Proctor v Police [2018] NZHC 763 (20 April 2018)

Last Updated: 5 September 2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE

CRI-2018-404-045 [2018] NZHC 763

BETWEEN	TUI MARLEY PROCTOR Appellant
AND	NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	17 April 2018
Appearances:	K Stretton & G H Vear for Appellant A L McConachy for Respondent
Judgment:	20 April 2018

JUDGMENT OF PAUL DAVISON J

This judgment was delivered by me on 20 April 2018 at 4.15pm. pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors:

Crown Solicitor, Auckland

PROCTOR v POLICE [2018] NZHC 763 [20 April 2018]

Introduction

[1] Mr Tui Proctor pleaded guilty to one charge of burglary and one charge of receiving property valued over $1,000. He was sentenced to two years and 11 months’ imprisonment and ordered to pay $300 reparation. Mr Proctor now appeals his sentence, arguing the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive and that an end sentence in the range of two years and two months would have been more appropriate.

The offending.

[2] The charge of receiving stolen property arose from events on 1 April 2017, when jewellery valued at approximately $5,000 was stolen from the victim’s home. That same afternoon, Mr Proctor sold the jewellery to a second-hand dealer for $1,160. He claimed to have purchased the jewellery from an associate for several hundred dollars, but pleaded guilty on the basis that he was reckless as to whether it had been stolen. The jewellery was recovered.

[3] The burglary occurred on 26 April 2017, and involved Mr Proctor entering the residence of a 67-year-old woman. At some time during the day, while the victim was outside in the garden of her property, Mr Proctor entered the house and took a laptop computer, iPad and a handbag containing the victim’s personal belongings. A sample of his blood was later found in the home. On 12 May, Mr Proctor was located and the victim’s driver’s licence was found in his possession. His initial explanation was that it had been found in a park. Mr Proctor later pleaded guilty to this offending.

[4] The victim impact statements record that both victims are now fearful in their own homes, and have had to pay an insurance excess of $200 and $300 respectively.

Mr Proctor’s personal circumstances

[5] Mr Proctor is 31 years old. He has an extensive criminal history which includes convictions for driving-related offences, drug-related offences, breaches of court-imposed conditions, and numerous dishonesty-related offences. Relevantly, he has seven prior convictions for receiving stolen property and 13 for burglary.
[6] The pre-sentence report describes Mr Proctor as a regular user of methamphetamine. Mr Proctor informed the report writer that his offending is motivated by a need to fund his drug addiction. He is assessed as presenting a high risk of reoffending.

District Court sentencing decision

[7] Judge Ronayne sentenced Mr Proctor on 23 January 2018.¹ A starting point of 20 months’ imprisonment was adopted for the burglary charge. That starting point reflected the fact that the burglary was of a dwelling house by day, which the Judge considered was a “very serious aggravating feature”.² He noted too that the burglary appeared to have been for the purposes of feeding Mr Proctor’s methamphetamine habit.

[8] Counsel for the police and Mr Proctor agreed that an uplift of six months was warranted for prior convictions. However, the Judge considered a greater uplift was necessary. He noted that Mr Proctor had a significant history in the Youth Court and since 2006 had committed 13 burglaries, most recently resulting in a sentence of two years and eight months’ imprisonment in 2013. The Judge also noted Mr Proctor’s other convictions for receiving and dishonesty offending including fraud. A nine- month uplift was imposed.

[9] In relation to the receiving charge, the Judge considered the appropriate starting point was one year and three months’ imprisonment. That was in line with the sentence Mr Proctor received when he was last sentenced for receiving. No uplift was applied to the receiving charge, to prevent double counting.

[10] No reduction in sentence was given for time spent on remand or personal mitigating factors. Counsel for Mr Proctor invited the Judge to reduce the sentence for time spent in custody in relation to other matters, however Judge Ronayne considered Mr Proctor was not entitled to any reduction on that account. Though Mr Proctor had written a letter of apology, the Judge attached little weight to it. He noted

¹ Police v Proctor [2018] NZDC 1186.

² At [8].

the views of the author of the pre-sentence report that Mr Proctor’s motivation for change appeared to be low. Mr Proctor owed around $3,000 in unpaid reparation, fines, enforcement fees and costs outstanding and it appeared that payments had ceased.

