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High Court of New Zealand Decisions |
Last Updated: 30 January 2019
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IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND CHRISTCHURCH REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA ŌTAUTAHI ROHE
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CIV-2018-409-000244
[2018] NZHC 3421 |
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IN THE MATTER
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of the Insolvency Act 2006
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AND
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IN THE MATTER
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of the bankruptcy of JOHN BRIAN KIPPING
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BETWEEN
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GERALD ERRINGTON SHARROCK
Judgment Creditor
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AND
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JOHN BRIAN KIPPING
Judgment Debtor
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Hearing:
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10 December 2018
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Appearances:
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R Hucker and R Selby for Judgment Creditor J B Kipping (Judgment Debtor) in
person
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Judgment:
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19 December 2018
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JUDGMENT OF JUSTICE OSBORNE
Introduction
[1] Gerald Sharrock has three judgment debts (being costs orders) against John Brian Kipping. They total $35,858.99 (without interest and subsequent costs).
[2] The background to the debts lies in events examined by this Court in a number of judgments1 and by the Court of Appeal.2 Mr Kipping had involved himself in the
1 These include Sharrock v Wedd [2016] NZHC 1477; Sharrock v Wedd [2017] NZHC 1739;
Sharrock v Kipping [2018] NZHC 2210.
2 Kipping v Sharrock [2018] NZCA 289 [“the Court of Appeal judgment”].
SHARROCK v KIPPING [2018] NZHC 3421 [19 December 2018]
affairs of a Mr Wedd. Mr Wedd, through entities he controlled, had dealings with Mr Sharrock’s company, Affordable Residential Ltd (“Affordable”). The litigation (which was unsuccessful for Mr Wedd) led to adverse costs judgments. Subsequent litigation has led to further costs orders.
The adjudication application
[3] Mr Sharrock applies for an order adjudicating Mr Kipping bankrupt. He relies on an available act of bankruptcy which occurred when Mr Kipping failed to meet the requirements of a bankruptcy notice – the time for payment of which had been extended by this Court when it dismissed Mr Kipping’s application for an order setting aside the bankruptcy notice.3
Mr Kipping’s opposition
[4] Mr Kipping opposes the making of an adjudication order on the basis that the Court should exercise its discretion under s 37 Insolvency Act 2006 or on the alternative basis that the Court should grant a halt under s 38 of the Act.
[5] Leaving aside for the moment particular arguments advanced in opposition, Mr Kipping asserts two over-arching grounds:
(a) adjudication would cause a miscarriage of justice;
(b) there has been a breach of natural justice.
[6] Mr Kipping also asserted that he has no assets and is unlikely to be able to pay these judgment debts in the coming three years.
[7] In the course of his submissions, Mr Kipping accepted that the reliance on a breach of natural justice takes matters no further than the assertion of a miscarriage of justice. Mr Kipping conceded that he does not rely on there having been any breach
3 Sharrock v Kipping [2018] NZHC 2210, at [40].
of fair process by any tribunal or court. The reference to “natural justice” was his alternative way of expressing the “miscarriage of justice” ground.
Adjudication under s 37 of the Act
[8] I adopt these principles in relation to this adjudication application:
(a) the creditor has the onus of establishing the allegations in its application;
(b) the Court may in its discretion refuse to adjudicate a debtor bankrupt (notwithstanding the jurisdiction is established) if it is just and equitable not to make an order or there is any other sufficient reason not to make an order (see s 37(c)—(d) of the Act);
(c) the debtor has the onus of satisfying the Court that either it is just and equitable or that some other sufficient reason exists for the Court's not making an order of adjudication; and
(d) the Court is not to refuse an order of adjudication on the grounds of expediency or convenience.
[9] I adopt also a list of factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion under s 37 of the Act, as provided by Master Williams QC in Re Epirosa ex parte Diners Club (NZ) Ltd & American Express International Inc.4
[10] Factors relevant to the exercise of the discretion include:
(a) What are the wishes of all affected parties, including the applying creditor, other creditors and the debtor?
(b) Does the debtor have the ability to meet his or her debts over time and, if so, does that meet the requirements of achieving finality within a reasonable period?
4 Re Epirosa ex parte Diners Club (NZ) Ltd HC Wellington B498/91, 6 March 1992.
(c) What were the circumstances in which the debt was incurred and do those circumstances suggest that the creditor is acting unreasonably in pursuing adjudication?
