|
|
Home
| Databases
| WorldLII
| Search
| Feedback
High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 18 July 2018
|
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
|
|
CIV-2017-404-176
[2018] NZHC 1703 |
|
BETWEEN
|
GLEN SEMPLE AND HEATHER SEMPLE
Plaintiffs
|
|
AND
|
BRUCE GAVIN WILSON AND AMANDA JANE WILSON
Defendants
|
|
Hearing:
|
On the papers
|
|
Counsel:
|
A G Rowe and ENH Harris for the Plaintiffs
M Casey QC and J Armstrong for the Defendants
|
|
Judgment:
|
11 July 2018
|
JUDGMENT OF GORDON J
This judgment was delivered by me on 11 July 2018 at 11 am, pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules
Registrar/Deputy Registrar Date:
Solicitors: Wells & Co, Auckland
Armstrong Murray, Auckland
Counsel: M Casey QC, Auckland
SEMPLE v WILSON [2018] NZHC 1703 [11 July 2018]
Introduction – the substantive proceeding
[1] In my judgment of 9 May 2018,1 I summarised the plaintiffs’ (the Semples) claims against the defendants (the Wilsons) as follows:
[2] The Semples claim that branches and roots from trees growing on the Wilsons’ property close to the boundary between the two properties constitute an actionable nuisance. They say they are the cause of physical damage to their property, they interfere with their use of their land and they are the cause of a significant loss of enjoyment of their land.
[3] In their first cause of action, the Semples seek a declaration that the trees be removed by the Wilsons at the Wilsons’ expense; a declaration that the roots that encroach onto their property be removed at the Wilsons’ expense; special damages; general damages and an inquiry by the Court into the full extent of the damage to their property following destructive testing.
[4] In the second cause of action, the Semples seek a mandatory injunction restraining the Wilsons from continuing or repeating the nuisances and a mandatory injunction restraining the Wilsons from permitting encroachment by the trees.
[2] I refused a declaration that the trees be removed, but made an order by way of a mandatory injunction that the Wilsons were to cut back to the boundary, and to keep cut back to the boundary, the branches of the trees which had been identified as the boundary trees.
[3] The Semples had sought special damages in the sum of $174,747, together with general damages of $30,000 for each of them for stress, anxiety, disruption and inconvenience.
[4] I awarded total damages of only $21,462, made up of $11,462 of special damages and $10,000 general damages for disruption and inconvenience, i.e. $5,000 each for Mr Semple and Mrs Semple.
[5] I also ordered that the Wilsons were to contribute one-third of the cost of removing and replacing only slab 1 in the concrete slab driveway (the driveway was made up of 23 slabs), as well as one-third of the cost of the removal of the tree root under slab 1 and the installation of a root barrier beside slab 1.
1 Semple v Wilson [2018] NZHC 992.
Claim for costs
[6] In my judgment, I referred to the fact that the Semples had succeeded only partially in their claim against the Wilsons.2 I then reserved costs by way of the following direction:
[191] ... I encourage the parties to agree costs and file a joint memorandum. That may be a forlorn hope given the extent of the disagreements to date. Any agreed memorandum is to be filed within 15 working days of the date of this judgment. In the event that there is no agreement, the Semples may file a memorandum within 10 working days after the date for the agreed memorandum and the Wilsons 10 working days thereafter. Memoranda should not exceed five pages.
[7] As I foresaw, the parties have been unable to come to an agreement on costs and separate memoranda have been filed.
[8] The Semples first calculate costs and disbursements by reference to the High Court Rules (the Rules) and arrive at a total sum of $64,315.85. Annexure A to this judgment is a reproduction of the Semples’ schedule calculated by reference to the Rules.
[9] Anticipating a submission on behalf of the Wilsons that the claim should have been brought in the District Court, the Semples also calculated total costs and disbursements under the District Court Rules 2014. That amount is $45,554.35.
