IG v PC [2018] NZLCRO 68 (1 August 2018)

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	LCRO 64/2018
CONCERNING	an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
AND
CONCERNING	a determination of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]
BETWEEN	IG Applicant
AND	PC QC _Respondent

[1] Mr IR has applied for a review of a decision by the [Area] Standards Committee [X] (the Committee), which made an unsatisfactory conduct finding against him following a complaint by Mr PC QC.

[2] Mr IR is a solicitor practising in Auckland. His law firm is called IR Lawyers.

[3] Mr IR is a friend of a barrister, Ms G, who practises in [Town A] and specialises in employment law.

[4] Mr E approached Ms G to act for him in relation to personal grievances against his employer, S Ltd. Ms G arranged for Mr IR to act as her instructing solicitor.

[5] Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E all agreed that Ms G would invoice Mr E directly for her fees and that Mr IR, as instructing solicitor, would have no responsibility for paying those fees.

[6] The personal grievances were resolved by a settlement agreement following a mediation between Mr E and S Ltd in [date].

[7] A dispute arose between Mr E and S Ltd about the meaning and effect of one clause in the settlement agreement. Mr E initiated proceedings in the ERA to enforce the clause in question (the enforcement proceedings).

[8] Ms G continued to act for Mr E in the enforcement proceedings, but another counsel, Mr A, was also instructed to appear on behalf of Mr E in those proceedings.

[9] In a determination dated [Date], the ERA dismissed Mr E’s application for an

[10] On behalf of Mr E, in mid-March 2016 Ms G approached a QC in Auckland for advice about challenging the ERA’s determination. The QC referred Ms G to Mr PC, who advised that there were grounds to appeal the ERA’s determination in the Employment Court.

[11] Mr PC informed Ms G that he required an instructing solicitor and enquired whether this might conveniently be Mr IR, as he [Mr IR] had been Ms G’s instructing solicitor in the ERA proceedings.

[12] In a letter dated 13 April 2016, Mr IR instructed Mr PC to “accept our instructions

[13] Mr PC forwarded Mr IR a letter which included his terms of engagement, dated

Unless otherwise agreed it is acknowledged and in accordance with usual contracts of retainer of a barrister that you and your firm will be personally liable to me for my fees. I would in these circumstances expect that you will hold from time to time sufficient monies in trust on account of fees and that you will also use all reasonable endeavours actively to recover fees from the client in the event that fees are not paid in accordance with the arrangements set out above.

[14] Mr PC also sent Mr E a letter of engagement dated [Date], in which he attached a copy of his letter of engagement to Mr IR. He said:

I attach a letter to your instructing solicitor which represents my standard terms of engagement.

As I am a barrister and provide only barristerial services I do not act as a solicitor and I do not operate a trust account. Accordingly, this letter is addressed to your solicitor who in turn instructs me.

... Although I act through instructions from your instructing solicitor, there will be occasions, perhaps quite frequently, when you and I will discuss matters direct and you will provide instructions to me direct.

[15] Ms G initially acted as junior counsel to Mr PC, however she had to relinquish that role when it became apparent that she would be required to give evidence in the proceedings before the Employment Court. For practical purposes, this meant that she was no longer on the record as junior counsel, but she continued to assist Mr PC in all aspects of preparation for and during the hearing.

[16] Mr PC sent his first invoice, dated 13 April 2016, to Mr IR. This was paid by Mr

Mr PC directly. This Mr PC did for his invoices dated 9 August 2016 and 31 October

[19] By the end of November 2016 Mr E was behind with his legal fees to Mr PC. Mr PC took that up with Mr IR, and asked Mr IR to obtain funds in advance from Mr E and hold them in his trust account.

[21] The hearing before the Employment Court took place during [Date] and [Month]

and [Date]. Mr PC appeared as counsel for Mr E, despite the issues over unpaid fees.

[22] Mr PC’s final invoice was for a total of $[amount] Of that amount, $[amount] represented his fees for preparing for and appearing in the Employment Court hearing. To this was added GST of $[amount] and GST inclusive disbursements of $[amount].

[23] This invoice was accompanied by a statement of account prepared by Mr PC, which showed fees charged on 9 August 2016 and 31 October 2016, of $[amount] (including GST and disbursements). The statement also showed that of that amount Mr

E had paid $[amount]. Although not recorded as such in the statement, clearly there was a balance owing by Mr E of $[amount] in relation to the August and October invoices.

[24] That amount was added to Mr PC’s invoice of 22 February 2007, which left an amount owing by Mr E as at that date ($[amount] plus $[amount] of $[amount].