[11] Judge Ronayne reduced the notional sentences on each charge by 20 per cent to recognise Mr Proctor’s guilty pleas. That reduced the burglary sentence to 23 months’ imprisonment and the receiving charge to 12 months. The sentences were imposed cumulatively. An order for reparation of $300 was made on the burglary charge, which corresponded to the excess the victim had to pay on her insurance. The Judge said there was no justification for a reduction of the cumulative total to reflect totality, as he considered the cumulative total sentence reflected Mr Proctor’s culpability and risk to the community. A final sentence of two years and 11 months’ imprisonment was therefore imposed.

Submissions on appeal

[12] Mr Proctor now appeals his sentence on the grounds the Judge:

(a) adopted starting points for each offence that were too high;

(b) imposed cumulative sentences where concurrent sentences should have been imposed;

(c) failed to give an adjustment for totality where one was required; and

(d) failed to apply a discount for remorse and rehabilitative prospects and attempts.

[13] Ms Stretton for Mr Proctor argues that an 18-month starting point should have been adopted for the lead offence of burglary. She does not challenge the Judge’s uplift of nine months to reflect the appellant’s previous burglary convictions. She submits that the Judge ought to have adopted a concurrent approach to the sentencing, and on that approach and taking into account the principle of totality, an uplift of nine months for the receiving charge would have been appropriate. Ms Stretton also
submits the Judge failed to recognise the genuine merit of Mr Proctor’s efforts to rehabilitate, and his expression of remorse. She submits that a reduction of 10 per cent would have been appropriate recognition, especially in light of the fact Mr Proctor has since his sentencing been offered a place in a rehabilitative programme.

[14] Ms McConachy for the respondent supports the sentence imposed by the Judge, and submits the starting points both fell within the available and appropriate range for the offending. She notes that the appellant was on bail at the time of offending, and submits there was no basis on which the Court could have given a discount for rehabilitative efforts, as there was no evidence to justify that approach. On the issue of remorse, she submits that the Judge considered all the available information, including the pre-sentence report, before concluding that a discount was not warranted. As the offending involved in each charge was distinct, the Crown submits that it was open to the Judge to adopt a cumulative sentencing approach.

Approach on appeal

[15] This Court will not lightly intervene in a sentence imposed by the District Court.³ But the Court must allow Mr Proctor’s appeal if it is satisfied that, for any reason, there is an error in the sentence imposed by the District Court and if it is satisfied a different sentence should be imposed.⁴ In any other case, the appeal must be dismissed.⁵

[16] The approach to be taken to an appeal brought under s 250(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011 was addressed by the Court of Appeal in Tutakangahau v R.⁶ The Court said:

[30] The practical effect of preserving the approach applied to date is that the appellate court does not just start afresh nor simply substitute its own opinion for that of the original sentencer. Rather, in the words of Shipton, it must be shown that there was an error “whether intrinsically, or as a result of additional material submitted” on appeal. If there is an error of the requisite character, the Court will then form its own view of the appropriate sentence.

(footnotes omitted)

³ Te Aho v R [2013] NZCA 47 at [30].

⁴ Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 250(2).

⁵ Criminal Procedure Act, s 250(3).

⁶ Tutakangahau v R [2014] NZCA 279, [2014] 3 NZLR 482.

[17] Where an error or errors are found to have occurred, the court’s assessment of their significance will inform its decision as to whether a different sentence should be imposed. The Court of Appeal noted that although s 250(2) makes no express reference to a “manifestly excessive” sentence, this concept remains engrained in the courts’ approach to sentence appeals.⁷

Cumulative or concurrent sentences?

[18] Section 84 of the Sentencing Act 2002 provides guidance on the use of concurrent and cumulative sentences. Cumulative sentences of imprisonment are generally appropriate if the offences for which an offender is being sentenced are different in kind, whether or not they are a connected series of offences.⁸ Concurrent sentences of imprisonment are generally appropriate if the offences are of a similar kind and are a connected series of offences.⁹ In determining whether two or more offences form a connected series of offences, the court may consider:¹⁰

(a) the time at which they occurred; or

(b) the overall nature of the offending; or

(c) any other relationship between the offences that the court considers relevant.

