Khophimai v Laurenson [2018] NZHC 2435 (17 September 2018)

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UNDER	Section 14 of the Wills Act 2007
IN THE ESTATE	of KELVIN JOHN NORMAN NAYSMITH (also known as KELVIN JON NAYSMITH (deceased)
BETWEEN	PHENSRI KHOPHIMAI Applicant
AND	CARLENE ELIZABETH LAURENSON, BRENT NAYSMITH, GARY JOHN NAYSMITH, DEBORAH ANNE NAYSMITH, KIM BEVERLEY HERBST, LEANNE NAYSMITH AND WAYNE NAYSMITH _Respondents

Hearing:	19 March 2018
Appearances:	Z Tope for Applicant C E Laurenson in Person
_Judgment:	_{17 September 2018}

KHOPHIMAI v LAURENSON NAYSMITH, NAYSMITH, NAYSMITH, HERBST, NAYSMITH AND NAYSMITH [2018] NZHC 2435 [17 September 2018]

Mr Naysmith’s will was signed by one witness. A valid will is required to be signed by two witnesses. Ms Khophimai has applied to the Court for a declaration the document is a valid will.

Ms Khophimai’s application. They say their father was old with failing health at the time the document was signed. They say further that, contrary to her claim,

Ms Khophimai was not Mr Naysmith’s de facto partner and she exerted undue influence upon him. In fact, they say the document is a forgery because the signature is not Mr Naysmith’s handwriting.

[3] These are the claims I must assess in reaching a conclusion about the validity of the will.

[4] By her application dated 7 April 2017 Ms Khophimai applies for a declaration pursuant to s 14 of the Wills Act 2007 that the document dated 7 June 2013 and signed by Mr Naysmith on 8 June 2013 is the valid will of the deceased Kelvin Jon Naysmith.

[5] The grounds for the application are that Ms Khophimai is the sole beneficiary under the will. The document is signed and dated and clearly expresses Mr Naysmith’s testamentary intentions. The document does not comply with s 11 of the Wills Act which prescribes the requirements for the validity of wills as the document bears only the signature of one witness.¹

[6] Ms Khophimai’s affidavit in support of her application addresses a formal complaint made by Ms Laurenson to the New Zealand Police following

_{Ms Laurenson’s receipt of a report by Michael Maran, a handwriting
expert, who}

concluded Mr Naysmith’s signature was “non-genuine” and “an attempted simulation”.

[7] As a consequence of the complaint a senior document examiner with the New Zealand Police evaluated Mr Maran’s report and conducted her own examination of samples of Mr Naysmith’s handwriting and his witness’s signature. I shall return to both reports.

[8] The respondents oppose the application for an order that the document is a valid will. The essence of the 14 grounds stated in the notice of opposition is that the deceased was an elderly and vulnerable person with failing health and there are serious questions about the circumstances in which the document was created and signed. The respondents say they have concerns about the evidence of Mr Stone, the sole witness to the will. And they rely on the evidence of Mr Maran who questioned the validity of the purported will as well as the authenticity of the signature. The family strongly disputes that Ms Khophimai was their father’s de facto partner.

[9] If the High Court is satisfied that a document appears to be a will and the document expresses the testamentary intentions of the deceased, the Court may make an order declaring the document to be a valid will.²The document’s apparent invalidity must be as a result of its non-compliance with s 11 of the Wills Act which provides for such formalities as signing and witnessing.³

(d) evidence of statements the deceased may have made that are relevant to the deceased’s testamentary intentions.

[11] The need for cogent evidence is inherent in the requirement that the Court must be satisfied that the document expresses the deceased’s testamentary intentions, but that does not mean that a higher standard of proof than the ordinary civil standard is required.⁵

hereby bequeath all my chattel, belongings, money and cars to my dearest Phensri Khophimai. This being my only Will and Testament

[15] On 13 March 2018 Ms Laurenson filed a memorandum seeking to have the respondents’ witness, Estelle Mary Cave, excused from attending the High Court hearing. Ms Cave had written to Ms Laurenson on 11 March 2018 advising she was unable to attend the hearing due to the failing health of her husband.

[16] Counsel for the applicant, Ms Tope, filed a memorandum in immediate response. Ms Tope advised that the applicant had not been served with any affidavit from Ms Cave. As the applicant did not know the content of any affidavit, or other evidence from Ms Cave, any application to have the evidence admitted was opposed.