[10] Next, the Semples say that in an effort to conclude costs they made an open offer to the Wilsons of $22,777.18, an amount that equalled half the claim based on the District Court Rules 2014.
[11] The Semples therefore ask the Court to make an order that the Wilsons pay a contribution to their costs in the sum of $22,777.18, the amount of their open offer of settlement and an amount which is approximately 35 per cent of the claimed costs in Annexure A.
2 At [191].
Principles
[12] Costs are at the discretion of this Court.3 The Rules provide guidance as to how the discretion might be exercised.4
[13] Ultimately, the general principle is that the party who fails with respect to a proceeding should pay costs to the successful party.5
[14] Rule 14.7 of the Rules provides, however, that any costs award can be refused or reduced. Relevant parts of that rule are as follows:
14.7 Refusal of, or reduction in, costs
Despite rules 14.2 to 14.5, the court may refuse to make an order for costs or may reduce the costs otherwise payable under those rules if—
...
(b) the property or interests at stake in the proceeding were of exceptionally low value; or
...
(d) although the party claiming costs has succeeded overall, that party has failed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs; or
...
(g) some other reason exists which justifies the court refusing costs or reducing costs despite the principle that the determination of costs should be predictable and expeditious.
Submissions
[15] Mr Rowe, for the Semples, first submits that although the Semples have not been totally successful, they have been more successful than not. In other words, they have succeeded overall.
[16] As to the first cause of action, while the Semples did not achieve the claimed damages in numerical terms, Mr Rowe submits that the findings in the judgment would
3 High Court Rules, r 14.1(1).
4 Rules 14.2-14.7.
5 Rule 14.2(1)(a).
not have been obtained but for the bringing of the proceedings. Specifically, Mr Rowe mentions the findings that some roots are an actionable nuisance, that a root barrier is to be installed, and that the Wilsons are to contribute to remedial work on slab 1 of the driveway.
[17] As to the second cause of action, Mr Rowe submits that if the Wilsons had discharged their duties so there were no actionable nuisances, a proceeding would not have been necessary. By the granting of a mandatory injunction which requires the Wilsons to cut the tree branches back to the boundary, and to keep them cut back to the boundary, Mr Rowe submits that the Semples have been completely successful in relation to the second cause of action.
[18] Therefore, Mr Rowe submits that the Wilsons should meet the Semples’ costs. But he accepts that some reduction under r 14.7 of the Rules is appropriate. Specifically, Mr Rowe submits that r 14.7(d) justifies a reduction in the costs claimed by half. He submits that none of the factors in r 14.7(a), (b), (c), (e), (f) and (g) applies.
[19] Mr Rowe concludes, as noted in [11] above, that the Semples made an open settlement offer of $22,777.18, which would be half of the amount of a claim made under the District Court Rules 2014. He therefore asks the Court to make an order that the Wilsons pay the Semples a contribution to their legal costs in the amount of
$22,777.18.
[20] The principal submission that Mr Casey QC makes for the Wilsons is that the costs should lie where they fall. Alternatively, Mr Casey submits that any award in the Semples’ favour should be no more than $10,000.
[21] Mr Casey first notes that the extent of the Semples’ monetary success was a fraction of the amount they claimed. Their non-monetary success, namely the injunction, was less than what was offered by the Wilsons on a Calderbank basis in 2016.
[22] Overall, Mr Casey submits that the Semples’ partial success is underscored by the fact their claim failed in the following significant respects:
- (a) the total removal of the trees;
(b) uplifting of the pool deck;
(c) movement and significant uplifting of the fence;
(d) undermining the house foundations;
(e) soil surface disruption from roots;
(f) significant root damage requiring the trees’ removal; and
(g) damage to the whole driveway, requiring its full replacement, when only one small area of damage was established.
