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LH v SR [2019] NZLCRO 27 (19 March 2019)

Last Updated: 30 March 2019


LCRO 195/2017

CONCERNING
an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
AND

CONCERNING
a determination of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]

BETWEEN
LH

Applicant

AND
SR and HP

Respondents

DECISION

The names and identifying details of the parties in this decision have been changed.

Introduction


[1] Ms LH has applied for a review of a decision by the [Area] Standards Committee [X] (the Committee) which, following inquiry into a complaint made by Mr SR and Ms HP, entered two findings of unsatisfactory conduct against Ms LH, and imposed a raft of orders consequential upon the conduct findings.

Background


[2] In July 2016 Mr SR and Ms HP approached Ms LH, and sought assistance with the preparation of new wills, and an agreement under section 21 A of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (the agreement).

[3] Ms LH could not act for both parties on matters relating to the agreement. One of them had to be separately advised.

[4] Ms LH acted for Mr SR. Ms HP instructed her own counsel.
[5] The agreement was duly finalised and certified by the lawyers instructed.

[6] Mr SR executed the will that had been prepared by Ms LH. Whilst this was being attended to, Mr SR expressed dissatisfaction to Ms LH about the service he had received. He says that during this meeting, he advised Ms LH that Ms HP was withdrawing her instructions to draft a will.

[7] In July 2016, Mr SR filed a complaint with the New Zealand Law Society Complaints Service (LSCS), and a decision in respect to that complaint was delivered in December 2016, following which Mr SR paid Ms LH’s fees, together with interest owing to the date of payment.

[8] On 28 February 2017 and 11 March 2017, Mr SR wrote to Ms LH, making request of her to provide him with the original of his relationship property agreement and will.

[9] Ms LH did not respond to those requests.

[10] On 30 March 2017, Ms LH forwarded an email to Ms HP, enclosing an invoice dated 8 March 2017, for work said to have been completed by Ms LH in preparing Ms HP’s will.

The complaint and the Standards Committee decision


[11] Mr SR and Ms HP lodged a complaint with the LSCS on 20 March 2017. The substance of their complaint was that Ms LH had:

[12] Mr SR and Ms HP explained that:
[13] Ms LH, having sought and obtained an extension of time for filing of her response, replied to the complaint on 15 May 2017.

[14] She submitted that:
[15] In correspondence to the LSCS of 21 May 2017, Mr SR provided response to Ms LH.

[16] He submitted that:

[17] The Committee, in a notice of hearing provided to the parties on 30 May 2017, clarified the issues that would be considered by the Committee, and invited the parties to provide submissions by 21 April 2017.

[18] On 15 June 2017, Ms LH sought an extension of time for filing further submissions. That application was declined.

[19] Mr SR elected to file further submissions. Those submissions in essence, traversed matters he had raised earlier, with some amplification of the points that had been previously raised.
[20] The Committee distilled the issues to be addressed as follows:

7.2 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 (the RCCC) and/or any other rule or enactment?


(b) Did Ms LH fail to act on instructions in a timely manner to prepare a will and, despite being advised that the will was no longer needed, had Ms LH rendered an invoice for work that had not been completed, if so, had Ms LH breached her professional obligations under r 3 of the RCCC and/or any other rule or enactment?

(c) Had Ms LH overcharged Ms HP and, if so, had Ms LH breached her professional obligations under r 9 of the RCCC and/or any other rule or enactment?

[21] The Standards Committee delivered its decision on 4 September 2017.

[22] The Committee determined that pursuant to:

[23] Whilst the Committee framed its inquiry in terms of the three issues identified above, and its decision recorded it had entered two findings of unsatisfactory conduct, in the course of its decision it notes four conduct issues which it considered merited findings of unsatisfactory conduct, those being a:
[24] I assume that in making just two findings of unsatisfactory conduct, the Committee was recognising the degree of overlap in some areas of the conduct examined.

[25] In reaching its decision the Committee concluded that:

[26] Consequential on its unsatisfactory conduct findings, the Committee made orders that Ms LH:

Application for review


[27] Ms LH filed an application for review on 4 September 2017.

[28] Her application sought to review the two matters which had resulted in the findings of unsatisfactory conduct.

