
club’:
a) The CCTV footage and YouTube footage also shows that organised fighting other than sparring occurred regularly at MECF, with four confirmed instances, and two probable separate instances, in the period from 11 June 2015 to 4 July
2015 (noting that CCTV footage does not record what happens in cells). This does not include the two organised
fighting events in the YouTube Footage, for which Serco has been unable to
provide a date.
b) MECF documentary records state that three prisoners were charged with fighting on 11 June 2015, which means that, combined with the evidence of the CCTV footage and YouTube Footage, there were five confirmed, and two probable instances of organised fighting in the less than four weeks between 11 June 2015 and 4 July 2015.
c) In my view the demeanour of the fighters and spectators in the
YouTube Footage and in CCTV videos is consistent with a
regular occurrence of
this type of organised fighting. The prisoners that appear in these videos
appear totally unsurprised at what
is taking place, and seem to treat it as an
ordinary part of life at MECF.
d) Prisoner interviews are consistent with organised fighting other than sparring having occurred on a regular basis, and at least as often as weekly during certain periods of time in the months which are the subject of the Investigation.
91. Based on the above, I conclude that organised fighting other than sparring is likely to have occurred on a regular basis, and at least as often as weekly during certain periods of time in the months which are the subject of the Investigation.
[63] Manifestly, the Chief Inspector’s findings were based
upon material that tended to “logically show the
existence of
facts” consistent with his findings. And his reasoning, and the
inferences he drew, were logically available
to him.24
[64] As to prisoner interviews ((d) above) the Chief Inspector addressed
in his report Serco’s contentions that prisoner
statements are anonymous,
generalised, unable to be verified, inconsistent, made by prisoners with little
or no incentive to be truthful,
and were made by only a small subset of
prisoners interviewed. The Chief Inspector discussed these objections with
the investigators
who informed him they considered the prisoners in general to
be straightforward and truthful when discussing the presence of organised
fighting. The Chief Inspector stated every interview was conducted by an
investigator with extensive experience interviewing prisoners
and he had
confidence in their judgements of prisoner demeanour. Where an interviewer had
concerns about a prisoner’s credibility,
this had been noted.
[65] The Chief Inspector addressed each of Serco’s concerns. It is
not necessary to recite in this judgment his detailed
responses. He was
satisfied that the statements were reliable. There were compelling reasons why
prisoner statements could not
be verified by reference to documentary evidence.
By its very nature organised fighting is covert. MECF documentary records
suggested
a prevalent underlying problem but because of the lack of
formal MECF records of organised fighting the Chief
Inspector
considered prisoner statements to be in fact some of the best
available evidence of the prevalence of the problem
and, importantly, consistent
with CCTV footage from the period available.
[66] Ultimately the Chief Inspector concluded that, when considered in the context of the CCTV footage and YouTube footage, the prisoner statements about the frequency of organised fighting were credible evidence that it was likely to have occurred on a regular basis and at least as often as weekly during certain periods of time in the months covered by the investigation. In this part of the report the Chief Inspector recorded a consensus among interviewees — those who were prepared to comment — that organised fighting occurred regularly with multiple
interviewees stating that the fights had been occurring as frequently as
daily. The
24 Re Erebus, above n 15, at 671.
Chief Inspector set out the prisoners’ various estimates of frequency
but he also considered that frequency could be inferred
from prisoners’
statements as to the number or frequency of fights they watched or participated
in. This evidence was set out
in the report.
[67] Importantly, where possible, the Chief Inspector used oral evidence
from prisoners “solely for the purpose of corroborating
conclusions
available from other evidence, such as documentary records and CCTV
footage”.
[68] While that material was not the only evidence supporting his
findings it was highly relevant to the investigation and the
Chief Inspector
considered its absence would impact on his ability to carry out his statutory
function. He deposed that it would
have been impossible to gather many, if not
all, of the statements obtained in the absence of agreements as to
confidentiality.
Therefore his reliance was both permissible and
legitimate.