(d) Will adjudication be pointless?
(e) Will the debtor, if adjudicated, be rendered unable to support himself or herself?
(f) Does the debtor have such a standing in the community that significant issues of stigma or embarrassment will result?
[11] The above list simply identifies factors which frequently arise. The Court’s ultimate task is to consider all the facts of the case in order to determine whether it is just and equitable not to make an order or whether there is any other sufficient reason not to make an order.
[12] Where the judgment debtor seeks to challenge the underlying judgment, the Court will not embark upon the exercise which a trial court undertakes. Associate Judge Matthews considered the correct approach in Nightingale v James.5 His Honour considered Australian authorities, including Ramsay Healthcare Australia Pty Ltd v Compton which he declined to follow.6 His Honour set out his formulation of the correct approach, which I respectfully adopt:7
The New Zealand legislative framework enables the Court to consider issues raised in relation to an underlying judgment and, if those issues are found to be of sufficient concern, to exercise its discretion accordingly. If a Court is not satisfied that it can form a firm view, it can afford time to a judgment debtor to take the matter up by way of an application for rehearing or appeal, as the case may be. But, because of the differences between the legislative provisions in Australia and New Zealand, this Court will not take the next step predicated in Ramsay and investigate the underlying judgment in the course of considering an application for adjudication. It will not embark upon an exercise akin to a retrial of the case which gave rise to the underlying judgment. Similarly, it will not engage in a process akin to an appeal. It will look at the underlying judgment to the extent that it needs to do so in order to assess the validity of a challenge to that judgment made by a judgment debtor.
5 Nightingale v James [2018] NZHC 965.
6 Ramsay Healthcare Australia Pty Ltd v Compton [2017] HCA 28, (2017) 345 ALR 534.
7 At [22].
Then it will make a decision on whether to allow time for reconsideration of the judgment elsewhere, or to dismiss the application, or to proceed to adjudication. Beyond that it is not in my view necessary to lay down any more rigid basis on which the Court should approach this issue.
Halting an adjudication application under s 38 of the Act
[13] Section 38 permits the Court at any time to halt a creditor’s application for adjudication on such terms and conditions and for such period as it thinks appropriate.
[14] By the very wording of the provisions, the discretion is intended to be exercised flexibly. It does not call for identification or application of fixed rules.8 A situation in which adjudication proceedings are quite frequently halted is where the debtor is pursuing and awaiting the decision of a court or body of competent jurisdiction which might reverse or materially alter the debt owed to the creditor (or might otherwise materially affect the debtor’s financial position).9
The facts relating to Mr Kipping’s insolvency
[15] As noted, the relevant facts are helpfully summarised by the Court of Appeal judgment in its recent judgment in Kipping v Sharrock:10
[2] On 22 February 2013 Mr Sharrock, Affordable Residential Ltd (Affordable Residential), Just Steel Framing Ltd (Just Steel) and Mr Wedd (at the time the sole shareholder in both companies) entered into a deed under which Mr Sharrock was to acquire 50 per cent of the shares in both companies. The circumstances giving rise to the execution of the deed are recorded in an earlier judgment of Associate Judge Smith.11 Mr Kipping was not a party to the deed. His interest in the matter appears to have arisen from his sale of a steel framing machine to Mr Wedd for use by Just Steel.
[3] A dispute arose concerning the performance of various obligations under the deed. While Mr Sharrock claimed that he had paid the full amounts required of him and that Mr Wedd was removed as a director and shareholder of the companies on 12 April 2013, Mr Wedd and Mr Kipping disagreed, contending that Mr Wedd was wrongfully ousted from Affordable Residential and Just Steel and that Mr Sharrock had no rights in either company.
8 Re Bank of New Zealand, ex parte Koroniadias [2013] NZHC 2865, at [11].
10 Kipping v Sharrock, above n 2.
11 Sharrock v Wedd [2016] NZHC 1477.
[4] The events which prompted Mr Sharrock’s claim culminating in the judgment against Mr Kipping are recorded in the following paragraphs of the judgment sought to be appealed:12
[22] On 22 July 2016, Mr Josland, a solicitor for the Registrar of Companies, advised Mr Sharrock that the Registrar intended to provide notice to Affordable of the Registrar’s intention to rectify the Companies Register to show Mr Sharrock’s shareholding in Affordable.