[26] Judgment in the case, which was heard by [redacted] Employment Court, was delivered on [date].2 In his 20 June 2017 report to Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E about the judgment, Mr PC described it as “a resounding success” for Mr E.

[27] By that date Mr PC had lodged his complaint against Mr IR seeking payment of his outstanding legal fees. For this reason, although he reported to Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E about the judgment, Mr PC said that because of the complaint he was unable to act for Mr E in relation to Mr E’s application for costs following delivery of the judgment.

[28] The application for costs was made to the Employment Court on Mr E’s behalf

by counsel who had appeared in the enforcement proceedings before the ERA, Mr A.

[30] In its judgment, the Court awarded costs and disbursements in favour of Mr E, noting that he was “[redacted]”.4 The court’s costs award did not include costs for making the application for costs.5

(b) $[amount] related to disbursements incurred as part of Mr E’s proceedings in the Employment Court.

[32] S Ltd paid the amounts ordered by the Employment Court into its solicitors’ trust account. Remaining in that trust account are the costs relating to Mr PC’s fees and disbursements, totalling $[amount].

(a) He was first approached by a colleague in his Chambers, who had in turn been approached by Ms G, to see if he would be prepared to act for Mr E following an adverse decision in the ERA (the enforcement proceedings).

(b) Mr PC was asked to review the ERA’s determination and advise on whether to pursue an appeal to the Employment Court. An appeal in the Employment Court operated as a de novo hearing.

(d) Mr PC sent Mr IR a letter of engagement dated 4 May 2016, as well as a copy to Mr E. A term of the engagement was that Mr IR remained responsible to pay Mr PC’s legal fees.

(e) By arrangement Mr PC sent his accounts to Mr E who paid them directly; this being “commonplace between barristers, instructing solicitors and lay clients”.

(f) In the second half of 2016 Mr E did not pay Mr PC’s invoices. Mr PC drew this to Mr IR’s attention.

(i) Mr PC’s final account (together with a small amount from previous accounts) remains unpaid. That final account was discounted by Mr PC by 50%.

only look to [his] instructing solicitor to take action or alternatively require the instructing solicitor, in accordance with standard conventions that apply and the [letter of engagement] itself to pay the fees that are properly due.

[34] Initially Mr PC’s complaint was referred to the Complaints Service’s Early Resolution Service and the parties were directed to explore the possibility of resolving the complaint by an alternative resolution process.

[36] The complaint was then referred to a different Standards Committee for determination.

[38] In his email to the Complaints Service dated 9 May 2017, Mr IR said that “it was clearly understood by all parties ([Mr PC and Mr E]) that I will not be liable for [Mr PC’s] fees”. And the all charges will be between them “man to man” [sic].

[39] In his letter to the Complaints Service dated 26 May 2017 Mr IR said that he was

... not personally liable to pay either [Ms G’s] fees or [Mr PC’s] fees and on that basis [he] instructed [Ms G] and later [Mr PC] on behalf of [Mr E]. To do so was merely to fulfil the rule that barristers need to be instructed by solicitors.

had a very brief telephone conversation with Mr PC immediately before [formally instructing] him that his fees will be between [Mr E] and him, I am just to fulfil the role only and not involved too much in the case.

It was clear that [he] had not much involvement in this case so [he does] not have much clearer information regarding the case and the arrangement for payment of Mr PC’s fees.

Apart from the rules, there was no legal relationship between [Mr PC] and [Mr IR]. [Mr IR] was instructing [Mr PC] to act for [Mr E]. If [Mr PC] has no cause of action to sue [Mr IR] for his fees at any formal Courts of New Zealand then he cannot ask the [Complaints Service] for order that [Mr IR] pay his fees.

[42] Mr IR also said that he believed that Mr PC was “using the complaint procedure for improper purpose”.

[43] In his letter to the Complaints Service dated 1 December 2017, Mr IR said: (a) he had little involvement in Mr E’s case;

involvement in this matter and all fees are between [Mr PC] and [Mr E]”; (d) none of Mr PC’s fees were ever paid by or through Mr IR; and

(b) There is no evidence to support Mr IR’s assertion that “it was expressly or impliedly agreed that [Mr IR] should not be personally liable to pay [Mr PC’s] fees”. Mr PC denies the phone call in which this comment was apparently made.

(d) Mr PC’s letter of engagement with Mr IR makes it clear that Mr IR remained liable for Mr PC’s fees. Mr IR acknowledged that he received this letter and did not question its terms.

