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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 27 October 2016
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND ROTORUA REGISTRY
CRI-2016-463-000037 [2016] NZHC 2484
BETWEEN
|
MATEKITAWHITI TANGITU
Appellant
|
AND
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NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent
|
Hearing:
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18 October 2016
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Appearances:
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C M Andersen for Appellant
N T C Batts for Respondent
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Judgment:
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18 October 2016
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JUDGMENT OF PALMER
J
Counsel/Solicitors:
C M Andersen, Barrister, Tauranga
B Hesketh, Barrister, Tauranga
Crown Solicitor, Tauranga
TANGITU v NEW ZEALAND POLICE [2016] NZHC 2484 [18 October 2016]
Facts
[1] On 3 August 2016 Ms Tangitu, aged 66, pleaded guilty to and was
convicted of three charges of causing loss by deception,
under s 240 of the
Crimes Act 1961, carrying a maximum penalty of up to seven years’
imprisonment.
[2] At the time of offending Ms Tangitu was serving a sentence of 12
months on home detention and also was under an obligation
to make reparations of
$6,500. That sentence was for four charges of misuse of a document to obtain a
pecuniary advantage, and
one charge of causing loss by deception. Those
were her first convictions.
[3] The first of the offences relevant to this appeal was
committed on
23 December 2015. Ms Tangitu asked someone if they would be interested in doubling their money, in two days. After the victim initially declined, Ms Tangitu persisted explaining her nephew had come back from Africa with diamonds. Why that might make a difference is difficult to understand. However, she was given
$1,000 and further inquiries about the money were ignored.
[4] The second and third offences were committed on 15 February 2016. Ms Tangitu said an old woman had left $500,000 to the Catholic Church for the poor and needy, and she could get the second victim a large amount of money. Two weeks later the second victim gave her $1,500 on the basis of a promise of getting
$15,000 back. Further inquiries yielded continuing promises but no
payment.
[5] On the same date, the third victim was told the same story about
the Catholic Church, and deposited $4,000 into a bank account.
Queries also
resulted in further promises but no payment.
District Court decision
[6] Judge Rollo in the District Court at Whakatane sentenced Ms Tangitu to 12
months’ imprisonment.1 He used a starting point of 18
months on the basis of several aggravating factors including that Ms
Tangitu had selected
vulnerable
1 Police v Tangitu [2016] NZDC 15947.
victims and the offending was committed while on home detention for similar
offences.
[7] Judge Rollo gave Ms Tangitu a six month or 33 per cent discount to
reflect her early guilty plea, her personal circumstances
and good character
references. He declined to commute imprisonment to home detention because the
offending had been committed while
Ms Tangitu was on home detention for similar
offending. Judge Rollo had regard to the fact that Ms Tangitu had lied to the
pre-sentence
report writer about repaying the victims, as well as to the
seriousness of the charges.
Submissions
[8] Ms Andersen, agent for Mr Hesketh who is counsel for Ms Tangitu, submits that the sentence was manifestly excessive because the starting point should have been 14 to 16 months rather than 18 months, referring to the lack of aggravating factors present as identified by the Court of Appeal in R v Varjan.2 She says excessive weight was placed on the belief Ms Tangitu targeted her victims, suggesting that the second instances of offending in particular were opportunistic
and there were few charges in number.
[9] Ms Andersen also says Judge Rollo erred in not granting leave to
apply for home detention and she submits there should have
been a discount for
remorse, and a greater discount for personal circumstances and good
character.
[10] Mr Batts for the Crown submits that the starting point was within the available range and the discounts were appropriate if not generous, as was the failure to apply an uplift for the significant aggravating factor of previous relevant convictions. Mr Batts submits the Judge’s decision not to exercise his discretion to
impose home detention should not be interfered with on
appeal.
2 R v Varjan CA97/03, 26 June 2003.
Law
[11] Under s 250 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 I am required to
allow the appeal if I am satisfied for any reason there is
an error in the
sentence imposed, and a different sentence should be imposed. Otherwise I must
dismiss the appeal. The High Court
does not intervene when the sentence is
within the range that can be properly justified by accepted sentencing
principles.
[12] Here, the purposes of sentencing identified by s 7 of the Sentencing
Act 2002 include, particularly:
(a) holding Ms Tangitu accountable for the harm done to the victims and to
the community by her offending;
(b) promoting in her a sense of responsibility for, and acknowledgement of
that harm;
(c) providing for the interests of the victims and reparation for the harm
done;
(d) denouncing her conduct and deterring her and others from committing such
offences;
(e) protecting the community from Ms Tangitu, and also
(f) assisting in her rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.