[19] Ms Stretton relies on two cases in which concurrent sentences were imposed. In Blissett v Police, the defendant pleaded guilty to charges of burglary, receiving and possession of a glass methamphetamine pipe.¹¹ Duffy J held that all the offences were sufficiently connected such as to make concurrent sentences appropriate. She observed:¹²

The totality of the offending appears to be a spree that was embarked on to fund Mr Blissett's methamphetamine addiction.

⁷ At [33] and [35].

⁸ Section 84(1).

⁹ Section 84(2).

¹⁰ Section 84(3).

¹¹ Blissett v Police [2013] NZHC 156.

¹² At [47].

[20] In R v Birkinshaw, the defendant pleaded guilty to multiple drug-related charges and one charge of receiving property.¹³ The events giving rise to the charges took place over a period of seven months. Collins J decided to sentence on a concurrent basis without discussing the alternative.

[21] I do not derive much assistance from these cases, given that each turns on its own facts. In the present case, while the offending which led to the receiving and burglary charges was broadly similar in that residences were burgled and readily saleable items were taken in both cases, there was an interval of 25 days between them. Consequently the offending was sufficiently disconnected in time not to be necessasrily considered as representing a continuing spree of offending. Moreover, although both offences appear to have been committed by Mr Proctor in order to fund his methamphetamine addiction, I do not consider that his motivation for the offending itself provides a compelling basis for treating them as a connected series of offences. While there is scope for taking a different view on this point and for the adoption of a concurrent sentencing approach, I am not satisfied that the Judge erred in adopting a cumulative approach.¹⁴ However, having adopted a cumulative approach, he was required to consider and apply the totality principle: cumulative sentences of imprisonment must not result in a total period of imprisonment wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.¹⁵ I will discuss the totality principle further below.

Were the starting points too high?

Burglary

[22] Burglary carries a maximum sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment.¹⁶ There is no tariff or guideline judgment for burglary, as the range of circumstances in which the offence may be committed varies widely.¹⁷ However, a distinction is generally

¹³ R v Birkinshaw [2016] NZHC 2257.

¹⁴ Note Gendall J’s comments in French v Police [2015] NZHC 2635 at [27], where his Honour acknowledged that there were two ways in which this offending could be approached (cumulatively or concurrently) and in his view “either approach [was] appropriate and ... likely to end up with a similar result”.

¹⁵ Sentencing Act 2002, s 85(2).

¹⁶ Crimes Act 1961, s 231(1).

¹⁷ Arahanga v R [2012] NZCA 480, [2013] 1 NZLR 189 at [78].

drawn between burglaries of residential and commercial premises. In Arahanga v R, the Court of Appeal made this observation about burglaries of dwelling houses:¹⁸

Burglary of a domestic residence is a significant aggravating feature at sentencing due to the heightened risk of confrontation with the occupants. Dwelling house burglaries at the relatively minor end of the scale tend to attract a starting point of approximately 18 months’ to two years and six months’ imprisonment.

[23] The Court in Arahanga recognised similar aggravating factors as had been listed in Senior v Police.¹⁹ In Senior, the Court considered the following factors to be aggravating:²⁰

(a) behaviour involving actual danger to or confrontation with occupiers, or the risk of such danger or confrontation;

(b) behaviour likely to make the victim feel targeted;

(c) wanton destruction of property and acts of vandalism;

(d) theft of high-value items — whether financial or sentimental;

(e) sophisticated planning and execution; and

(f) offending while on bail or parole, or in close proximity to court appearances on other charges.

[24] Following the Court of Appeal’s decisions in R v Taueki and R v Clifford,²¹ sentencing Judges typically distinguish between factors relevant to the offence, which assist in setting the starting point, and factors relevant to the offender personally, which may result in uplifts or discounts from the starting point. For this reason I prefer to treat the last of the factors listed in Senior above (offending while on bail or parole) as

¹⁸ At [78].

19. At [78]–[79]; Senior v Police (2000) 18 CRNZ 340 (HC). See also Benson v Police [2018] NZHC 296 at [30].

²⁰ Senior v Police (2000) 18 CRNZ 340 (HC) at [19].

