Deep v Auckland Gold Line Co-Operative Taxi Society Limited [2018] NZHC 1189 (25 May 2018)

Last Updated: 14 June 2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CIV-2017-404-001516 [2018] NZHC 1189

BETWEEN	RAMAL DEEP First Plaintiff SATNAM SINGH Second Plaintiff SURINDER KUMAR Third Plaintiff KAHLON KULVER SINGH Fourth Plaintiff VIPAN KUMAR Fifth Plaintiff ... Cont
AND	AUCKLAND GOLD LINE CO- OPERATIVE TAXI SOCIETY LIMITED Defendant

Hearing:	24 May 2018
Appearances:	L T Meys for Plaintiffs R White / S S Khan for Defendant
Judgment:	25 May 2018

JUDGMENT OF LANG J

[on application for priority fixture]

This judgment was delivered by me on 25 May 2018 at 11 am, pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date...............

DEEP v AUCKLAND GOLD LINE CO-OPERATIVE TAXI SOCIETY LTD [2018] NZHC 1189 [25 May 2018]

JASVINDER PAL SINGH GILL
Sixth Plaintiff

AMARJEET SINGH
Seventh Plaintiff

ANIL KUMAR
Eighth Plaintiff

VIKAS SAHARAN
Ninth Plaintiff

KANWAL JIT SINGH
Tenth Plaintiff

PRADEEP KUMAR
Eleventh Plaintiff

MANDIP SINGH GILL
Twelfth Plaintiff

SIKANDERJEET SINGH BAJWA
Thirteenth Defendant
[1] Neither counsel has filed a memorandum seeking an oral hearing for the plaintiffs’ interlocutory application for an urgent priority fixture. As foreshadowed in my Minute issued earlier today, I now propose to deal with the application on the papers.

[2] The plaintiffs suggest an earlier fixture can be allocated provided there is some adjustment made to the existing timetable. The defendant does not oppose the allocation of an earlier fixture provided the present timetable remains the same.

[3] The timetable directed by Fitzgerald J on 18 May 2018 provides for any outstanding interlocutory matters to be determined at a hearing on 31 August 2018. It would be premature at this stage to proceed on the basis that this fixture will not be required.

[4] The current timetable also provides for the sequential filing of affidavits in anticipation of the current trial date of 4 February 2018. On my interpretation of the timetable, the plaintiffs’ affidavits will be due towards the end of September 2018 so long as any decision from the fixture on 31 August is delivered no later than 15 September. The defendants’ affidavits will then be due towards the end of October 2018. The plaintiffs have a further week within which to file affidavits strictly in reply. The proceeding will therefore not be ready for trial until early to mid-November 2018. This provides a window of just four to five weeks within which to allocate any new trial date before the end of the year.

[5] Not surprisingly, the Registry advises there is no time currently available for a trial of three days duration between 1 November and 10 December 2018.¹ This is always a particularly busy period because of urgent matters that must be dealt with before the Christmas break. The Court also continues to run criminal jury trials and to conduct its usual complement of civil work during this period. The Court can and does, however, accord urgency to proceedings that must be heard before the end of the year. In the present case that could only be justified if the Court was satisfied the delay until the existing trial date of 4 February 2019 is likely to result in an injustice to the plaintiffs.

[6] The circumstances on which the plaintiffs rely are set out in Mr Gill’s
affidavit sworn on 21 May 2018. His affidavit appears to be premised on the basis

1. Court sittings finish for the year on 19 December 2018. The week commencing 17 December is reserved for urgent work such as bail appeals that must be concluded before the Christmas vacation.

that the defendants have sought to delay the proceeding coming to trial. This overlooks the fact that it was Fitzgerald J who set the trial date. The Judge set the date after making proper allowance for the steps that still need to be completed before the proceeding is ready for trial.

[7] The plaintiffs are also obviously concerned about what will occur after the current airport contract comes to an end in June 2019. They believe that the directors of the defendant are likely to apply for a new contract in the name of a different entity. However, that risk will remain regardless of whether the trial is held in November or December 2018 rather than February 2019.

[8] The plaintiffs also point to the financial hardship they will suffer by not being able to work at the airport between now and the date of the trial. I acknowledge this is a matter of significant concern. Even if the trial was held in the last six weeks of this year, however, there is no guarantee a judgment will be available by 31 January 2019.

[9] I have therefore concluded that the present proceeding does not warrant being accorded priority so that it is heard before the end of this year. I have, however, asked the Schedulers to assign the trial on 4 February 2019 to me. I will then do whatever it takes to ensure a judgment is delivered within two weeks of the conclusion of the trial. I hope this goes some way towards meeting the concerns of all parties.

Result

[10] The application for an order granting the proceeding a priority trial is dismissed.

[11] The timetable orders made by Fitzgerald J on 18 May 2018 remain in effect pending trial.






Lang J