[45] As well as providing written submissions through counsel, Mr PC also swore an affidavit responding to Mr IR’s assertion that there was a telephone call between the two men during which Mr IR said that he would not have any responsibility for Mr PC’s fees.

5. I state unequivocally and without any reservation or qualification that the telephone call to which Mr IR refers never took place. Indeed I never spoke with Mr IR at any time in 2016 and most certainly not around the time of the formal retainer of me.

[47] The parties provided further submissions to the Committee; each essentially maintaining the positions set out above.

[48] It was said by Mr IR that Mr E intended lodging a complaint against Mr PC in relation to the fairness and reasonableness of Mr PC’s legal fees.

Whether Mr IR, in his capacity as an instructing solicitor, failed to pay Mr PC’s fees in breach of rule 10.7 of the [Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008].

[A] primary purpose of rule 10.7 ... is to ensure certainty in the allocation of liability (e.g. whether the instructing solicitor is liable or rather whether their client is liable) to the barrister, prior to the engagement of the barrister. This is especially so given that a barrister sole cannot sue for their fees. In the light of barristers’ inability to sue for their fees, the high Court has said that an instructing solicitor’s obligation to pay a barrister is ‘one of honour not debt’.

[52] The Committee rejected Mr IR’s argument that agreement had been reached between him and Mr PC whereby Mr PC’s fees would be between him and Mr E alone. It noted that Mr PC’s terms of engagement with Mr IR “contained an express requirement that the instructing solicitor is and remains personally liable to Mr PC for any fees”.9

[53] The Committee further noted that even if there was an agreement between Mr IR and Mr PC, as contended for by Mr IR, Mr IR still had “a professional obligation... under rule 10.7.1 ... to use reasonable endeavours to recover Mr PC’s fees from Mr E if

Mr IR appeared to have misunderstood the rationale behind the rule and his professional obligations. The rule is necessary as a barrister sole is not entitled to sue for the recovery of fees whereas an instructing solicitor can.

[54] The Committee concluded that Mr IR had breached r 10.7 and determined that this amounted to unsatisfactory conduct pursuant to s 12(b) and (c) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act).11

[55] The Committee noted that Mr IR had said that Mr E intended to lodge a complaint about Mr PC’s fees, but said that there was “no record of any such complaint being received from Mr E” (although he had been sent a complaint form).12

(a) ordered Mr IR “to rectify his error and pay Mr PC the amount of $[amount], as recorded in Mr PC’s statement of 22 February 2017”;

within 10 working days of the expiration of the period for lodging a review with [this Office], or within 10 working days of the determination of any [review by this Office], if one is sought and the orders imposed are upheld.

[57] Mr IR filed his application for review on 27 April 2018. He said: (a) Mr E has now lodged a complaint about Mr PC’s fees;

(b) until that matter is finalised the final figure payable by Mr IR is not clear;

[59] In his letter to this Office dated 2 May 2018, Mr PC responded to Mr IR’s

[60] He noted that Mr IR “does not dispute the merits of [the Standards Committee’s determination]. Rather what he is really seeking is a stay of execution”. He further submitted that Mr IR has not sought to review the Committee’s finding of unsatisfactory conduct.

[61] Mr PC attached a copy of Mr E’s fees complaint. It is apparent from that complaint that Mr E had read the Committee’s determination, as he commented on aspects of it.

[62] I note that by way of outcome Mr E seeks “a major reduction in the size of [Mr PC’s fees]”; this on the basis that he had “paid twice for a lot of the work costs [that] have been claimed for”.

[63] The nature and scope of a review have been discussed by the High Court, which said of the process of review under the Act:14

... the power of review conferred upon Review Officers is not appropriately equated with a general appeal. The obligations and powers of the Review Officer as described in the Act create a very particular statutory process.

The Review Officer has broad powers to conduct his or her own investigations including the power to exercise for that purpose all the powers of a Standards Committee or an investigator and seek and receive evidence. These powers extend to “any review” ...

... the power of review is much broader than an appeal. It gives the Review Officer discretion as to the approach to be taken on any particular review as to the extent of the investigations necessary to conduct that review, and therefore clearly contemplates the Review Officer reaching his or her own view on the evidence before her. Nevertheless, as the Guidelines properly recognise, where the review is of the exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate for the Review Officer to exercise some particular caution before substituting his or her own judgm ent without good reason.

