R v G [2016] NZHC 501 (22 March 2016)

Last Updated: 21 April 2016

ORDER PROHIBITING PUBLICATION OF NAME, ADDRESS, OCCUPATION OR IDENTIFYING PARTICULARS OF APPELLANT UNTIL FURTHER ORDER OF THE COURT.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY

CRI-2015-085-006980 [2016] NZHC 501

THE QUEEN

v

_G

Hearing:	22 March 2016
Counsel:	G J Burston for Crown I M Antunovic and C L Parkin for Defendant
Judgment:	22 March 2016

_{JUDGMENT OF COLLINS J}

Introduction

[1] Ms G was charged with five charges namely, one charge of murder,¹ three charges of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm² and one charge of assault with a weapon.³ The offending occurred on 1 July 2015 in a Wellington suburb.

[2] On 22 March 2016, I orally recorded my finding that Ms G was not guilty of the five charges she faced on account of her insanity at the time she committed the

_{offences. I made this finding under s 20 of the Criminal Procedure (Mentally}

¹ _{Crimes Act 1961, s 172.}

² _{Section 188(1).}

³ _{Section 202C.}

R v G [2016] NZHC 501 [22 March 2016]

Impaired Persons) Act 2003 (CPMIP Act). At the same time, I ordered Ms G be detained in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health (Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992 (the MHCAT Act). I made that order under s 24(2)(a) of the CPMIP Act.

[3] This judgment explains the reasons for the finding and order I made on

22 March 2016.

Background

[4] Ms G is now 25 years old. She has had a long history of mental illness.

[5] In August 2010, Ms G was admitted as an in-patient under the MHCAT Act because of her psychotic state and fears about the risks of her harming herself. At the time, Ms G’s symptoms included thought disorder, paranoid delusions and auditory hallucinations. Ms G was discharged into a community health programme after approximately five weeks as an in-patient. Ms G was hospitalised again in February 2011 and July 2014.

[6] In the weeks leading up to her offending, Ms G’s mental health again began to deteriorate. It is now apparent she had stopped taking her medication and as a result she began displaying symptoms of thought disorder, paranoid delusions and auditory hallucinations.

[7] On 1 July 2015, Ms G’s parents took her to her general practitioner. The general practitioner attempted to give Ms G quetiapine, an oral anti-psychotic medication, which she had been prescribed. Ms G resisted these attempts. She punched the general practitioner and refused to take the medication. She was referred to Wellington Hospital for assessment by the Mental Health Crisis Assessment and Treatment Team (the CAT Team). Ms G’s parents drove her to Wellington Hospital. She was seen by the CAT Team at about 7.00 pm. Members of the CAT Team thought they had successfully administered quetiapine to Ms G, but it appears that she must have spat the medication out. Ms G returned home with her parents.

[8] At about 8.15 pm, Mr G saw Ms G looking at a knife and said words to the effect, “don’t even think about it”. Ms G ran into the bathroom with a small vegetable knife followed by her father and mother. An altercation occurred in the bathroom. Tragically, Mr G received two stab wounds to his chest from which he died at the scene. Mrs G also received multiple stab wounds.

[9] Ms G then ran from the bathroom and stabbed her nine year old nephew in the stomach, narrowly missing his aorta. Ms G then ran past her sister, who was telephoning the police. Ms G stabbed her sister in the shoulder and then ran from the family home.

[10] Ms G went to a number of neighbouring properties. At one property she stabbed a middle-aged woman in her chest with such force that the handle of the knife snapped from its blade.

[11] Ms G then went to another property. She left that property just as the police arrived. When Ms G refused directions to stop she was brought down by a police dog, which bit her on her thighs. Ms G underwent surgery at Hutt Hospital to treat the dog bite wounds. Blood samples taken from Ms G at the time subsequently revealed that there was no trace of quetiapine in her blood.

[12] Ms G was seen by Dr Barry-Walsh, a forensic psychiatrist on 3 July 2015. Dr Barry-Walsh certified that Ms G needed to be detained in a psychiatric hospital or secure facility under s 38(2)(c) of the CPMIP Act. Dr Barry-Walsh recorded that Ms G was actively psychotic and suffering hallucinations and thought disorder. He also said she was suicidal. Ms G was discharged from Hutt Hospital to Rangipapa Medium Secure Unit (Rangipapa), a facility managed by the Central Regional Forensic Mental Health Service.

