MY v KA [2020] NZLCRO 187 (5 October 2020)

Last Updated: 28 October 2020

LEGAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW OFFICER ĀPIHA AROTAKE AMUAMU Ā-TURE

	[2020] NZLCRO 187 Ref: LCRO 55/2020
CONCERNING	an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
AND
CONCERNING	a determination of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]
BETWEEN	MY Applicant
AND	KA Respondent

DECISION

The names and identifying details of the parties in this decision have been changed

Introduction

[1] Mr MY has applied to review a decision by the [Area] Standards Committee

[X] (the Committee), in which the Committee made an unsatisfactory conduct finding against him pursuant to s 12(c) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act).

[2] This followed the Committee’s inquiry into a complaint that had been made against Mr MY by his former client, Mr KA.

Background

[3] During January 2019 Mr MY acted for Mr and Mrs KA on the purchase of their home.

[4] Settlement was concluded mid-afternoon on 18 January 2019.

[5] Mr MY reported to Mr and Mrs KA that afternoon, and attached a copy of the Record of Title (the Title).

[6] Mr KA noted that his wife’s name had been spelt incorrectly on the Title. That same day he emailed Mr MY, pointed out the error and asked him to correct it.

[7] About a week later Mr MY replied and said that the error was minor and did not affect property ownership.

[8] Some two weeks later Mr KA again emailed Mr MY and asked when the correction would be made. Mr MY replied and said that he would attend to it.

The complaint

[9] Mr KA lodged a complaint against Mr MY with the New Zealand Law Society Complaints Service (Complaints Service) on 20 March 2019. He said:

• (a) Mr MY had misspelt Mrs KA’s name on the Title.
  
• (b) Mr MY had said that it was a minor matter that did not affect ownership.
  
• (c) LINZ had told Mr KA that the error required correction.
  

[10] By way of outcome Mr KA said “I just want to change my [wife’s] name correctly this is what I want from the lawyer.”

[11] Attached to Mr KA’s complaint were the email exchanges between himself and Mr MY, and with LINZ.

Response by Mr MY

[12] The Complaints Service notified Mr MY of Mr KA’s complaint in a letter to him dated 16 April 2019.

[13] This triggered several exchanges of correspondence between Mr MY and the Complaints Service. Because the nature of that correspondence and the period of time over which it was exchanged assume relevance to the issue before me, it is important for me to set it out below, and in detail:

• (a) The Complaints Service sent a reminder to Mr MY dated 9 May 2019, to say that he had not responded to Mr KA’s complaint.

• (b) A further reminder was sent to Mr MY on 28 May 2019. In that reminder the Complaints Service said:

If you have taken steps to register a correction of name, or intend to take such steps, it would be helpful to provide this information to the Committee ... by 4 June 2019.

(c) Mr MY sent an email to the Complaints Service dated 28 May 2019 indicating that he was expecting to receive documents relating to the correction, and that all that was required to complete it was a declaration. He noted that the error was slight; these errors were “fairly common” and did not affect ownership.

[14] The Committee did not meet to consider Mr KA’s complaint until 14 August 2019. Because it had not heard further from Mr MY after his 28 May 2019 email to the Complaints Service, the Committee resolved to inquire into the complaint and request further information from him.

[15] Specifically, in a letter to Mr MY dated 6 September 2019, the Committee repeated the request that had been made in the Complaints Service’s 28 May 2019 email to Mr MY.

[16] Mr MY responded on 17 September 2019 and said:

....

Does this mean I am expected to “remedy the error on the title”? This is not clear.

I doubt there is an error because the bank and LINZ have both accepted the title after registration.

However I may be prepared to organise the deletion of one letter from the second name notwithstanding.

Please advise.

[17] Responding to Mr MY’s email, the Complaints Service wrote to him on 7 October 2019 and said the following:

...

The Committee considers it has received material to support a view that Mr KA has instructed you to correct the misspelling of Mr KA’s wife’s name on the title, and that you had previously indicated, in direct correspondence with Mr KA, that you would remedy the misspelling.

Accordingly, the Committee wishes to explore with you whether you intend to take such steps, and if so, for you to advise the Committee of any steps taken and provide relevant supporting documentation.