[69] Serco also challenged for want of evidence other findings in the
report such as that food contaminated by animals had been
served to prisoners
and had been stored in an uncovered and sanitary manner and also that
it was likely some prisoners
had been denied their right to call their legal
adviser for significant periods of time. I have examined each alleged
insufficiency
of evidence and find the concerns unfounded. I refer to two
examples.
(a) As to food contamination the MECF kitchen was visited by the
inspectorate and the Ombudsman on 31 July 2015. The report
described the
unsanitary and disorganised state it was found to be in. Following that visit
external contractors were brought in
to clean the facility and equipment.
Furthermore, CCTV footage observed by the investigators revealed unsanitary
habits among kitchen
workers including, in particular, leaving food in areas
where it could be contaminated by animals. There was footage of birds eating
bread that had been placed on top of trolleys awaiting delivery to
the housing units. The Chief Inspector was entitled
to conclude, as he did,
that this food was very likely to have been served to prisoners
|
|
having been placed on the top of the trolleys awaiting delivery to their
units.
|
(b)
|
As to the finding that many prisoners were denied their right to call their
legal advisor for significant periods of time of
time Serco
|
|
|
|
accepted in its response to the draft report that it would improve
its
performance in this area. But now the finding is challenged as
lacking
|
|
|
a proper evidential basis. The Chief Inspector recorded in his
report
that there had been 20 complaints to Serco via its CMS kiosk system
|
|
|
but only three complaints to the inspectorate in 2015 about access
to
phones. He noted complaints to the inspectorate typically only occur
|
|
|
when prisoners have failed to resolve their complaint with Serco
and
wish to take the matter further. Interviews with Serco management
|
|
|
confirmed there has been issues with the system and these issues were
detailed in the report.
|
[70]
|
It is
|
apparent that the Chief Inspector approached his
investigation
|
methodically and was attuned to the importance of assessing the strength and
reliability of the factual information from which he
drew his conclusions. His
report and the evidence reflect a conscientious awareness of his obligations to
Serco and that Serco
should have every reasonable opportunity to
contribute to the investigation and ultimate findings.
[71] What is also apparent is that Serco approaches what it
considers to be disputed facts as though this were civil
litigation and that
evidence may be contested to the point where findings, if not conclusively
established by the facts, should be
withdrawn. But, as Mr Heron submitted, the
inquiry was not a court of law and the Chief Inspector’s role was to
investigate
and report. This he did and the evidence shows Serco was given a
level of detail and information that was full and expansive and
afforded it
every opportunity to comment on the essence of the findings.
[72] It is telling that in its response to the final draft report Serco
accepted the
finding that “it is likely that organised fighting in the form of
‘contender fighting’ or
‘fight club’ was occurring at least once a week during certain periods” yet now takes
the position that the finding was not available to the Chief Inspector other
than on the basis of objectionable oral information.
[73] This brings me to the next limb of the natural justice argument:
that because the notes of interviews were withheld from
Serco it was deprived of
a proper opportunity to respond to the issues raised in the drafts of the
report.
Did Serco have a proper opportunity to respond?
[74] Serco objected strongly to the Chief Inspector’s
partial reliance on anonymous statements of interviewees
and pressed for
disclosure of complete interview notes, anonymised or otherwise. Allied to
this part of Serco’s case is Serco’s
rejection of the Chief
Inspector’s earlier assertions that undertakings as to confidentiality
were given.
[75] I deal first with the claimed confidentiality of
interviews.
[76] The Chief Inspector and other investigators and officers deposed
that the interviews did include discussion about confidentiality.
A Serco
employee who was interviewed deposed that there was no discussion of
confidentiality at the beginning of his interview.
[77] In his affidavit the Chief Inspector described the interviews as
being “subject to an understanding of confidentiality”.
This seems
more likely than not particularly when one considers the prisoner interests that
the legislation has specifically safeguarded
in pt 2, subpt
6:25
... persons ... are able to make a complaint ... without fear of adverse
consequences.
And:
... identities of complainants are disclosed only to the extent that it is
necessary to assist in the investigation of the
complaints.
