Tribble v Police [2016] NZHC 187 (18 February 2016)

Last Updated: 20 April 2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY

CRI-2015-488-41

CRI-2015-488-42

CRI-2015-488-43
CRI-2015-488-44 [2016] NZHC 187

ISRAEL JOHN TRIBBLE

v

_{NEW ZEALAND POLICE}

Hearing:	3 February 2016
Appearances:	A Dooney for the Appellant M A Jarman-Taylor and J W Wall for the Respondent
Judgment:	16 February 2016
Reissued:	18 February 2016

_{JUDGMENT OF THOMAS J}

This judgment was delivered by me on 16 February 2016 at 4.45 pm pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Date:...............................

Solicitors:

Marsden, Woods, Inskip and Smith, Whangarei.

Counsel:

A Dooney, Whangarei.

TRIBBLE v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2016] NZHC 187 [16 February 2016]

Introduction

[1] Mr Israel Tribble was convicted of aggravated robbery using a firearm, under s 235(c) of the Crimes Act.¹ He pleaded guilty, and was sentenced on 12 November

2015 to five years and three months’ imprisonment, with a minimum non-parole period of two years.

[2] Mr Tribble now appeals that sentence on the grounds that it was manifestly excessive.

Factual background

[3] On 11 August 2015, the victim was at the Hilltop Dairy in Dargaville where she worked. Her home is attached to the dairy.

[4] Mr Tribble and his co-offender Mr Paniora planned to rob the dairy, discussing it over text with associates. Mr Paniora was to be the driver and pick Mr Tribble up afterward. For the purpose of the robbery, Mr Tribble obtained a double-barrelled shotgun, which had had the barrel shortened, ammunition, a carry bag and some items of disguise.

[5] Around 4.15 pm, Mr Paniora drove Mr Tribble near the store. Once nearing the shop, Mr Tribble pulled a red bandanna over his face. Once inside, he took the shotgun out of the bag.

[6] As there was no-one in the store, Mr Tribble went through a hallway into the victim’s home. He pointed the shotgun at her and demanded access to the safe. On being told there was no safe, Mr Tribble demanded that she come back into the shop area, and requested the money from the till. The victim opened the till, removed the cash, and placed it in the defendant’s carry bag. Mr Tribble then requested the cigarettes from the display cupboard, which the victim also placed in the bag. Mr Tribble pointed the shotgun at her while making these requests.

[7] Mr Tribble then ran out of the shop, to the nearby road where Mr Paniora was waiting. The amount taken was approximately $200 in cash, and 20 packets of cigarettes.

[8] The Police executed a search warrant at a house on 21 August, and located both men there as well as a number of items used in the robbery, such as the bandanna, carry bag and shotgun. When asked, Mr Tribble admitted some of the facts and stated that he needed money. He claimed he had received the shotgun from an unknown associate about a year earlier and had cut it down.

Pre-sentence report

[9] Mr Tribble was found to have little insight into his offending. Key influences on his offending were seen as being gang and peer associations, and methamphetamine use. These factors were also reported by Probation as being drivers in Mr Tribble’s more recent non-compliance with the conditions of his supervision sentence. While his family appeared to be supportive, they too noted the effect of methamphetamine and gangs on Mr Tribble. He reported taking methamphetamine daily, but was unable to link his drug-taking with his offending, simply stating that he carried out the offence because he “was bored”.

District Court Decision

[10] In the District Court, the Judge sentenced Mr Tribble on a number of charges: aggravated robbery, breach of a supervision order, driving dangerously, driving while disqualified and failing to stop for a police officer on request.

[11] The Judge found the aggravated robbery charge was the lead charge, and identified the aggravating factors as the actual and threatened use of violence, use of a weapon, entry into the victim’s private residence, and the planning (including the use of disguises, getaway vehicle and obtaining a weapon). He considered that there were no mitigating features of the offending.

[12] The Judge drew on the guideline judgment of R v Mako and adopted a

starting point of seven years’ imprisonment, higher than the Crown, who advocated

six years’ in written submissions, and five years orally. The Judge described the victim’s experience as one of the most frightening experiences anyone could expect.

[13] The Judge considered whether to impose an uplift, but chose not to, given that he had adopted a high starting point. This was despite the fact that the offending was committed whilst on bail and while subject to a sentence, being the community based sentences, and on bail for the driving charges outlined above.