[18] The Committee wrote further to Mr MY on 30 October 2019, pointing out that he had not responded to its 7 October 2019 letter, and informing him that it intended to consider the complaint against him at a meeting on 6 November 2019. In fact the Committee was unable to meet until the following month.

[19] On 12 November 2019 Mr MY sent the following email to the Complaints Service:

The title is fine. I had somebody in the other day where the title was incorrect – the name was misspelt (not by me). You just do a declaration that the name is wrong as part of the conveyancing services on the sale. It’s really easy and no problem at all. This is fairly common and nothing is wrong with the title.

[20] At its December 2019 meeting the Committee resolved to set the complaint down for a hearing on the papers. It provided Mr MY with a Notice of Hearing, setting out the issues to be determined.

[21] On 23 January 2020 Mr KA wrote to the Complaints Service and said that he had spoken to Mr MY the day before, and he and Mrs KA had arranged to meet with Mr MY so they could sign the necessary correction papers. Mr KA said that his issues had been “sorted” and that he wished to withdraw his complaint.

[22] On 27 January 2020 Mr MY wrote to the Committee and said:

There is a complaint about me making a tiny error about somebody’s name that was registered on the unique identifier. It has been fixed.

[23] The Committee nevertheless decided to continue with its hearing on the papers, and invited submissions from Mr MY, to be provided by 14 February 2020. None were provided by him.

[24] A similar letter was sent to Mr KA, who replied saying that the matter had been sorted out and the spelling of his wife’s name had been corrected.

Standards Committee decision

[25] The Committee identified the following issues to be determined:

• (a) Whether Mr MY made an error in the spelling of Mrs KA’s name on the Title.
  
• (b) Whether Mr MY failed to take steps to remedy the error on the Title and act on instructions from Mr KA.

Error1

[26] The Committee was satisfied that Mr MY had made the error. However, it did not consider that of itself, the error was one which breached any conduct standard or otherwise justified a disciplinary response. It held that the error was “clerical ... and was capable of simple rectification”.

Failure to take steps and follow instructions2

[27] The Committee noted that Mr KA drew the error to Mr MY’s attention on 18 January 2019, and that Mr MY had said on 7 February 2019 that he would correct it. Yet by 21 March 2019 when the complaint was made, the error was still on the Title.

[28] The Committee set out the history of its dealings with Mr MY during 2019 and early 2020, noting that Mr MY had not substantively engaged with it. It said that “Mr MY ... decided to act to address the error” once he had received the Committee’s Notice of Hearing in mid-January 2020.

[29] The Committee noted with concern that it had taken Mr MY a year to respond to Mr KA’s request to correct the spelling of his wife’s name. It held that this was inconsistent with his obligation to act in a timely manner, pursuant to r 3 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 (the Rules). It said the following:

The Committee had ...sought to resolve the issue in its correspondence with Mr MY, as there was a very simple remedy for Mr MY to implement. In the Committee’s view Mr MY failed to recognise the significance of Mr KA’s request to him and he failed to respond constructively to requests from the Committee during the course of the complaint.

[30] As well, the Committee held that Mr MY’s delays in rectifying the issue “reflected a disregard for Mr KA’s instructions, as well as the attempts by the Committee to resolve the issue ... [and that this] reflected poorly on the legal profession.”

[31] The Committee’s conclusion on that account was that Mr MY had breached his obligations under r 11 of the Rules to administer his practice in a manner that ensures that the duties to clients are adhered to and that the reputation of the legal profession is preserved.

1 Standards Committee decision at [12]–[13].

2 Standards Committee decision at [14]–[17].

[32] In conclusion the Committee made a finding of unsatisfactory conduct against Mr MY. By way of penalty he was censured, and was also ordered to pay costs of

$1,000 to the New Zealand Law Society.3

Application for review

[33] Mr MY filed his application for review on 24 March 2020. The outcome sought is a reversal of the finding of unsatisfactory conduct, and an award of costs against the Standards Committee.

[34] Mr MY submits:

• (a) Mr KA had withdrawn his application.
  
• (b) The complaint had been about something “utterly trivial.”
  
• (c) The spelling error had not affected Mr and Mrs KA’s legal position.
  
• (d) Typographical errors on unique identifiers are “fairly common and can easily be rectified by a standard declaration.” LINZ guidelines make it clear that errors of that sort do not “vitiate the entire transaction.”
  