[23] On or about 1 August 2016 Mr Wedd and/or Mr Kipping lodged a “Consent and certificate of Director” document with the Companies Office. The document recorded that Mr Kipping had been appointed as a director of Affordable on 20 July 2016. It also recorded that Mr Kipping had granted his consent to be a director of Affordable and was not disqualified from being appointed or holding office as a director. The document was signed on 30 July 2016. The form records it was “completed by” Mr Wedd. A “Particulars of Director” document was also filed, recording Mr Wedd as the “Presenter” and Mr Kipping as a “New Director” appointed on 20 July 2016.
[24] On or about 1 August 2016 Mr Kipping, purporting to act as director of Affordable, lodged an objection to the Registrar proceeding to rectify the Companies Register.
[25] Mr Wedd, purporting to act as the sole shareholder in Affordable, then resolved to appoint Mr Hunt as liquidator of Affordable. Notification of Mr Hunt’s appointment was lodged with the Companies Office on 18 August 2016.
[26] On 19 August, Mr Josland advised Mr Sharrock that the Registrar now had no ability to rectify the Companies Register as proposed given the provisions of ss 360A(4) and 360B of the Act, and the objection received from Mr Kipping.
[5] Consequently, Mr Sharrock sought declarations in the High Court that he was a shareholder in Affordable Residential and that Mr Kipping had not been validly appointed as a director of Affordable, there having been no shareholders’ meeting or resolution of shareholders appointing Mr Kipping a director. In the substantive judgment summary judgment was entered in favour of Mr Sharrock declaring, among other things, that Mr Sharrock is a shareholder in Affordable Residential and that Mr Kipping is not a director of Affordable Residential. It is that judgment which Mr Kipping appealed and it is in that appeal that he now seeks an extension of time under r 43(2).
[6] One of the reasons we explain this background is that Mr Kipping appeared to be aggrieved at the fact that he was a party to the proceeding and hence became liable for costs when Mr Sharrock’s claim was successful. Indeed, in his application for extension of time dated 12 March 2018 he requested “relief from this Kafkaesque situation”. However, as the brief chronology at [4] above discloses, his inclusion and consequent liability stemmed from his intervention in the Companies Office processes.
[7] On 21 August 2017 Mr Kipping filed this appeal against the substantive judgment. However he did not file an appeal against the consequent costs judgment.
12 Sharrock v Wedd [2017] NZHC 1739 (footnotes omitted).
[16] In its judgment, the Court of Appeal was considering Mr Kipping’s application for an extension of time to file a case on appeal and a direction allocating a fixture. Mr Kipping intended to challenge a judgment relating to the directorate and shareholding of Affordable. The Court of Appeal held that that issue was moot given the liquidation of that company.13 The Court then explained why it rejected an assertion by Mr Kipping that a successful appeal would benefit him:14
Mr Kipping’s response was that Affordable Residential may have a significant claim against another party and substantial funds could become available for disbursement on a liquidation. However, the flaw in that contention is that, even if that eventuality occurred, Mr Kipping makes no claim to being a shareholder in Affordable Residential and hence could have no interest in that outcome, a point which he appeared to accept in his notes dated 13 July 2018.
[17] The Court identified that Mr Kipping’s primary purpose in appealing was in fact to resist the award of costs against him:15 The judgment continued:16
...We have considered whether it would be appropriate to treat the notice of appeal as extending to the costs judgment but we have concluded that that would not be appropriate in the circumstances.
[15] As we explained to Mr Kipping, his primary point in reliance on the Joint Action Funding case was misconceived. That case concerned the situation of a lawyer-litigant who represented himself. However Mr Sharrock was represented by counsel at the hearing before Associate Judge Smith and consequently the finding in Joint Action Funding has no application to him merely because he happens to be both a litigant and a lawyer.
[16] There would appear to be no error in the costs judgment so far as the award of costs was made on a 2B basis. While we express no opinion on the point, it may be that Mr Kipping could take objection to the 10 per cent uplift. However, we heard no argument on that proposition. Consequently, if Mr Kipping wished to challenge that aspect of the costs order (which could involve no more than $1,784.00) then it would be necessary for him to apply for an extension of time under r 29A of the Rules to file an appeal against the costs judgment.