[14] The Judge rejected an argument that Mr Tribble was entitled to a youth discount at the age of 21, as he had a host of prior convictions and was an experienced offender. He allowed a 25 per cent reduction for Mr Tribble’s early guilty plea, taking the overall sentence to 5 years and three months’ imprisonment.

[15] For the other charges the Judge imposed concurrent sentences, with one month imprisonment for dangerous driving, three months’ imprisonment for driving while disqualified, and one month imprisonment each for the breaches of community work and supervision.

Appellant’s submissions

[16] Counsel for Mr Tribble challenges the seven year starting point that was adopted. Counsel submits that a starting point of four years’ imprisonment is appropriate, or five years at the upper end.

[17] Following the guideline judgment of Mako, counsel submits that Mr Tribble’s main intention was to rob a dairy. The entry into the victim’s home was not a primary motivating factor. Counsel submits that within the guidance offered in Mako, this was essentially a robbery of a “small retail shop” for which a four to five year starting point is recommended.

[18] Counsel for Mr Tribble points to two cases with lower starting points which are said to be comparable, Mark v R and Leisi v New Zealand Police.² Counsel also submits that no minimum period of imprisonment was necessary.

Respondent’s submissions

[19] The Crown submits that the seven year starting point, although at the very top end, was not out of range. The Crown submits that the aggravating factors were correctly identified, although it is noted that the Judge was mistaken to say that the gun was loaded as it appears that it was unloaded but that Mr Tribble had five or six rounds of ammunition in his pocket. The Crown submits that the fact that the gun was not loaded does not diminish the seriousness of the use of a firearm. Ms Jarman-Taylor conceded, however, that the dicta in Mako relating to robbing dwelling homes is not really, in the circumstances, relevant.

[20] The Crown further submits that the Judge was correct not to give a youth discount given that Mr Tribble was 21 and had seven prior convictions.

[21] In the alternative, the Crown submits that, if the five year three month sentence was excessive, it is offset by the fact that the Judge did not impose cumulative sentences for the unrelated offending involving speeding and breaching other sentences.

[22] Finally, the Crown submits that the minimum period of imprisonment (MPI) was appropriate with reference to the guidelines for imposing an MPI in s 86 of the Sentencing Act. The MPI of 24 months is very slightly different to the time at which the appellant would have served one-third of his sentence, or 21 months.

Appeal against sentence

[23] Section 250(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 states that the Court must allow the appeal if satisfied that:

(a) for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed on conviction; and

(b) a different sentence should be imposed.

[24] In any other case, the Court must dismiss the appeal.³

[25] The Court of Appeal in Tutakangahau v R has recently confirmed that s

250(2) was not intended to change the previous approach taken by the courts under the Summary Proceedings Act 1957.⁴ Further, despite s 250 making no express reference to “manifestly excessive”, this principle is “well-engrained” in the court’s approach to sentence appeals.⁵

[26] The approach taken under the former Summary Proceedings Act was set out in R v Shipton:⁶

(a) There must be an error vitiating the lower Court’s original sentencing discretion: the appeal must proceed on an “error principle.”

(b) To establish an error in sentencing it must be shown that the Judge in the lower Court made an error whether intrinsically or as a result of additional material submitted to the appeal Court.

(c) It is only if an error of that character is involved that the appeal Court should re-exercise the sentencing discretion.

[27] The High Court will not intervene where the sentence is within the range that can properly be justified by accepted sentencing principles. Whether a sentence is manifestly excessive is to be examined in terms of the sentence given, rather than the process by which the sentence is reached.⁷

Analysis

[28] The guideline judgment on aggravated robbery sentences is R v Mako.⁸ In that case, the Court of Appeal identified a range of factors which serve to aggravate an aggravated robbery. They stated:

[52] What we have said about these features amply demonstrates that the criminality in any aggravated robbery offence must be assessed by the particular combination of features of which it is composed. That assessment must be made as a matter of judgment unconstrained by over-emphasis on one feature such as the nature of the target premises.