• (e) Censure orders and fines should be applied sparingly and following “good judgement.” The Committee’s determination is “absurdly misconceived.”
  
• (f) A tiny spelling error of a foreign name is not wrong advice.
  
• (g) The Committee ought to have discontinued its inquiry after Mr KA had withdrawn his complaint. It did not address the correct issues or cite the correct law.
  
• (h) Mr and Mrs KA’s ownership was valid despite the error, and contrary to Mr KA’s belief.
  

[35] Mr MY also provided an explanation as to how the error had arisen, relating to a medical issue with his eyes at that time.

[36] As well, Mr MY attached to his review application information from LINZ concerning its processes for dealing with applications to correct or change names in its Register.

3 Standards Committee decision at [18]–[20].

Response

[37] Mr KA was invited to comment on the review application. In emails to the Case Manager dated 25 March and 15 May 2020 he said that he did not want to comment further on or add to the matter.

Nature and scope of review

[38] The nature and scope of a review have been discussed by the High Court, which said of the process of review under the Act:4

... the power of review conferred upon Review Officers is not appropriately equated with a general appeal. The obligations and powers of the Review Officer as described in the Act create a very particular statutory process.

The Review Officer has broad powers to conduct his or her own investigations including the power to exercise for that purpose all the powers of a Standards Committee or an investigator and seek and receive evidence. These powers extend to “any review” ...

... the power of review is much broader than an appeal. It gives the Review Officer discretion as to the approach to be taken on any particular review as to the extent of the investigations necessary to conduct that review, and therefore clearly contemplates the Review Officer reaching his or her own view on the evidence before her. Nevertheless, as the Guidelines properly recognise, where the review is of the exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate for the Review Officer to exercise some particular caution before substituting his or her own judgment without good reason.

[39] More recently, the High Court has described a review by this Office in the following way:5

A review by the LCRO is neither a judicial review nor an appeal. Those seeking a review of a Committee determination are entitled to a review based on the LCRO’s own opinion rather than on deference to the view of the Committee. A review by the LCRO is informal, inquisitorial and robust. It involves the LCRO coming to his or her own view of the fairness of the substance and process of a Committee’s determination.

[40] Given those directions, the approach on this review, based on my own view of the fairness of the substance and process of the Committee’s determination, has been to:

• (a) Consider all of the available material afresh, including the Committee’s decision; and
  
• (b) Provide an independent opinion based on those materials.
  

4 Deliu v Hong [2012] NZHC 158, [2012] NZAR 209 at [39]–[41].

5 Deliu v Connell [2016] NZHC 361, [2016] NZAR 475 at [2].

Hearing in person

[41] Mr MY’s application for review was progressed before me at an applicant only hearing in [City], on 24 September 2020. Mr KA was invited to appear but elected not to do so.

[42] At the hearing, Mr MY addressed me on his application for review, and answered questions put by me.

[43] Because Mr MY did not bring his file relating to this matter with him to the hearing, having left it at his home, at the conclusion of the hearing I offered him the opportunity to file brief written submissions, and timetabled that.

[44] Mr MY took that opportunity and forwarded brief written submissions to the Case Manager.

[45] I confirm that I have read Mr KA’s complaint and Mr MY’s responses to it including his responses to matters raised by the Committee. I have read the Committee’s decision and Mr MY’s application for review. I have also heard from Mr MY in person, and I have read the submissions subsequently filed by him.

[46] I confirm that there are no additional issues or questions in my mind that necessitate any further evidence, information or submissions from either party.

Discussion

Jurisdiction

[47] At the hearing before me, Mr MY raised a preliminary jurisdiction issue, which he repeated in his email submissions. He argued that because Mr KA told the Complaints Service that he wanted to withdraw his complaint, the Committee had no choice but to discontinue its inquiry.

[48] I do not agree.

[49] Conduct inquiries are carried out by both Standards Committees and Review Officers against a statutory framework that includes the following:6

(1) The purposes of [the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006] are—

6 Section 3 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006.

(a) to maintain public confidence in the provision of legal services and conveyancing services:

(b) to protect the consumers of legal services and conveyancing services:

...

[50] The inquiry process is not driven by an individual complainant’s wishes about the progress or outcome of their complaint. To allow that would be to subjugate public interest, as set out above, to those interests.