[23] Mr Casey submits that the expert witnesses engaged by the Semples, except for Mr Grigg, an architect, provided no assistance to the Court and their evidence was almost entirely rejected. In any event, he submits that Mr Grigg’s evidence was only used to show that the Semples’ claim was unsustainable. Mr Grigg acknowledged he was not suitably qualified to comment on the foundation of the driveway, and instead deferred to Mr O’Brien, the engineer called by the Wilsons. Mr Casey, therefore, submits that the Wilsons should be able to set-off the costs of their expert witnesses against the Semples’ claimed costs.
[24] Furthermore, Mr Casey submits that the hearing fees and the time claimed for the hearing should be considerably reduced on account of the large amount of hearing time taken upon on issues and evidence on which the Semples were unsuccessful, and by their witnesses whose evidence was of no assistance to the Court.
[25] He says that the claim for the costs of serving the proceedings should be disallowed as that cost was unnecessary, as the Wilsons’ solicitors had advised in writing that they had authority to accept service.
[26] Mr Casey also says that the Wilsons made two Calderbank offers on 30 August 2016 and 3 October 2016. The terms of those offers were that the Wilsons would trim
the tree branches back to the boundary and reduce the trees’ canopy height, and would maintain them at the corresponding height and volume on a biannual basis. The offer to reduce canopy height related to the line of trees on both sides of the Wilsons’ driveway and not just to the line of trees closest to the boundary (the subject of the claims). The Semples’ degree of success was less than what was offered. The mandatory injunction only relates to the line of trees adjacent to the boundary and it does not require any reduction in height.
[27] Mr Casey points out that in the offer on 3 October 2016, the Wilsons offered to meet the reasonable cost of any work required to remediate the damage caused by the tree roots to the driveway. That being the case, the Semples hindered the investigation of the tree roots by the Wilsons’ expert, Mr Barton.
[28] Lastly, Mr Casey submits that the claim should have been filed in the District Court. It exceeded the District Court threshold at the time it was filed only because of the excessive amount claimed. Therefore, Mr Casey submits that the Semples’ claim should be based on the scale contained in the District Court Rules 2014, allowing at most two days for the hearing and nothing for their expert witness costs.
[29] As to figures, Mr Casey arrives at a sum for costs and disbursements in accordance with the District Court Rules 2014 of $17,960. He then adopts the Semples’ suggested 50 per cent reduction, resulting in an amount of $8,890.
[30] However, as noted, Mr Casey’s primary submission is that costs should lie where they fall. He relies on the Semples’ modest degree of success, and the considerable costs the Wilsons were put to, to respond to the overreaching claims and worthless expert evidence to offset the amount of $17,960.
Issues
[31] There are three issues I must decide:
(a) Should I assess costs by reference to the Rules or the District Court Rules 2014?
(b) What quantum of costs is appropriate?
(c) What quantum of disbursements is appropriate?
Should I assess costs by reference to the Rules or the District Court Rules 2014?
[32] The Wilsons submit that costs should be based on the District Court Rules 2014 because the claim would have fallen to be determined in the District Court but for the excessive amount claimed by the Semples.
[33] Rule 14.13 of the Rules states:
Costs ordered to be paid to a successful plaintiff must not exceed the costs and disbursements that the plaintiff would have recovered in the District Court if the proceeding could have been brought there, unless the court otherwise directs.
[34] I accept that, on a damages basis, the Semples only recovered a fraction of what they claimed, namely $21,462, compared to a total claim for general and special damages of $234,747.
[35] But, in my view, the answer to Mr Casey’s submission is that the proceedings could not have been brought in the District Court due to the amount claimed. If the Semples’ claim had been under $200,000, the matter would have been heard in the District Court.6 But it was not. It was heard in the High Court, and the Rules govern the proceedings.
[36] Other measures are available in the Rules to take into account the Semples’ degree of success.
What quantum of costs is appropriate?
[37] The parties agree that costs should be awarded on a 2B basis. The issue is what quantum of costs is appropriate given the Semples’ degree of success in the proceeding.