[64] More recently, the High Court has described a review by this Office in the following way:15

A review by the LCRO is neither a judicial review nor an appeal. Those seeking a review of a Committee determination are entitled to a review based on the LCRO’s own opinion rather than on deference to the view of the Committee. A

review by the LCRO is informal, inquisitorial and robust. It involves the LCRO coming to his or her own view of the fairness of the substance and process of a Committee’s determination.

[65] Given those directions, the approach on this review, based on my own view of the fairness of the substance and process of the Committee’s determination, has been to:

[66] As the Officer with responsibility for deciding this application for review, I appointed Mr Robert Hesketh as my statutory delegate to assist me in that task.16 As part of that delegation, on 9 and 23 July 2018, Mr Hesketh conducted hearings at which both Mr IR and Mr PC appeared.

[67] The process by which a Review Officer may delegate functions and powers to a duly appointed delegate was explained to the parties by Mr Hesketh. They indicated that they understood that process and took no issue with it.

[68] Mr Hesketh has reported to me about the hearings and we have conferred about the application for review, and my decision. There are no additional issues or questions in my mind that necessitate any further submissions from either party.

[69] I note at the outset that as part of his responses to Mr PC’s complaint, Mr IR provided the Committee with statements from Ms G and Mr E. These did not advance matters in any helpful way.

[70] Ms G provided at least two statements and these traversed matters that were irrelevant to Mr PC’s core complaint against Mr IR, which was that Mr IR was both contractually and professionally obliged to pay Mr PC’s legal fees.

[71] Mr PC took the step of instructing counsel to respond to some of the allegations that had been made by Mr IR and Ms G, given their nature.

[72] I observe that Mr IR’s manner of responding to Mr PC’s complaint was unnecessarily inflammatory and in many respects unhelpful, obscuring the issue to be determined.

[73] Before Mr Hesketh, Mr IR acknowledged his responsibility to meet Mr PC’s fees.

[74] Mr IR did not advance argument in this Office, as he had done before the Committee, that this arrangement had been varied during the retainer. He did not for example suggest, as he had done to the Committee, that he and Mr PC had spoken by telephone early in the retainer at which time Mr IR said that he would not be responsible for Mr PC’s legal fees.

[75] As indicated, this represented a change by Mr IR from the position he had taken before the Committee. Yet, no additional material has been presented by Mr PC which led to this turnabout. It would appear that by the time matters reached this Office Mr IR had taken the trouble to read Mr PC’s letter of engagement and reflect upon its effect.

[76] Mr PC’s legal fees for representing Mr E before the Employment Court (i.e. fees incurred in preparation for and attendance at the hearing including preparing legal submissions) were (inclusive of GST and disbursements) $[amount].17

[77] Of that amount, it is said by Mr PC that Mr E has paid $[amount]. This amount includes fees, GST and some disbursements. There is a balance owing to Mr PC of

23 July 2018, about whether this Office might amend the Committee’s order which directed Mr IR to pay Mr PC the sum of $[amount]

17 Mr PC’s statement of account to Mr IR (22 February 2017). An earlier invoice dated 13 April

2016 for $[amount] (plus GST and disbursements) involved attendances by Mr PC in reviewing the ERA determination, advising on an appeal and drafting pleadings for that appeal. This has been paid in full by Mr E. Mr PC did not include that invoice in his 22 February 2017 statement to Mr IR.

[79] The discussion centred on the amount of costs and disbursements that had been awarded to Mr E by the Employment Court, as representing a proportion of Mr PC’s legal fees and some related disbursements. Those amounts are respectively $[amount] and $[amount].

$[amount] and $[amount]. He said that he would arrange for those amounts to be transferred to Mr PC from S Ltd’s solicitors’ trust account.

[81] The difference between those amounts and the amount that the Committee ordered Mr IR pay, is $[amount] (including GST and disbursements).

[82] Mr IR acknowledged that if the Committee ultimately upheld all of Mr PC’s fees

[83] Mr IR also agreed that the Committee’s finding of unsatisfactory conduct should remain; this having been made on the basis that Mr IR had breached r 10.7 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 which obliged him to pay Mr PC’s outstanding legal fees.

[84] Mr PC also indicated that he was happy for that amendment to be made to the

[85] Such an amendment would mean that of the $[amount] that Mr PC has invoiced Mr E, he would have received $[amount] (already paid by Mr E) and $[amount]. (the Employment Court’s order); a total of $[amount].

[86] Mr PC said that if the Committee reduced his fees to below $[amount], he would refund to Mr IR the overpayment (reserving his position as to any application for review to this Office).