[51] That is not to say that a complainant’s interests about, for example, the withdrawal of their complaint, will never be considered. The Committee’s role is to weigh that request against the overall regulatory public interest requirements.

[52] On this occasion I consider that the Committee correctly considered, as it obviously did by proceeding with its inquiry, that the public interest in addressing the issues raised by Mr KA’s complaint and Mr MY’s conduct, outweighed Mr KA’s request to withdraw his complaint.

[53] Mr MY also sought to draw a comparison between a complainant withdrawing their conduct complaint, and the Police withdrawing a charge in a criminal prosecution. He said that this was a fairly routine occurrence, noting that there was a significant public interest in the administration of criminal justice.

[54] However, Mr MY’s submissions at the hearing overlooked that a charge in a criminal prosecution may only be withdrawn with the leave of a judge.7 He indicated that he was not aware of this requirement.

[55] Mr MY did however address the issue in his later written submissions. He argued that because leave to withdraw a charge is specifically required under the Criminal Procedure Act 2011, but the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 is silent on that, it means that leave under the Act is not required before a complainant withdraws their complaint.

[56] I do not agree. In my view the statutory scheme of ss 137 and 138 of the Act contain the same “leave to withdraw” principle as those contained in s 146 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.

[57] Section 137(1) of the Act gives a Standards Committee a discretion to exercise three options upon receipt of a complaint:

• (a) To inquire into it;
  

7 Section 146 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011.

(b) To direct negotiation, conciliation or mediation;

(c) To decide under s 138 to take no further action on the complaint.

[58] Section 138 of the Act sets out the grounds on which a Committee in its discretion might decide to take no further action on a complaint.

[59] This includes s 138(1)(d), which allows a Committee to take no further action on a complaint if “the [complainant] does not desire that action be taken or, as the case may be, continued.”

[60] But whether a Committee elects to do so, is a matter for that Committee. Section 138 makes that plain when it says that “a ... Committee may, in its discretion, decide to take no action or ... no further action, on any complaint.”

[61] This is consistent with the public interest principles underpinning the Act. As I have said above at [50] it is inconsistent with those principles to say that a complainant may direct a Committee as to how it manages a complaint, including that it must be withdrawn.

The conduct finding

[62] Mr MY’s written review application is advanced upon a misunderstanding by him of the Committee’s decision.

[63] Mr MY’s written submissions repeat this misconception.

[64] Mr MY has argued that the Committee made a finding of unsatisfactory conduct against him because he had made an error with the spelling of Mrs KA’s name.

[65] That is wrong.

[66] The Committee’s finding of unsatisfactory conduct was based upon two conduct breaches by Mr MY. First, that he failed to respond in a timely manner to instructions from Mr KA to correct the error in the spelling of his wife’s name. That conduct engaged r 3.8

8 Standards Committee determination at [16].

[67] Secondly, the Committee held that Mr MY’s responses to both Mr KA’s instructions and its own efforts to resolve the spelling error, “reflected poorly on the legal profession” and that this engaged r 11.9

[68] Indeed, earlier in its determination the Committee specifically held that the spelling error was “clerical” and “capable of simple rectification” and that “it did not amount to incompetence .... sufficient to amount to a breach of r 3.” The Committee said that “[no] disciplinary action was necessary in relation to this aspect of complaint.”10

[69] I agree with the Committee and would only observe that to make a disciplinary finding on that account alone would be to put a premium on clerical slips.

Rule 3

[70] At the hearing, Mr MY submitted that the Committee’s finding of unsatisfactory conduct, censure and costs award were disproportionate; that is to say, his conduct in delaying the correction process by some 12 months, did not justify a disciplinary response.

[71] Mr MY repeated this in his written submissions.

[72] It is clear to me that if Mr MY had corrected the error in a timely manner, then even in the face of complaint that he had made the error in the first place no disciplinary outcome would likely have resulted.

[73] So the focus is on Mr MY’s conduct when he was instructed by Mr KA to correct the error, as well as his response to the complaint.

[74] In relation to Mr KA’s instructions to Mr MY to correct the spelling error, there is little material: a couple of email exchanges between Mr KA and Mr MY during mid to late January and early February 2019.

[75] It could be said that Mr MY’s response to Mr KA on 7 February 2019 was needlessly brusque and dismissive: “I said I will do this”. Although words in an email they convey irritation.

