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Hebei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Limited v Shi [2021] NZHC 2687 (8 October 2021)

Last Updated: 18 October 2021


IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND AUCKLAND REGISTRY
I TE KŌTI MATUA O AOTEAROA TĀMAKI MAKAURAU ROHE
CIV-2020-404-733
[2021] NZHC 2687
BETWEEN
HEBEI HUANENG INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO LIMITED
Plaintiff
AND
DEMING SHI
Defendant
Hearing:
12 April 2021
Counsel:
K Morrison and E Hong for the Plaintiff
B O’Callahan and J Nolen for the Defendant
Judgment:
8 October 2021


JUDGMENT OF ASSOCIATE JUDGE SUSSOCK



This judgment was delivered by me on 8 October 2021 at 2.30pm pursuant to r 11.5 of the High Court Rules

Registrar/Deputy Registrar











Solicitors/Counsel:

Meredith Connell, Auckland K3 Legal Limited, Auckland

B O’Callahan, Barrister, Auckland



HEBEI HUANENG INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT CO LTD v SHI [2021] NZHC 2687 [8 October 2021]

Introduction

Legal principles applying to summary judgment







1 Pemberton v Chappell [1986] NZCA 112; [1987] 1 NZLR 1 (CA) at 3–4.

2 At 3.

3 At 4.

4 Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v Cognition Education Ltd [2014] NZSC 188, [2015] 1 NZLR 383 at [37].

5 Ma v Ming Shan Holdings Ltd [2010] NZCA 325 at [25]; Pemberton v Chappell, above n 1, at 3– 4; MacLean v Stewart [1997] 11 PRNZ 66 (CA) at [69].

6 Auckett v Falvey HC Wellington CP296/86, 20 August 1986 at 2.

7 MacLean v Stewart, above n 5, at [69].

8 Ma v Ming Shan Holdings Ltd, above n 5, at [30].

Procedural background

Factual background

9 Hebei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Ltd v Shi [2020] NZHC 2470.

10 Hebei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Ltd v Shi [2020] NZHC 2992.

Shi in 2003. The plaintiff paid Boen China to source coal and distribute it to various electricity production companies in PRC. Each electricity production company would pay the plaintiff for the coal received. From these payments the plaintiff kept an agreed margin and paid the remainder to Boen China.

Recognition principles

(a) be issued by a foreign court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) for a definite sum of money; and

(c) be final and conclusive.

(a) the judgment was obtained by fraud;

(b) enforcement of the judgment will be contrary to public policy; or

(c) the proceedings in which the judgment was obtained were contrary to natural justice.






11 Eilenberg v Gutierrez [2017] NZCA 270 at [30] relying on Kemp v Kemp [1996] 2 NZLR 454 (HC) and Reeves v OneWorld Challenge LLC [2005] NZCA 314; [2006] 2 NZLR 184 (CA).

12 Chen v Lin [2016] NZCA 113 at [18].

[I]n order for the foreign judgment to be enforced in this country, it is essential that the foreign court should have had jurisdiction over the defendant, not in the sense of the foreign law but according to the rules of our law ... and the defences which may be pleaded by the defendant in an action upon a foreign judgment, such as that the judgment was obtained by fraud, are themselves creatures exclusively of English law.

(Court of Appeal emphasis.)

Discussion

(a) the PRC courts had jurisdiction over the defendant in accordance with New Zealand conflict of law rules;

(b) the judgment is for a definite sum of money; and

(c) the judgment is final and conclusive.






13 Adams v Cape Industries Plc [1990] 2 WLR 657.

14 Owens Bank Ltd v Bracco [1992] 2 AC 443 (CA) at 457.

(a) a New Zealand court should not recognise the judgment because the Higher People’s Court judgment is not given by a “court” as understood for recognition at common law; and

(b) the judgment is not final and conclusive between the parties because it is a judgment on a personal guarantee, with enforceability depending on further analysis of the plaintiff’s conduct in relation to the property security provided by Detai.