[38] In my view, unlike the situation in Body Corporate 97010 v Auckland City Council,7 the Semples succeeded overall. They obtained a mandatory injunction requiring the Wilsons, at their own expense, to cut back the tree branches to the boundary and keep them cut back to the boundary. In financial terms, the Semples achieved a total damages award of $21,462.
[39] Put in context though, that success was partial. The Semples did not succeed in getting the boundary trees removed. They only received a tenth of the total damages claimed.
[40] That being said, there were some key findings that favoured the Semples. These include the findings that encroachment by the branches of the boundary trees were an actionable nuisance, and that encroachment by one of the tree roots was an actionable nuisance.
[41] As the Court of Appeal stated in Weaver v Auckland Council:8
[26] ... In the present case however, the only party to have succeeded by any “realistic appraisal” were the appellants. It is true that they did not succeed to the full extent of their claim but only to roughly half that extent, yet success on more limited terms is still success ...
[42] These findings justify an award of some costs and disbursements to the Semples. I have reviewed the Semples’ claimed costs in schedule A to their submissions, and I find that the sum claimed of $36,906.50 is accurate. But it is appropriate to reduce the total based on r 14.7 of the Rules.
Rule 14.7(d)
[43] As set out above, r 14.7(d) allows the court to reduce the costs otherwise payable if “although the party claiming costs has succeeded overall, that party has failed in relation to a cause of action or issue which significantly increased the costs of the party opposing costs”.
7 Body Corporate 97010 v Auckland City Council [2001] NZCA 345; (2001) 15 PRNZ 372 (CA) at [11].
8 Weaver v Auckland Council [2017] NZCA 330.
[44] As the Court of Appeal stated, “it is appropriate that the costs ultimately awarded to the appellants should be reduced in accordance with r 14.7(d) because, although the appellants succeeded, the time and resources necessary for the respondent to meet ultimately unsuccessful arguments significantly increased its costs”.9 I consider that a similar approach is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
[45] It is difficult to be absolutely precise as to how much preparation and hearing time related to evidence and issues in respect of which the Semples were unsuccessful.
[46] The Semples suggested reducing their total costs by 50 per cent.
[47] The hearing took place over five days. Adopting a broad approach, I consider that an allowance of three days of hearing time for evidence and issues on which the Semples were unsuccessful is appropriate. In other words, there would be a reduction by 60 per cent. I further consider that a 60 per cent reduction for costs overall is appropriate in the circumstances of this case.
[48] That brings the costs award down to $14,762.60 before any further considerations are applied.
Settlement offers
[49] Rule 14.7(f)(v) allows the court to reduce the costs otherwise payable if the party claiming costs has contributed unnecessarily to the time or expense of the proceeding by failing, without reasonable justification, to accept an offer of settlement, whether in the form of an offer under r 14.10 or some other offer to settle or dispose of the proceeding.
[50] The Wilsons made two offers to the Semples by email and each of the two emails is annexed to the submissions.
[51] On 30 August 2016, the Wilsons’ solicitor wrote to Mr Rowe on a without prejudice save as to costs basis. The email refers briefly to possible solutions which
9 Weaver v Auckland Council, above n 8, at [26].
might address the problems between the Semples and the Wilsons. The email states that a Deed of Settlement is attached.
[52] On 3 October 2016, the Wilsons’ solicitor again wrote to Mr Rowe on a without prejudice save as to costs basis. The email stated that the Wilsons “would be willing to arrange and meet the reasonable cost of any work required to remedy that nuisance”. It attached a draft Deed of Settlement. That Deed contained the following terms:
[53] The email also stated that the Wilsons would be willing to reduce the height of the canopies by between one to two metres, which was the maximum their arborist believed could be achieved having regard to the wellbeing of the trees.
[54] As Heath J explained in Aldrie Holdings Ltd v Clover Bay Park Ltd:10
[14] A Calderbank letter is one in which a party to Court proceedings makes an offer to settle on a without prejudice basis, but reserves the right to produce the letter when question of costs are addressed. The procedure encourages a realistic appr[a]isal of a party's position in litigation. It enables costs to be sought where an offer has been rejected but a less beneficial outcome results for the party declining the offer.
