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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 19 November 2018
IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND NEW PLYMOUTH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA NGĀMOTU ROHE
CIV-2018-443-16 [2018] NZHC 2963
IN THE MATTER
AND
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of the Trustee Act 1956
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IN THE MATTER
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of an application pursuant to s 51 of the
Trustee Act 1956
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BETWEEN
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LINDA MARGARET THOMSON AND KERRY WAYNE THOMSON
Plaintiffs
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AND
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KEVIN JOHN RILEY Defendant
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Hearing:
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10 October 2018
(further submissions received 19 and 31 October 2018)
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Appearances:
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S Hughes QC for Plaintiffs
J Marinovich and S Ebert for Defendant
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Judgment:
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15 November 2018
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(INTERIM) JUDGMENT OF GRICE J
[1] Mr and Mrs Thomson, the plaintiffs, and Mr Riley, the defendant, are the executors and trustees of the estates of their late parents, Kenneth Riley who died on
18 July 1999 and Margaret Riley who died on 26 March 2013. Their children,
Mrs Thomson and Mr Riley, are the sole beneficiaries
of their estate.
[2] The primary asset of the Riley estate is a farm property at Kaimata
in Taranaki. The wills of Kenneth and Margaret Riley
anticipate that Mr Riley
could acquire ownership of this farm property by exercising an option to
purchase under the wills.
THOMSON v RILEY [2018] NZHC 2963 [15 November 2018]
[3] Kenneth and Margaret Riley had mirror wills. The farm was owned by
them as tenants in common in equal shares, with the
surviving partner having a
life interest under each will.
[4] Mr Riley’s option under the wills was to purchase the farm as
a going concern. The valuation process is set out in
the wills. The trustees
may provide a second mortgage at a rate of interest and other terms and
conditions to be determined by
the trustees.
Issues
[5] It is common ground now that the option to purchase has been
properly exercised. The parties have also now agreed that they
will all resign
as trustees and a replacement trustee should be appointed by the court. The
appointment of new trustees will bring
these proceedings to an end.
[6] Counsel came to this agreement after some initial dispute
concerning the scope of today’s hearing. They agreed that
the:1
Agreed 1. Trustees resign;
2. Replacement trustees follow terms of will;
3. Option to purchase has been exercised;
4. Primary function to sell farm according to option process in Wills;
5. Trustees acting as “trustees” and not
“executors”.
[7] The only matter for this court is whether it should appoint new
trustees and if so who the new trustees should be.
Disputed evidence
[8] At the outset of the hearing Ms Hughes indicated that there were a number of items of evidence contained in the briefs of evidence and affidavits that she objected to on the basis that the parties had agreed that the hearing was limited to the appointment of replacement trustees. She noted that the basis upon which the parties
had agreed to proceed was that the evidence would be focused on the
issue of the new
1 Handwritten agreement handed up by counsel at the hearing of 10 October 2018.
trustees to be appointed. This was to avoid criticisms being made of the
other by either party.
[9] Ms Hughes submitted that the briefs filed by
Mr Riley and
Ms Van Wyngaarden strayed considerably from the agreed point of the hearing and engaged on a wholesale attack on the Thomsons. She sought that
Ms Van Wyngaarden’s brief of evidence from [4] to [23] and Mr
Riley’s brief of evidence from [8] to [56], [64] to [135]
and [139] to
[152] be redacted. At the hearing it was noted that she did not seek that any of
the documents which had been produced
in the common bundle be excluded from the
hearing.
[10] Accordingly, I decline to make the orders for redaction as sought,
as:
(a) Mr Riley has responded to the issues raised by Ms Thomson and purports to explain his reasons for acting in the way Ms Thomson has criticised in her evidence. Mr Riley and his partner
Ms Van Wyngaarden have set out the background as they see it. It may be that
Ms Thomson’s background affidavit was more restrained
and succinct than Mr
Riley’s. Nevertheless, Mr Riley is entitled to reply.
(b) Much of the evidence is by way of background and not directly
relevant to the matters I need to decide. Nevertheless, it
is a useful
background. I will receive the evidence and put such weight as I consider
appropriate on it; and
(c) I also bear in mind that the evidence of neither the Thomsons nor
of
Mr Riley or Ms Van Wyngaarden has been tested in
cross-examination.