[17] Our comments on the issue of costs should not be taken by Mr Kipping as implicit encouragement to pursue a further appeal. However, as he is a litigant in person and as we have commented unfavourably in this judgment on his costs contention in reliance on the Joint Action Funding case,
13 At [13].
14 At [13].
15 At [14].
16 At [14] – [17].
we felt it appropriate to explain why this judgment cannot address other grounds of concern which he may have about the costs award.17
[18] Accordingly, the judgment (for costs) stands as a final judgment unaffected by the Court of Appeal judgment.
Issue 1: dishonest evidence leading to costs judgments
[19] Mr Kipping asserts in his notice of opposition simply that the judgment debts (all orders of costs) were the result of “lies, perjury and other dishonesty matters by the applicant”.
[20] Mr Kipping repeated the same words in his affidavit in support of the application, adding that he had therefore filed a private prosecution for perjury in the North Shore District Court.
[21] That was the extent of his narrative evidence in support of his application. He also exhibited a statement he had made for the purposes of his private prosecution on 24 September 2018. The statement contains numerous allegations concerning the shareholding in Affordable and records evidence in Court proceedings given in relation to the shareholders.
[22] The exhibited statement is not sworn. There is no basis to admit it in evidence.
[23] Mr Kipping subsequently filed a further affidavit on 5 December 2018 (three working days before this hearing). The affidavit did not purport to be an affidavit in reply to anything said by Mr Sharrock in his evidence. Rather, Mr Kipping traversed detail of the affidavit evidence given by Mr Sharrock’s accountant, Kevin Whitley, in proceedings in 2016. Mr Kipping concludes his affidavit by saying that Mr Whitley’s affidavit clearly demonstrates that Mr Sharrock and Mr Walker “engaged in deceptive conduct with numerous untrue statements, some of which, in my opinion, amount to perjury”.
17 The Court of Appeal was referring to Joint Action Funding Ltd v Eichelbaum [2017] NZCA 249, [2018] 2 NZLR 70, in which the Court held that a party who was both litigant and lawyer was not entitled to a costs award.
[24] The attempt to introduce this analysis of the 2016 evidence so late before this hearing, in a purportedly reply affidavit, is not to be condoned. Mr Kipping had the opportunity to present his evidence in opposition when he initially did so in October 2018. His grievance over the outcome of earlier hearings and costs orders had been previously advanced. There was no justification for Mr Kipping to not fully present his evidence in October at a time when Mr Sharrock could have meaningfully replied to it before the hearing. The failure of Mr Kipping to file his supporting evidence at the correct time has not been explained. I refuse to treat Mr Kipping’s further affidavit as evidence on this application.
[25] Mr Kipping’s single sentence alleging dishonesty is no more than bare assertion. That would render it an unacceptable basis for reaching conclusions upon it in relation to the general run of matters. The bare assertion is all the more unacceptable when the allegation made is one of dishonesty or perjury.
[26] In these circumstances, the Court cannot, on the basis on Mr Kipping’s evidence, embark upon even the threshold analysis of the validity of any challenge to a judgment as identified by Associate Judge Matthews in Nightingale.18
[27] As the recent Court of Appeal judgment confirms, the costs judgments against Mr Kipping stand. They will not be the subject of appeal. There are no extant means by which Mr Kipping can have the final judgments reversed.
Issue 2: Mr Kipping’s private prosecution and standards complaint
[28] By his notice of opposition, Mr Kipping invokes the fact that he has commenced a private prosecution against Mr Sharrock in the North Shore District Court and that a decision of the Law Society’s Standards Committee (upon a complaint made by Mr Kipping against Mr Sharrock) is pending.
[29] Mr Kipping refers to the existence of both proceedings in his affidavit evidence in opposition. He includes the “submission” in his affidavit that adjudication should be at least postponed until a perjury charge within the private prosecution has been
18 Nightingale v James, above n 5.
determined by the District Court. In submissions, he similarly seeks an outcome which effectively defers the determination of this proceeding until the Law Society’s Standards Committee has issued its determination upon his complaint.
[30] Neither the outcome of Mr Kipping’s private prosecution nor the outcome of his complaint will affect the finality of the costs judgments.
[31] To the extent that Mr Kipping’s evidence and submissions effectively sought an order halting this proceeding, Mr Kipping has not established that any delay would likely lead to an alteration of his costs liability.
Issue 3: Lack of assets / inability to pay the judgment debt
[32] In his notice of opposition Mr Kipping asserted three financial matters:
(a) He has no assets.