⁴ _{Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482 at [26]- [27].}

⁵ _{At [33], [35].}

⁶ _{R v Shipton [2007] 2 NZLR 218 (CA) at [138]-[140].}

⁷ _{Ripia v R [2011] NZCA 101 at [15].}

⁸ R v Mako [2000] NZCA 407; [2000] 2 NZLR 170, (2000) 17 CRNZ 272 (CA).

[29] However, the Court also identified some examples of aggravated robbery offending and the appropriate starting points in each case. In particular, and as identified by the District Court Judge in this case:

[54] ... The robbery of commercial premises where members of the public can be expected to be present, targeting substantial sums in tills or a safe by a group, with a lethal weapon, disguises and other indications of preparation, should attract for adult perpetrators after a defended trial a starting point of

6, or perhaps more, years. Where firearms are loaded or the danger of harm is increased in other ways, or if actual violence is used, the starting point

would be 8 years or more.

...

[56] A further example can be given taking another combination of features typical of many aggravated robberies. This envisages a robbery of a small retail shop by demanding money from the till under threat of the use of a weapon such as a knife after ensuring no customers are present, with or without assistance from a lookout or an accomplice waiting to facilitate getaway. The shopkeeper is confronted by one person with face covered. There is no actual violence. A small sum of money is taken. The starting point should be around 4 years. Should the shopkeeper be confined or assaulted, or confronted by multiple offenders, or if more money and other property is taken 5 years, and in bad cases 6 years, should be the starting point.

[30] Looking to the aggravating features of aggravated robbery offending identified in Mako, I identify:

(a) Planning and premeditation: this was not a sophisticated planned operation, but the two offenders had discussed their plans, brought disguises and arranged for one to be the driver of the “getaway” car. While not highly planned, the offending goes beyond impulsive or spontaneous actions.

(b) Use of a weapon: although there is no evidence the shotgun was loaded, and it was not used, the fact that it was brought to the scene is a significant factor nonetheless. Mako specifically noted that although there is generally less risk of danger with unloaded firearms, they can still create danger by causing fire from police, or more extreme reactions from victims.

(c) Target premises: the targeted premise was a dairy, with a relatively low potential gain compared to a bank or other commercial operation. This is reflected in the value of what was taken.

(d) No members of public present: although it is an aggravating factor when members of the public are around during a robbery, the fact that none were there may have simply been coincidence.

(e) Home invasion element: Mr Tribble clearly intruded on the personal residence of the victim, which likely added to her overall distress. However, this cannot be considered a dominant element of the offending, insofar as Mr Tribble did not plan to enter her home.

(f) Victim impact: the impact on the victim was very serious. She has shut down the dairy, and struggles to go outside, as she suffers panic attacks. She has incurred loss of income as a result of no longer being able to run the dairy.

[31] The description in Mako of the robbery of a small retail shop does suggest a starting point of four years. However, the use of a sawn-off gun to threaten the shop- keeper in this case aggravates the crime significantly. Although there was no actual assault, the presence of that type of weapon might be considered a more aggravating factor than the use of a knife. Further, there is some discretion in the descriptions given in Mako – “bad cases” are seen as having latitude to extend to six year staring points.

[32] The defence point to the cases of Leisi and Mark in support of a four year starting point. In Leisi, the appellant, with another, purchased food from a petrol station. The appellant’s co-offender attempted to drink milk without paying for it.⁹

When the service station service manager approached them, the appellant delivered a king hit to the side of his face, causing him to fall to the ground. The co-offender then kicked the victim three times in the head and body. During this period the appellant took bottles of soft drink valued at $11 from a nearby shelf before going to

the main doors to wait for the co-offender. The appellant was 17. The starting point of three and a half years was found on appeal to be at the high end but not excessive.

[33] Leisi has few similarities to the current case. On appeal the High Court Judge agreed with the view of the sentencing judge that the case did not fall easily into either the “street standover” category or the “small retail shop” category in Mako. This case far more clearly falls into the category of the small retail store robbery. Neither is the assessment of the mitigating factors in that case relevant, given Mr Leisi was a 17 year old first time offender.

[34] In R v Mark, the appellant was one of three men who entered a TAB, all heavily disguised and with two carrying a rifle and a knife.¹⁰ Two staff members were present, as were as members of the public. Two of the men jumped over the counter and demanded that the staff members open the safe. There was a scuffle, with one staff member being punched. The third offender fired his rifle twice, once at the staff member and once in the air, but it did not go off either time.