25 Corrections Act 2004, s 152(1).
[78] The Chief Inspector asked interviewees whether they consented to their interview notes being provided to Serco on an anonymised basis. Only a few agreed. It seems obvious that interviewees expected the information would be confidential. But it is not necessary to resolve the factual dispute about the precise nature of the
‘confidentiality’ discussion at the beginning of the 90
interviews.
[79] The fact is prisoners have reasonable concerns for their safety.
Revelation of the identity of informants can lead to retribution
by staff or
other prisoners.
[80] A key theme of the Corrections Act is the protection of prisoner
safety. That interest informs the shape and content of
natural justice
entitlements in these circumstances.
[81] As regards the interviews with staff, a more general point may be made about natural justice entitlements and inquiries (though it is equally applicable to the interviews with prisoners). Preserving confidences of informant witnesses is generally good policy in the context of investigations carried out in the public interest and it is a recognised justification for limiting disclosure of evidence. The
rationale is that witnesses should be encouraged to come
forward.26
[82] Accordingly, whether there were in fact express
undertakings of confidentiality comes second to the compelling
public
interest, recognised by the statute and the common law, in protecting the
identity of prisoner and staff witnesses.
[83] In A v Attorney-General the Court of Appeal considered that the letter provided to “A”, containing information about the copying and scanning of documents with the precise times when “A” logged receipt of Cabinet papers and when copying and scanning occurred, provided a proper basis for “A” to know the case against him and respond to it.27 The Court of Appeal rejected the submission that the source data was needed so it could be checked and corrected holding that
such an opportunity was not a necessary component of the obligation to
meet the
26 Re Pergamon Press Ltd [1970] 3 WLR 792 (CA) at 798 per Lord Denning MR.
27 A v Attorney-General, above n 18, at [65].
principles of natural justice. What was required was that the appellant be
told of the evidence against him so he could respond not
so that he could second
guess the investigation.
[84] Mr Wilson sought to distinguish this case. He submitted that
“A” already knew the precise times on which it
was alleged he had
scanned the Cabinet papers. The photocopier data added very little. But here
Serco has not been provided with
the precise times and evidence as to when the
events are alleged to have occurred. Serco’s position is that without the
interview
notes it cannot identify the incidents referred to in the report and
cannot therefore provide comment on those incidents.
[85] This point is borne out, Mr Wilson submitted, by the course of the
draft exchanges between the Chief Inspector and Serco.
There were several
instances where Serco’s opportunity to bring further evidence resulted in
changes to the report. It follows
that had Serco been given the interview notes
it would have been able to make effective contributions that could have changed
the
Chief Inspector’s findings.
[86] In response to a query about how the interview notes might assist
Serco Mr Wilson said Serco could check which units the
interviewee prisoners
were in to “identify individual units, potential patterns, [and then]
interview staff”. Elaborating
on patterns Mr Wilson submitted
—
if all of the prisoners making a certain allegation were located in the same
place at the same time in the same housing unit, then
that might suggest that
the allegation, rather than being site-wide, was confined to a specific unit,
which could allow you then
to look at things like the personnel who were
staffing that unit. It might allow you to identify who else was in that
unit.
[87] The notes would not have allowed Serco perfection in its
responses, Mr Wilson submitted, but “would have
enabled Serco to look and
to examine and to consider whether it had anything that could assist the
Chief Inspector in
this process.”
[88] I accept, and prefer, the Chief Inspector’s own assessment of whether Serco could have materially assisted his investigation were it to have the confidential information it sought. The Chief Inspector did not believe that disclosing the
confidential information to Serco would materially assist it to respond to
his report for several reasons:
(a) He had confirmed that the prisoners interviewed were in the units
that they claimed.
(b) He had taken into account whether, in relation to consistent
statements made by prisoner interviewees, prisoners were housed
in the same
prisons at the time of the interviews which may have resulted in
collusion.
(c) While Serco had no medical records relating to organised fighting,
to the extent that information about organised fighting
might be inferred from
records of injuries, insults and fighting generally, that
information had been set out in
graphs elsewhere in the report.
