Hill v R [2019] NZHC 1464 (26 June 2019)

Last Updated: 16 July 2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WELLINGTON REGISTRY I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TE WHANGANUI-A-TARA ROHE

CIV-2017-485-1018A [2019] NZHC 1464

BETWEEN	FREDRICK HILL Plaintiff
AND	THE CROWN First Defendant
	THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL Second Defendant
	THE MĀORI LAND COURT Third Defendant
	THE WAITANGI TRIBUNAL Fourth Defendant DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION Fifth Defendant

	CIV-2017-485-1018B
BETWEEN	FREDRICK HILL Plaintiff
AND	THE CROWN First Defendant
	THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL Second Defendant
	THE MĀORI TRUSTEE Third Defendant
	THE TARARUA DISTRICT COUNCIL Fourth Defendant

Hearing:

On the papers

HILL v THE CROWN [2019] NZHC 1464 [26 June 2019]

Counsel:	Plaintiff in Person G L Melvin and J B Watson for First and Second Defendants G Shaw for Third Defendant D J Neutz for Fourth Defendant
Judgment:	26 June 2019

JUDGMENT OF CLARK J

[1] In my judgment delivered 14 May 2019 I granted the first and second defendants’ application to strike out the statement of claim in CIV-2017-485-1018A and granted the defendants’ application to strike out the claim in CIV-2017-485- 1018B. Having succeeded in their applications I recorded the defendants were entitled to 2B scale costs.

[2] I reserved costs for determination following receipt of “brief memoranda”. Any party claiming costs was to file a memorandum not exceeding five pages and if he opposed costs Mr Hill was to file and serve a composite memorandum not exceeding eight pages “structured so as to clearly respond separately to each of the three applications for costs”.¹

[3] The defendants filed the following memoranda in relation to costs:

(a) a memorandum and updated memorandum on behalf of the fourth defendant seeking costs in the sum of $6,244 plus disbursements of
$500;

(b) a memorandum on behalf of the third defendant seeking costs in the sum of $9,366 plus disbursements of $500; and

(c) a memorandum of costs on behalf of the first and second defendants seeking costs in the sum of $2,899 and disbursements of $478.26 in relation to CIV-2017-485-1018B, and costs in the sum of $9,812 and disbursements of $491.98 in relation to CIV-2017-485-1018A.

¹ Hill v Attorney-General [2019] NZHC 691 at [74]–[77].

[4] In response Mr Hill filed:

(a) a 27-page “memorandum of interlocutory application” in which some nine orders are sought;

(b) an affidavit “in support of interlocutory application after trial”; and

(c) a memorandum correcting footnote citations in the 27-page memorandum.

[5] Mr Hill makes numerous complaints about the judgment including that it was obtained by fraud. Mr Hill asks the Court to review its decision “... and call interested parties ... to deal with specific matters raised”. Mr Hill also suggests that if the Court considers a hearing on the application is warranted it should go to a jury.

[6] Mr Hill’s application must be viewed as analogous to an application for recall.

[7] It is long-established that a judgment, once delivered, must stand for better or worse, subject to appeal.² There are three exceptions to that principle, none of which are applicable to Mr Hill’s application.

(a) First, there has been no amendment to a relevant enactment nor any new judicial decision of relevance and high authority, since my decision was delivered.

(b) Secondly, there has been no failure on the part of counsel to direct the Court’s attention to a legislative provision or authority of plain relevance.

(c) Thirdly, Mr Hill has not identified a “very special reason justice requires that the judgment be recalled”.

² Horowhenua County v Nash (No 2) [1968] NZLR 632 (SC) at 633.

[8] I appreciate Mr Hill will take a different view of what justice requires. While this third exception to the rule against recall is not defined with particularity, the discretion to recall is to be exercised with circumspection. Critically, a recall “must not in any way be seen as a substitute for appeal”.³

[9] Mr Hill’s many contentions, including that the Court has erred in law; that the judgment has relied on “contested facts” without substantive evidence in support; that clarity could have been sought in respect of unintelligible pleadings — are all quintessentially appeal arguments. They do not disclose a proper basis, or reach the high threshold, for recall.

[10] In closing I mention one point: Mr Hill seeks rescission for variation of an aspect of the judgment in which he says “details as to whakapapa” are wrong. Mr Hill says: “I most certainly did not advise the court I was a direct descendent [of Keepa te Rangihiwinui].” The only passage in my judgment that I can identify as causing Mr Hill concern refers to his ancestry but does not state definitively that he is a direct descendant of Keepa te Rangihiwinui. I said:⁴

Mr Hill cites evidence given to the Waitangi Tribunal in 2015 in relation to Wai 2200, which he says shows that 2BH2D is still in the name of Keepa te Rangihiwinui, who appears to be an ancestor of Mr Hill.

Result

[11] The application for (effective) recall is dismissed.

[12] Each defendant’s costs conforms to its entitlement to 2B scale costs. Accordingly, costs are awarded in accordance with the sums claimed as set out above at [3].



Karen Clark J

Solicitors:

Crown Law Office, Wellington Māori Trustee, Wellington Brookfields Lawyers, Auckland

³ Nottingham v Real Estate Agents Authority [2017] NZCA 145 at [9].

⁴ At [57].