Is it arguable that a PRC court is not a court for the purposes of recognition at common law?

Though the United Kingdom has no written constitution comparable with that of Australia, both are common law countries, and in both judicial power is an exercise of sovereign power. I would identify a court in (or ‘of’) law, i.e. a court of judicature, as a body established by law to exercise, either generally or subject to defined limits, the judicial power of the state. In this context, judicial power is to be contrasted with legislative and executive (i.e. administrative) power. If the body under review is established for a purely legislative or administrative purpose, it is part of the legislative or administrative system of the state, even though it has to perform duties which are judicial in character. Though the ubiquitous presence of the State makes itself felt in all sorts of situations never envisaged when our law was in its formative stage, the judicial power of the state exercised through judges appointed by the state remains an independent, and recognisably separate, function of government. Unless a body exercising judicial functions can be demonstrated to be part of this judicial system, it is not, in my judgment, a court in law.

(footnotes omitted)

15 Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation [1981] AC 303 at 359–360.

The true position is that there is no rule that the English Court (or Manx Court) will not examine the question whether the foreign court or the foreign court system is corrupt or lacking in independence. The rule is that considerations of international comity will militate against such finding in the absence of cogent evidence. That, and not the act of state doctrine or the principle of judicial restraint in Buttes Gas & Oil Co v Hammer (Nos 2 & 3), is the basis of Lord Diplock’s dictum in The Abidin Daver and the decisions which follow it. Otherwise the paradoxical result would follow that, the worse the system of justice in the foreign country, the less it would be permissible to make adverse findings on it.




16 Altimo Holdings and Investment Ltd v Kyrgyz Mobile Tel Ltd [2011] UKPC 7, [2012] 1 WLR 1804.

17 At [101].

18 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 (HL).

19 At 976.

If this argument could have been carried to the point of showing that the courts of East Germany are not courts of law at all or that their decisions were corrupt or perverse, that might (I do not say would) be a ground for disregarding them in favour of decisions of other courts shown to act more judicially. But the evidence did not, in my opinion, approach this point, and a mere difference in philosophy, or even of method, so far from entitling us to prefer the West German approach, on the contrary gives support to those who argue that the East German variety of German law should be taken as being the law in East Germany.

The only criticism which is made by the West German lawyers of the East German judgment is that there are no free judges in East Germany and that no East German court would dare to come to a contrary conclusion. But this is only the opinion of the West German lawyers and there is not a shred of evidence to support it.

What is required is an assessment of the tribunal’s nature and function within the setting of Bahrain’s domestic local system to determine whether the BCDR meets the criteria of a judicial tribunal and has the fundamental attributes to be recognised as a Court in this jurisdiction for the purpose of enforcing one of its decisions.

(a) the nature and function of the BCDR in Bahrain’s legal system; and

(b) whether the BCDR has the fundamental attributes for recognition as a court in New Zealand.



20 At 939.

21 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) BSC v Teece [2017] NZHC 1308, [2018] 2 NZLR 257.

22 At [2]–[3].

23 At [16].

(a) A chief characteristic of a court of judicature is the exercise of judicial power of the state through Judges appointed by the state. The appointment of members of the tribunal by the Council of the New Zealand Law Society was contrasted with members of the Employment Tribunal being appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the Minister of Labour under the Employment Contracts Act 1991.

(b) The public function of the tribunals in question. The Employment Tribunal determines disputes between parties to employment contracts which would otherwise have to be dealt with by the ordinary courts, whereas the Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal’s responsibility was to maintain standards within the legal profession. The important public benefit in maintaining those standards was acknowledged but the primary beneficiary was the profession itself, which was why most professions and service industries develop their own disciplinary regimes.

24 Hebei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Ltd v Shi, above n 10, at [60].

25 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) BSC v Teece, above n 21.

26 Waikato/Bay of Plenty District Law Society v Harris [2006] NZCA 532; [2006] 3 NZLR 755 (CA).

27 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) BSC v Teece, above n 21 at [59].