(d) The Chief Inspector had confirmed that no complaints of organised
fighting were made by any prisoners to Serco. In a context
where a number of
episodes of organised fighting were captured on CCTV the absence of records
did not prove an absence of
fighting. The Chief Inspector considered
the lack of other records of the fighting captured by CCTV in June and
July 2015,
and in the YouTube footage, illustrated the point
clearly.
[89] In my view Serco’s proposed analysis of the interview material
would be to effectively second guess the investigation
and to that extent has
parallels with the unsuccessful argument by the applicant in A v
Attorney-General: Serco’s request appears to be more in the nature of
a fishing expedition than a requirement for disclosure to ensure its natural
justice entitlements are met.
[90] To my mind Serco’s complaints under this head approach a level of grievance more commonly associated with an impoverished consultation process. While consultation may be required as part of the duty of fairness in an inquiry context, Serco’s entitlement was to be appraised of any potentially adverse finding against it
and to have the opportunity of adducing material of probative value which
might contradict or correct relevant statements potentially
adverse to
Serco.28 If consultation is “an opportunity for
persuasion”29 that is a different kind of opportunity
from the opportunity to comment on and correct factual information that is to be
relied
on to one’s prejudice.
Conclusions on breach of natural justice
[91] I am satisfied that the Chief Inspector’s process afforded to
Serco its full entitlement to natural justice. Relevantly,
Serco accepted what
it describes as the core finding, that organised fighting was likely to have
occurred on a regular basis in the
months the subject of the
investigation.
(a) The Chief Inspector’s findings were based on material of
probative
value.
(b) Serco had notice of the findings and responded
fulsomely.
(c) Natural justice did not require provision of the notes of
interviews.
(d) In any event there are compelling public interest reasons,
recognised in Re Pergamon Press Ltd and also derived from the
Corrections Act,30 why the interview notes should not be
disclosed.
Error of law
[92] An inquiry may be reviewable for material error of
law:31
If the alleged error of law materially affects a matter of substance relating
to a finding on one of the terms of reference it is
in general reviewable. The
reason for exercising the power of review is the stronger if that
error damages the reputation
of any person directly concerned in the
inquiry.
28 Daganayasi v Minister of Immigration, above n 20, at 143; Re Erebus, above n 15, at 671.
30 Re Pergamon Press Ltd, above n 26.
[93] Serco claims that the Chief Inspector overlooked certain matters
which he was in fact bound to take into account, and took
into account certain
matters that were irrelevant. Thus the Chief Inspector is said to have fallen
into legal error.
[94] Two principles are to be kept in mind. First is the distinction between the relevance of a consideration and the weight to be given to a relevant consideration.32
The latter is for the decision-maker,33 subject
to the possibility that a weighting
might be so unreasonable as to be unlawful. But that is not how this aspect
of
Serco’s case is pleaded, nor how it was argued.
[95] Second, what is relevant and irrelevant for the Chief Inspector when investigating a referral from the Chief executive is to be identified from the statute. A Court will only hold a decision to be invalid on the basis of a failure to take into account a relevant consideration if the consideration was, as a matter of legal obligation, required to be taken into account. That obligation will most typically arise expressly, or impliedly, from the operative statute. It is not sufficient that the consideration is one that may properly be taken into account or even one that many
people would have taken into account.34
[96] Mr Heron submitted that the question for the Court was whether,
bearing in mind the Chief Inspector’s statutory powers
and his terms of
reference, the matters raised by Serco were required to be taken into account.
In Mr Heron’s submission all
the matters raised were either in fact dealt
with or not so squarely within the terms of reference that by not addressing
them the
Chief Inspector erred in law.
[97] In my view, this aspect of Serco’s case is properly analysed
in terms of whether the Chief Inspector has exceeded his
terms of reference and
accordingly erred in law. I acknowledge—35
the importance of ensuring the integrity of the essential findings of a report in its answers to the terms of reference. There is a legitimate public interest
32 Waitakere City Council v Estate Homes Ltd [2006] NZSC 112, [2007] 2 NZLR 149 at [66]; Health Advocates Trust v Director of Health and Disability Services Consumer Advocacy [2008] NZCA 67 at [41].
