Hunn v Police [2019] NZHC 1975 (13 August 2019)

Last Updated: 21 August 2019

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND WHANGAREI REGISTRY I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA WHANGĀREI-TERENGA-PARĀOA ROHE

CRI-2019-488-000017 [2019] NZHC 1975

IN THE MATTER OF	an appeal against order to pay reparation
BETWEEN	CHRISTINE MAUREEN HUNN Appellant
AND	NEW ZEALAND POLICE Respondent

Hearing:	12 August 2019
Appearances:	C M Hunn (Self-represented Appellant) in Person C S Taylor for the Respondent
Judgment:	13 August 2019

JUDGMENT OF EDWARDS J

This judgment was delivered by me on 13 August 2019 at 4.30 pm.

Registrar/Deputy Registrar

Solicitors: Marsden Woods Inskip Smith (Office of the Crown Solicitor), Whangarei

Copy To: C M Hunn, Hikurangi

HUNN v POLICE [2019] NZHC 1975 [13 August 2019]

[1] Ms Hunn was convicted on one charge of wilful damage following a judge- alone trial by Judge Spear in the Whangarei District Court.¹ Ms Hunn kicked her former partner’s car, a 1993 maroon Jaguar Sovereign, several times. Judge Spear sentenced her to nine months’ supervision and ordered her to pay reparation of
$4,256.15. Ms Hunn now appeals that sentence.

The offending

[2] The charges arise out of events on the morning of 2 January 2019. Ms Hunn went to the home of her ex-partner’s new partner and had a discussion with her that morning. Ms Hunn asked to see her former partner, and some sort of argument ensued.

[3] Ms Hunn retreated down the steps of the house to where her former partner’s car was parked. She yelled abuse at her former partner, who had by this time appeared in the doorway, and kicked his car a number of times. She caused two large dents, and possibly some smaller ones.

District Court sentence

[4] Ms Hunn pleaded not guilty but admitted to kicking the car. The Judge found that Ms Hunn had the required intent to cause the damage and convicted her on the charge in an oral judgment delivered the same day.

[5] The Judge proceeded to sentencing immediately after entering conviction. There is no written sentencing judgment, but there is a transcript of the sentencing discussion. There was no reparation report before the Judge, and the Judge did not adjourn the sentencing to order one. However, he did make enquiries of Ms Hunn’s counsel as to her ability to pay before making the reparation order.

[6] The Judge then sentenced Ms Hunn to nine months’ supervision and ordered her to pay reparation in the sum of $4,256.15 at a rate to be fixed by Collections. The reparation sum was based on a quote dated 7 January 2019 from a panel beater. That invoice was attached to a reparation schedule provided by the police.

¹ New Zealand Police v Hunn [2019] NZDC 11768.

[7] Ms Hunn says that she did not receive a copy of this quote until after the sentencing hearing. She did not, therefore, have an opportunity to dispute the quantum of the cost of repairs. She has since obtained another quote dated 6 August 2019, which estimates the cost of repairs at $2,274.13. That quote was attached to an affidavit filed shortly before the appeal hearing.

[8] Although the reparation schedule was clearly before the District Court, Mr Taylor (counsel for the respondent) accepts that he cannot show that the original quote was in fact sent to Ms Hunn prior to the hearing. There is no objection to the second quote being received in evidence, and Ms Hunn’s affidavit for the appeal is admitted accordingly.

Analysis

[9] Section 33 of the Sentencing Act governs reparation reports. Under s 33(2) a court may decline to seek such a report without further inquiry if:

(a) the court is satisfied as to the amount of reparation that the offender should pay; or

(b) the type of information referred to in a reparation report is available through other means (including, without limitation, a declaration made following a direction under section 41); or

(c) in all the circumstances the court considers that a report is unnecessary.

[10] The Judge clearly considered he had all the necessary information before him to make a reparation order. However, the new invoice obtained by Ms Hunn suggests that the information he was relying on in the absence of a reparation report may have been flawed. There is accordingly a real risk that the quantum of reparation was manifestly excessive.

[11] In the circumstances, I consider the sentence of reparation ought to be quashed, and the matter referred back to the District Court for re-sentencing with the benefit of a reparation report under s 33 of the Sentencing Act. That report may address the value of the loss or damage to the car (s 33(1)(a)) in light of the different quotes, and Ms Hunn’s financial capacity to make reparation (s 33(1)(d)–(f)).
[12] That just leaves the question of the nine months’ supervision order imposed by the Judge. Although the notice of appeal only focused on the quantum of reparation, Ms Hunn sought to challenge the supervision component of her sentence in her oral submissions on appeal. She considered such a sentence to be unduly harsh given the nature of the offending and her personal circumstances.

[13] An offer to make reparation can reflect an offender’s remorse and an acceptance of responsibility for their criminal conduct. Those factors are relevant to the nature and length of the other components of a sentence. It is not clear from the material before the Court whether Ms Hunn had previously offered to pay for the damage she caused to the car. I cannot, therefore, discount the possibility that re- assessment of the reparation order may have some impact on the nine months’ supervision sentence imposed by the Judge.

[14] In all the circumstances, I consider it preferable that the entire sentence be considered afresh, with the benefit of a reparation report and any other reports the District Court Judge considers necessary to tailor the sentence to Ms Hunn’s particular circumstances.

Result

[15] Accordingly, I quash the sentence and remit it back to the District Court for reconsideration in light of a reparation report, and any other reports that the Judge may consider necessary.







Edwards J