[87] It was said by Mr PC that Mr A had, in his costs submissions to the Employment Court, acknowledged on Mr E’s behalf that all of Mr PC’s fees for representing Mr E before that court (including preparation), were reasonable. Mr PC was in effect arguing that Mr E may be estopped from now challenging those fees.

[88] I note that in the Employment Court’s judgment on costs, the judge noted that

Mr A had submitted that “costs usually follow the event and should be calculated on the

basis that the successful party is to be awarded a reasonable contribution to costs actually and reasonably incurred” (emphasis added).18

[89] However, this argument, in effect, invites me to express a view about Mr PC’s

legal fees when that issue is currently before a Standards Committee for determination.

[90] Despite the discussion between the parties and Mr Hesketh at the hearing on

23 July 2018 about amendment to the Committee’s money order, I do not consider that such a step is appropriate. By endorsing that Mr PC should receive at least the amounts ordered by the Employment Court, it might be inferred that I have expressed a view about the fairness and reasonableness of Mr PC’s fees.

[91] The parties agreed that it was unlikely that the Committee would reduce Mr PC’s

[92] To make the amendment discussed at the hearing on 23 July 2018, I would, in effect, be saying that legal fees (including GST and disbursements) of a minimum of

[93] Given that Mr E’s complaint about Mr PC’s legal fees is currently before the Committee, it must be left to consider and rule upon that complaint without any view about the issue being expressed by this Office, even obliquely.

[94] Mr IR’s principal complaint about the Committee’s determination, is its order that he pay Mr PC $[amount]. He submits that Mr PC’s fees are currently the subject of a separate complaint and inquiry, and so that order should not remain.

[95] It is clear from both Mr IR’s written application for review and the submissions that he made before Mr Hesketh, that he accepts the Committee’s determination of unsatisfactory conduct on account of his breach of r 10.7.

[96] Nevertheless, it is appropriate for me, as part of my function as a Review Officer, to review the Committee’s reasoning and conclusions. I begin by setting out the relevant parts of r 10.7:

A lawyer who, acting in a professional capacity, instructs another lawyer, must pay the other lawyer’s account promptly and in full unless agreement to the contrary is reached, or the fee is promptly disputed through proper professional channels.

[97] First, it is accepted that Mr IR instructed Mr PC to act for Mr E in relation to

[98] Secondly, Mr IR has abandoned argument that he was not responsible to pay Mr PC’s legal fees because “agreement to the contrary [had been] reached”. Mr IR accepts that Mr PC’s letter of engagement to him dated 4 May 2016 explicitly states that he, Mr IR, remained responsible to meet Mr PC’s legal fees.

[99] The next question is whether Mr IR was absolved of the requirement to “promptly and in full” pay Mr PC’s legal fees because those fees had been “promptly disputed through proper professional channels”.

[100] The Committee did not explicitly address that aspect of r 10.7, which operates as an exemption to the general rule that a solicitor must pay the legal fees of counsel instructed.

[101] However, the Committee clearly turned its mind to that issue because it noted:19

[T]here is no record of any ... complaint being received from [Mr E] although it

complaint about that was made on 5 April 2017. The Committee’s determination is dated

19 March 2018. Complaint about Mr PC’s fees was not made by Mr E until 23 March

[103] Rule 10.7 refers to a fee being “promptly disputed through proper professional channels”. One such channel is clearly the New Zealand Law Society Complaints Service. On any view of it, Mr E did not “promptly dispute” Mr PC’s fees. Complaint was made by him almost exactly 13 months after Mr PC rendered his final invoice and provided his statement of account.

[104] During Mr PC’s retainer with Mr E, Mr PC rendered four invoices. As indicated above, three of those relate to preparation for and appearances at the Employment Court appeal.20

[105] The correspondence between Mr PC, Ms G and Mr IR about legal fees from the latter part of 2016 and up to the time that Mr PC made his complaint on 5 April 2017, was one-sided. It involved Mr PC raising concern about late and non-payment of his

20 Those invoices were dated 9 August 2016, 31 October 2016 and 22 February 2017.

invoices.21 Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E did not raise concern about the fairness and reasonableness of Mr PC’s fees during this time.

[106] Comment by Mr E about the level of Mr PC’s legal fees was not made until after Mr PC had made his complaint about Mr IR. That took the form of a statement from Mr E (as well as from Ms G) supporting Mr IR’s response to that complaint, which was that he was not obliged to pay Mr PC’s legal fees.

[107] In his response to Mr PC’s complaint, dated 26 May 2017, Mr IR did foreshadow that Mr E would be making a complaint about Mr PC’s fees.