33 As Mr Wilson acknowledged in his submissions at [6.66].
34 CREEDNZ Inc v Governor-General [1981] 1 NZLR 172 (CA) at 183.
in those findings being properly based in law if the purposes of the report
are to be achieved.
A. Failure to take account of relevant considerations?
[98] Serco’s case was that the Chief Inspector failed to take account of: (a) the history of organised fighting at MECF;
(b) the level of ongoing violence at MECF; (c) the role of gangs in organised fighting;
(d) the level of violence at other prisons in the New Zealand estate; (e) concessions made by Serco;
(f) evidence complimentary of Serco.
[99] I accept the submission for the respondents that the Chief Inspector
either accounted for the matters Serco identifies, or
was not required to by his
terms of reference. Section 156(1) of the Act permits an inspector of
corrections to investigate
a complaint in any manner that the inspector
considers appropriate. While the scope of the Chief Inspector’s
investigation
was bounded by the terms of reference he had a wide discretion as
to the witnesses he would interview, the evidence he would review
and the
weight he would accord to particular evidence.
[100] I am confident that the so-called relevant considerations were not
made mandatory or obligatory by either the Act or the terms
of reference. And if
they were the evidence shows the Chief Inspector considered them:
(a) History of organised fighting: The Chief Inspector did in fact refer to two previous reports of investigations into organised fighting but Serco regards the references as inadequate because they are only “scene-setting”. The criticism goes to weight, a matter for the Chief Inspector.
(b) Ongoing violence: The terms of reference specify a time frame, the
three months preceding, for “particular attention”.
At the hearing
Mr Wilson submitted that the term of reference do not prevent the Chief
Inspector from reaching beyond that three-month
period. I agree. But they
certainly do not require him to.
(c) Role of gangs: The report makes at least a dozen references to the
role of gangs in organised fighting. The complaint
is really that the
references were not prominent enough, or perhaps do not attribute enough blame
to gangs, and not that a relevancy
was not taken into account.
(d) Violence at other prisons: The terms of reference divide
the investigation into two phases the latter of which
expressly includes
“adequacy of controls designed to address prisoner violence ... operating
in other New Zealand prisons”.
The level of violence at other prisons in
the New Zealand estate is, on a plain reading of the terms of reference, a
matter for
the second phase of the investigation. By implication it is not a
matter for the first phase with which this application is concerned,
such that
it could be a mandatory relevant consideration. But it is also beyond the terms
of reference which at the most general
level directed the Chief Inspector to
investigate “the potential existence of organised prisoner on prisoner
fighting (fight
club) at [MECF]” (emphasis added).
(e) Concessions and complimentary evidence: The Chief Inspector was
alive to Serco’s concern that he had not adequately
complimented it and
addressed the point in his report:
This Report, although relatively wide-ranging in parts, is not intended to be an exhaustive review of all aspects of prisoner welfare at MECF. Accordingly, while it identifies various areas of concern, it does not recite the areas in which no concerns have been identified, and in which Serco may in fact be performing well.
[101] This ground of review is, in fact, a complaint about the Chief
Inspector’s approach to the evidence before him: the
weight or emphasis he
gave to particular evidence, the inferences he drew and the conclusions he
reached. The statement of claim
reveals that to be Serco’s real concern.
Serco pleads that the matters now argued as disregarded were not
“sufficiently
taken into account”.
B. Irrelevant considerations taken into account?
[102] Although not pleaded, Mr Wilson submitted that the Chief Inspector
took into account a range of irrelevant factors for example:
(a) uncorroborated oral evidence that organised fighting likely occurred on a
regular basis and at least as often as weekly;
(b) evidence from Prisoner P who the interviewer regarded as self-serving and
whose evidence was not considered worthwhile.
