GN v IG [2018] NZLCRO 8 (22 February 2018)

	Home \| Databases \| WorldLII \| Search \| Feedback New Zealand Legal Complaints Review Officer

	LCRO 113/2017
CONCERNING	an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
AND
CONCERNING	a determination of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]
BETWEEN	GN Applicant
AND	IG _Respondent

[1] Mr GN has applied for a review of a decision by the Auckland Standards Committee X (the Committee) in which a finding of unsatisfactory conduct was made against him, together with the imposition of a censure, a fine of $10,000 and costs of

[3] In the early 1990s Mr GN prepared a will and set up a family trust (the trust)

[4] Mr IG lived in [Country Z] with his second wife, Mrs IG. Mr IG had a son from his previous marriage, from whom he was estranged.

[6] When it was set up, the trust’s only asset was a sum of money from the proceeds of the sale of a house that Mr IG had inherited from his late mother’s estate (trust funds).

[7] In instructing Mr GN to set up the trust, Mr IG said that he did not want either his son or Mrs IG’s family to eventually receive the trust funds.

[8] He instructed Mr GN that the final beneficiary of the trust funds was to be FNZ. Mr IG and Mr D had had a similar discussion some years earlier.

[9] Mr GN advised Mr IG that rather than identifying a specific final beneficiary, he should consider a provision giving the trustees the discretion to nominate any charities of their choice as the final beneficiary.

[10] Mr IG accepted this advice, whilst still indicating a wish for FNZ to be the final beneficiary.

[11] Mr GN drafted a trust deed which he sent to Mr IG in [Country Z] for him to consider. In drafting the deed, Mr GN used and adapted a trust deed that he had drafted for other (unrelated) clients.

[12] The draft trust deed that Mr GN sent to Mr IG contained some errors. These included a reference to children and grandchildren, and the name of another family altogether. Apart from Mr IG’s son from his previous marriage, Mr and Mrs IG did not have children from their marriage and at the time that the trust was set up Mrs IG was aged approximately 60 years.

[13] Two counterparts of the final trust deed were executed by Mr IG during 1992. The errors that had been present in the draft trust deed had been corrected by this time.

[14] Mr GN retained one of the executed counterparts and the second was forwarded to the IRD so that a tax number could be generated for the trust.

[15] Mr GN was one of two trustees of the trust. The other trustee was Mr D. [16] The trust deed provided for Mr and Mrs IG to be discretionary beneficiaries.

[17] Mr GN also acted for the trust. The legal services provided included investing the trust funds through his nominee company. Mr GN also made quarterly distributions of interest earned by the trust’s investments into Mr IG’s bank account in [Country Z].

[19] Under the terms of Mr IG’s will, his sole beneficiary was Mrs IG. Mr GN was the sole executor and trustee.

[20] Mr GN administered Mr IG’s estate. After the sale of some assets, the estate realised approximately $80,000 (estate funds).

[22] At Mr GN’s suggestion, Mrs IG sought advice from a lawyer in [Country Z] as to how she should deal with the estate funds that she had inherited. After discussion between that lawyer and Mr GN, it was agreed that the estate funds would be amalgamated with the trust funds and invested by Mr GN through his nominee company.

[23] In a letter sent directly to Mrs IG on 5 November 2002, he informed her that

[24] Amongst Mr IG’s papers in [Country Z], Mrs IG located a copy of the draft trust deed that Mr GN had prepared for Mr IG to consider in 1992, which contained the errors. She forwarded that document to Mr GN.

[25] Mr GN continued to act for and administer the trust after Mr IG’s death by investing the capital and making quarterly distributions of interest earned into Mrs IG’s bank account in [Country Z].

[26] From time to time Mr GN also made capital distributions from the trust to Mrs IG. Most of the capital distributions that Mr GN made to Mrs IG were debited against the estate funds.

[27] In order to distinguish between the estate funds and the trust funds, Mr GN maintained a separate trust account ledger in Mrs IG’s name in which he recorded capital distributions from the estate funds.

[28] In approximately 2013, Mr GN made capital distributions to Mrs IG, at her request, to cover the cost of cataract surgery that she required. Those advances were made using the trust funds. At that stage, there was still a small balance in the separately recorded estate funds.

[29] In June 2014, Mrs IG instructed her lawyers in [Country Z] to write to Mr GN and require the capital in the trust, comprising the trust funds and the estate funds, to be vested in her as the sole beneficiary under the trust.