(c) The ability to enforce its own orders. The Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal has no power to enforce its own orders. Orders were required to be filed in the High Court and could only then take effect as if they were orders of this Court. This was to be compared with the position of the Employment Tribunal which possessed the power to enforce its own orders.

(d) The omission by Parliament to include in the Law Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal’s constitutive statute a provision declaring its proceedings to be “judicial proceedings” as it had for the Employment Tribunal in the Employment Contracts Act 1991. To the contrary, under s 127 of the Law Practitioners Act 1982 immunity was conferred on witnesses and counsel in relation to disciplinary proceedings “as if they were proceedings in a Court of law”; the implication being that disciplinary proceedings under that regime were not in fact “proceedings in a Court of law”.

... noted the primarily administrative statutory functions of the Commissioner and his status as an employee of the Ministry of Justice rather than as an independent officer. These features were considered to be telling.

... it will ultimately be a question of New Zealand law whether the character of the foreign tribunal and its role within the foreign jurisdiction is sufficient to constitute what is considered to be a court in this country. However, the principle of comity requires the domestic Court to be circumspect about denying recognition to a foreign tribunal created by the legislative authority of a sovereign state, to exercise that state’s judicial power as a component part of its legal system.






28 Daimler AG v Sany Group Co Ltd [2014] NZCA 421.

29 At [14].

30 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) BSC v Teece, above n 21 at [61].

31 At [63].

[67] The differences between a body such as the BCDR and a New Zealand court in terms of process and procedure ought not, therefore, necessarily be greatly influential. However, some elements may be considered fundamental to a recognised judicial process. Importantly the tribunal must have sufficient judicial attributes enacted in a sufficiently judicial way to be recognised as a court by this jurisdiction. At the most fundamental level, any tribunal must have employed a process which included the application of the law to the facts with opportunity to parties to participate.

(a) Section (1) disputes under which the BCDR exercises a mandatory jurisdiction as a matter of law over a prescribed category of commercial disputes; and

(b) Section (2) disputes under which the BCDR exercises a voluntary jurisdiction by agreement of the parties.

[47] Because Art (18) required the Supreme Judicial Council to exercise oversight over the conduct of the BCDR’s Section (1) work as an entity with “judicial jurisdiction”, the Constitutional Court held the members of such an entity should be judicial, thereby providing the accompanying “guarantees” of competency, impartiality and independence, and appointed in the ordinary way by resolution of the Supreme Judicial Council upon the request of the Minister of Justice. The Court explained that because of the protections provided in the Constitution of the right to litigate and equality of access to the courts to litigate, a dispute resolution tribunal formed to exercise Section

(1) jurisdiction needed to be judicial. Because the draft Decree failed to require that judicial element for the purpose of exercising its compulsory jurisdiction, Art (1) of the draft Decree breached the Constitution.






32 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) BSC v Teece, above n 21 at [45].

... Article 32 that states “a. The system of government rests on a separation of the legislative, executive and judicial authorities while maintaining cooperation between them in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. None of the three authorities may assign all or part of its powers stated in this Constitution.

Article 104 [Independence, Public Prosecutor]

  1. The honour of the judiciary, and the probity and impartiality of judges, is the basis of government and the guarantee of rights and freedoms.
  1. No authority shall prevail over the judgment of a judge, and under no circumstances may the course of justice be interfered with. The law guarantees the independence of the judiciary, and the law shall lay down the guarantees of judges and the provisions pertaining to them.





33 At [48].

34 At n 31.

35 At [49].

[w]ithout the people’s court system, there would be no body capable of adjudicating on the dispute between the defendant and plaintiff. It cannot be the intention of the state to leave its citizens without the means to resolve disputes between them.



36 At [81].

37 At [89].

38 At [94].

... has not been undertaken against any factual matrix of how the proceeding unfolded in Dr Teece’s case. For example, a tribunal has flexibility as to how it will proceed, including the ability to engage experts who may investigate and present evidence in the form of a report. Of itself such a process does not prevent a decision making body from being recognised as a court, but how such a process is carried out and utilised in a given case may affect whether a tribunal is acting in a manner which would be considered consistent with the expectations of a judicial body in this country.