[17] As it happens, Ms Cave had signed a declaration on 17 July 2017. Her one-page statement described Ms Cave’s, and her husband’s, relationship with

Mr Naysmith over some 15 years. The statement was to the effect Mr Naysmith brought his friend, Ms Khophimai to their place “a couple of times for afternoon tea” but to Ms Cave’s knowledge Ms Khophimai did not live with Mr Naysmith.

[18] As Ms Cave was unavailable for cross-examination I ruled that her statement not be read.

[19] Ms Tope applied to have the hearsay statement of Ernest Claypole ruled admissible. I granted the application.

[20] Earnest Claypole swore an affidavit on 11 July 2017. He died towards the end of 2017. The application was made under s 18 of the Evidence Act 2006 on the basis

[21] Section 18 of the Evidence Act provides that a hearsay statement is admissible in any proceeding if—

(a) the circumstances relating to the statement provide reasonable assurance that the statement is reliable; and

[22] A person is “unavailable as a witness” in a proceeding if the person “is dead”.⁶

Although a death certificate was not produced to the Court the respondents did not dispute that Mr Claypole had died.

[23] Mr Claypole deposed to knowing Mr Naysmith and Ms Khophimai because they were next-door neighbours for approximately 18 months before Mr Naysmith died.

(a) his knowledge the Council had given permission for Ms Khophimai to move into Mr Naysmith’s home;

(b) Ms Khophimai’s panicked state when she came to Mr Claypole’s house on the morning Mr Naysmith died;

(c) his perception Mr Naysmith and Ms Khophimai were a “happy well- adjusted couple” and that Mr Naysmith had mentioned to Mr Claypole their intention to marry;

(d) Mr Naysmith being in the army in his earlier days, fighting in Korea and that he had a strong personality and a good head on his shoulders and would not be influenced by others to create a will;

(f) not recalling Mr Naysmith’s children visiting him during the period they were neighbours or Mr Naysmith mentioning his children.

[25] I was satisfied as to the reliability of the hearsay statement. Ms Tope interviewed Mr Claypole herself and recorded the information in affidavit form.

Mr Claypole’s affidavit was then affirmed and witnessed independently of counsel.

[26] Ms Tope correctly submitted that any possible prejudice to the respondents from Mr Claypole being unavailable for cross-examination could be managed by the weight I accorded Mr Claypole’s affidavit evidence. In that regard, I note there is no evidence contradicting Mr Claypole’s particular evidence. Furthermore, Mr Claypole evidence tends to be supported by other evidence. For example, the confirmation from the City Council that Ms Khophimai was permitted to move into Mr Naysmith’s home.

[28] The respondent’s case was that the document produced as Mr Naysmith’s will was not in Mr Naysmith’s handwriting and therefore not his will. This issue was the subject of expert testimony given by Mr Maran for the respondents and Ms James for the applicant.

[29] Ms Laurenson obtained an opinion from Mike Maran who is a handwriting and document examiner. Mr Maran has a Certificate of Training from the school of Reed Hayes (US). Mr Maran is also a practising graphologist with a “Diploma in Advance studies in Contemporary Graphology from Dr Erika Karohs (US)”.

[30] Ms Laurenson instructed Mr Maran to ascertain the authenticity of the signature on the document by comparison with Mr Naysmith’s known signature on two other documents. The documents given to him were photocopies, “multi- generational copies”, with average images. The original documents were not available for Mr Maran’s inspection.

[31] In his report dated 17 June 2015 Mr Maran concluded Mr Naysmith’s signature in the testamentary section of the will was non-genuine and an attempted simulation.

Mr Maran also suggested it was “probable” the author of the document was the same author who signed as witness, Rodney Stone.

(a) There were some “fundamental dissimilarities” between the signature on the document and the two examples of Mr Naysmith’s signature. There were also secondary similarities, but “these could be due to the high writing skills of the perpetrator”. Dissimilarities included pen lift, terminal stroke formation, construction features, lower loop formation, pressure patterns and placement of the t bar in relation to the t stem. Similarities included placement on the signature line, letter spacing and slant, pictorial features, letter connections on the middle zone letters, and missing dots on the “i”.

(b) In the witness section of the document Mr Maran identified several “discrepancies and suspicious errors in the pictorial traits” including distorted and awkward letter formations, capital letters written in the middle of words, sudden change of slant, illegible signature, the date written the following day, t bar similarities between the testator’s

section and witness’s section, spelling errors, and words and lines lacking internal consistency – “another sign of disguise”.