[30] Mr GN responded by saying that the original trust deed had been lost, and that in any event Mrs IG was a discretionary and not a final beneficiary of the trust.

[31] At about this time Mr GN discovered that his counterpart of the executed trust deed was missing. He contacted the IRD to obtain a copy of the counterpart they held, but they could not locate that document.

[32] Mr GN next informed Mrs IG’s lawyers that he and Mr D had conferred as trustees and their position was that the capital was to be distributed amongst various charities.

[33] Mr GN then sought Counsel’s opinion as to distribution of the capital in the trust. That opinion discussed distributing the whole of the capital to FNZ. This was based upon Mr IG’s instructions to Mr GN in 1992 and his earlier discussion with Mr D.

[34] Mr GN forwarded the opinion to Mrs IG’s lawyers in [Country Z] with an indication that the capital would be distributed to FNZ. Through her lawyers in [Country Z] Mrs IG objected to this.

[36] The trustees issued proceedings in which they sought confirmation of their intention to pay the trust capital to FNZ as the final beneficiary. Mrs IG opposed that, arguing that she was the final beneficiary (the trust proceedings).1

[39] Mr GN gave evidence in the trust proceedings, as did Mr D. As trustees their position was that Mr IG’s instructions to Mr GN were that the final beneficiary was to be FNZ.

[40] Mrs IG’s position was that there was insufficient evidence to support the trustees’ position, that she was the final beneficiary, or that the trust was void for uncertainty.

[41] The parties and the court were hampered by the fact that there was no original trust deed.

[42] At the conclusion of the hearing on [date], the Judge indicated that he would reserve his decision.

[43] After the hearing had concluded but before the judge delivered his decision, during June and July 2016 Mr GN renewed existing investments of the trust capital. He did so by two separately dated loan agreements made through his nominee company, for terms of 12 or more months. The last term expiry date was during September 2017.

[45] The Court found that the trust had failed. One of the reasons for this conclusion was that there was no certainty as to the identity of the beneficiaries under the trust.

[46] The trustees were ordered to transfer the funds to Mr IG’s estate and then to

[47] After the Court’s decision had been delivered, Mrs IG’s [Country Z] lawyers wrote to Mr GN and asked for the funds to be paid to her in accordance with the judgment.

[48] Mr GN advised the lawyers that he had invested the funds on terms which did not mature until during 2017.

[50] There were two parts to Mrs IG’s complaint. The first was that Mr GN was conflicted by acting for lender and borrower when he invested the trust’s capital through his nominee company during June and July 2016.

[51] In respect of this issue of complaint, the Committee determined to take no further action. Mrs IG has not sought a review of that aspect of the Committee’s determination and so it is unnecessary for me to deal with either that part of her complaint or the Committee’s decision about it.

[52] The second part of Mrs IG’s complaint and in respect of which the Committee made its finding of unsatisfactory conduct, was that Mr GN had invested the trust’s capital, knowing that the issue of the validity of the trust had been before the Court and in circumstances where that capital was tied up for 12 months or more. By so doing, Mr GN failed to comply with the Court’s direction to the trustees to transfer the funds to Mr IG’s estate and thereafter pay them to Mrs IG in her capacity as the sole beneficiary of that estate.

[T]hree of the transactions ... were made when the Court had reserved its decision. That is relevant because [Mrs IG] asserting that the funds should vest in her. At a time when that issue was not resolved you appear to have entered into loan arrangements whereby the funds belonging to [Mrs IG], could not be repayable until 7 June 2017 or 7 September 2017. Accordingly,

[54] In an email to the Complaints Service, dated 2 February 2017, Mr GN offered the following brief response to the complaint:

At all times prior to the decision of the High Court I was acting in the interest of [the trust] and any investments made until that date were in the interests of the beneficiaries.

[55] In a further letter to the Complaints Service dated 28 February 2017, Mr GN

(a) he and Mr D had duties to the trust to maximise the return on its investments;

(b) had he not done so, Mrs IG would undoubtedly have complained that he had failed in his duties as a trustee;

(c) he had no indication as to when the High Court would deliver its decision and so he proceeded to act as a prudent trustee to maximise the trust’s return;

(e) his conduct, rather than being unbecoming or unprofessional, was prudent and responsible.