[108] I do not regard this as amounting to “[a prompt dispute] through proper professional channels”.

[109] There is no doubt that the Committee’s decision is correct. Mr IR was obliged to promptly and in full pay Mr PC’s account. No agreement had been reached otherwise as between Mr IR and Mr PC; indeed, Mr PC’s letter of engagement with Mr IR confirmed the r 10.7 obligation. There was no “prompt dispute” of Mr PC’s fees through “proper professional channels”. As indicated, that did not occur until 13 months after Mr PC sent Mr IR his final invoice and statement of account and after the Committee had delivered its determination.

[110] It is abundantly clear that Mr IR was clearly in breach of his obligations under r 10.7.

[111] Ordinarily, I would simply leave matters there and confirm the whole of the

[112] However, matters are complicated by the fact that there is now before the same

Committee Mr E’s fees complaint and it has yet to complete its inquiry into that complaint.

[113] I have already indicated that I do not consider it appropriate for me to modify the amount of Committee’s money order, even if that is by consent. As I have endeavoured to explain, this could, by implication, be seen as an endorsement of Mr PC’s fees (including GST and disbursements) at a minimum of $[amount].

21 For example: Mr PC’s email to Ms G and Mr E on 25 October 2016; Mr PC's email to Ms G and Mr E on 27 October 2016; Mr PC’s email to Mr IR on 27 October 2016; Mr PC's email to Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E on 2 November 2016; Mr PC's email to Ms G on 2 November 2016; Mr PC's email to Ms G and Mr E on 7 November 2016; Mr PC's email to Ms G on 21 November 2016; Mr PC's email to Ms G and Mr E on 23 November 2016; Mr PC is email to Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E on 1

December 2016; Mr PC’s email to Mr IR, Ms G and Mr E on 2 December 2016; Mr PC’s email to Ms G on 19 December 2016; Mr PC's email to Ms G on 15 January 2017; Mr PC’s email to Ms G and Mr E on 18 January 2017; Mr PC's email to Mr E on 25 January 2017; Mr PC’s email to Mr IR on 7 February 2017.

[114] In the circumstances, it seems to me that the only practical approach is to reverse the Committee’s money order. The same Standards Committee is inquiring into Mr E’s fees complaint and it will eventually determine whether Mr PC’s fees were fair and reasonable, and whether there is a balance still owing to him by Mr IR.

[115] For the avoidance of doubt, the Committee’s determination of unsatisfactory conduct remains, this having been based on its rejection of Mr IR’s argument that he was not obliged to pay Mr PC’s fee because the two of them had reached an “agreement to the contrary” and that there had been no “prompt dispute” about those fees “through proper professional channels”.

[117] I refer again to Mr IR’s willingness to arrange payment to Mr PC of the funds currently in S Ltd’s solicitors’ trust account, being the costs and disbursements awarded in Mr E’s favour by the Employment Court.

[118] As indicated above, Mr IR acknowledged that it was unlikely that the Committee would reduce Mr PC’s fees below $[amount] (if it reduces them at all), being the amount Mr E has already paid ($[amount]) and the funds in S Ltd’s solicitors’ trust account.

[119] Given the procedural difficulties that I have identified for this Office to modify the Committee’s money order, I leave it to Mr IR to consider whether it would be appropriate for him to arrange for that payment to be made to Mr PC in the meantime.

[120] Finally, I note that Mr PC’s fees have now been outstanding for close to 18 months. Delay in their payment initially arose because of Mr IR’s response to Mr PC’s complaint, which was to deny liability on grounds that had no substance; and now the fees complaint by Mr E delays matters further.

[121] I would hope that in those circumstances the Committee proceeds promptly with

its inquiry into Mr E’s complaint and brings the matter to a conclusion for all concerned.

(a) The Committee’s determination that Mr IR breached rule 10.7 of the rules and that this was unsatisfactory conduct by him, is confirmed

[123] Mr IR has been largely unsuccessful with his application for review. It is appropriate to order him to pay costs. Pursuant to s 210 of the Act, he is ordered to pay the sum of $1,200 by way of costs, to the New Zealand Law Society. That sum must be paid by him by within 30 days of the date of this decision.

[124] Pursuant to s 215 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 I confirm that the order for costs made by me may be enforced in the civil jurisdiction of the District Court.

In accordance with s 213 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 copies of this decision are to be provided to:

New Zealand Legal Complaints Review Officer

IG v PC [2018] NZLCRO 68 (1 August 2018)