(c) The document was not formal and typed but a handwritten note on ordinary writing paper. A document of this importance would be formally lodged with a lawyer or the Public Trust and have a unique identification number with a formal stamp or seal. Missing also a bank

account number next to “TSB Bank” Mr Maran challenged the validity of the document and pronounced it invalid.

[33] On the basis of Mr Maran’s assessment, Ms Laurenson made a complaint to the Police.

[34] Trish James, senior document examiner with the Police, undertook an examination of the handwriting on the document to assist investigating officers in their decision whether or not to commence a prosecution. Ms James has been involved in the special study of identification of handwriting and signature for more than 20 years. Ms James is a member of the New Zealand Police Document Examination Section, a laboratory accredited by the American Society of Crime Laboratory Directors Laboratory Accreditation Board. Members operate under a quality assurance programme.

[36] In her report completed on 23 December 2015 Ms James concluded the document was not an attempted forgery.

(a) There was little appreciable difference between the pressure patterns of the specimen signatures and the signature on the document. Several of the dissimilarities noted by Mr Maran were seen in the additional specimens available to Ms James that were not available to Mr Maran. This meant the dissimilarities could be characterised as natural variations in genuine signature style.

(b) The two specimen signatures relied on by Mr Maran were inadequate to support any sound conclusion as to authorship. Mr Maran’s conclusion that Mr Naysmith’s signature was not genuine was unreliable due to the limited handwriting specimens available to

(c) Mr Maran did not have any specimens of Mr Stone’s handwriting. To carry out an examination of the witness handwriting and signature purported to be by Mr Stone on this basis is contrary to the fundamental principles of the field. The “discrepancies and suspicious errors” identified by Mr Maran were characteristics of the natural handwriting of Mr Stone as seen in the specimens available to Ms James.

(d) The witness handwriting and signature were entirely consistent with the specimens attributed to Mr Stone and he was the author of the witness section of the document. There was no evidence of disguise in the writing in this part of the document.

(e) In concluding the signature and witness section were written by the same author, Mr Maran ignored many fundamental dissimilarities between the two sets of writing. The dissimilarities between the writing in the “will” and “witness” sections reflected a difference in the skill level of the writers.

(f) Mr Maran’s conclusion about the witness details on the questioned document was supposition. And his opinion the will and witness sections were penned by the same author had no basis.

[37] Both experts were cross-examined. Ultimately, I preferred the testimony of Ms James. Ms James impressed me as a careful, experienced and considered witness who answered questions thoughtfully and convincingly. Ms James was entirely independent of the parties her assessment having been completed for the purpose of a criminal investigation.

[38] Ms James had the benefit of the original ink signature to examine under a microscope. She was able to scrutinise the tapers, the feathering in the ink line which were indicators of speed and fluency, speed and fluency themselves being indicative of naturalness. She went through the very many areas of similarity in the four specimen signatures of Mr Naysmith available to her and other documents containing his handwriting. The reason Ms James concluded Mr Naysmith’s signature was not simulated by another was because of the number of similarities across the samples.

Mr Naysmith’s signature. The “y” in Mr Naysmith’s signature in the document had a flourish not present in the specimen signatures. For this reason Ms James offered a qualified view as to the authorship of the signature. Her explanation for offering a qualified opinion was that her conclusions were reached on the basis of limited specimen material. If a bigger picture of Mr Naysmith’s handwriting had been available Ms James was confident the larger number of examples would cover the differences in handwriting because, in Ms James’ opinion, any variations between examples were due to the natural variability of handwriting rather than evidencing the involvement of another. Further, Ms James observed that in her experience people frequently sign formal documentation with a degree of flourish they do not bring to their everyday handwriting.

[40] By contrast with Ms James’ long experience and immersion in the specialised field of forensic document examination, Mr Maran’s evidence was that his expertise

was “fifty/fifty” graphology and forensic examination. A graphologist ascertains personality through handwriting. Mr Maran did not have the equipment to examine indentations on documents whereas Ms James gave detailed evidence about the impressions and indentations created on one document sitting underneath a second document which Mr Naysmith had signed.

[41] Nor were any original documents given to Mr Maran for examination. Three documents were available to Mr Maran and he accepted in cross-examination the resolution was “not good” as they were multi-generational copies. Mr Maran accepted original documents are needed to complete a high-quality examination.