[56] The Committee delivered its decision on 5 May 2017. [57] It identified the issue for consideration as being:2

(a) In arranging loans after the High Court hearing and before the reserved judgment was issued, with term expiry dates of at least one year later, did Mr GN make unavailable funds that should have been available to pay to Mrs IG should the High Court judgment be in her favour?

(b) What impact, if any, did Mr GN’s duties to the trust and its beneficiaries

(c) If Mr GN did make the funds unavailable in that manner, did he act in a way that undermined court processes? (r 13.2 of the [Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008]

(d) And/or, was Mr GN’s conduct such that would be regarded by lawyers of good standing as being unacceptable (s 12(b) of the [Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006] because, for example:

[13] It was the timing of those loans in the very particular circumstances of the case that was problematic. The issue before the Court was effectively: were the funds actually ‘trust’ funds or in fact estate funds? Mr GN was well aware that, if the outcome was in Mrs IG’s favour, the funds should be paid to her. Yet while awaiting the outcome, he loaned the funds, making them unavailable.

[59] The Committee rejected Mr GN’s submission that he was acting as a prudent trustee in the best interests of the beneficiaries, by maximising the trust’s return on its investments and that there was no indication as to when the Court would release its decision.3

[15] ... Mr GN, as a lawyer, is an officer of the court and owes duties to the court. In contrast, as to his duties as a trustee, whether he even was a trustee was a live issue before the court. The risk for Mr GN was that he would be found not to have the right to deal with the funds as proposed. ... The Committee considered Mr GN’s duty as trustee in these circumstances would be limited, for example to investing the funds on call at the best interest rate achievable.

[16] The Committee considered that Mr GN had hindered or undermined the processes of the court by his actions. ... The intended effect of the judgment was that Mr GN pay the funds to Mrs IG. Yet, Mr GN made that impossible for some time.

[17] ... The Committee concluded that, in so making the funds unavailable, Mr GN had acted in a way that undermined the processes of the court, in breach of r 13.2 of the RCCC. The Committee also concluded that lawyers of good standing would regard the steps taken by Mr GN to have been unacceptable (s 12(b) of the Act).

[61] The Committee found that Mr GN was acting in dual roles as trustee and lawyer for the trust, such that he was providing regulated services — or, at the very least, his conduct was connected with the provision of regulated services.4

[62] A finding of unsatisfactory conduct was made in terms of ss 12(b) and (c) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act). 5

[63] In relation to penalty, the Committee concluded that “interfering with Court processes was conduct at the higher end of the scale of unsatisfactory conduct”.6

[65] Mr GN filed his application for review on 14 June 2017. He submits: (a) The Committee’s decision imposes an extreme burden upon a

professional trustee in that, had the funds not been invested on behalf of the trust, there would have been complaints from Mrs IG that Mr GN has failed in his duty as a trustee to maximise the returns to the trust, but also that he had been negligent as a lawyer to the trust.

(ii) by investing the funds, Mrs IG has made a profit that she would not otherwise have received.

[66] In opposing the application for review, on behalf of Mrs IG her lawyers dispute Mr GN’s assertion that she was “financially sound”. They also submit that there is no evidence to support the claim by Mr GN that his investment of the funds made her better off than she would otherwise have been.

[67] The nature and scope of a review have been discussed by the High Court, which said of the process of review under the Act:8

... the power of review conferred upon Review Officers is not appropriately equated with a general appeal. The obligations and powers of the Review Officer as described in the Act create a very particular statutory process.

The Review Officer has broad powers to conduct his or her own investigations including the power to exercise for that purpose all the powers of a Standards Committee or an investigator and seek and receive evidence. These powers extend to “any review” ...

... the power of review is much broader than an appeal. It gives the Review Officer discretion as to the approach to be taken on any particular review as to the extent of the investigations necessary to conduct that review, and therefore clearly contemplates the Review Officer reaching his or her own view on the evidence before her. Nevertheless, as the Guidelines properly recognise, where the review is of the exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate for the Review Officer to exercise some particular caution before substituting his or her own judgment without good reason.

[68] More recently, the High Court has described a review by this Office in the following way:9

A review by the LCRO is neither a judicial review nor an appeal. Those seeking a review of a Committee determination are entitled to a review based on the LCRO’s own opinion rather than on deference to the view of the Committee. A review by the LCRO is informal, inquisitorial and robust. It involves the LCRO coming to his or her own view of the fairness of the substance and process of a Committee’s determination.