[29] Ms LH submits that:

[30] By way of outcome, Ms LH sought:

[31] In a detailed response to what had been a comprehensive exposition of her position by Ms LH, Mr SR submitted that:

Review on the papers


[32] The parties were invited to advise as to whether they consented to the review being conducted on the papers and requested to confirm their positions by 5 pm 23 February 2018. They were informed that if the Office received no response, that lack of response would be taken as indicative of their consent to the matter proceeding on the papers.

[33] Further correspondence was forwarded on 2 March 2018, confirming that the review would proceed as an on the papers hearing. The parties were invited to contact a case manager if they had any queries.

[34] This review has then been undertaken on the papers pursuant to s 206(2) of the Act, which allows a Legal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO) to conduct the review on the basis of all information available if the LCRO considers that the review can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties.

[35] I record that having carefully read the complaint, the response to the complaint, the Committee’s decision and the submissions filed in support of and in opposition to the application for review, there are no additional issues or questions in my mind that necessitate any further submission from either party. On the basis of the information available I have concluded that the review can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties.

Nature and scope of review


[36] The nature and scope of a review have been discussed by the High Court, which said of the process of review under the Act:1

... the power of review conferred upon Review Officers is not appropriately equated with a general appeal. The obligations and powers of the Review Officer as described in the Act create a very particular statutory process.

The Review Officer has broad powers to conduct his or her own investigations including the power to exercise for that purpose all the powers of a Standards Committee or an investigator and seek and receive evidence. These powers extend to “any review” ...

... the power of review is much broader than an appeal. It gives the Review Officer discretion as to the approach to be taken on any particular review as to the extent of the investigations necessary to conduct that review, and therefore clearly contemplates the Review Officer reaching his or her own view on the evidence before her. Nevertheless, as the Guidelines properly recognise, where the review is of the exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate for the Review Officer to exercise some particular caution before substituting his or her own judgment without good reason.


[37] More recently, the High Court has described a review by this Office in the following way:2

A review by the LCRO is neither a judicial review nor an appeal. Those seeking a review of a Committee determination are entitled to a review based on the LCRO’s own opinion rather than on deference to the view of the Committee. A review by the LCRO is informal, inquisitorial and robust. It involves the LCRO coming to his or her own view of the fairness of the substance and process of a Committee’s determination.


[38] Given those directions, the approach on this review, based on my own view of the fairness of the substance and process of the Committee’s determination, has been to:

Analysis


[39] The issues to be considered on review are:

1 Deliu v Hong [2012] NZHC 158, [2012] NZAR 209 at [39]–[41].

2 Deliu v Connell [2016] NZHC 361, [2016] NZAR 475 at [2].

(b) Did Ms LH fail to provide Mr SR with documents he had requested, and fail to respond to requests to provide those documents?

(c) Did Ms LH fail to act on instructions in a timely manner to prepare a will and, if advised that the instructions to prepare the will were withdrawn, did Ms LH render an invoice for work not completed, and if so had Ms LH breached her professional obligations under r 3 of the RCCC and/or any other rule or enactment?

(d) Did Ms LH overcharge Ms HP for the services provided?

Was Ms LH’s position compromised by the refusal of the Committee to allow the adjournment sought?


[40] No. Ms LH had an obligation to provide response to the Committee in the time frame allowed.

[41] A lawyer’s job is frequently a demanding and busy one which, for many, presents a daily and difficult challenge of balancing competing demands. But responding to complaints should be a matter of priority.

[42] It has been said that a lawyer’s duty to co-operate with the Standards Committee, once the complaints investigation procedures have been engaged should be regarded as a self-evident incident of professional life.3

[43] This is not to suggest that Ms LH’s failure to meet the deadline for filing of her submissions remotely gives indication of a reluctance to co-operate with the inquiry, but rather to reinforce the importance of lawyers ensuring that the complaints process, which has necessary focus on the need to ensure that complaints are resolved expeditiously, is not unnecessarily delayed by a lawyer’s failure to comply with realistic timetables for filing of documents set by a Committee.

[44] Ms LH had been granted an adjournment to allow her further time to provide her first submission in response. She did not file within the time permitted by the first extension granted.

[45] The notice of hearing allowed adequate time for the parties to provide response to the issues identified in the notice of hearing. The issues as framed in the notice of hearing, were couched in identical terms to the summary of the complaint that

3 Paul Collins “The Duty to Play Ball” (2012) 793 LawTalk at 5.

had been initially provided to Ms LH. It could not be said that Ms LH was not fully aware of the focus of the Committee inquiry.