[13] Section 8 of the Sentencing Act sets out the principles
of sentencing I
am
required to apply. They include here particularly:
(a) taking into account the gravity, culpability and seriousness of the
offending;
(b) the desirability of consistency with sentences for similar offenders committing similar offences in similar circumstances;
(c) the least restrictive outcome appropriate in the circumstances,
and
(d) taking into account Ms Tangitu’s personal family, whānau,
community
and cultural background.
Analysis
[14] I have considered all of Ms Tangitu’s and the Crown’s
submissions. The first
question I must consider is whether there was an error in the Judge’s
sentence.
[15] As Mr Hesketh in the written submissions and Ms Andersen orally
point out, there is no guideline judgment on the starting
points for this kind
of offending. That is because such offending can happen in so many different
ways. In Varjan, as Ms Andersen submits, the Court of Appeal referred to
certain circumstances and factors that should be considered.
[16] In considering those, I agree that this was not particularly
sophisticated offending nor is it of a remarkable magnitude,
or comprised of
very many charges. I agree there may have been an element of opportunism to
some of the offending, as Ms Andersen
submits. Though, as Mr Batt submits, it
does rather highlight the vulnerability or trusting nature of the
victims.
[17] And it should not be taken to minimise the losses or effects on the
victims who were vulnerable and put their trust in Ms
Tangitu after some
insistence by her that they do so. The number of character references for Ms
Tangitu is positive for her but
as the Department of Corrections report says, it
is unclear whether some of them were aware of the offending. In addition, they
also indicate the extent to which she has betrayed a position and reputation of
trust through spinning considered stories to induce
people to part with their
money.
[18] Contrary to Mr Hesketh’s written submissions, I do not consider the lack of much repetition of offending significantly mitigates Ms Tangitu’s culpability. It was repeated three times while on home detention, after earlier offending.
[19] I do not consider that the case of Turner cited by Mr
Hesketh and Ms Andersen where an 18 month starting point was used, was
significantly more serious or the culpability
significantly higher than in this
case.3 Indeed, the cases surveyed in that judgment and in the
judgment of Collins J in Bennett v Police suggests the offending here was
in line with a number of other cases using that starting
point.4
[20] I also consider that Ms Tangitu’s offending is comparable with
offending in the case of Sardana v R.5 The offender there
led victims to loan him $15,000 and fled the country. A 12 to 15 month starting
point was considered appropriate.
While the offending there was more serious in
some respects, it was not committed while on home detention for the same sort
of
offending, an aggravating factor under s 9(1)(c) of the Sentencing
Act.
[21] As Mr Batts submits, it is comparable to Bennett v Police
where charges of obtaining $3,091 by deception while on community detention.
That attracted an 18 month starting point.
[22] Overall, I do not consider Judge Rollo erred in setting the starting
point at 18 months. It was within the range available
to him.
[23] Neither do I consider Judge Rollo erred in not providing a
discount for remorse. Given the pattern of dishonesty here
it is not easy to
tell how genuine remorse would be distinguished from further lies. The report
of remorse in the pre- sentence
report comes together with the lie that she
repaid her victims $5,000.
[24] I also consider the full discount of 25 per cent for a guilty plea,
rounded up to
33 per cent for personal circumstances was within the range available to Judge Rollo. That is particularly because Ms Tangitu’s offending may have involved taking advantage of some of those involved in community projects in which she
worked, according to the pre-sentence report that I have
seen.
3 Turner v R [2014] NZCA 454.
4 Bennett v Police [2015] NZHC 2592.
5 Sardana v R [2016] NZCA 138.
[25] Finally, given that Ms Tangitu’s offending was committed while
she was on home detention, I do not consider home detention
an option. By her
own actions Ms Tangitu has demonstrated home detention is not likely to promote
in her a sense of responsibility
for, or acknowledgement of the harm she has
done. Neither will it deter her from committing the same or similar offence,
or protect
the community from her, or facilitate her rehabilitation.
Result
[26] I do not consider Judge Rollo erred. I do not regard
his sentence as manifestly excessive. I consider it
was within the range
available to him.
[27] Accordingly, I dismiss the
appeal.
Palmer J
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