[103] It is unnecessary to address each of the examples given under this
ground of review which I consider to lack merit. One
example illustrates the
point. Serco complains that Prisoner P’s oral evidence should not have
been taken into account. The
interviewer, Mr Phelan, explained in his affidavit
that he passed on to the Chief Executive his assessment of this
witness’s
credibility. It appeared to Mr Phelan that the
prisoner’s motivation for the interview appeared to be so that he could
complain about an assault. Mr Phelan recorded on the interview notes that his
only reason for agreeing to be interviewed was self-serving
and that no
worthwhile information was forthcoming. Mr Phelan deposed that in fact the
prisoner did provide valuable information
about the fights at MECF. He did not
provide worthwhile information connected with his assault complaint and Mr
Phelan’s
note was not intended to suggest otherwise.
[104] Nor is there any merit in the claim that the report’s core finding — that organised prisoner fighting occurs regularly and at least as often as weekly — is a finding only available to the Chief Inspector based on his oral sources of information.
[105] Serco expressly accepted this finding in its final consultation
response. Yet it rejects the finding now as being in error
of law because Serco
resists any degree of reliance by the Chief Inspector on the interview evidence.
As I have held this complaint
is without merit.
[106] The remainder of Serco’s arguments under this head of review
fail for similar reasons. Serco has not shown that the
Chief Inspector has
considered a matter that he ought not to have considered much less that such an
impermissible consideration influenced
his approach or his findings. This part
of Serco’s case is, in substance and effect, a further complaint about
weight. And,
again, that is evidenced by the statement of claim. Serco pleads
that the Chief Inspector consistently gave “undue weight”
to
information critical of Serco while minimising the responsibility of others and
that the Chief Inspector placed “inappropriate
reliance” on
irrelevant factors such as information from prisoners including Prisoner
P.
[107] I return to the complaint that oral evidence from prisoners was uncorroborated. In my view, to hold that evidence from prisoners amounts to an “irrelevant consideration” unless it can be corroborated in the way Serco seeks would hinder the ability of the inspectors to fulfil their statutory obligations and role in the corrections system, one of the purposes of which, it needs to be remembered, is to ensure that sentences of imprisonment are administered in a safe, secure,
humane and effective manner.36
[108] Although Serco has not pleaded that any finding was outside the terms
of reference it did advance such an argument at the
hearing. I briefly address
the arguments.
[109] Serco submits that the following findings are outside the Chief
Inspector’s
terms of reference.
(a) It is likely many prisoners at MECF have been denied their right to call
their legal adviser for significant periods of time.
36 Corrections Act 2004, s 5.
(b) Following its decision to require prisoners to use
prisoner-designated phones for calls to lawyers Serco failed to adequately
resource the process to ensure calls could be made in a timely
manner.
(c) MECF kitchen sanitation practices fell far below an
acceptable standard.
(d) Prisoners had been served food contaminated by animals and food had
been stored in uncovered and unsanitary manner.
(e) Meal delivery practices were not sufficient to ensure all prisoners
received a meal and that the meals delivered
were appropriately
heated.
[110] While the catalyst for the inquiry was the awareness of incidents of
fighting in MECF the terms of reference did not confine
the Chief Inspector to
investigating and reporting on those events. Other terms expanded the scope of
the investigation to include
standards, procedures, operational
systems and work practices. Importantly, the Chief Inspector was to
“investigate
prisoner safety and welfare in general at MECF and review
prisoner complaints”. While he was to investigate prisoner safety
and
welfare generally he was to have particular focus on complaints related to
serious assaults.
C. Error of law — conclusion
[111] The areas which the Chief Inspector investigated, and his associated
findings, were within the legitimate scope of the Chief
Inspector’s
inquiry. He regarded, for example, the concerns raised by prisoners about their
inability to telephone their legal
adviser as denying “their fundamental
right” to call their lawyer and an aspect of prisoner welfare. As with
other matters
relating to work practices and internal controls they were matters
relating to prisoner welfare and were examined on that basis.
He did not exceed
his terms of reference.