[76] They also give indication that he would attend to what he had been instructed to do.

9 Standards Committee determination at [17].

10 Standards Committee determination at [13].

[77] However, by 20 March 2019 (when Mr KA lodged his complaint) Mr MY had not done what, six weeks earlier, he had said that he would do.

[78] Doubtless this is what prompted Mr KA’s complaint.

[79] Thereafter the Committee’s focus was squarely on trying to get Mr MY to complete Mr KA’s instructions.

[80] Mr MY is right to say that the error was clerical and not substantive. However he is wrong to say that it was an unimportant error. It involved a client’s name being misspelt on a formal, legal document.

[81] I would venture to suggest that for many people, the correct spelling of their name on a legal document of significance such as a Record of Title, would be of considerable importance.

[82] Indeed, an incorrectly spelt name could create difficulties, for example, on resale when proof of identity is a necessary prerequisite to completion of the transaction. An inconsistency between the name on a title and the name on proffered identification can delay the process.

[83] The fact that an error of this nature would not bother Mr MY, as he submitted at the hearing, somewhat misses the point. It was an issue for his clients and it is to them he owed duties.

[84] Mr MY further misses the point by repeatedly asserting that it was an inconsequential, one-letter misspelling of “a foreign name”. There is a lack of insight in that remark which is troubling.

[85] Mr and Mrs KA wanted Mrs KA’s name – her own, if you like, “unique identifier” – correctly spelt.

[86] That this is a simple administrative step – something acknowledged by Mr MY

– makes it all the more difficult to understand why Mr MY prevaricated and obfuscated for 12 months.

[87] Mr MY received notice of Mr KA’s complaint in April 2019.

[88] It is also difficult to understand why that of itself (let alone Mr KA’s 18 January 2019 request) did not immediately prompt Mr MY to take action and recognise his error, apologise for the inconvenience and take the administratively simple step of correcting it.

[89] That, I am sure, would have been the end of it.

[90] Instead Mr MY appears to have preferred to adopt an approach which completely lost sight of his clients’ understandable wish to have one of their names correctly spelt on a legal document.

[91] It is bewildering to me as to why Mr MY thought that this was a reasonable way to conduct himself.

[92] Although the Committee has not said as much, I do not doubt that if Mr MY had engaged constructively with it from an early stage – for the sake of his client if nothing else – then it would not have inquired further.

[93] At the hearing Mr MY submitted that the Committee ought to have “fired a shot across his bows”, or made an “unless” order, and that this would have focussed his mind and ensured that he attended to the correction with alacrity.11 He repeated that in his written submissions.

[94] However, that misunderstands both Mr MY’s role as a lawyer and the Committee’s disciplinary functions. Mr MY’s role as a lawyer is to act on his client’s instructions and to do so in a timely manner. The Committee’s role is not to manage a lawyer’s obligations as a parent might their child; it is to make decisions about lawyer conduct.

[95] In my view Mr MY has no one but himself to blame for being on the receiving end of a finding of unsatisfactory conduct. The conduct was not that he made a spelling error; the conduct was his failure – indeed his refusal – to correct that for a period of 12 months in circumstances where he himself had described the process as simple.

[96] It was a triumph of obduracy over reason.

[97] The legal consequences of Mr MY’s spelling error matter not. The fact that one of his clients wanted the courtesy of being correctly identified on a legal document and instructed him to do so, is the issue; on that account Mr MY has failed to act in a timely way as r 3 of the Rules requires.

Rule 11

[98] The Committee also found that Mr MY had breached r 11 of the Rules. This provides:

11 For a discussion about “unless” orders see Jin v North Shore District Court [2013] NZCA 475.

A lawyer’s practice must be administered in a manner that ensures that the duties to the court and existing, prospective, and former clients are adhered to, and that the reputation of the legal profession is preserved.

[99] The Committee’s reasoning appears to be that r 11 of the Rules was triggered by “the delays in rectifying the issue [reflecting] a disregard for Mr KA’s instructions, as well as attempts by the Committee to resolve the issue”. It noted that this “reflected poorly on the legal profession.”12

[100] To some extent, the conduct described by the Committee as triggering r 11 of the Rules (disregard for Mr KA’s instructions) is captured by its finding that Mr MY had breached r 3 of the Rules by failing to respond to those instructions in a timely way. In a sense therefore, there is an element of duplication across those findings.