[46] Ms LH had provided comprehensive response to the complaint in her initial submissions.

[47] Her request for an extension was made at last minute. Reasons provided in support of that request do not present as compelling.

[48] In any event, Ms LH has had opportunity to provide a full response to the Committee’s decision on review. Any supposed defect in procedural failure of the nature claimed by Ms LH, is cured by the review process.

Did Ms LH fail to provide Mr SR with documents he had requested, and fail to respond to requests to provide those documents?


[49] On 28 February 2017, Mr SR made request of Ms LH to provide him with his relationship property agreement and will. Receiving no response, he forwarded a reminder to Ms LH on 11 March 2017. That was not responded to.

[50] The relevant conduct rules to consider are rr 3, 3.2, 4.4.1 and 7.3 which provide as follows:4

3 In providing regulated services to a client, a lawyer must always act competently and in a timely manner consistent with the terms of the retainer and the duty to take reasonable care.

3.2 A lawyer must respond to inquiries from the client in a timely manner.

4.4.1 Subject to any statutory provisions to the contrary, upon changing lawyers a client has the right either in person or through the new lawyer to uplift all documents, records, funds, or property held on the client’s behalf. The former lawyer must act upon any written request to uplift documents without undue delay subject only to any lien5 that the former lawyer may claim.

7.2 A lawyer must promptly answer requests for information or other inquiries from the client.


[51] Ms LH contended that she was entitled to retain Mr SR’s documents, as she held a legitimate lien over the documents engaged by Mr SR’s request.

[52] This argument was described by the Committee as “entirely misconceived”.

[53] I agree with the Committee.

4 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008

[54] Items withheld under a lien must be, by definition, the property of the client.

[55] A lien operates as a de facto security

[56] It is not contested that, at the time Mr SR made request for release of his documents, he had settled his accounts in full.

[57] Accepting, as she must, that there could be no grounds to exercise a lien over documents in circumstances where Mr SR had fully paid for the work involved in the preparation and execution of the documents, Ms LH takes the argument back to the point where she was first instructed by Mr SR and Ms HP. She argues that Mr SR had agreed to pay Ms HP’s fees at commencement. She says that as she had not received payment for work competed for Ms HP, she was entitled to assert a lien over Mr SR’s documents.

[58] In her submissions on review, she explains her position thus:

[Mr SR] was aware that he was responsible for our charges which he agreed to at the outset, hence the reason for [Ms HP] not advancing a separate retainer to us although separate terms of engagement were signed by them both. Since the relationship property agreement involved both parties and they were interconnected, and they were mirror wills, I do not see how it could be a misconception on my part for the lien claimed. After all, it was accepted by the Standards Committee that some work was carried out (see paragraph 37). [Mr SR] paid all the other invoices. However, an invoice was not rendered to [Ms HP] until she made our firm liable. She also claimed that I had refused to act for her which I clarified in my subsequent email to her.


[59] This is a difficult argument to follow.

[60] I assume that Ms LH, when she employs the term interconnectivity to describe the retainer with Mr SR and Ms HP, is suggesting that because there was a degree of commonality in the work involved, and she says that Mr SR had agreed to pay fees incurred for the preparation of Ms HP’s will, her actions in claiming a lien were legitimate.

[61] I do not accept the interconnectivity argument advanced by Ms LH.

[62] Indeed, her own submission contradicts the novel argument she advances.

[63] She accepts that separate terms of engagement were provided to the parties.

[64] She was not acting for Ms HP on the relationship property matters. She could not do so. Ms HP had instructed her own counsel.
[65] The fact that there was an inevitable commonality of interests in the subject matter of the relationship property agreement and an inclination expressed by Mr SR and Ms HP to execute mirror image wills does not, as Ms LH suggests, transform the characteristics of a conventional retainer.

[66] I am uncertain as to what Ms LH is referring when she suggests that an invoice was “not rendered to Ms HP until she made our firm liable”. This appears to be suggestion that the nature of the retainer was varied in some way, subsequent to the instructions being received.

[67] There were two separate retainers. Ms LH does not dispute that. She confirms that Ms HP provided instructions to draft a will. A letter of engagement is provided to Ms HP. She renders her invoice to Ms HP.

[68] If it was intended, as Ms LH suggests, that Mr SR had agreed to meet all costs, it could have been expected that this arrangement would have been recorded in the letters of engagement provided to the parties at the outset.