Appointment of trustees – s 51 of the Trustee Act
1956
[11] Under s 51(1) of the Trustee Act 1956, the court may appoint a new
trustee or trustees, if:
(a) It is “expedient” to appoint a new trustee or trustees; and
(b) It is “inexpedient, difficult, or impractical, to do this
without the assistance of the court”.
[12] The principles that govern appointment under s 51 of the Act were
summarised by Randerson J in Attorney General v Ngati Karewa and Ngati
Tahinga Trust when he said:2
The Court must be satisfied not only that there are grounds for the exercise
of the discretion but also that ‘it is inexpedient,
difficult or
impracticable to do so without the assistance of the court ...’. That
condition may be fulfilled where, for example,
there is no or inadequate
provision in the trust instrument for the appointment of trustees but may also
apply even where such provision
does exist. If, for example, the Court were
satisfied that the power to appoint new trustees was unlikely to be exercised
fairly
and objectively having regard to the interests of all beneficiaries
(including those who seek to be on the preferential roll of beneficiaries),
then
that could afford a basis for the Court to conclude that the statutory
conditions were fulfilled.
[13] The word “expedient” imports concepts such as
practicality and efficiency.3 In this case I consider it is
expedient to appoint new trustees for the following reasons:
(a) The present trustees have indicated they wish to
resign;
(b) The evidence discloses there have been a number of disputes between
the parties. In particular, concerning the deductions
that Mr Riley has
indicated he will be claiming on the transfer value he will pay Mrs
Thomson for her share in the farm.
This is the most significant asset in the
estate. The disputes go back some years and strike at the heart of their
relationship.
(c) For periods of time Ms Thomson and Mr Riley and their respective
families have not spoken to each other because of the disputes.
(d) While the parties agree they should resign have been unable to
agree upon who should be the new substitute trustee.
2 Attorney General v Ngati Karewa and Ngati Tahinga Trust HC Auckland M2073/99, 5 November
2001 at 21.
(e) The evidence
indicates that parties remain suspicious of the other’s
motives.
[14] It is clear that the parties are unable to reach agreement on who
should be appointed in their places. Without the assistance
of this Court, it
is likely that that progress in the distribution of the trusts and the sale of
the farm would face substantial
disputes and delays.
[15] I am of the view that it is appropriate for the court to assist in
the appointment of trustees to replace the present trustees.
Having resolved
that matter, the major issue now before me is who those trustees should
be.
Who should replace the present trustees
[16] Often where there are trustees whose relationship has become fraught,
particularly where they are also beneficiaries, they
become entrenched, and this
results in a contested application for the removal and replacement of the
trustees. In this case the
parties must be given credit for the fact they agree
that they should all step down and be replaced with an independent trustee or
trustees.
[17] Two potential groups of trustees are proffered as options before the
Court:
(a) The Thomsons suggest the appointment of Mr Larmer and Ms James as
trustees.
(b) Mr Riley suggests the appointment of the New Zealand Guardian
Trust
Company Ltd (Perpetual Guardian).
Mr Larmer and Ms James
[18] The Thomsons press for the appointment of Mr Larmer and Ms James on
the basis that:
(a) Mr Larmer has the required expertise and experience in areas of valuation, dispute resolution (both mediation and arbitration) and farm advisory work. He has an impressive list of appointments and
positions. He was previously a principal in a firm of registered valuers in
New Plymouth. He is no longer with that firm and no
longer undertakes
valuation work in the Taranaki area, due to an agreement with his former firm.
He now concentrates on appointments
as trusteeships, advisory work and dispute
resolution.
(b) Ms James is a chartered accountant and a partner with Staples
Rodway based in New Plymouth. She has an impressive governance
background,
including as a founding director of Fonterra Co-operative Group Ltd up to
2003.
(c) Both Mr Larmer and Ms James have experience as trustees.
[19] Mr Riley says that he likes Mr Larmer’s experience in regard
to resolving the dispute. However, he considers the job
of mediating “or
deciding the dispute” is quite separate to the job of trustee of the
estates. He sees advantages in
keeping the two roles separate which is why he
says he prefers Perpetual Guardian to be the trustee and to have Mr Larmer deal
with
the dispute.