21. R v Taueki [2005] NZCA 174; [2005] 3 NZLR 372 (CA) at [8] and [42]–[44]; and R v Clifford [2011] NZCA 360, [2012] 1 NZLR 23 at [60].

a factor relevant to the offender personally, to be considered after the starting point has been set.²²

[25] In the present case there is no evidence of premeditation, sophisticated planning or execution, targeting of a particular victim, or wanton destruction of property. While the precise value of the goods stolen is unknown, the items taken in the burglary included a laptop computer and iPad. The most significant aggravating factor is the fact that the burglary was of a dwelling house while the occupant was at home. There was therefore a very real risk of confrontation with the occupant. The Judge appropriately recognised this factor in setting the starting point for the burglary charge.²³

[26] The Judge did not refer to any case law in the course of adopting a starting point of 20 months. Ms Stretton cites three cases to support her argument that the starting point was too high.

[27] In Hotene v Police,²⁴ Clifford J reached a starting point of 18 months for a burglary which involved Mr Hotene and two associates entering a residence during the day when the occupants were away and taking a television set, other electronic items and cash collectively valued at approximately $3,000.

[28] In Bates v R,²⁵ the appellant was found guilty of the day-time burglary of a residence from which an iPhone and jewellery valued at $15,000 was taken. The residents encountered and spoke to the appellant as he and his associate were leaving the property. The appellant explained that he and his girlfriend were looking for their dog. Shortly afterwards the house alarm was activated and the occupants returned to find items missing. The District Court Judge’s adoption of a starting point of 18 months for burglary was not challenged on appeal.

22. See Blissett v Police [2013] NZHC 156 at [28]–[35], where Duffy J discusses the discrepancies in approach to sentencing for burglary; see also R v Columbus [2008] NZCA 192 at [12]–[15].

²³ At [8].

²⁴ Hotene v Police [2014] NZHC 2081.

²⁵ Bates v R [2016] NZCA 456.

[29] In Blissett v Police, Mr Blissett pleaded guilty to two charges of burglary, two charges of receiving and one charge of possession of a glass pipe for the purpose of consuming methamphetamine. Both burglaries were committed during the daytime. The second burglary was the more serious, as property was taken. It involved Mr Blissett and an associate breaking into a residence and taking personal property including a camera and items of jewellery with a total value of $2,000. Duffy J reviewed and compared several broadly similar burglary cases before adopting a starting point of 17 months.

[30] Although the facts of these three cases obviously differ, they are broadly comparable to the present case in terms of the gravity and circumstances of the burglary offending involved. Those cases tend to support an 18-month starting point in Mr Proctor’s case.

[31] However, the Crown cites and relies on French v Police.²⁶ There the defendant was sentenced on one charge of burglary and one charge of receiving. The burglary occurred at a residential property during the daytime. The occupant of the house was a 73-year-old woman who was out at the time. The defendant used a shovel to force open a window, causing minor damage, and proceeded to take 12 items of jewellery, estimated to have a value of $1,340. Gendall J considered that the offending fell at the “relatively minor” end of the scale for dwelling house burglaries, and adopted a starting point of 20 months. The burglary offending in French v Police, while broadly comparable to the present case, may be considered less serious as the value of the property stolen was less and because the occupant of the residence was absent from the address at the time. Nevertheless, a starting point of 20 months was adopted.

[32] This comparative exercise demonstrates that a starting point of between 18 to 20 months was available to the Judge. Although 20 months was stern, it was in my view within the available range for this offending.

²⁶ French v Police [2015] NZHC 2635.

Receiving

[33] Receiving stolen property valued over $1,000 carries a maximum sentence of seven years’ imprisonment.²⁷ Again, there is no tariff sentencing judgment for the offence of receiving. However, in Allen v Police French J said:²⁸

... regard is to be had to the value of the goods, the duration of the offending, the number of charges, the existence of a commercial element and the closeness of the relationship between the burglar and the receiver.

[34] Ms Stretton cites two cases to support her submission that the starting point on this charge was too high. In R v Birkinshaw, items that were stolen in three separate burglaries and worth around $4,500 in total were found at the defendant’s address. Collins J observed that were the defendant being sentenced separately on the charge of receiving, the appropriate starting point would be 12 months’ imprisonment, but having regard to the totality of the offending he considered an uplift of six months to reflect the receiving charge was appropriate.²⁹ In Blissett v Police, the defendant was found to be in possession of personal items valued at $1,100 that were taken in one burglary, and personal items valued at $300 that were taken in another. Duffy J uplifted the lead sentence by 11 months to reflect the two receiving charges. It is relevant to note that both Blissett and Birkinshaw are cases where the uplifts were made in the context of the courts adopting a concurrent approach to sentencing.