[35] The appellant, who was unarmed, remained in the customer area of the building and detained the patrons there. Eventually, as the safe took too long to open, cash was taken from the counter drawers instead and the offenders left. The amount taken from the TAB was around $3,200, along with cash and a cellphone taken from the manager. None of the property taken was recovered. In that case, a seven year starting point was imposed, with no MPI.

[36] The offending in that case was, in my view, at a higher level of culpability than the current case. Although the level of planning was similar, Mr Tribble did not discharge his firearm, which added to the culpability of those involved in Mark. Although Mark involved offending in front of members of the public, it is not clear whether Mr Tribble deliberately waited to target the dairy until it was empty or if that was simply fortuitous. Although the Judge suggested it was deliberate choice, there is nothing on the evidence which suggests that.

[37] Turning to other comparable cases which give an indication of the appropriate starting point, I identify:

(a) Mahia v R:¹¹ three offenders formed a plan to rob a dairy as they were driving past one. They undertook some limited reconnaissance of those in the dairy, went home and changed into clothing which provided a disguise and two of them armed themselves with a length of pipe and a metal car jack handle. One defendant, Mr Kingi, smashed the candy stand of the dairy to provide a distraction while Mr Mahia confronted the worker, demanding that they open the till and give them the money. When the till could not be opened, the offenders took packets of cigarettes. Mr Mahia then struck the victim approximately five times with the metal carjack handle. This took around 30 seconds. On appeal, Heath J upheld a starting point of six years for Mr Mahia as at the higher end of the range but justified given the existence of two offenders, the actual use of weapons, particularly to strike the worker around the head, and the use of disguises.

(b) Molia v R:¹² Mr Molia and an associate (wearing gloves and with covered faces) went to a dairy, armed with a slug pistol. Mr Molia pointed the pistol at a member of the public outside the dairy and told him to stay where he was, which he did. Once inside the dairy, Mr Molia brandished the pistol at the dairy owner and told him to hand over the money in the cash register. The appellant and his associate then jumped the service counter, telling the owner to open the register. Mr Molia and his associate took cash and between 80 and 100 packets of cigarettes. On appeal, the Court of Appeal stated that the starting point of five years was a little high, but that four years six months, with an uplift of six months to reflect that the crime was committed

_{while on supervision, was appropriate taking into account that there}

¹¹ _{Mahia v R [2014] NZHC 3284.}

¹² Molia v R [2013] NZCA 512.

were two offenders, two members of the public caught up in events, and property valued at $6000 was taken.

(c) Christofides v R:¹³ In Christofides, the appellant wearing sunglasses and a bandanna pointed an imitation pistol at a shopkeeper's head and demanded money. He took $300, but as a result of the offending the shopkeeper closed his business. A starting point of four years three months' imprisonment was considered appropriate.

(d) R v Bidois:¹⁴ the Court of Appeal upheld a starting point of five years for offending in which the appellant and co-offenders robbed a superette. During the offending, one co-offender produced a knife, of which the Judge was satisfied the appellant had been unaware, and used it to threaten the shopkeeper and his father-in-law who was helping him. Another offender punched one of the victims and pushed the other, telling both to lie on the floor. The offenders took some $950 in cash, together with cigarettes and chocolates. They required the shopkeeper to hand over his car keys and cell phone. They then got into the shopkeeper's car and drove it away. They divided among themselves the proceeds of the aggravated robbery, none of which has been recovered. While the co-offender received a five years starting point, the appellant who was unaware of the knife received a four and a half year starting point.

(e) Solicitor-General v Singh:¹⁵ two incidents of aggravated robbery occurred four days apart. The first arose when Mr Singh and two associates drove to a retail store in East Tamaki Road. The two associates went inside, and one punched the sales person in the face and then grabbed a plastic bag and filled it with packets of synthetic cannabis from a display stand beside the counter. The two men then left the store and returned to the vehicle. Mr Singh then drove them

_{away. The second incident arose when Mr Singh drove the same}

¹³ _{Christofides v R [2011] NZCA 126.}

¹⁴ _{R v Bidois [2009] NZCA 426.}

¹⁵ Solicitor-General v Singh [2014] NZHC 3331.

associates to a different retail store. The associates went inside, and one was armed with a rifle. He walked up to the counter, pointed the rifle at the shop keeper and demanded money from her. The shopkeeper took out about $100 in cash from the till and gave it to them, following which they ran out of the shop, and Mr Singh drove them away.