[55] These offers cannot be Calderbank offers because the Semples and the Wilsons were not (as at those dates) parties to Court proceedings.11 Similarly, they cannot be offers of settlement because they did not “offer to settle or dispose of” a proceeding.12
[56] However, I can take the offers into account by way of r 14.7(g), which allows the court to reduce costs otherwise payable if some other reason exists which justifies the court reducing costs. White J in Taylor v District Court at North Shore commented on the applicability of r 14.7(g):13
[10] The “catch-all” exception in rule 14.7(g) is broad, but requires identification of a good reason for departing from the general rule that costs should follow the event. Examples may include habeas corpus applications and claims under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 ...
[57] Ultimately, the question is whether the Semples’ rejection of the offers was unreasonable, so that I might exercise my discretion to reduce the costs award.
[58] The reasonableness of a party’s rejection of an offer must be assessed at the time the offer was made and declined, not against the subsequent result.14 It will depend on the circumstances of the case, including the size and timing of the offer, the reasonable expectations of the party refusing the offer and on the parties’ ability, at the time of the offer, to assess the merits of the case.15
[59] I accept that the offers contained a few terms that were more beneficial to the Semples than what they achieved out of the proceedings. Specifically, the Wilsons
10 Aldrie Holdings Ltd v Clover Bay Park Ltd [2016] NZHC 1482.
11 See High Court Rules, r 14.10(1). The statement of claim is dated 8 February 2017.
12 Rule 14.7(f)(v).
13 Taylor v District Court at North Shore HC Auckland CIV-2009-404-2350, 13 October 2010.
15 Weaver v HML Nominees Ltd, above n 14, at [30](a)-(i).
offered to reduce the height of the canopies and they offered the Semples a right of abatement. The offer to reduce the height applied to both the boundary trees and the line of trees on the far side of the Wilsons’ driveway.
[60] However, I consider that the rejection of the offers was reasonable. The offers contained no financial incentive to settle. Nor did they address debris or the damage caused by the tree roots.
[61] The Semples were awarded $21,462 in damages against the Wilsons in my substantive judgment. The breakdown was as follows:16
(a) $10,100 towards repairs and replacement of the guttering [on the Semples’ house].
(b) $500 towards the purchase of a swimming pool net.
(c) $862 paid to Treescape Ltd to trim encroaching branches.
(d) $10,000 general damages for disruption and inconvenience.
[62] At the time of the offers, the Semples had incurred substantial costs as a result of the effects of the boundary trees. They had already paid to replace the internal guttering which was present on their property. As I found in my substantive judgment:17
[77] ... what is clear is that leaves, twigs and other debris from the Wilsons’ boundary trees did get into the internal guttering and, on occasion, the blocked guttering was the cause of water entering the house at No 120 ...
[63] That caused material physical damage to the timber in the house.
[64] Furthermore, the Semples had already paid Treescape Ltd for the side trimming of the boundary trees. The swimming pool pump was already being clogged up as a result of leaves and debris falling from the encroaching branches.
[65] I awarded general damages of $5,000 each to Mr Semple and Mrs Semple. My basis for doing this was, again, largely already realised at the time of the offers.18
16 Semple v Wilson, above n 1, at [189].
17 Semple v Wilson, above n 1.
18 At [182]-[184].
[66] It cannot be said that the rejection of the offers was unreasonable.
Disbursements
[67] The Semples also claim a total of $27,409.35 in disbursements.
[68] Rule 14.12(1) defines a disbursement:
(1) In this rule,—
disbursement, in relation to a proceeding,—
(a) means an expense paid or incurred for the purposes of the proceeding that would ordinarily be charged for separately from legal professional services in a solicitor’s bill of costs; and
(b) includes—
(i) fees of court for the proceeding:
(ii) expenses of serving documents for the purposes of the proceeding:
(iii) expenses of photocopying documents required by these rules or by a direction of the court:
(iv) expenses of conducting a conference by telephone or video link; but
(c) does not include counsel’s fee.