(b) His income for the next three years is likely to be under $45,000 per year.
(c) He has no other debts.
[33] In his affidavit in opposition he deposed to having filed a proof of debt (for
$50,000) in the liquidation of Affordable. He states that that claim is his only asset.
[34] He continued in a passage which partly explains the reference in his grounds of opposition to “natural justice”:
It is also to be observed that my income for the next few years is likely to be below $45,000, therefore the assignee will recover no money from this. In plain speaking, I will not be working to pay the applicant, I am not prepared to borrow the money to pay the applicant and the Official Assignee will recover no money. Under these circumstances a bankruptcy will only be “punishment”, and would therefore not be natural justice.
[35] In submissions, Mr Kipping explained that he has been advised that the
$45,000 figure is that which the Assignee regards as the trigger-level before requiring contribution by bankrupts to their estates.
[36] As Mr Hucker, for Mr Sharrock submitted, the judgment of this Court in Re Fidow is authority for the proposition that a mere allegation without corroboration is insufficient to establish a lack of assets.19
[37] The evidence proffered in apparent corroboration by Mr Kipping, on the topic of his finances, is a single sentence email by a person who states he is Mr Kipping’s accountant. That person records:
I am aware you hold no personal assets of any significance.
[38] I do not regard the evidence adduced by Mr Kipping as establishing that he has no recoverable assets. That is for two principal reasons. First, the email from his accountant does not constitute evidence. It adds nothing to Mr Kipping’s bare assertions. Secondly, the accountant’s specific reference to “personal assets” admits at least the possibility that Mr Kipping may have other assets such as “business assets”. That seems likely as Mr Kipping introduces his affidavit evidence with a statement that he is involved in running a company that provides underfloor heating for new houses and he is a director of Circle K Ltd.
[39] It was for Mr Kipping to establish both his allegedly asset-less position and his expectation of the $45,000 annual income to a satisfactory standard, which he has not.
[40] A final matter emerged in the course of Mr Kipping’s oral submissions in relation to the assertion in his notice of opposition that he has no debts (other than the judgment debts owing to Mr Sharrock). In the course of his oral submissions, Mr Kipping indicated that his accountant has advised him that he has a pending income tax liability of approximately $10,000.
[41] Mr Hucker submitted that, where a debtor wishes to assert the financial pointlessness of adjudication, it should be expected as a minimum that the debtor will file a detailed statement of assets, liabilities and income. Mr Kipping’s bare, piecemeal approach to disclosing his position serves to underline the appropriateness of the Court’s requiring some detailed and orderly presentation of financial
19 Re Fidow [1989] NZHC 298; [1989] 2 NZLR 431 (HC).
information such as would occur if the debtor were to complete Form E2 Schedule 1, High Court Rules. In this case I am not satisfied that the level of Mr Kipping’s disclosure allows for any reliable conclusion as to his financial circumstances as might cut across the appropriateness of leaving such investigation in the hands of the Official Assignee.
Issue 4: Assignment of debt by Christopher Jellie
[42] In his notice of opposition Mr Kipping stated as a further ground that:
... there will be a further Deed of Assignment between the defendant and Christopher Wayne Jellie resulting in [Mr Sharrock] owing an additional six figure sum to the defendant.
[43] Even on Mr Kipping’s own evidence, it is clear that as matters stand any assignment of a debt by Mr Jellie (a bankrupt) would be a nullity. Furthermore, Mr Sharrock has given evidence of the litigation he had with Mr Jellie which led to Mr Jellie’s bankruptcy. In the process, Mr Sharrock obtained judgment on Mr Jellie’s counterclaim. Mr Jellie’s later application for annulment of his bankruptcy, based in part on his asserted claims against Mr Sharrock, similarly failed.
[44] There is no merit in Mr Kipping’s assertion that any assignment he obtains from Mr Jellie will have any value.
Issue 5: Assignment by Circle K Ltd
[45] Circle K Ltd as deposed by Mr Kipping is the company of which he is a director.
[46] In his notice of opposition, Mr Kipping referred (without express reference to Circle K Ltd) to another “deed of assignment”. He states that it results in his having a counterclaim against Mr Sharrock which is considerably in excess of the judgment debts.