[20] The criticism made of Mr Larmer by Mr Riley is not that he does not
have the skills, but rather that his particular skills
lie in dispute resolution
and farm advisory work. Mr Riley says he is willing for Mr Larmer to be retained
to undertake that work
in relation to resolving the disputes between the
parties. However, Mr Riley says:
(a) Mr Larmer was willing to undertake a dual role as dispute
resolution practitioner and trustee. These roles are incompatible.
(b) Mr Riley’s partner, Ms Van Wyngaarden, had a telephone conversation with Mr Larmer where she discussed the possibility of him assisting in resolving the disputes. Therefore, this gives rise to a conflict of interest as Mr Larmer had expressed some views. Mr Larmer does not deny there was a conversation, and in fact agrees that some of the notes made by Ms Van Wyngaarden would likely be things he said. For instance, “cost value” and references to values of land would have been
references to his comments. However, he cannot specifically recall the
conversation. He said he often had inquiries about his availability
as a
dispute resolution practitioner and, given he cannot recall this conversation,
it must have been a very general inquiry.
(c) No objection is taken to Ms James’ credentials. However, Mr
Riley says that his partner was on a netball committee
with Ms James some years
ago and so this is a conflict. He also notes she was founding director of
Fonterra which may mean she might
favour Fonterra to take the farm milk. In
response, Ms James says she has not been involved with netball although she has
been involved
with other sporting organisations and cannot recall any dealings
at all with Mr Riley’s partner. I also note that her Fonterra
role ended
some 15 years ago.
[21] In my view, neither of the argued conflicts put forward would be
impediments per se to the appointment of either Ms James or
Mr Larmer in the
ordinary course.
[22] In relation to Mr Larmer:
(a) His willingness to also act as a dispute resolution facilitator in
the past as well as a trustee does not disqualify him
from being appointed. I
would have reservations about a trustee acting as an arbitrator (in the formal
sense) as that role imports
other responsibilities which may be at odds with the
fiduciary obligations of a trustee. However, that is not the issue
here.
(b) In relation to the telephone conversation that Ms Van Wyngaarden recalls. Copies of her notes made at the time were attached to her affidavit. The notes contain information not only about the telephone conversation she said she had with Mr Larmer, but also outline a strategy for Mr Riley to take in relation to the farm. It refers to the names of accountants and lawyers who might assist. This material appears to be unrelated to any conversation with Mr Larmer. I accept
Mr Larmer’s evidence that if there was a query by Ms Van Wyngaarden
it was of a general nature. It would not be sufficient to give rise to any
conflict of interest in the ordinary course.
[23] I also consider both Mr Larmer and Ms James are well qualified to
undertake the role of trustees.
[24] That being said, I have reservations about whether it is appropriate
to appoint them in the present circumstances. I refer
to those
later.
Perpetual Guardian
[25] Mr Riley nominates the Perpetual Guardian as an independent trustee
to replace himself and the Thomsons.
[26] Mr Fifield gave evidence. He is the branch manager of Perpetual
Guardian covering the areas of Manawatu and Taranaki.
The company has
an office in New Plymouth.
[27] Perpetual Guardian is:
(a) A professional trustee company set up under statute;
(b) Regulated by the financial markets authority for some of its
operations;
(c) Has offices nationwide with over 140,000 will relationships,
administering or supervising assets valued over $100 billion;
(d) The company has 135 years of experience in estate planning and trustee
services in New Zealand;
(e) Has been appointed countless times as an independent trustee to
administer dairy farms such as the present;
(f) Has established systems and processes over many years to ensure compliance with legislation and best practices; and
(g) Holds insurance to cover trustee activities, excluding only health and safety matters and certain tax matters. Mr Fifield’s evidence was that in the areas that it does not insure for (Health and Safety and specific
tax issues) no insurance cover is available at all in New
Zealand.
[28] Mr Fifield had reviewed Kenneth and Margaret’s wills
and had some knowledge of the estate assets, but not
in detail. In fact, the
Perpetual Guardian’s consent to act as trustee was conditional on further
due diligence. His evidence
was that it was unlikely that Perpetual Guardian
would not accept an appointment. However, he said from a sensible commercial
point
of view he needed to take various steps to satisfy himself as to the
position of the estate. He indicated that some of the due diligence
was
required to check the level of compliance. This was in areas such as health and
safety. If the check showed any noncompliance
steps could be taken by the
company upon appointment to put in place a programme to achieve
compliance.