[42] Mr Maran was instructed to examine Mr Naysmith’s signature only. Although he concluded the signature had been authored by Mr Naysmith’s witness, Mr Stone, Mr Maran reached this conclusion without seeing any specimen samples of Mr Stone’s handwriting. When Mr Maran was asked to comment on Ms James’ conclusion that it was unlikely Mr Stone had written the will, Mr Maran responded that Ms James “had more documents than I did for examination”.

[43] Additionally, Mr Maran’s pronouncement of the will as “invalid” was founded on what he characterised as the “unusual circumstance” of it being written on a piece of paper. Mr Maran accepted this “finding” influenced his view of likely authorship.

[44] I did not find Mr Maran’s evidence of assistance. Critically, Mr Maran accepted Ms James was more likely than he to have reached the correct conclusion as to authorship of the document and the authenticity of Mr Naysmith’s signature. Even with that concession Mr Maran maintained a position he could not tenably adopt because of the limited number and quality of the specimens he had examined. This adherence to a position lacking a proper foundation tended to undermine Mr Maran’s asserted independence and consequently, the value to the Court, of his evidence.

Mr Maran would not go so far as to say he was wrong but said he was “sitting on the fence with it”.

[45] I also take into account Mr Stone’s evidence. Mr Stone described Mr Naysmith signing the will before Mr Stone on 8 June 2013. Mr Naysmith explained it was his

last will and that he wanted Mr Stone to witness it. He had written it the previous day and it was dated 7 June 2013. Before Mr Naysmith signed, Mr Stone read the will to him. Mr Naysmith said he was leaving everything to his partner. Mr Stone’s further evidence was that if he had known two witnesses were required a second person could have been arranged easily enough. Ms Khophimai was not present when, in

Mr Stone’s presence, Mr Naysmith signed his will. Mr Stone strongly denied the will was written and signed by him.

[46] The evidence establishes to a high degree of likelihood that Mr Naysmith himself wrote his will, completed the document and signed it. Similarly, the evidence establishes Mr Stone signed the witness section of the document. There is no evidence of forgery or simulation.

[47] The respondents assert Mr Naysmith’s will is not valid as he was potentially influenced by Ms Khophimai due to his “vulnerability and age”.

[48] The respondents case as reflected in Ms Laurenson’s affidavit is that the will was not witnessed by two witnesses and Mr Naysmith was “potentially subject to undue influence because of his vulnerability and age. In support of this assertion

(a) Mr Naysmith was 80 years old with failing health when he signed the document. His medical records record he had type 2 diabetes, severe coronary artery disease, hypertension, hypercholesteroaemia and gout.

(c) Ms Laurenson went with Mr Naysmith to his appointments at Wellington Hospital. He told her it was his intention to leave everything to his children and he did not mention his partner. The family was in constant contact with Mr Naysmith prior to his death. They visited and stayed with him and Mr Naysmith would stay with

(d) Ms Laurenson disputes Ms Khophimai’s claim she and Mr Naysmith became de facto partners in October 2012. Mr Naysmith had been in a relationship with a Patricia Glover until December 2012.

Ms Laurenson accepts Ms Khophimai and Mr Naysmith were friends but did not consider Ms Khophimai was in a position to claim she was Mr Naysmith’s de facto partner.

(e) Ms Khophimai could not have moved in with Mr Naysmith because he lived in a retirement village at which the age limit is 65.

(f) Mr Naysmith’s family only became aware of the document when it was shown to Ms Laurenson and her brother, Wayne Naysmith, when they were clearing out Mr Naysmith’s home.

[49] I address first the nature of Mr Naysmith’s relationship with Ms Khophimai.

[50] Ms Khophimai’s evidence is that she and Mr Naysmith became friends towards the end of 2010. They became de facto partners around October 2012. Ms Khophimai says four of Mr Naysmith’s children attended his funeral and three permanently reside in Australia. During the course of their relationship, three children visited

Mr Naysmith a couple of times; but the others only had limited phone contact with him.

[51] In support of her application for security for costs Ms Khophimai swore a further affidavit. She annexed an email from Leigh Clark, housing coordinator at the Napier City Council. Ms Clark’s email confirmed the Council had given permission to Ms Khophimai to reside at Mr Naysmith’s Council flat. She had been living with him since October 2012. The email stated Ms Khophimai looked after Mr Naysmith when he became unwell and helped with emptying and cleaning of the flat to return to the Council.