[69] Given those directions, the approach on this review, based on my own view of the fairness of the substance and process of the Committee’s determination, has been to:

[70] As the Legal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO) with responsibility for deciding this application for review, I appointed Mr Robert Hesketh as my statutory delegate to assist me in that task.10 As part of that delegation, on 12 October 2017 at Auckland, Mr Hesketh conducted a hearing at which Mr GN appeared on person.

[71] Through her lawyers in [Country Z], Mrs IG had indicated that she did not wish to participate in the hearing.

[72] The process by which a LCRO may delegate functions and powers to a duly appointed delegate was explained to Mr GN by Mr Hesketh. He indicated that he understood that process and took no issue with it.

[73] Mr Hesketh has reported to me about that hearing and we have conferred about the complaint, the application for review and my decision. There are no additional issues or questions in my mind that necessitate any further submissions from either party.

[74] At the hearing before Mr Hesketh, Mr GN outlined the circumstances of the two investments that he made after the hearing of the trust proceedings had concluded on [date].

[75] The first investment had been due to expire on 7 June 2016. Ordinarily he would have expected that investment to simply roll-over for a further similar period on similar terms; this had been the trustees’ approach with previous investments going back many years.

[76] With that in mind, on 24 May 2016 Mr GN obtained a signed authority from Mr

[78] Mr GN submitted that he had no intention of depriving Mrs IG of any of the funds to which she ultimately became entitled. However, he acknowledged that he could have asked Mrs IG, through her lawyers in [Country Z], about the reinvestments before he proceeded with them.

[79] Despite that acknowledgement, Mr GN said that with both reinvestments he turned his mind to what would happen if the High Court found against the trustees in the trust proceedings. His conclusion was that he would be able to replace the funds with other investor funds, and thereby free up the trust’s capital so that it could be paid to Mrs IG.

[80] However, after he completed the reinvestments, Mr GN said that there was a regulatory change in relation to the administration of solicitor nominee companies. He said that the change prevented the ability to replace investor funds as he had anticipated he might be able to do, until after 23 September 2016.

[81] In addition, the regulatory change meant that lawyers who operated nominee companies were unable to lend until their systems were deemed compliant by the Financial Markets Authority. In Mr GN’s case, compliance wasn’t achieved until November 2016.

[82] Mr GN wrote to Mrs IG’s [Country Z] lawyers in November 2016, pointing this out to them.

[83] Mr GN submitted that Mrs IG was not disadvantaged by the reinvestments he had made. He also pointed out that ultimately Mrs IG received very little of the trust capital as a significant portion went towards her legal fees.

[84] Mr GN submitted that he was not aware that he was doing anything wrong when he made the reinvestments. He acknowledged that he did not seek advice about what he ought to do in the particular circumstances he faced, which were that he was awaiting a decision from the High Court as to the final destination of the trust capital. He considered that the status quo existed until such time as a judgement of the court altered that.

[85] Putting to one side for the moment the validity of the trust, as a lawyer acting for and a trustee administering a trust Mr GN’s actions overall were appropriate and professional. As a trustee, he had a duty to ensure that the trust funds were wisely invested and that there was a return on that investment.

[87] However, these were unusual circumstances. The very existence of the trust, let alone the identity of its final beneficiary, had been contested since 2014, resulting in the two-day hearing in the High Court during May 2016. Mrs IG’s argument was a combination of asserting that she was the final beneficiary of the trust, or that it did not exist at all in which case she became entitled to the funds through Mr IG’s estate. Either argument if successful would have seen the trust capital vest in her.

[88] When the judge indicated at the conclusion of the hearing that he would be reserving his decision, no particular indication was given as to when that might be delivered. Apart from judicial best practice as to the delivery of reserved decisions as a guide, there is really no way of predicting when a judge will release their decision.

[89] The first of the two investments was due for renewal approximately two weeks after the conclusion of the hearing; the second of the two investments some five to six weeks after that.

[90] At the time that each investment was due for renewal, Mr GN faced a dilemma.

[91] On the one hand, he had a duty to his client, the trust, to act in its best interests and he also had a duty as a trustee in that trust. Unless and until the High

Court said otherwise, Mr GN was obliged to proceed on the basis that Mr IG’s trust was

[92] On the other hand, the High Court had been asked to determine whether or not Mr IG’s trust existed at all, and if so what terms were including the identity of the final beneficiary. As with any reserved decision, it is not possible to predict with any degree of accuracy how a judge will rule. Mr GN acknowledges as much because he reckoned at the time that he carried out the reinvestments that if the court ruled against him he might be able to replace the contributors in the reinvested funds.