[69] To be recoverable as a disbursement, an item must both satisfy the definition in r 14.12(1) and meet the requirements in r 14.12(2):
(2) A disbursement must, if claimed and verified, be included in the costs awarded for a proceeding to the extent that it is—
(a) of a class that is either—
(i) approved by the court for the purposes of the proceeding; or
(ii) specified in paragraph (b) of subclause (1); and
(b) specific to the conduct of the proceeding; and
(c) reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding; and
(d) reasonable in amount.
[70] Despite r 14.12(2), a disbursement may be disallowed or reduced if it is disproportionate in the circumstances of the proceeding.19
[71] Some of the disbursements claimed fall within r 14.12(1). I approve the claims for the filing fee on the statement of claim, the setting down fee and the photocopying expenses. These all fall within r 14.12(1)(b).
[72] I disallow the claim for service. That expense was unnecessary given the Wilsons’ solicitors advised the Semples’ solicitors in writing that they had authority to accept service.
[73] Given my decision regarding a reduction under r 14.7(d), I also reduce the total for the hearing fee by 60 per cent, resulting in an amount of $4,480.
[74] I turn now to the expert witness fees.
Expert witness fees
[75] A party is generally entitled to recover the actual fees and expenses of its expert witnesses provided they meet the criteria contained in r 14.12(2).20 The Court of Appeal has stated:21
[62] A party can recover in respect of an expert witness only for the time he or she spends giving evidence and the time he or she spends in preparing that evidence. In addition, a party could properly claim for time spent by its expert in critiquing other parties’ experts so as to assist counsel to understand the issues and opposing contentions and to assist counsel in cross- examination. But experts do not draft pleadings and do not write legal submissions. Any claim for time spent on those tasks would not fall within the criteria ...
[76] Ultimately, it cannot be said that the claimed expert witness fees satisfy r 14.12(2)(c).
19 Rule 14.12(3).
20 Air New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission [2007] NZCA 27, [2007] 2 NZLR 494 at [47].
21 Air New Zealand Ltd v Commerce Commission, above n 20.
[77] I did not rely on the evidence of Mr Bates in making my decision. It was not reasonably necessary for the conduct of the proceeding. I disallow the claim for his expenses.
[78] As to Mr Barrell, I similarly did not rely on his evidence. Instead, I preferred the evidence of Mr O’Brien and Mr Barton, witnesses called by the Wilsons. I disallow the claim for Mr Barrell’s expenses.
[79] I also disallow the claims for expenses relating to Mr Grigg. He was an architect and he properly deferred to the evidence of Mr O’Brien, who was an engineer with the relevant expertise.
[80] The Wilsons say they were put to the expense of engaging the experts on whom the Court relied. They say this entitles them to claim the costs of those experts and set that off against the total costs and disbursements owed. There is no such ‘entitlement’. Any offset would be at the discretion of the Court, guided by relevant costs principles. In this case, I consider that a reduction of the claimed costs and hearing fee by 60 per cent, and a disallowance of the claim by the Semples for their expert witness fees, is sufficient.
Conclusion
[81] Therefore, the Semples are entitled to costs of $14,762.60 and disbursements of $8,180.00, totalling $22,942.60, as set out in Annexure B to this judgment. I have approached the claim in a different way from the way in which it was formulated by the plaintiffs. But the resulting sum approximates the amount sought in their claim.
[82] I make an order accordingly.