[52] Mr Stone’s second affidavit sworn 11 July 2017 deposed to his knowledge of Mr Naysmith and Ms Khophimai’s relationship. He says they were de facto partners and it was Mr Stone’s understanding they were engaged to be married. Mr Naysmith had gotten approval from the Napier City Council for Ms Khophimai to move in with him and had sought a copy of his certificate of dissolution of marriage so he could marry Ms Khophimai. Mr Stone had met Ms Khophimai and would visit her and

Mr Naysmith several times a week. Mr Naysmith did not talk about his children and they did not visit him as far as Mr Stone was aware. When Mr Stone asked

Mr Naysmith if he was sure the document was what he wanted Mr Naysmith said his children were okay but Ms Khophimai had nothing.

[53] Mr Stone was cross-examined on his role as witness and about Mr Naysmith’s relationship with Ms Khophimai. Mr Stone had known Mr Naysmith since 2009 and they were good friends. He described Mr Naysmith as very self-reliant. Mr Stone observed Mr Naysmith and Ms Khophimai seemed very close and “well-suited”.

[55] Mr Stone’s evidence as to the circumstances in which Mr Naysmith made his will and signed it is not disputed. Nor was there any challenge to his evidence that

Mr Naysmith whether he was sure he “wanted to do this” and asked about his children. As I have noted, Mr Naysmith was reported to have said “his children were all okay but Phensri has nothing” and Mr Naysmith wanted to leave his estate to Phensri. In her cross-examination of Mr Stone Ms Laurenson did not challenge this evidence.

[56] I found Mr Stone to be a low-key, good-humoured and credible witness. He laughed when asked whether he knew of Mr Naysmith’s apparent engagement to another woman. He felt sure he would have been told had that been the case. Mr Stone was quite relaxed about being a witness to the will and being a witness in the proceedings. He had no particular interest in it, was not mentioned in the document and, as he observed, “there was no benefit to me”.

[57] I am satisfied no issue arises from the fact Ms Khophimai’s intials appear on the document. Ms Khophimai explained that her initials appear on the document because the original was annexed as an exhibit to her first affidavit and her lawyer required her to initial each page.

[58] Although the respondents dispute Mr Khophimai’s claim she and Mr Naysmith were in a de facto relationship Ms Khophimai was not cross-examined and her evidence was not therefore contested. Ms Laurenson accepted Ms Khophimai came to stay with her while taking Mr Naysmith to a medical appointment.

[59] Ms Laurenson took issue with the email confirmation from the Council’s housing co-ordinator that the couple were living together. Permission was needed

Ms Khophimai was not this age. During cross-examination Ms Laurenson said she had contacted the Council employee who denied confirming Ms Khophimai had permission to live with Mr Naysmith. When asked why Ms Laurenson did not call the Council employee to give evidence Ms Laurenson’s response was that the employee did not want to get involved.

[60] Indeed, Ms Laurenson failed to bring any evidence to support any of her claims. By way of further example, Ms Laurenson said Mr Naysmith repeated himself in conversations on the phone. He was very vague and she was worried about him. She asked him to come and live with her. Yet this evidence, relevant to mental capacity one might think, was not included in Ms Laurenson’s affidavit. Nor did Ms Laurenson adduce any evidence in support of her contention Mr Naysmith was engaged to another. When shown a photograph of the couple together at a mutual friend’s birthday party Ms Laurenson asked what the photo had to do with it: “anyone can take a photo”.

[61] When asked why she had not sought to have the other woman file an affidavit, Ms Laurenson described her as bipolar and unable to do so.

[62] I am satisfied as to the authenticity of Ms Khophimai and Mr Naysmith’s relationship.

[63] Turning to undue influence, crucially, Ms Laurenson accepted in cross- examination she had nothing upon which to base her assertion Mr Naysmith was being unduly influenced. Ms Laurenson also accepted her father was a strong-minded man who would not be easily persuaded to something unless he wished it.

Mr Naysmith was unduly influenced due to his vulnerability and age, nor any evidence from which such a conclusion might be reasonably inferred.