[93] The second of those two matters, the Court’s examination of the validity of the trust, gave rise to a further duty owed by Mr GN and thereby honed the dilemma.

[94] The Committee identified that as Mr GN’s duty as an officer of the court, in particular his duty under r 13.2 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 (the Rules).

[95] The heading to rule 13.2 reads “Protection of court processes”, and the rule itself states that “[a] lawyer must not act in a way that undermines the processes of the court or the dignity of the judiciary”.

[96] It is not suggested that by reinvesting the funds between the end of the hearing and the delivery of judgement, Mr GN has undermined the dignity of the judiciary.

[97] However, as Mr GN recognised when he completed the two reinvestments, the court could well rule against him even to the extent of declaring Mrs IG to be the owner of the trust capital. Indeed, that is exactly what happened.

[98] Such a ruling could give rise to only one outcome: a transfer of the capital to

[99] Mr GN had been treating Mrs IG as a discretionary beneficiary and had made some payments of capital to her including from the non-estate funds, as well as quarterly payments of income. To that extent Mr GN owed her duties as a trustee and, up until the hearing in [date], it is reasonable to suggest he discharged them appropriately. Her lawyers referred to fiduciary duties that he owed her pending judgment, but that issue has not been advanced further.

[100] At the very least, Mr GN could simply have invested the maturing investments on-call pending delivery of the Court’s judgment. Neither the trust nor Mrs IG could

have taken reasonable objection to that course. The funds would have remained secure and earning interest.

[101] Although a comment made with the benefit of hindsight, it is apparent that Mr GN recognises the dilemma I have referred to. At the hearing before Mr Hesketh he acknowledged that although he had no intention of depriving Mrs IG of money that might rightfully be hers, he should perhaps have asked her before completing the two reinvestments.

[102] Although speculative, it is reasonable to conclude that had he done so, Mrs IG, through her lawyers, would have objected to the funds being reinvested for periods of 12 months or more from mid-2016. The fact that she complained about Mr GN’s conduct in doing so, supports this conclusion. Mrs IG was aged almost 90 years and did not enjoy good health. It is reasonable to suppose that she would have wanted access to the funds sooner rather than later; again, her complaint bears this out.

[103] Had that consultation taken place, then Mr GN’s dilemma would have become acute. In those circumstances, the proper course would have been to seek directions from the court about management of the trust capital pending judgment.

[104] However, in my view, the real issue for Mr GN in the period of time between hearing and judgment, was his duty to the court and its processes given that the parties had entrusted the court with the task of — in effect — determining the ownership of the trust capital.

[105] I agree with the Committee’s conclusion that by reinvesting the two sets of funds as he did, Mr GN has undermined the very process that he entrusted to the court. It must be remembered that it was Mr GN and Mr D who brought the matter to the attention of the court by seeking directions.

[106] To the obligations owed by a lawyer under r 13.2, can be added those set out in r 2. That rule relevantly reads: “A lawyer is obliged to ... facilitate the administration of justice”.

[107] The administration of justice is not confined to events in the lead up to or during a hearing before a court or tribunal. Proceedings in any jurisdiction do not come to an end until judgement has been delivered. Pending delivery of a decision, the process of justice continues. For a lawyer involved in proceedings, this means avoiding and if possible preventing material changes in circumstances which have the effect of frustrating the implementation of a judgement.

[108] In my view, the facilitation of administration of justice in the context of this case involved a recognition by Mr GN that the court might rule against him and therefore ensuring that he took no steps which might have the effect of defeating that.

[109] This also has the effect of protecting court processes, as the heading to r 13.2 provides.

[110] The administration of justice thus meant the ability to ensure the seamless transfer of the ownership of the capital to Mrs IG.

[111] In my view by reinvesting the funds for terms of 12 months or more from mid-

2016, Mr GN’s actions thwarted, rather than facilitated, the administration of justice. As the Committee noted, in reinvesting the funds “Mr GN made unavailable funds that should have been kept available to pay to Mrs IG should the judgement be in her favour”.11

[113] The Committee also concluded that lawyers of good standing would regard Mr

[114] I agree with that conclusion also. In my view, it would be apparent to any lawyer in these circumstances that one of the outcomes of the litigation could be that ownership of the capital would become Mrs IG’s. In those circumstances, the dilemma I have referred to should also be obvious and, at the very least, lawyers of good standing would consult with Mrs IG, through her lawyers, before taking steps the effect of which would be to deprive her of the fruits of the litigation.