[69] Ms LH confirms that Ms HP signed a separate letter of engagement and provided written instructions:

for our firm to draft her will. She also nominated me as an executor of her will. At no stage had [Ms HP] terminated her instructions to us, either directly or indirectly through [Mr SR].


[70] The difficulty with Ms LH’s argument that agreement had been reached that Mr SR would be responsible for meeting her fees, thus providing justification she says for her decision to exercise a lien on his documents, is that the position argued for by her presents as inconsistent with the evidence of her taking instructions, on the basis of a separate retainer, to represent Ms HP on the preparation of her will.

[71] It could also have been expected that if it was the case that Mr SR had agreed to pay Ms HP’s fees and Ms LH had an expectation of him doing so, that she would have raised that issue with him when her relationship with Mr SR broke down.

[72] If that arrangement had been agreed, it would have been expected that Ms LH would have rendered her fee for the services provided to Ms HP directly to Mr SR, avoiding the problem she says she had of being unable to forward her final account to Ms HP because of uncertainty over Ms HP’s contact details.

[73] That a third party is liable for the bill of costs or the lawyer did not think a particular person was the client is not determinative of the nature of the relationship. In determining whether the lawyer – client relationship exists it is important to look at the

expectations and understandings of the client which the conduct of the lawyer has given rise to.5


[74] In Groom v Crocker it was stated that no particular contractual intention is required to create a lawyer – client relationship; rather:6

The relationship is normally started by a retainer, but the retainer will be presumed if the conduct of the two-party shows that the relationship solicitor and client has in fact been established between them


[75] There is a thread of contradiction that runs through Ms LH’s argument. She says in her submission to the LCRO of 22 November 2017, that Ms HP’s invoice was not issued as an act of retaliation to Mr SR, but rather to bring it to Ms HP’s attention that she had not finalised it. Ms LH was not writing to Ms HP to prompt her to attend to executing the will, she was forwarding her final invoice for services she said had been provided to Ms HP.

[76] On review, Ms LH argues that a further reason for her refusing to release Mr SR’s original will, was that she was obliged, as the sole executor, to retain the original.

[77] I do not agree that Ms LH’s role as executor, imposed obligation on her to retain the will.

[78] Her obligation was to release all documents of her client’s on being requested to do so.

[79] Until the client dies, the named executor has no role to play. This is illustrated by a client’s capacity to execute a new will which revokes the previous one.

[80] Mr SR was entitled to the will along with all other documents as provided in r 4.4.

[81] If Ms LH had concerns that circumstances could potentially arise where the will prepared had been misplaced and she would be criticised for having not retained the original, any such concern would be met by retaining a copy of correspondence on file recording release of the will to Mr SR, and the recording in her deeds register that the will had been returned to him.

[82] Ms LH’s failure to release documents, constituted a breach of r 4.4.1. This constituted unsatisfactory conduct in terms of s 12(1)(c) of the Act.

5 Duncan Webb, Kathryn Dalziel and Kerry Cook Ethics, Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer (3rd ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2016) at 157.

6 Groom v Crocker [1939] 1 KB 194 (CA).


[83] The issue as to whether Ms LH responded sufficiently promptly to Mr SR’s requests for release of his documents, is of course closely intertwined with argument advanced that she was under no obligation to release the documents.

[84] I simply note that having concluded that she was required to release the documents, the conduct rules make clear that lawyers must respond promptly and without undue delay to such requests.7

Did Ms LH fail to act on instructions in a timely manner to prepare a will and, if advised that the instructions to prepare the will were withdrawn, did Ms LH render an invoice for work not completed, and, if so had Ms LH breached her professional obligations under r 3 of the RCCC and/or any other rule or enactment?


[85] Ms LH took instructions to prepare Ms HP’s will in September 2015.

[86] On 13 March 2017, immediately following receipt of a request from Mr SR to uplift his file, Ms LH forwarded an invoice to Ms HP for costs incurred in work completed in preparing her will.

[87] The delay between receipt of instructions, and issuing an invoice was 18 months.

[88] In July 2016, Mr HP made complaint about Ms LH’s fees and the service she had provided. At this time, there were discussions concerning Ms HP’s will.

[89] Mr SR and Ms LH have differing recollections as to the nature of those discussions.

[90] Mr SR says that he instructed Ms LH not to proceed with preparing a will for Ms HP. He says that Ms HP had neither received a draft of the will, nor received any communications from Ms LH advising progress on completing the work.