[35] The decisions in Ellis v R³⁰ and French v Police are examples where the sentence for receiving was considered as either a single offence or as part of a cumulative sentencing approach. In French v Police, the defendant was charged with receiving property after selling a stolen mountain bike valued at over $1,000 for $270. At sentencing, Gendall J was influenced by the fact that the defendant was present at the time the burglary occurred, having accompanied an associate to the secure bike lock-up premises of a high school. He adopted a 14-month starting point on the receiving charge.

²⁷ Crimes Act 1961, s 247(a).

²⁸ Allen v Police HC Christchurch CRI-2009-409-113, 3 September 2009 at [22].

²⁹ At [33].

³⁰ Ellis v R [2012] NZCA 513.

[36] In Ellis v R, there was a burglary of a property in Grey Lynn. Approximately
$5,000 worth of property was stolen. A few hours after the burglary Mr Ellis was found in possession of the property stolen in the burglary. The sentencing Judge adopted an 18-month starting point, which the defendant challenged on appeal. The Court of Appeal commented:³¹

We are satisfied that the 18 month starting sentence was within the range available to the Judge although stern. The Judge was entitled to take into account that Mr Ellis had come into possession of the stolen goods very shortly after the burglary within hours if not minutes. This obviously suggested some connection between the burglar and the receiver. This inference is reinforced by Mr Ellis's previous convictions for dishonesty. The value of the property taken was not minor but nor was it a major receiving. A start sentence, therefore, in the 12 to 18 month range was appropriate.

[37] The present case is more serious than was the case in French, given the significantly higher value of the stolen property. Here Mr Proctor sold the items stolen in the course of the burglary the same day as the burglary, suggesting a close connection between burglar and receiver. The value of the items stolen in the present case ($5,000) was the same as in Ellis. The Court in Ellis suggested a range of 12 to 18 months. I am therefore satisfied that the 15-month starting point adopted by the District Court Judge in the present case was within range.

Were additional reductions for remorse and rehabilitation necessary?

[38] Ms Stretton submits that the Judge ought to have discounted Mr Proctor’s sentence to recognise his remorse. She refers to Mr Proctor’s letter of apology written to the Court, and submits that a combined discount of 10 per cent for remorse and his rehabilitative efforts was appropriate.

[39] The Supreme Court gave the following guidance on remorse discounts in

Hessell v R:³²

Sentencing judges are very much aware that remorse may well be no more than self-pity of an accused for his or her predicament and will properly be sceptical about unsubstantiated claims that an offender is genuinely remorseful. But a proper and robust evaluation of all the circumstances may demonstrate a defendant’s remorse. Where remorse is shown by the defendant

³¹ At [9].

³² Hessell v R [2010] NZSC 135, [2011] 1 NZLR 607 at [64].

in such a way, sentencing credit should properly be given separately from that for the plea.

[40] Having regard to the appellant’s letter and the contents of the pre-sentence report, I consider the Judge was justified in concluding that Mr Proctor’s letter did not demonstrate genuine remorse. The letter refers primarily to the effects of his offending upon himself and his children, and tends to blame his offending on the use of methamphetamine. The pre-sentence report, which was completed following an interview with Mr Proctor, concludes that he lacks insight into his offending. There is no indication in the report that he has shown any remorse.

[41] As for rehabilitative efforts, Ms Stretton refers to the following material that was before the sentencing Judge:

(a) the pre-sentence report recording that Mr Proctor had applied for and been accepted into the Te Ara Hou residential drug rehabilitation programme, although the address was not suitable for electronic monitoring;

(b) a letter from The Salvation Army advising that Mr Proctor had been offered a place at the Salvation Army’s Supportive Accomodation facility, Epsom Lodge, where he would be required to attend a drug and alcohol rehabilitation programme with a residential component; and

(c) a letter to the Court from Mr Proctor’s aunt who had been closely involved in his upbringing and in which she describes the endeavours he has made in recent times to make positive changes in his life, including obtaining a job before he went into prison, and attending the Man Up programme.