[47] Mr Kipping supported this ground in a single paragraph of his affidavit in which he stated:
Attached as a Deed of Assignment (Exhibit B), are debts originally owed by the applicant to Circle K Limited, now assigned to the defendant. These debts, included in a previous affidavit, are considerably in excess of any amounts owed to the applicant.
[48] The exhibit is expressed to be a Deed of Assignment between Circle K Ltd (through Mr Kipping as director) and Mr Kipping himself (in his personal capacity). The deed sets out a background which indicates that Circle K Ltd issued invoices to Mr Sharrock. In the operative clause of the deed, Circle K Ltd assigns all debts owed to it by Mr Sharrock to Mr Kipping.
[49] In his affidavit, Mr Kipping referred to an earlier affidavit that apparently refers to his earlier 5 June 2018 affidavit sworn in support of his unsuccessful application to set aside Mr Sharrock’s bankruptcy notice. Mr Kipping deposed in that affidavit that he had recently (on 14 May 2018) presented an invoice to Mr Sharrock for a range of sums alleged to total a net $80,800.
[50] The Court necessarily dealt with this crossclaim when determining Mr Kipping’s application to set aside the bankruptcy notice. In its judgment on 27 August 2018, the Court found upon analysis that Mr Kipping had not established to the required standard a set-off in relation to the sums invoiced.20 The Court also rejected Mr Kipping’s other grounds and dismissed his application.
[51] Mr Kipping did not appeal that judgment. He has offered no further evidence or analysis to indicate that there is any validity in his “invoices”. I adopt the reasoning in that judgment as if set out in full. I find that the invoice sums do not support an arguable crossclaim.
Issue 6: Should there be a halt under s 38 of the Act?
[52] Mr Kipping submitted that, at the very least, the Court should order a halt of this adjudication application. That was for the reason that he was pursuing his private prosecution and standards complaint.
20 Sharrock v Kipping, above n 3, at [20] – [30].
[53] For the reasons I have set out at [28] – [31] above, I am not satisfied that any improvement of Mr Kipping’s debt situation can be brought about through those two sets of proceedings.
[54] As Mr Kipping did not submit that there would be any other justification for a halt, the Court will not order a halt.
Conclusion
[55] This is a relatively straightforward if somewhat sad case. I say this notwithstanding the repeated and varied efforts of Mr Kipping to attack final judgments and to characterise demands he has made of Mr Sharrock as claims of substance, thereby causing additional irrecoverable costs to Mr Sharrock.
[56] Mr Kipping owes Mr Sharrock $35,858.99 because of the three judgment debts he has incurred through his involvement in unsuccessful litigation.
[57] He committed an act of bankruptcy by failing to meet the requirements of a bankruptcy notice.
[58] None of the matters raised in opposition by Mr Kipping in his setting aside application (including allegations of crossclaims or set-offs) were upheld. The Court has no basis on which to reach different conclusions here.
[59] As I observed towards the conclusion of that judgment:21
[38] Nothing in these findings cuts across the strong impression created by previous judgments and by the evidence in this proceeding which indicates that Mr Kipping has acted with sincere and altruistic motivation. As he himself put it to the Court at the conclusions of his submissions, “I only got involved to help Stephen Wedd”. The fact that it was centrally the property interests of a third party rather than of himself which Mr Kipping sought to protect through involvement in the litigation has undoubtedly made the judgment debt and the risk of bankruptcy all the harder for Mr Kipping to accept. They are, however, the direct consequence of his becoming involved in litigation. Mr Kipping thereby exposes himself to costs orders.
21 Sharrock v Kipping, above n 3.
[60] There are no grounds on which the discretion under s 37 of the Act ought to be exercised in favour of Mr Kipping.
[61] Mr Kipping has ageing debts. It is his own evidence that he cannot pay them and will not be able to contribute any payments towards them in the coming years. The time has come when Mr Kipping should be adjudicated bankrupt so that the Official Assignee can undertake her responsibilities of investigation of Mr Kipping’s affairs and administration of his bankrupt estate.
Orders
[62] I order:
(a) John Brian Kipping is adjudicated bankrupt.
(b) John Brian Kipping is to pay to the judgment creditor the costs of the application which I fix on a 2B basis together with disbursements to be fixed by the Registrar.
(c) This order is timed at 4.25 pm.
Osborne J
Hucker Associates, Auckland
Copy to: J B Kipping (Judgment Debtor) in person
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