Fitness to plead

[13] Dr Barry-Walsh saw Ms G on several occasions after she was placed in

Rangipapa. Dr Barry-Walsh prepared reports for the Court on 15 July 2015, 27 July

2015, 21 August 2015 and 14 October 2015. He also gave oral evidence in the hearing on 22 March 2016.

[14] I have also had the benefit of a report prepared by Professor Brinded, a forensic psychiatrist who assessed Ms G at the request of the Crown. Professor Brinded’s report is dated 11 November 2015. Professor Brinded also gave evidence at the hearing on 22 March 2016.

[15] Dr Short, who is a psychiatrist responsible for Ms G’s ongoing care and treatment, also provided the Court with a comprehensive report about Ms G. That report is dated 14 March 2016.

[16] It is not necessary for me to traverse the details set out in the psychiatric reports. Suffice to record that in his report of 27 July 2015, Dr Barry-Walsh advised the Court that Ms G remained seriously unwell and that her psychotic illness rendered her unfit to stand trial at that juncture.

[17] By 14 October 2015, Dr Barry-Walsh was satisfied that Ms G’s mental health had improved to the point where she was, by then, fit to stand trial. That assessment was confirmed by Professor Brinded in his report of 11 November 2015 and Dr Short in her report of 14 March 2016.

[18] As a result of these assessments, Mr Burston for the Crown, and Mr Antunovic, senior counsel for Ms G, informed the Court that there was no issue about Ms G’s ability to enter a plea and that it was not necessary for me to conduct assessments under ss 9 and 14 of the CPMIP Act.

[19] I accordingly accepted Ms G’s pleas of not guilty to all charges on the basis that she had, through her counsel, advised that she intended to raise the defence of insanity. In entering those pleas Mr Antunovic accepted on behalf of Ms G that she committed the physical acts that formed the basis of the charges.

Insanity

[20] Section 20(2) of the CPMIP Act sets out the three steps that need to be satisfied as part of a finding of insanity in a case such as this. That subsection provides:

20 Finding of insanity

...

(2) Before or at a ... trial, the Judge must record a finding that the

defendant is not guilty on account of his or her insanity if—

(a) the defendant indicates that he or she intends to raise the defence of insanity; and

(b) the prosecution agrees that the only reasonable verdict is not guilty on account of insanity; and

(c) the Judge is satisfied, on the basis of expert evidence, that the defendant was insane within the meaning of section 23 of the Crimes Act 1961 at the time of the commission of the offence.

...

[21] In the present case, Ms G indicated she intended to raise the defence of insanity and Mr Burston agreed that the only reasonable verdict was one of not guilty on account of insanity. I was therefore required to determine on the basis of the psychiatric evidence if Ms G was insane at the time of the commission of the offences.

[22] Section 23(2) and (3) of the Crimes Act 1961 explain insanity for present purposes. Those subsections state:

23 Insanity

...

(2) No person shall be convicted of an offence by reason of an act done or omitted by him when labouring under natural imbecility or disease of the mind to such an extent as to render him incapable—

(a) Of understanding the nature and quality of the act or omission; or

(b) Of knowing that the act or omission was morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of right and wrong.

(3) Insanity before or after the time when he did or omitted the act, and insane delusions, though only partial, may be evidence that the offender was, at the time when he did or omitted the act, in such a condition of mind as to render him irresponsible for the act or omission.

[23] I am in no doubt Ms G was suffering a disease of the mind at the time she offended. My reasons for reaching this conclusion can be succinctly stated:

(1) First, Ms G had a history of significant mental illness prior to the events of 1 July 2015;

(2) Second, Ms G stopped taking her medication in the weeks leading up to 1 July 2015. As a consequence her mental health began to deteriorate markedly;

(3) Third, Ms G’s family sought urgent medical care for Ms G on 1 July

2015. Unfortunately, Ms G actively resisted any treatment;

(4) Fourth, Ms G’s behaviour on the evening of 1 July 2015 was entirely

consistent with her history of psychotic illness; and

(5) Fifth, all three psychiatrists who have assessed Ms G are satisfied that on the evening of 1 July 2015, Ms G was suffering a Schizo-Affective Disorder, which is a major mental disorder.