[115] I do not attach any weight to Mr GN’s submission that his actions in reinvesting the funds did not disadvantage Mrs IG, as once the court held that the funds belonged to her she had the benefit of the interest they were earning. Indeed, he submitted that Mrs IG was better off than she might have been, as a result of the reinvestments.

[116] The fact that the funds might have been secure and earning interest at a favourable rate is irrelevant to the question of Mr GN’s duties between the completion of the hearing and the delivery of judgement. Those duties were to his client (the trust) and to the court. As r 2.1 provides, the overriding duty of a lawyer is as an officer of

[118] The Committee said that “interfering with court processes was conduct at the

higher end of the scale of unsatisfactory conduct, warranting censure and a fine of

[119] I agree that a fine of $10,000 represents a substantial penalty. It is a clear mark of the Committee’s denunciation of Mr GN’s conduct. It was undoubtedly also intended to act as a deterrent to others, because the Committee called for submissions as to publication of its determination including the possibility of Mr GN’s name.

[120] I do not doubt that Mr GN considered that his duty to his client, the trust, was a matter of some significance. As r 6 provides, “a lawyer must, within the bounds of the law and [the] rules, protect and promote the interests of [their] client to the exclusion of the interests of third parties”.

[121] However, Mr GN also recognised the possibility that the court might rule against him and he turned his mind to what steps he might take in that event. He now accepts that he ought to have consulted with Mrs IG.

[122] The above suggests that Mr GN was and is now more acutely aware of what I earlier described as his dilemma. In my view, it was not a difficult dilemma to recognise in the circumstances. Consulting the rules would readily have revealed rr 2,

2.1 and 13.2, and at the very least this should have put Mr GN on notice and prompted him to consult with Mrs IG, or even take advice.

[123] Given the Committee’s finding, with which I agree, that lawyers of good standing would have regarded Mr GN’s conduct as unacceptable, it is likely that any advice received would have been to not reinvest the funds without the explicit approval of Mrs IG.

[124] I regard Mr GN’s conduct as being careless rather than deliberate. I accept that Mr GN did not deliberately set out to frustrate the administration of justice, ignore his duties to the court or undermine its processes.

[125] The maximum fine that a Standard’s Committee may impose, is $15,000. The maximum penalty is usually reserved for the worst possible case of unsatisfactory conduct.

[126] This Office is reluctant to interfere with the level of fine that has been imposed by a Committee. Committees are made up of practising lawyers with first-hand knowledge of the nature of legal practice and the issues that frequently arise. Their determinations are a form of peer review of their colleagues.

[128] As such, a Committee is well placed to assess the seriousness of a lawyer’s

[129] That being said, I do not consider that Mr GN’s conduct was at the higher end of unsatisfactory. In my view, a fine of $7000 appropriately reflects the seriousness of his conduct.

[130] I agree with the Committee’s imposition of a censure. In LCRO 248/2012 this

A censure would amount to an indication from the profession that regardless of the circumstances, a lawyer must adhere to the standards of conduct required of him or her and is to be taken seriously. It is not a nominal penalty to be imposed. As noted by the High Court in B v Auckland Standards Committee No 1, “a rebuke of a professional person will inevitably be taken seriously.”

[131] For the reasons, I have given in this decision, in my view Mr GN’s conduct

[133] Mr GN’s application for review has been unsuccessful. It is appropriate to

_{order him to pay costs. Pursuant to s 210 of the Act, he is ordered to
pay the sum of}

13 LCRO 248/2012 (3 September 2014), citing B v Auckland Standards Committee No 1 of the

$1,200 by way of costs, to the New Zealand Law Society. That sum must be paid by him by within 30 days of the date of this decision.

[134] Pursuant to s 215 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 I confirm that the order for costs made by me may be enforced in the civil jurisdiction of the District Court.

[135] Pursuant to s 211(1)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 the decision of the Standards Committee is:

(b) Reversed as to the imposition of a fine of $10,000 and in lieu Mr GN is ordered to pay a fine of $7000.

In accordance with s 213 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 copies of this decision are to be provided to:

New Zealand Legal Complaints Review Officer

GN v IG [2018] NZLCRO 8 (22 February 2018)