[101] However, the Committee also said that r 11 of the Rules was infringed by Mr MY because of his responses to the Committee’s attempts to resolve the matter, and that this conduct reflected poorly on the legal profession.

[102] I have already outlined above my views about Mr MY’s prevarication and obfuscation during the Committee’s inquiry processes. The sequence of correspondence exchanged between the Complaints Service and Mr MY, bears eloquent testimony to that.

[103] In particular, it bears repeating what Mr MY said in his email to the Complaints Service dated 17 September 2019 (over seven months after he said to Mr KA “I said I will do this”):

Does this mean I am expected to “remedy the error on the title”? This is not clear.

I doubt there is an error because the bank and Linz have both accepted the title after registration.

[104] This is a disingenuous and obtuse email.

[105] As I have noted, in February of that year Mr MY had told Mr KA that he would correct the error. He had been instructed to do so and had an obligation to carry out those instructions. There is nothing “not clear” about that, as Mr MY suggests in his email.

[106] It must be remembered that the Complaints Service was sending Mr KA copies of all of Mr MY’s correspondence (such as it was) during 2019, and it is not difficult to imagine Mr KA’s frustration at what was playing out before him.

12 Standards Committee determination at [17].

[107] I agree that conduct of that type reflects poorly on the legal profession, and I agree that for this reason alone Mr MY has breached r 11 of the Rules.

Conclusion

[108] I agree with the Committee’s finding that Mr MY breached r 3 of the Rules by failing to act in a timely way when instructed by his client to arrange to have Mrs KA’s name correctly spelt on the Title to their home.

[109] I also agree with the Committee’s finding that Mr MY breached r 11 of the Rules, by failing to administer his practice in a manner that preserved the reputation of the legal profession: specifically, his manner of responding to the complaint and the Committee’s inquiry.

[110] Both breaches are deserving of a finding of unsatisfactory conduct, pursuant to s 12(c) of the Act.

Penalties

[111] The Committee censured Mr MY and ordered him to pay costs of $1,000 to the New Zealand Law Society. No other penalty was imposed.

[112] I do not intend to interfere with the Committee’s penalty orders.

[113] I regard a censure as an appropriate response to Mr MY’s woeful conduct in taking 12 months to attend to a very simple task, including the manner in which he conducted himself during this time.

[114] I emphasise that the censure does not relate to the error he made in the first place; of itself that does not justify a disciplinary response.

[115] It is difficult to understand Mr MY’s conduct. His explanation was that it was a meaningless, inconsequential error involving one letter of an unfamiliar non-English name.

[116] However, as I have been at pains to point out above Mr MY’s opinion as to the nature and effect of the error is irrelevant. His clients wanted it corrected and could reasonably expect that their lawyer would attend to that simple task, expeditiously and with a degree of grace.

Costs

[117] Where an adverse finding is made, costs will be awarded in accordance with the Costs Orders Guidelines of this Office. It follows that Mr MY is ordered to pay costs in the sum of $1,200 to the New Zealand Law Society by 5pm on Friday 6 November 2020, pursuant to s 210(1) of the Act.

Enforcement of costs order

[118] Pursuant to s 215 of the Act, I confirm that the order for costs made by me may be enforced in the civil jurisdiction of the District Court.

Decision

[119] Pursuant to s 211(1)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 the decision of the Standards Committee is:

• (a) Confirmed as to the finding that Mr MY breached r 3 of the Rules.
  
• (b) Confirmed as to the finding that Mr MY breached r 11 of the Rules but modified so as to relate only to the manner in which Mr MY responded to the complaint and the Committee’s inquiry.
  
• (c) Confirmed as to the imposition of a censure.
  
• (d) Confirmed as to the order to pay costs.
  

Anonymised publication

[120] Pursuant to s 206(4) of the Act, this decision is to be made available to the public with the names and identifying details of the parties removed.

DATED this 5th day of October 2020

R Hesketh

Legal Complaints Review Officer

In accordance with s 213 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 copies of this decision are to be provided to:

Mr MY as the Applicant Mr KA as the Respondent

[Area] Standards Committee [X] New Zealand Law Society