[42] Ms Stretton further says that since his sentencing Mr Proctor has been found suitable for admission to the the adult residential rehabilitation programme at Odyssey House and can be admitted on 26 April 2018. Counsel has produced a letter from Odyssey House confirming his acceptance for the programme.
[43] Acceptance into these programmes is most certainly a positive achievement for Mr Proctor. The Judge did not refer to these efforts or to the progress made by obtaining a placement in the Salvation Army residential programme in his sentencing decision. While the steps taken by Mr Proctor to obtain employment and acceptance into the Salvation Army residential programme are to his credit and indicate a level of commitment to rehabilitation, at the date of sentencing no rehabilitative steps had yet been taken and consequently the Judge was entitled to conclude that no discount for rehabilitative efforts was available.

[44] The Crown also submits that Mr Proctor was on bail at the time of the offending. Although I consider he could have done so, Judge Ronayne did not add an uplift to the sentence for this factor.³³ In my view, any discount that may have been given to recognise Mr Proctor’s rehabilitative efforts would have been effectively counter-balanced by an uplift for the fact that the offending occurred while Mr Proctor was on bail.

Was a further adjustment for totality required?

[45] After applying uplifts for prior convictions and guilty plea discounts, which are not challenged, the District Court Judge reached a cumulative end sentence of two years and 11 months’ imprisonment. He then carried out the requisite totality assessment before concluding that the overall outcome and cumulatively constructed sentence reflected Mr Proctor’s culpability and his risk to the community.

[46] While it was open to the Judge to adopt a cumulative approach to the construction of the sentence, in my view the sentencing could equally appropriately have been approached on a concurrent basis. The present case has much in common with the offending dealt with in Blissett, where a concurrent sentencing method was adopted.

[47] As I have noted, in Birkinshaw Collins J, having determined that the charge of receiving involving goods valued at over $4,500 warranted a starting point of 12

³³ See Sentencing Act 2002, s 9(1)(c).

months’ imprisonment, proceeded to apply an uplift of six months for that charge taking into account the totality of the offending.

[48] Here, while both of the starting points for the burglary (20 months) and the receiving (15 months) were in range, they were in each case at the upper level of the available range and could appropriately be seen as stern. To those starting points the Judge added the nine-month uplift for the appellant’s prior offending. Although no challenge was made to that uplift on appeal, it is relevant in this context to note that both the police prosecutor and the appellant’s counsel had submitted to the Judge that an uplift of six months would be appropriate to reflect the appellant’s previous burglary and dishonesty convictions.

[49] When a cumulative approach to the construction of a sentence is adopted, there is a risk the sum of the separate assessments will yield a sentence that does not reflect the overall criminality of the offending unless adjusted. The existence of such a risk is recognised in s 85(2) of the Sentencing Act, which in mandatory terms stipulates that where cumulative sentences of imprisonment are imposed, they must not result in a total period of imprisonment wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the overall offending.

[50] An appropriate example of the adjustment of a starting point in this context can be seen in Birkinshaw, where the Court reduced a starting point of 12 months to six months for a receiving charge in circumstances where the defendant in that case was also being sentenced for other offences which were being treated as the lead offences. There, Collins J made the adjustment to take into account the totality of the offending.

[51] In the present case I consider that the Judge erred in his view that there was no justification to reduce the sentence he had arrived at by adopting the cumulative approach. As I have noted, the Judge adopted stern starting points for both the burglary and receiving charges and coupled those with a stern uplift for the appellant’s previous offending. While these individual assessments were within range, when combined they compound to produce a total sentence that was wholly out of proportion to the gravity of the appellant’s overall offending. In my view a sentence of almost three years’ imprisonment for the offending in the present case is manifestly excessive.
[52] Applying the totality principle, I consider that it is appropriate to reduce by six months the total sentence derived by means of adopting a cumulative approach, to yield a final sentence of two years and five months.

Result

[53] Accordingly I allow the appeal and make an order quashing the sentence of two years and 11 months’ imprisonment imposed by Judge Ronayne on 23 January 2018, and substitute a sentence of two years and five months’ imprisonment.

[54] The Judge’s orders relating to the payment of reparation and the appellant’s outstanding fines are to stand.




Paul Davison J