Is there evidence in support of the defendant’s position?

(a) Dr Ding Chunyan, an Associate Professor of Law from Hong Kong who has expertise in Chinese civil and comparative law; and

(b) Mr Clive Ansley, a Canadian lawyer who speaks and reads Chinese and has significant experience of Chinese civil, criminal and maritime law.



39 At [68].

According to the Civil Procedure Law, a civil case should be finally decided after two trials, that is, the “final after two trials” system. The first instance court for most civil cases is either the basic or intermediate people’s court. A party can bring an appeal only once to the people’s court at the next higher level within fifteen days from the date of service of the written judgment (which deals with substantive legal issues ...) or verdict (which deals with procedural legal issues ...). The judgment or verdict made by the appellate court is final and effective. An exception is that any decision rendered by the SPC as the first instance court becomes immediately legally binding.

(a) summing up trial work experience;

(b) deliberating and deciding on the application of law in major, difficult and complicated cases;

(c) deliberating and deciding whether the judgments, verdicts and mediation documents of the court that have come into force should be re-tried; and

(d) deliberating and deciding on other major issues relevant to trial.

On the one hand, the Adjudication Committee is criticised for its influential decision-making power over those major, difficult and complicated cases as well as its problematic “deciding without hearing” practice. On the other

hand, the Adjudication Committee is exploited by both individual Judges and Committee members to shelter responsibility in reality.

Although the SPC’s recent judicial reforms have reduced or mitigated both internal and external interference with judicial decisions, the independence of individual Judges are still subject to the supervisory power of the Division Chief Judge and the leadership team of the court as well as the Adjudication Committee in the court; and Chinese courts as an institution remains under the supervision of the People’s Congress or its representatives and the CPC [Communist Party of China], and the interference by administrative organs (sic).

General v British Broadcasting Corporation.40

(a) There is no separation of powers in China.

(b) The members of the judiciary are all members of the Chinese Communist Party (“CCP”).

(c) The Judges that “hear” cases do not decide them.

(d) Cases are decided secretly by Judicial Committees both appointed in each Court whose members are drawn from the Judges in the Court and from the CCP. Decisions are delivered as they have been determined by the Judges who conducted the trial.

(e) It is a feature of the system that through several mechanisms, cases are routinely influenced by political matters. This is not ad hoc corruption or poor decision making. It is how the system is designed to work.

(f) As a further elaboration of this last point, Judges are expected to do whatever is in the interests of the CCP, must answer to or be accountable to the CCP and are not to regard themselves as independent. Judicial independence has often been described as an immoral western concept in China’s top leadership and has denounced it, rejected it, and pledged to never allow judicial independence to be implemented now or in the future.

(g) Some Judges are not trained in law and in any event the political/legal committee of the Chinese Communist Party at every level can overrule the Courts at that level.

(h) China has no rule of law. Instead it has a system of rule by law although laws are codified in statutes and may be consulted if necessary, the decisions are arbitrary and reflect, ultimately, the will of the CCP. There is no mechanism for any individual to challenge the CCP or require it to be judged or assessed according to fundamental overriding principles.

40 Attorney-General v British Broadcasting Corporation, above n 15, at 359–360.

48. The “Judicial Committee” is an invisible group which meets regularly within each “court” to decide on the judgments in cases which have already been “tried” in court and are awaiting a ruling by the judicial committee, none of whom will normally have attended the trial and perhaps may not have even read the file.

When the Judicial Committee has heard the views of the CCP Secretary and agreed on the basic terms of the “judgment”, it instructs the original tribunal to write and issue the decision over the signatures of the original three tribunal members. Every Judicial Committee includes the official CCP Secretary within the “court” and he or she drives the decisions and specifically informs the other “Judges” on the Committee on how the CCP wishes the decision to be decided.