Gordon J
Annexure A
|
Description
|
Daily Rate
|
Number of Days
|
Total
|
|
|
1
|
Commencement of proceeding by plaintiff
|
$2,230.00
|
3
|
$6,690.00
|
|
10
|
Preparation for first case management conference (including discussion
about
discovery)
|
$2,230.00
|
0.4
|
$892.00
|
|
11
|
Filing memoranda for first or subsequent case
management conference or mention hearing
|
$2,230.00
|
0.4
|
$892.00
|
|
30
|
Plaintiff’s preparation of briefs or affidavits
|
$2,230.00
|
2.5
|
$5,575.00
|
|
31
|
Plaintiff’s preparation of list of issues, authorities,
and common bundle
|
$2,230.00
|
2.5
|
$5,575.00
|
|
33
|
Preparation for hearing
|
$2,230.00
|
3
|
$6,690.00
|
|
34
|
Appearance at hearing for principal counsel
|
$2,230.00
|
Time occupied by the hearing measured in
quarter days
|
$10,592.50
|
|
|
|
|
Total costs
|
$36,906.50
|
|
|
Disbursements
|
|
|
|
|
|
Filing fee on statement of claim
|
|
|
$1,350.00
|
|
|
Service: Scope Investigations Ltd
Inv00031162 2.3.2017
|
|
|
$302.11
|
|
|
Setting down fee
|
|
|
$1,600.00
|
|
|
Hearing fee
|
|
|
$11,200.00
|
|
|
Bundles – 5 @ 525 pages; 50c per page; allow for
1500 bound pages
|
|
|
$750.00
|
|
|
|
|
Sub-total
|
$15,202.11
|
|
|
Expert witness costs
|
|
|
|
|
|
Peter Bates
|
|
|
$2,127.50
|
|
|
Andrew Barrell
|
|
|
$724.50
|
|
|
Babbage Consultants (Phillip Grigg)
|
|
|
$2,639.24
|
|
|
Peter Bates
|
|
|
$713.00
|
|
|
Peter Bates
|
|
|
$690.00
|
|
|
Peter Bates
|
|
|
$4,485.00
|
|
|
Andrew Barrell
|
|
|
$828.00
|
|
|
|
|
Sub-total
|
$12,207.24
|
|
|
|
|
Total disbursements
|
$27,409.35
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Grand total
|
$64,315.85
|
Annexure B
|
Item
|
Description
|
Daily Rate
|
Number of Days
|
Total
|
|
1
|
Commencement of proceeding by plaintiff
|
$2,230.00
|
3
|
$6,690.00
|
|
10
|
Preparation for first case management conference
(including discussion about discovery)
|
$2,230.00
|
0.4
|
$892.00
|
|
11
|
Filing memoranda for first or subsequent case
management conference or mention hearing
|
$2,230.00
|
0.4
|
$892.00
|
|
30
|
Plaintiff’s preparation of
briefs or affidavits
|
$2,230.00
|
2.5
|
$5,575.00
|
|
31
|
Plaintiff’s preparation of list of issues, authorities,
and common bundle
|
$2,230.00
|
2.5
|
$5,575.00
|
|
33
|
Preparation for hearing
|
$2,230.00
|
3
|
$6,690.00
|
|
34
|
Appearance at hearing for principal counsel
|
$2,230.00
|
Time occupied by the hearing measured in
quarter days
|
$10,592.50
|
|
|
|
|
Total costs
|
$36,906.50
|
|
|
|
|
Discounted by 60 per cent
|
$14,762.60
|
|
|
Disbursements
|
|
|
|
|
|
Filing fee on statement of claim
|
|
|
$1,350.00
|
|
|
Setting down fee
|
|
|
$1,600.00
|
|
|
Hearing fee
|
|
Discounted by 60 per cent
|
$4,480.00
|
|
|
Bundles – 5 @ 525 pages; 50c per page; allow for
1500 bound pages
|
|
|
$750.00
|
|
|
|
|
Total disbursements
|
$8,180.00
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Grand total
|
$22,942.60
|
NZLII:
Copyright Policy
|
Disclaimers
|
Privacy Policy
|
Feedback
URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/cases/NZHC/2018/1703.html