[29] Mr Fifield said he also needed to be satisfied that there were
adequate financial resources in the trusts, whether that
was by way of funds
held, or in assets. This may lead to deferral of the payment of trustee fees and
professional fees to fund what
was required in terms of resolution of the
disputes, transfer of the farm and distribution of the trusts. Again, he did
not consider
this would prevent Perpetual Guardian from taking up the
role.
[30] Mr Fifield appeared to be straightforward and responsible in
answering questions put to him. He accepted that Mr
Larmer had substantial
qualifications as a valuer, business adviser, farming adviser and dispute
resolution specialist. Mr Fifield
admitted he did not have the level of skills
held by Mr Larmer, but came from a banking background. He had been an officer
at a
substantial bank in Taranaki which had the largest market share of rural
lending in New Zealand at the time. He is now based in
Palmerston
North.
[31] Mr Fifield also mentioned that Perpetual Guardian would consider
appointing
Mr Larmer as either the second appointed valuer or umpire in the valuation process of the farm, nevertheless considering what had happened in these proceedings he might canvass the parties first to seek their consent on that issue.
[32] Mr Fifield indicated that in his view the role of the trustees was
to make decisions according to their professional responsibilities.
It was the
role of advisors and other practitioners to advise the trustees. That advice
may well be accepted but not necessarily.
[33] Mr Fifield was aware that the parties had previously attempted to
appoint
Mr Larmer and Mr Ansley (an experienced solicitor) to be the replacement
trustees and to resolve the disputes between the parties
including the valuation
price of the farm for the option to purchase. He noted the appointment at some
stage contemplated a dual
role of trustees and “arbiters”. He was of
the view that this dual role might give rise to a conflict of interest.
Mr
Fifield said that Perpetual Guardian would never assume both roles although he
said in cross-examination that he was aware that
other trustees may well do so.
He noted that the dual role was becoming less common these days. Presumably as
the risks to those
undertaking those roles have increased.
[34] Mr Fifield has not been drawn into the beneficiaries’ dispute.
He did not appear partisan and was clear Perpetual Guardians’
obligation
as a trustee. He also had an appreciation of the need to use appropriate
professionals where necessary, but had no hesitation
in noting that where
decisions were required, Perpetual Guardian would make them on a suitably
informed basis.
[35] The Thomson’s concerns about the appointment of Perpetual
Guardian are largely centred around the fact that Mr Fifield
is based in
Palmerston North, and that there will more costs in involving both trustees as
well as separate dispute resolution specialists
and farm advisors. They say
that there was no objection to Mr Larmer when he was to be appointed together
with Mr Ainsley, and cannot
see why there should be now.
Conclusion
[36] The court is guided by three considerations in considering who to
appoint as trustees:4
97 – 98.
(a) Settlors’ intentions: the court will give considerable weight
to the expression of the settlors’ intentions
as to the identity of their
trustees, if such can be discerned. But the court is not bound by those
intentions and may depart from
them “if good cause is shown”.5
In this case there are no apparent settlors intentions beyond the
appointment of the present trustees who are family members.
There is no
mechanism for the appointment of new trustees under the will.
(b) Neutrality between beneficiaries: the trustees must be neutral and
even handed as between beneficiaries with different interests.
The Courts
typically will refuse to appoint beneficiaries (or their spouses or relatives or
advisors) or others interested in the
trust property, even though their
appointment would not be objectionable on that ground alone;
(c) Promotion of the purposes of the trust: this is inherent
in any trusteeship.6 In this case both parties have put up
independent trustees. Therefore, the issue of neutrality between beneficiaries
and any suggestion
of conflict of interest in that regard does not
arise.
[37] In my view both Mr Larmer and Mr Fifield for Perpetual Guardian in
their evidence have shown appreciation of the responsibility
of trustees. Ms
James did not give evidence but her affidavit indicates she is also well
equipped for appointment. Therefore, the
decision as to who should be the
trustees requires a finer analysis than is usually the case.
[38] I had considered the possibility of the appointment of a third
party, not suggested by either, as a trustee. However, that
would further
complicate and delay the resolution and distribution of the trusts. In any
event, both parties have proposed independent
and professional
trustees.