If the CCP at the level of the particular “court” concerned were supporting the claimant, the claimant was frequently allowed to attend the committee meeting and provide input; no such privilege would be extended to the defendant.

on the basis that the judgments themselves do not record the involvement of a judicial committee. The evidence filed on behalf of the defendant disputes this.


41 Minister of Justice v Kim [2021] NZSC 57.

42 Kim v Minister of Justice [2019] NZCA 209, [2019] 3 NZLR 173.

43 The minority decision of O’Regan and French JJ records that they agree with the reasons given by Glazebrook J but not the disposition of the appeal.

44 Minister of Justice v Kim [2021] NZSC 57.

(footnotes omitted)

the likelihood of Mr Kim’s case being referred to a judicial committee, the composition of the committee, the material that would be considered by it, any ability to make oral submissions before the committee, the function the committee would perform and the extent of any written judgment.

It appears that one of the motivations for cases being referred to a judicial committee beyond those that might strictly fit the criteria above was (and perhaps remains) the sharing of responsibility for decisions, as Mr Ansley said.

45 At [316].

46 At [316].

47 At [318] to [321].

48 At [321].

August 2014, the judicial committee of a particular court only discussed 39 cases. The Supreme Court commented:49

The vastly different results in these two studies speak to the difficulty in establishing the rate of referral in courts across the PRC.

[341] As noted above, the essence of the requirement for judicial independence and impartiality is that judges should decide a case on the basis of the evidence before them and on their understanding of the law, free of outside influence and, in particular, from the other branches of government.
[342] A very common criticism of the judicial committee system has been that it “leads to a separation between the trial process and the actual decision-making. Judges who are involved in the trial do not deliver the final judgment and members of the judicial committee who do not hear a case make the final decision for the judges”. The system “directly results in excluding the judges who know the cases better from making the decision, which result[s] in [the] criminal trial losing its function in China”. Further, it seems that the parties cannot make oral or written submissions directly to the judicial committee. This “denies those individuals whose interests are directly affected by the judgment opportunity to present their case before the actual decision maker”.
[343] Although the material we have referred to was not before the Minister, it is consistent with the evidence given by Mr Ansley for the first judicial review, which was before her when she made her second surrender decision. The uncontradicted evidence from Mr Ansley was that most cases are referred to judicial committees and that it is those bodies, rather than the court which had heard the evidence, that decide on the verdict. In addition, there is regular input from external figures at judicial committee level and no opportunity for input by the accused.
[344] We do not accept the appellants' submission that, because it was reasonable for the Minister to conclude that political interference in Mr Kim's case is unlikely, it would also have been reasonable to conclude that referral to a judicial committee would not occur. As noted, the Minister had uncontested evidence before her that referral was very common for reasons beyond the exertion of political influence. As such, this conclusion would not have been available on the evidence. In any event, the Minister did not in fact reach a conclusion on this issue, shown by the fact that her first decision letter does not
mention judicial committees and her second surrender decision refers to

49 At [322].

concerns regarding political interference in judicial decision-making but again
does not deal with judicial committees specifically.
[345] On the basis of the evidence before her at the time of her second surrender decision, it was not possible for the Minister to have come to the conclusion that Mr Kim's case would be decided by the judges who had heard the evidence rather than by a judicial committee. Nor was it possible to consider that the judicial committee would decide the case on the basis of the evidence and free of outside influence, and in particular influence from party representatives. Even if that influence would not be political in the sense discussed above, it is nonetheless influence from external bodies in a judicial decision-making process. It was therefore not open to the Minister to have considered that Mr Kim would be tried by an independent and impartial tribunal.
[346] There is, however, more information before us on judicial committees than was before the Minister and the Courts below. We now consider whether that new information changes the above assessment.
[347] From the referral criteria in the 2019 Opinions, it seems Mr Kim's case will have to be referred to the judicial committee if a question of law arises or where there is a possibility of an acquittal. It may also be that it will be considered mandatory to refer Mr Kim's case because it could be seen as a case involving foreign affairs, given that diplomatic assurances are involved. Mr Kim's case may in any event, because of the international dimension, be a case where a sharing of responsibility for the decision may provide a motive to refer the case to a judicial committee. We therefore consider that, absent further inquiries changing the above assessment, any Minister making a decision about extradition would have to consider there was a real possibility that Mr Kim's case would be referred to a judicial committee.
(footnotes omitted)
House.50 In any event, questions remain about the independence and impartiality of the collegial panels even if a judicial committee was not involved.



