Meenken v Attorney-General [2016] NZHC 2039 (31 August 2016)

Last Updated: 29 September 2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CIV-2014-485-11456 [2016] NZHC 2039

BETWEEN	DIEDERIK MARTEN MEENKEN Applicant
AND	ATTORNEY-GENERAL Respondent

Hearing:	On the papers
Judgment:	31 August 2016

_{JUDGMENT OF WILLIAMS J}

Introduction

[1] Mr Meenken filed a claim on 18 November 2014 seeking, it seems, that his estate be transferred to the Crown. The Crown applied to strike out the proceeding. Mr Meenken then discontinued the claim. Costs were awarded against him. He has now made a new application, which Registry staff have determined to be an attempt to relitigate the same case. Accordingly, they have refused to accept it. He has asked that a Judge determine whether the matter should be accepted for filing. The file has come to me as Duty Judge.

[2] Mr Meenken has been attempting to transfer his estate to the Crown since

2010. He was made bankrupt in 2012. His lengthy campaign to transfer his estate to the Crown appears to be an attempt to avoid his debts.

HCR 15.24

[3] HCR 15.24 provides:

15.24 Restriction on subsequent proceedings

A plaintiff who discontinues a proceeding (proceeding A) against a defendant may not commence another proceeding (proceeding B) against

DIEDERIK MARTEN MEENKEN v ATTORNEY-GENERAL [2016] NZHC 2039 [31 August 2016]

the defendant if proceeding B arises out of facts that are the same or substantially the same as those relating to proceeding A, unless the plaintiff has paid any costs ordered to be paid to the defendant under rule 15.23 relating to proceeding A.

[4] Accordingly, the application should not be accepted if the following conditions are met:

(a) it arises out of the same or substantially the same facts; (b) it is against the same defendant; and

(c) the applicant has not paid any costs awarded in respect of the discontinuation.

Same facts

_{[5] The 2014 application sought the following orders:}

	1.	To progress application for relief and to be discharged from the custody of the money or property held in trust relating to the estate of MEENKEN, DIEDERIK MARTEN.
	2.	Concerning any additional matters relating to the transfer, management or administration of any such property, or respecting the exercise of any power of discretion vested in the deemed trustee.
[6]	That	application and accompanying affidavit appear to claim that

Mr Meenken is the deemed trustee of an estate of a deceased person, and sought directions discharging his trusteeship. He says the Crown (in a “global sense”, as he was born in Holland) created a “legal fiction deceased person estate” in his name shortly after birth, and that he has previously made false claims to the ownership property of the “estate” which he sought to renounce and transfer to the Crown.

[7] The current application seeks orders:

1. For the approval of the applicant’s disclaimer of all the beneficial interest in the estate DIEDERIK MARTEN MEENKEN.

2. For relief, loosing the applicant from being bondsman and surety in respect of the estate

[8] One of the grounds given is that Mr Meenken “repents of having mistaken a beneficial interest in the estate property without authority, and elects to unconditionally and irrevocably disclaim all property interests in the estate.” The affidavit filed in support says that the estate is a legal fiction, that he has wrongly claimed ownership, and that he wants the estate to be irrevocably transferred to the Crown.

[9] Thus the application arises out of the same facts as the discontinued claim.

Same defendant

[10] As to the second limb of the test, the Attorney-General is not named in this application. However, in my view, the application, like the previous one, is an attempt to avoid paying his debts. He effectively seeks to do this by passing his “estate” to the Crown, that is, making the Crown liable for his debts. Accordingly, if the application were to proceed, there would likely be an order adding the Attorney- General as a defendant and, in any event, the Crown as guise or another is plainly the correct respondent. In my view, the intent of HCR 15.24 covers this situation.

Payment of costs

[11] There is nothing on the file to show that Mr Meenken has paid costs. Because the other two limbs have been met, it is for Mr Meenken to show that he has paid costs in order for the application to be accepted. As he has not shown this, the application must be rejected on this basis.

Jurisdiction

[12] Another ground for refusing the application is that there is, in any event, no cause of action in the pleading for which the Court has jurisdiction.

[13] The application is said to be made in reliance on

(a) “the royal law”;

(b) the equitable (including ecclesiastical) jurisdiction of the Court, in

HCR 18.1(a); and

(c) Mr Meenken’s affidavit.

[14] In my view, the Court does not have any jurisdiction arising from “the royal law”.

[15] HCR 18.1(a) provides that part 18 applies to:

(a) proceedings in which the relief claimed is wholly within the equitable jurisdiction of the court, such as—

(i) the determination of a claim to an entitlement as beneficiary under a will or trust or on the intestacy of a deceased person, or as creditor of a deceased person, whether the claim is made by the person claiming to be entitled or by that person’s assignee or successor:

(ii) the ascertainment of a class of creditors, beneficiaries under a will, or persons entitled on the intestacy of a deceased person, or of beneficiaries under a trust:

(iii) the giving of particular accounts by executors, administrators, or trustees:

(iv) the payment into court of money held by executors, administrators, or trustees:

(v) the giving of directions to persons in their capacity as executors, administrators, trustees, or beneficiaries to do or abstain from doing a particular act:

(vi) the approval of a sale, purchase, compromise, or other transaction by executors, administrators, or trustees:

(vii) the carrying-on of a business authorised to be carried on by any deed or instrument creating a trust or by the court:

(viii) the interpretation of a deed or instrument creating a trust:

(ix) the determination of a question that arises in the administration of an estate or trust or whose determination is necessary or desirable to protect the executors, administrators, or trustees:

[16] The application does not fall within any of these categories. Although the list is not exhaustive, there is no existing equitable cause of action entitling a plaintiff to

obtain a Court order to give up one’s property to the Crown so as to avoid private

debts. Such applications would in fact be contrary to equity. [17] I decline to overturn the Registrar’s decision.

Williams J

Solicitor:

Crown Law, Wellington for Respondent cc: Applicant in person