[65] Turning to testamentary capacity, the applicable principles relating to testamentary capacity are settled. They were recently restated by the Court of Appeal in Loosley v Powell.⁸

[19] The principles relating to the assessment of testamentary capacity are well-settled, and were set out by this Court in Woodward v Smith. There, this Court re-stated the principles laid down in the often-cited judgment of Banks v Goodfellow:

(1) Because it involves moral responsibility, the possession of the intellectual and moral faculties common to our nature is essential to the validity of a will.

(i) understands the nature of the act and its effects; and also the extent of the property of which he is disposing;

(ii) is able to comprehend and appreciate the claims to which he ought to give effect;

(iii) be free of any disorder of the mind which would poison his affections, pervert his sense of right, or prevent the exercise of his natural faculties; that no insane delusion shall influence his will in disposing of his property and bring about a disposal of it which,

(5) In deciding upon the capacity of the testator to make his will, it is the soundness of the mind, and not the particular state of the bodily health, that is to be attended to. The latter may be in a state of extreme weakness, feebleness or debility and yet he may have enough understanding to direct how his property shall be disposed of; his capacity may be perfect to dispose of his property by will, and yet very inadequate to the management of other business, as, for instance, to make contracts for the purchase or sale of property.

(6) A testator who has reflected over the years on how his property should be disposed of by will is likely to find it less difficult to express his testamentary intentions than to understand some new business.

(7) Testamentary capacity does not require a sound and disposing mind and memory in the highest degree; otherwise, very few could make testaments at all.

(8) Nor must the testator possess such capacity to the same extent as previously. His mind may have been in some degree weakened, his memory may have become in some degree enfeebled; and yet there may be enough left clearly to understand and make a sound assessment of all those things, and all those circumstances, which enter into the nature of a rational, fair and just testament.

Although we have quoted from the summary in Woodward v Smith, we will refer to these as the Banks v Goodfellow criteria. Courtney J relied on them. The Banks v Goodfellow propositions as summarised in Woodward v Smith have been widely accepted and applied in New Zealand. It is important to treat them as guiding propositions rather than as a formula.

[66] The Court of Appeal cautioned against a formulaic application of the propositions. They are guiding principles.⁹

[67] Ms Khophimai does not have to establish that Mr Naysmith had testamentary capacity unless there is some evidence raising lack of capacity as a tenable issue:¹⁰“In the absence of such evidence, the maker of a will apparently rational on its face, will be presumed to have testamentary capacity”.

¹⁰At [20] citing Bishop v O’Dea (1999) NZCA 239; (1999) 18 FRNZ 492 (CA).

[68] I note that across the many medical reports and correspondence there is not a single reference to mental disability, or loss of acumen or other mental impairment as distinct from expressions of concern about Mr Naysmith’s physical welfare. In deciding upon testamentary capacity, it is the soundness of mind and not the particular state of the bodily health that is to be attended to.¹¹

[69] The expert evidence of Ms James bearing on the authenticity of the document, Mr Stone’s evidence as to the creation, signing and witnessing of the document and as to Mr Naysmith’s testamentary intentions, satisfies me the document expresses

[70] Mr Naysmith was living alone until October 2012 when Ms Khophimai began to live with him. Undoubtedly, Mr Naymsith had widespread vascular disease as the medical records exhibited to Ms Laurenson’s affidavit show. But there is no evidence that Mr Naysmith’s mental faculties or ability to create a will were compromised by his physical health. Indeed, a letter written by the consultant cardiologist to his colleague at the Wellington hospital the day after Mr Naysmith made his will on 7 May

80kg. He is in sinus rhythm with a normal BP and there are no signs of heart failure ...

[71] It is one thing to assert, as the respondents have asserted, that Ms Khophimai had the means and opportunity to influence Mr Naysmith in his disposition in her favour, but the respondents have not shown that Mr Naysmith lacked testamentary capacity.

[72] There is no evidence Mr Naysmith was unduly influenced in the making of his will nor that he lacked testamentary capacity. The will does not comply with s 11 of the Wills Act because only one witness was present when Mr Naysmith signed the

document. I am satisfied that the statutory prerequisites for declaring the document to be a valid will are met.

[73] The application for a declaration the document dated 7 June 2013 signed 8 June

2013 is granted. The document is declared to be the valid will of Kelvin Jon Naysmith.

[74] Ms Khophimai is entitled to costs on a 2B basis. If the parties are unable to agree costs they may submit memoranda not exceeding five pages, within 20 days.

High Court of New Zealand Decisions

Khophimai v Laurenson [2018] NZHC 2435 (17 September 2018)