[91] Ms LH says that Mr SR agreed to convey a message to Ms HP that Ms LH was expecting Ms HP to attend her office to sign the will.

[92] It is difficult at this distance to determine which of the differing accounts provides most accurate recall of the events, but I am not persuaded that a consideration of the question as to whether Ms LH acted promptly, is dependent on

7 Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules, rr 3.2, 4.4.1.

close scrutiny of the import and effect of the conversation between Mr SR and Ms LH. To a degree, focus on those events presents as diversionary.


[93] What is clear, is that from the time Ms LH took instructions in September 2015 to the time of her meeting with Mr SR in July 2016, there is no evidence of:

[94] This was a considerable period of inactivity, particularly considering the nature of the work to be done.

[95] The preparation of a will must be attended to promptly.

[96] The consequences of a failure to do so can be serious for a lawyer.8

[97] A lawyer’s obligation to act competently and in a timely manner, as required by r 3, reinforces that the issue of timeliness is to be assessed in a manner consistent with the terms of the retainer.

[98] Ms LH suggests that it was Mr SR’s responsibility to ensure that Ms HP followed up with Ms LH.

[99] As has been noted, Ms LH’s retainer was with Ms HP.

[100] If Ms LH had prepared the will as she suggests she had done, was she obliged in the face of an apparent lack of follow up from Ms HP, to take steps to chase Ms HP along?

[101] Clearly, Ms LH was required to advise Ms HP when the will was ready for signing.

[102] There is no indication of her having taken steps to do so.

[103] It could also be reasonably expected of Ms LH that she would, once the relationship property agreement work had been finalised, have turned her attention to ensuring that Ms HP’s will was finalised.

8 See Gartside v Sheffield Young & Ellis [1983] NZCA 37; [1983] NZLR 37 (CA).


[104] Ms LH’s position appears to be that she would simply do nothing and leave it to Ms HP to get in touch with her.

[105] In my view, Ms LH’s obligation to act competently and in a timely manner, consistent with her duty to take reasonable care, required her to take steps to follow up with Ms HP. It was not consistent with a lawyer’s obligation to act competently, to take instructions to prepare a will but to then do nothing further.

[106] Ms LH’s argument that she had in essence prepared the will does not assist her. If it was the case that she had finalised the will, then it could reasonably be expected of her that she would have then taken steps to ensure that her client signed the will.

[107] I agree with the Committee that it is unusual that Ms LH waited such a considerable period to invoice Ms HP for the work said to have been completed.

[108] This delay presents as particularly inexplicable, as it could be expected that she would have been acutely sensitive to the need to promptly attend to drafting a will following receipt of instructions to do so. Whilst Ms LH argues that she had prepared the will and was awaiting a response from Ms HP, her instructions were provided in September 2015 and she had taken no steps taken to finalise the matter until March 2017.

[109] Whilst I have indicated a reluctance to endeavour to attempt to distil, from the conflicting accounts, precisely what was said in the conversation between Mr SR and Ms LH’s of 19 June 2016, this much is clear. The conversation would not have been congenial. Mr SR was expressing dissatisfaction with the service provided by Ms LH. He indicated that he no longer wished for her to remain as an executor of his will.

[110] This should have put Ms LH on notice to immediately contact Ms HP to clarify her instructions. It was not sufficient for Ms LH to rely on an apparent representation from Mr HP as to what Ms HP’s position was, or for her, particularly in the face of the disintegrating relationship, to rely on Mr SR to prompt Ms HP to make contact with her.

[111] And matters deteriorated. Mr SR then filed the first of his complaints with the LSCS, including complaint about fees charged. A decision was delivered on 15 December 2016. Having had her fee held upheld by the Committee, what understandably promptly followed, was an insistence from Ms LH that her outstanding accounts be paid.

[112] This demand was accompanied by an indication of her intention that matters would be referred to a debt collection agency if payment was not promptly made.

[113] Mr SR then makes request to uplift documents. This is a lawyer client relationship that has disintegrated (a relationship which she emphasises was intimately connected to Ms HP), and yet there is no indication that Ms LH has taken positive steps to bring Ms HP’s matter to resolution.

[114] She could not have contemplated that Mr SR could provide a satisfactory line of communication with Ms HP, nor could she have expected that it was appropriate for her to simply do nothing and leave the matter of Ms HP’s will in limbo.