5 Guest v Warner, above n 4, at [26].
6 At [26].
[39] Another option would have been the appointment of both Mr Larmer and
Perpetual Guardian as trustees. However, Mr Riley made
it clear that he would
not contemplate the appointment of Mr Larmer as trustee in any
circumstances.
Practical implications of the appointment of a trustee
[40] Mr Larmer impressed me in his evidence as a practical and robust
professional. Clearly skilled in many areas including dispute
resolution, farm
management and valuation. He impressed me as someone who would not be shy of
using his knowledge in any area for
what he considers is the benefit of the
trust. While that in some respects may be useful, in these circumstances it may
lead to conflict
with Mr Riley who is the present manager of the farm. He has
now expressed a firm view that he would not voluntarily accept Mr Larmer
as a
trustee.
[41] Mr Riley’s views appear to have been reinforced by the advice
that he is receiving about trustees acting as arbitrators.
Mr Fifield also
commented, while there were trustee/arbitrators, that was not the model that
Perpetual Guardian used. He also noted
that the concerns with conflicts and risk
around the dual roles and that currently the thinking in the trust industry was
the roles
should be separate.
[42] It is clear from the correspondence that Mr Larmer and Mr Ainsley were considered suitable trustees for appointment at an earlier stage, by both parties.
Ms Hughes says the suggestion that they also be arbitrators or dispute
resolvers was only made by Mr Riley not her client. Nevertheless,
it was being
actively pursued at one stage at least by Mr Riley and Mr Larmer was amenable to
the suggestion. I do not consider
this necessarily would result in his having a
conflict of interest, however, in the circumstances Mr Larmer’s
appointment may
add a further complication to the effective resolution of the
disputes between the beneficiaries and distribution of the trusts.
[43] In all the circumstances, it appears appropriate to appoint
Perpetual Guardian as the independent trustee. The reasons for
this
are:
(a) It is a dedicated trust company with all the benefits that that
brings.
This includes core expertise (including in-house counsel), extensive
experience dealing with trusteeships of farms such as the present case,
appropriate insurance and compliance systems, as well as a
presence in New
Plymouth.
(b) It has significant capital and is not dependent on one individual
being responsible for the administration.
(c) Mr Larmer is well qualified but has been involved in discussions concerning the appointment of trustees and a possible role as a dispute resolution expert for some time. Mr Riley, at least, has an objection to
Mr Larmer acting in those roles and as trustee. Given the possibility that this may give rise to further problems in the relationship, there is a risk in appointing Mr Larmer to be trustee. It may lead to the compromising of the official distribution of the estate. While it is
Mr Riley’s perception that Mr Larmer has views on the dispute, due to
his conversation with Ms Van Wyngaarden, nevertheless
that
perception may add to the difficulties surrounding resolution of the issues
between the beneficiaries. Therefore, that is
not a risk that should be taken
in the circumstances.
(d) There is no suggestion that Ms James be appointed other than
together with Mr Larmer as trustee. Therefore, if Mr Larmer
is not appointed
she should not be considered alone.
[44] In those circumstances, the balance favours the appointment of the
Perpetual Guardian subject to it accepting appointment.
As the indication from
Mr Fifield was that further due diligence would be required before it accepted
the appointment, I direct that
the consent of Perpetual Guardian be provided by
memorandum to this court within 10 days of the date of this judgment. The
appointment
will not be complete until that consent is provided.
[45] Leave is reserved to counsel to make any submissions in relation to that consent within five days of filing and service of that consent.
Conclusion
[46] I make an interim order appointing Perpetual Guardian as trustee of
the trusts created by the wills of Kenneth and Margaret
Riley.
[47] Perpetual Guardian is to file its consent (without conditions) to such
appointment within ten days of the date of this decision
at which stage I will
issue a final order.
[48] The parties have a further five days from the filing of the consent
to file any submissions in relation to that consent.
Costs
[49] Counsel indicated they would attempt to resolve the issue of costs
between them. If they remain unable to resolve this issue,
I will direct the
filing of submissions.
Solicitors:
Billings, Barristers & Solicitors, New Plymouth
C & M Legal, New Plymouth
Grice J
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