[112] The Chief Inspector did not fail to account for relevant factors or take into account irrelevant factors.
[113] Serco has not demonstrated that the Chief Inspector was in error of
law.
Unreasonableness
[114] Serco’s case under this head of review is that the Chief
Inspector has an obligation to act reasonably which entails
making
findings only where there is sufficient evidential foundation. That
obligation extends to an obligation on the Chief
Inspector to properly
“inform himself”, an obligation which he breached because he
consistently failed to inquire into
claims and allegations many of which were
highly contentious and inflammatory.
[115] In the course of his argument Mr Wilson acknowledged that the
unreasonableness relied on by Serco overlapped sufficiently with
the first two
grounds of review (insufficient evidential foundation and failure to take
account of relevant considerations) that
lawfulness could be analysed under
either head.
[116] For the respondents Mr Heron submitted that Serco was “simply
wrong” in its claim that there was no sufficient
evidence on which to base
the findings which Serco impugns. Mr Heron cross-referenced his written
submissions to the factual bases
available to the Chief Inspector for the
findings he reached.
[117] Accepting unreasonableness as a ground upon which the Chief Inspector
may be reviewed in the conduct of his investigation
and preparation of
his report I suggest the intensity of review must be minimal.37
I reach this view in light of the nature and consequences of the public
function which he, and the inspectors of corrections, are
performing when
undertaking their inquiries.
(a) The inspectors’ procedures are essentially inquisitorial.
(b) They may investigate complaints in any manner they consider
appropriate.38
37 Air New Zealand Ltd v Wellington International Airport Ltd [2008] NZHC 1781; [2009] NZAR 138, [2009] NZCCLR 15 (HC) at [33]: “There is a spectrum of review intensity under the head of unreasonableness.”
38 Corrections Act 2004, s 156(1).
(c) They make recommendations not binding decisions.
(d) They are expected to exercise judgement and a significant
discretion bounded in this instance by broad terms of reference.
(e) Frequently the findings reached and recommendations made will call
for a high degree of subjective evaluation.
(f) Crucially, the complaints system — and therefore the
inspectors — must ensure identities of complaints are disclosed
only to
the extent necessary to assist in the investigation of complaints and that
complaints may be made without fear of adverse
consequence.39
[118] In these circumstances, if the terms of reference have not been
exceeded and if natural justice entitlements have been effected
and findings
have been reached on the basis of material which tends logically to support the
finding, there remains little scope
for judicial review on the ground of
unreasonableness. The two broad bases advanced in support of this cause of
action, namely,
that there was an insufficient evidential foundation for a
number of findings and the “decision-maker” failed to inform
himself, cannot meet the threshold of unreasonableness which it is necessary to
meet in light of my conclusions about the quality
of the Chief Inspector’s
process and his report.
[119] Furthermore, even if the Chief Inspector made findings based solely on the oral evidence of prisoners and staff it is not correct to suggest that such findings would lack an evidential basis and therefore would be “unreasonable”. Interviews with prisoners may indeed provide sufficient and probative evidence. Serco’s stance would severely curtail the Chief Inspector’s ability to inquire into the (mis)treatment of prisoners. There will undoubtedly be situations in which mistreatment or other events of concern occur which cannot be investigated by documentary evidence
alone.
39 Section 152(1)(b) and (i).
Summary
[120] As I observed at the outset Serco accepts most of the recommendations
but draws a distinction between the recommendations
and the body of
the report. Mr Wilson described the body of the report as
a collection of unsubstantiated claims and allegations drawn together in such
a way as to wilfully portray Serco in the worst possible
light and to minimise
any criticism of the Department. It includes findings that are not supported by
any evidence ... The Report’s
tone and language are deliberately
controversial, sensational and prejudicially selective.
[121] I consider that description to be unfounded and inaccurate.
What has happened is this: concerning footage showing
the likely presence of a
‘fight club’ at MECF came to light. As he was asked, the
Chief Inspector reported
rapidly following a thorough investigation. He was
consistently objective, balanced and concerned to meet his obligations of
fairness
to Serco.