[115] I find myself again in agreement with the Committee, this time in respect to its conclusion that it was Ms LH’s obligation to complete the work in a timely manner, and to contact Ms HP when the will was ready for signing.

[116] Her failure to take reasonable steps to complete the retainer over such a considerable period of time is a breach of her obligations under r 3 and constitutes unsatisfactory conduct in terms of s 12(c) of the Act.

[117] It is the extent of the delay, and the absence of any indication of activity on Ms LH’s part, that reinforces the unacceptable conduct finding.

[118] I also consider that Ms LH’s decision to render an invoice, after such lengthy delay, was inappropriate, and conduct that would be regarded by lawyers of good standing as being unacceptable, such as to merit a further finding of unsatisfactory conduct.

[119] Whilst the Committee concluded that there was no evidence that Ms LH had actually prepared a draft will, it is difficult to determine the extent of the work that had been done. I think it probable that preliminary work had been completed on the draft. Not a great deal would have been expected to have been involved in that. She had prepared Mr SR’s will which was drafted in seemingly identical terms to that proposed for Ms HP. But in the absence of any demonstrable efforts by Ms LH to follow-up with Ms HP, to finalise the invoice, and to attend to matters with the degree of urgency required, it presents as unacceptable for her to expect remuneration for services which have not been fully provided, and in circumstances where the extent of the work completed remains uncertain.

[120] These shortcomings bring Ms LH into collision with those conduct rules, which require her to inform her client of any material and unexpected delays, and to keep her client informed about progress on the retainer. Whilst not specifically addressed by the Committee, a lawyer must render a final account to their client within a reasonable time of concluding the matter or the retainer being otherwise terminated. It must have been abundantly apparent to Ms LH months before rendering her invoice, that this retainer was effectively at an end.

Did Ms LH overcharge Ms HP for the services provided?


[121] Whilst Ms LH did not directly challenge the Committee’s finding into the reasonableness of fee charged, she contends that the position adopted by the Committee when addressing the fee issue was contradictory and inconsistent with its findings in respect to the two matters which had resulted in unsatisfactory conduct findings.

[122] The Committee concluded that it had no jurisdiction to inquire into the complaint as it had concluded that there were no special circumstances which justified an inquiry.

[123] As it had determined that it lacked jurisdiction, Ms LH contends that the Committee lacked authority to direct that her invoice be cancelled.

[124] I agree with Ms LH that the approach adopted by the Committee presents, at least on cursory examination, as potentially conflicting, but the apparent contradiction did not go unnoticed by the Committee, who observed that its inquiry into allegation of overcharging was largely academic.

[125] I agree with the Committee that once it had concluded that the invoice rendered by Ms LH should be cancelled in its entirety, there was little point in it considering the issue as to whether there were special circumstances that merited the invoice being the subject of an inquiry into its reasonableness.

[126] The decision to cancel the invoice issued was open to the Committee under its power accorded under s 156(1)(f) of the Act, following its unsatisfactory conduct finding.

[127] The Committee need not have proceeded further to undertake a jurisdictional inquiry which was of no relevance. But its decision to do so does not contaminate the decision made to cancel Ms LH’s invoice.

[128] I see no grounds which could persuade me to depart from the Committee’s decision.

Costs


[129] Where a finding of unsatisfactory conduct is made or upheld against a practitioner on review it is usual that a costs order will be imposed. I see no reason to depart from that principle in this case.

[130] Taking into account the Costs Guidelines of this Office, the practitioner is ordered to contribute the sum of $1,200 to the costs of the review, that sum to be paid to the New Zealand Law Society within 30 days of the date of this decision.

[131] The order for costs is made pursuant to s 210 (1) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006. The order for costs may, pursuant to s 215 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006, be enforced in the civil jurisdiction of the District Court.

Publication


[132] Pursuant to s 206(4) of the Act I direct that this decision be published so as to be accessible to the wider profession in a form anonymising the parties and bereft of anything as might lead to their identification.

Decision

Pursuant to s 211(1)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 the decision of the Standards Committee is confirmed.

DATED this 19TH day of March 2019


R Maidment

Legal Complaints Review Officer

In accordance with s 213 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 copies of this decision are to be provided to:

Ms LH as the Applicant

Mr SR and Ms HP as the Respondents [Area] Standards Committee [X]

New Zealand Law Society

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