On appeal, Lang J held that each incident warranted a starting point of around five years, as each incident involved an element of premeditation, violence was used including firearms, and there were two offenders. Considering the two robberies, a six year starting point was warranted.

(f) E v Police:¹⁶ while awaiting sentence for burglary, the appellants went to a dairy and robbed it with a sawn off shotgun. Three people entered the dairy, wearing disguises over their heads with a fourth person waiting in the car according to a plan. One offender aimed a shotgun at her head and demanded money and cigarettes. Another offender shut the front door and then joined the other behind the counter grabbing cigarettes. He then struck the woman on the back of the head three times while the first offender yelled abuse at her and pointed the gun at her head. The three then hurriedly left the dairy, got into the waiting getaway car and drove off. Ronald Young J took into account that the shotgun was unloaded, and that no one else was in the dairy, and also that actual violence was involved, with planning and disguises utilised. He stated that in those circumstances, a starting point of six to six and a half years was at the top end of the available range.

[38] This analysis supports the appellant’s position that a starting point of seven

years was out of range for the level of offending. In this case, there was no actual violence used although the presence of an unloaded firearm was obviously

¹⁶ E v Police HC Wanganui CRI-2009-483-13, 8 April 2009.

aggravating. Even taking into account the home invasion element, and the severe impact on the victim, the offending was not at the seven year starting point mark.

[39] The cases of Molia v R and Solicitor-General v Singh, where firearms were pointed at the victims but not used, and there was no actual violence involved, are similar. In cases in which actual violence was involved, such as E v Police and Mahia v R, starting points of around six years have been adopted, and even described as at the higher end. Further, many of those cases involved multiple offenders in the store, which is a clearly aggravating factor compared to one individual. Although the threatened violence involved in this case would have been very frightening to the store owner, having only one person involved and no actual violence utilised should be reflected in a lower starting point.

[40] Considering these authorities, and considering the particularly traumatic effect on the victim and the aggravating element of home invasion, I consider a starting point of five years’ imprisonment would have been appropriate. Seven years is well outside the appropriate range.

Aggravating factors

[41] Mr Tribble committed this crime while on bail, and while subject to a sentence of supervision. An uplift of six months is appropriate for that fact, taking the starting point to five years six months.

[42] There are no aggravating factors personal Mr Tribble which require an uplift. Although he has 12 other convictions (including the ones for which he was concurrently sentenced in November), I do not consider that to be sufficient to warrant uplifting for prior history. None of Mr Tribble’s other convictions are close to the same level of seriousness of the current offending.

Mitigating factors

[43] The only mitigating circumstance to consider is Mr Tribble’s early guilty

plea. There is nothing to suggest that an earlier plea could have been entered. Given

that, applying a 25 per cent discount reaches the end result of four years two months’

imprisonment.

Totality/Cumulative or concurrent

[44] The Crown submits that, as the other offences for which Mr Tribble was being sentenced were separate in time and nature from the aggravated robbery offending, they could have been the subject of cumulative sentences rather than concurrent sentences. This would have balanced out, in the Crown’s view, any disparity in the starting point.

[45] The sentences imposed for the other offences for which Mr Tribble was charged are as follows:

(a) 3 months’ imprisonment on the charge of driving while disqualified, third and subsequent;

(b) 1 month imprisonment for dangerous driving;

(c) 1 month imprisonment for a breach of community work;

(d) 1 month imprisonment for breaching conditions of supervision.

Each of these sentences was imposed concurrently on the aggravated robbery charge.

[46] The driving charges all arose from one incident and the breaches of supervision and community work arose separately. I consider that generally, an uplift would be appropriate to take into account that separate and unrelated offending.¹⁷ However, that is subject to the fact that the court must consider the totality of the offending and ensure that the total period of imprisonment is not

_{wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.}¹⁸

¹⁷ _{Sentencing Act 2002, s 84.}

¹⁸ Sentencing Act, s 85.