50 Kuwait Finance House (Bahrain) BSC v Teece, above n 21 at [67].

Is the judgment final and conclusive?

What does “final and conclusive” mean?

My Lords, I think that in order to establish that such a judgment has been pronounced it must be shewn that in the Court by which it was pronounced it conclusively, finally, and for ever established the existence of the debt of which it is thought to be made conclusive evidence in this country, so as to make it res judicata between the parties. If it is not conclusive in the same Court which pronounced it, so that notwithstanding such a judgment the existence of a debt made between the same parties be afterwards contested in that Court, and upon proper proceedings being taken and such contest being adjudicated upon, it may be declared that there existed no obligation to pay the debt at all, then I do not think that a judgment which is of that character can be regarded as finally and conclusively evidencing the debt, and so entitling the person who has obtained the judgment to claim a decree from our courts for the payment of the debt.

The principle upon which I think our enforcement of foreign judgments must proceed is this: that in a Court of competent jurisdiction, where according to its established procedure the merits of the case were open, at all events, to the parties, however much they may have failed to take advantage of them, or may have waived any of their rights, a final adjudication has been given that a debt or obligation exists which cannot thereafter in that Court be disputed, and can only be questioned in an appeal to a higher tribunal. In such a case it may well be said that giving credit to the Court of another country we are prepared to take the fact that such an adjudication has been made as establishing the existence of the debt or obligation. But where, as in the present case, the adjudication is considered with the non-existence of the debt or obligation which it is sought to enforce, and it may thereafter be declared by the tribunal which pronounced it that there is no obligation and no debt, it appears to me

51 Nouvion v Freeman (1889) 15 App Cas 1 (HL).

52 At 9–10.

that the very foundation upon which the Courts of this country would proceed in enforcing a foreign judgment altogether fails.

What are the parties’ positions?

What do the respective experts say?






53 Hebei Huaneng Industrial Development Co Ltd v Shi, above n 10.

(a) enforce the security rights over the assets of the third party;

(b) pursue the guarantor on his personal covenant; or

(c) to pursue both.

principle, the objection would be dismissed. This submission is based however on his interpretation that Article 178 of the Property Law means that Article 28 of the Guarantee Law does not apply. As noted above, this is an issue on which the experts differ.

What enforcement steps did the plaintiff take against Detai?

equally amount to a partial or full waiver of the mortgage rights under Article 38(3) and Mr Shi could again claim his liability under the judgment ought to be reduced or exempted to the extent of the plaintiff’s waiver.

Is the defendant prevented from raising enforcement issues now?


The Henderson v Henderson principle precludes a party from raising in subsequent proceedings matters which were not, but should and could have been, raised in earlier ones.54

54 Henderson v Henderson [1843] EngR 917; [1843] 67 ER 313 (Ch).

55 Bau v Qu; Tian (No 2) [2020] NSWSC 588 at [30].

56 Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner and Keeler Ltd (No 2), above n 18.

Ding in respect of waiver and the plaintiff’s obligation to preserve the security raise further factual and legal issues.




57 Arnold v National Westminster Bank plc [1991] 2 AC 93 at 105.

58 At 104–105.

Is this issue capable of determination in a summary judgment context?




59 Chen v Lin, above n 12.

60 At [20].

Result

(a) the plaintiff’s application for summary judgment is dismissed;

(b) a case management conference is to be allocated by the Registry at least four weeks from the date of this judgment, three working days prior to which memoranda (preferably joint) are to be filed proposing next steps and addressing Schedule 5 matters.

Costs









Associate Judge Sussock


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