[122] To my mind the report itself is measured and temperate and
Serco’s description of it is wholly unwarranted.
The investigation was
fair and the report is without error.
Result
[123] For the reasons given the application for review is
dismissed. The suppression orders are lifted.
[124] The respondents are entitled to costs. If costs cannot be agreed
the parties may file memoranda.
Solicitors:
Kensington Swan, Wellington for Plaintiff
Crown Law Office, Wellington for First and Second Respondents
Karen Clark J
APPENDIX
Terms of Reference
27 August 2015
IN012003
S/15/01
TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE INVESTIGATION OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDlNG ORGANISED PRISONER ON PRISONER FIGHTING
(Fight Club) AND ACCESS TO CELL PHONES AT MOUNT EDEN CORRECTIONS FACILITY (MECF)
Background
On 15 July 2015 the Department of Corrections became aware that a series of
video clips showing organised fighting between prisoners
at MECF had been
uploaded to YouTube which appears to indicate the presence of a "fight Club"
operating at MECF.
Subsequent video footage has also been released which indicates prisoner access to
Contraband and a Prison radio.
An internal Investigation into these events is being completed by Serco
management. Police have also been advised and may conduct
their own
investigation.
The Department of Corrections believes that it is appropriate that the
possible existence of organised prisoner on prisoner fighting
"fight club" and
access to contraband, including cell phones, be fully investigated by the Chief
Inspector of Corrections.
The Investigation
The Investigation team will be led by Chief Inspector Andy Fitzharris and assisted by
Ms Louise MacDonald, Inspector of Corrections.
The Office of the Ombudsman has been invited to monitor and review the
Investigation. Full cooperation will to be afforded to the
Ombudsman's
investigator, who may also independently report on any matter concerning the
incidents or its subsequent Investigation.
The Investigation will have access to all relevant information,
documentation, premises and persons pertaining to the events, and
may, with the
approval of the Chief Inspector, call on such additional or specialist
assistance to the Investigation as may be appropriate.
Phase one of the Investigation will be completed and a report presented to the
Chief Executive, through the Chief Inspector, by 30 October 2015.
Phase two of the Investigation will be completed, and a report presented to the
Chief Executive, through the Chief Inspector, by 30 November 2015.
Terms of Reference
Phase One
1. To investigate and report on the circumstances surrounding
the events, as depicted on YouTube, and the potential
existence of
organised prisoner on prisoner fighting (fight club) at MECF.
The Investigation will pay particular attention to the last 3 month
period to determine:
• Whether this type of activity is widespread across the site
or limited to specific Units.
• The adequacy of controls and procedures to prevent access to,
and the use of, cell phones.
• Whether staff and management had knowledge of the existence
of a 'fight club' operating, and any involvement by staff
in its
operation.
• Levels of supervision and security operating that would allow
this activity to occur without staff intervention.
• What information was available to management through Intel,
staff reports or Health Services which may indicate that
prisoners may be
involved in unreported fighting.
• Whether incidents of prisoner on prisoner violence was
being under- reported.
• Review any actions taken previously by MECF to
address prisoner violence or access to contraband.
• What actions management have subsequently implemented to
prevent this type of activity.
2. To investigate and report on the extent to which the standards,
procedures, operational systems, work practices and internal
controls for the
proper management of prisoners were in place and being complied
with.
3. To make such recommendations for the improvement of promulgated
standards, procedures, operational systems, work practices
and internal controls
as may be necessary, arising out of the findings of the
Investigation.
4. To review the Department of Corrections prison monitoring arrangements at MECF. This will include the Corrections monitors' areas of focus, access to essential information, reporting and escalation arrangements and their interactions between Serco management and Corrections management.
Phase Two
6. To review the adequacy of controls designed to address prisoner
violence and access to cell phones operating in other New
Zealand prisons.
Investigate any similar reported incidents of cell phone use in other New
Zealand prisons.
Ray Smith Chief Executive Department of Corrections
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2016/1859.html