[47] I do not have access to the summary of facts for the driving offences. The

District Court Judge described them as follows:

[4] In respect of the driving charges, the background to that is on

11 December 2013 he was convicted of driving whilst disqualified. On 1

August he was driving a Toyota motor vehicle in the Kaipara area. Police attempted to stop him due to lights on a trailer he was towing not working correctly and the red and blue flashing lights were activated. Mr Tribble has failed to stop, turned onto Tangowahine Valley Road. He has been pursued along Tangowahine Valley Road where the police lost sight of the vehicle. Police have begun searching for him. He was located. A second pursuit was engaged. During the course of that, police lost control of the vehicle and slid off the road, ending the pursuit. A second unit was travelling towards Tangowahine Valley Road and has seen Mr Tribble. That unit has turned around and engaged in a third pursuit with Mr Tribble. Another unit was also travelling over and deployed road spikes. Mr Tribble avoided those. The pursuit continued onto Mangakahia Road. He turned off onto Opouteke Road. He travelled along then smashed through a farm gate into the paddock and he has then driven into trees and decamped on foot. Police seek confiscation of that vehicle.

[48] Given the relatively egregious nature of the driving offending, and the fact that this is part of a pattern of driving offences for Mr Tribble I consider four months uplift warranted. Mr Dooney concedes that a significant portion of community work was not completed and Mr Tribble has two prior convictions for breach of community work. A two month cumulative sentence of imprisonment is warranted in this regard. The pre-sentence report describes Mr Tribble as compliant through the majority of his supervision sentence. A sentence of one month imprisonment concurrent with the community work sentence is appropriate for the breach of supervision.

[49] This brings the end result to four years eight months’ imprisonment.

Minimum period of imprisonment

[50] Counsel for Mr Tribble also challenges the imposition of a MPI. Section 86 of the Sentencing Act provides:

(1) If a court sentences an offender to a determinate sentence of imprisonment of more than 2 years for a particular offence, it may, at the same time as it sentences the offender, order that the offender serve a minimum period of imprisonment in relation to that particular sentence.

(2) The court may impose a minimum period of imprisonment that is longer than the period otherwise applicable under section 84(1) of the Parole Act

2002 if it is satisfied that that period is insufficient for all or any of the following purposes:

(a) holding the offender accountable for the harm done to the victim and the community by the offending:

(b) denouncing the conduct in which the offender was involved:

(c) deterring the offender or other persons from committing the same or a similar offence:

(d) protecting the community from the offender.

[51] The Judge imposed a 24 month, or two year MPI. Given the lower sentence which I substitute on the charge of aggravated burglary, (four years and two months) a two year MPI would be close to 50 per cent of the sentence. Based on the higher sentence imposed by the Judge, two years was around 38 per cent of the sentence. This was very slightly higher than the standard one-third of the sentence typically served before becoming eligible for parole. In this case, if no MPI were imposed and a four year two month sentence imposed on the aggravated robbery, Mr Tribble

would serve around 16 months of his sentence before being eligible for parole.¹⁹

[52] Defence counsel submitted that the case of Mark v R supports not imposing an MPI. While that was a case in which an MPI was not imposed for more serious offending than here, I consider that decision essentially turned on the facts of that case.

[53] In this case, looking to s 86, the need for denunciation and deterrence is high. I note this is the first sentence of imprisonment ever received by Mr Tribble. However, I consider that the need to hold the offender accountable for the harm done to the victim and community is a significant factor. The standard non-parole period would be insufficient to reflect the level of harm caused to the victim by Mr Tribble’s behaviour.

[54] I consider a minimum non-parole period of 20 months (one year eight months), which is approximately 40 per cent of the sentence and similar to that

¹⁹ Although the cumulative sentence would impact on this.

imposed by the Judge, adequately reflects the need to hold Mr Tribble accountable for the harm he has caused to his victim.

Result

[55] The appeal is allowed. The sentence is quashed and substituted by a sentence of four years two months’ imprisonment on the charge of aggravated robbery with a minimum period of imprisonment of 20 months.

[56] On the charge of driving while disqualified third or subsequent a cumulative sentence of four months’ imprisonment is imposed with two months’ concurrent on the charge of dangerous driving. The disqualification imposed remains. Two months’ imprisonment for the breach of community work is imposed, cumulative on the four months’ term. One month imprisonment is imposed for the breach of

_{supervision, to be served concurrently.}

Thomas J