[24] I am also satisfied Ms G was both incapable of understanding the nature and quality of her acts and of knowing that her acts on the evening of 1 July 2015 were morally wrong, having regard to the commonly accepted standards of the community.

[25] My reasons for reaching this conclusion can be distilled to two points:

(1) First, it is clear from all surrounding evidence that on the evening of

1 July 2015 Ms G was deeply affected by paranoid delusions and auditory hallucinations, which led her to believe she needed to act in the way she did.

(2) Ms G’s irrational state of mind on the evening of 1 July 2015 was

graphically demonstrated by the strenuous efforts she took to avoid

medication because she believed that it was bad for her and that others were trying to harm her.

[26] In summary, Ms G’s profound mental illness on the evening of 1 July 2015 led her to act irrationally. She did not know what she was doing or appreciate that what she was doing was wrong. Tragically, those who loved and cared for Ms G the most were the victims of her deeply disturbed state of mind. Ms G now appears to appreciate the horrendous consequences of her stopping her medication.

[27] For these reasons, on 22 March 2016 I recorded my finding that Ms G was not guilty by reason of insanity.

Detention as a special patient

[28] Section 24(1) and (2) of the CPMIP Act provide in part:

24 Detention of defendant found unfit to stand trial or insane as special patient or special care recipient

(1) When the court has sufficient information on the condition of a defendant found unfit to stand trial or acquitted on account of his or her insanity, the court must—

(a) consider all the circumstances of the case; and

(b) consider the evidence of 1 or more health assessors as to whether the detention of the defendant in accordance with one of the orders specified in subsection (2) is necessary; and

(c) make one of the orders referred to in paragraph (b) if it is satisfied that the making of the order is necessary in the interests of the public or any person or class of person who may be affected by the court's decision.

(2) The orders referred to in subsection (1) are that the defendant be detained—

(a) in a hospital as a special patient under the Mental Health

(Compulsory Assessment and Treatment) Act 1992; or

...

_{[29] The Court of Appeal has explained that:}⁴

⁴ M (CA819/11) v R [2012] NZCA 141 at [7]-[8].

In determining whether it is necessary to make an order under s 24(2), the Court undertakes a judicial assessment that is wider in some respects than the medical assessments made by health assessors. It must determine whether an order under s 24(2) is necessary in the interests of the public. The interests of the public in this context are twofold. First, there is the need to be protected from further offending by the offender. The longer term public interest, and one that the offender obviously shares, is to ensure that the offender is managed and treated in a manner best calculated to achieve the ultimate goals of rehabilitation and reintegration into the community.

The Court must therefore take into account both the immediate and long term risks that the offender poses, as well as the need to comprehensively manage and treat any medical and/or personality issues that he or she presents. In this way the interests of the public will be properly protected ...

[30] In the present case, both Professor Brinded and Dr Barry-Walsh provided oral evidence on whether or not an order should be made under s 24(2)(a) of the CPMIP Act. Both were convinced such an order was necessary.

[31] I agree with the conclusions reached by Professor Brinded and Dr Barry- Walsh for the following reasons:

(1) First, Ms G’s unfortunate history demonstrates that unless carefully managed, there is a real risk that she will stop her medication and, suffer serious deterioration in her health.

(2) Second, if Ms G’s health deteriorates again others may be placed at

risk.

(3) Third, placing Ms G in a hospital as a special patient ensures that she will receive the optimum treatment that will assist her in her long- term reintegration into the community.

(4) Fourth, the benefits of Ms G being detained in a hospital as a special patient include the fact that her ongoing treatment and assessments will be undertaken by a team of specialists working collaboratively to ensure that the best results are achieved for Ms G and ultimately the community.

[32] For these reasons, I made orders under s 24(2)(a) of the CPMIP Act on

22 March 2016.

Name suppression

[33] Ms G currently has the benefit of name suppression. A hearing will be conducted on 30 March 2016 to determine whether or not the interim name suppression orders will continue. The name suppression orders currently in place

_{will remain in force until further order of this Court.}

_{D B Collins J}

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Wellington

I M Antunovic, Porirua for Defendant