EB v FI [2024] NZLCRO 62 (30 May 2024)

Last Updated: 14 June 2024

LEGAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW OFFICER ĀPIHA AROTAKE AMUAMU Ā-TURE

	[2024] NZLCRO 062 Ref: LCRO 28/2024
CONCERNING	an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006
AND
CONCERNING	a decision of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]
BETWEEN	EB Applicant
AND	FI Respondent

DECISION

The names and identifying details of the parties in this decision have been changed.

Introduction

[1] The applicant, Ms EB, has applied for review of a decision dated 9 February 2024 by the [Area] Standards Committee [X] (the Committee) on her complaint about the professional conduct of the respondent, Mr FI.

[2] Both the complaint and the review application have been made on the applicant’s behalf by her son, Mr LB. The applicant has given no evidence in the matter. All factual assertions made in support of her complaint have been made by Mr LB.

[3] References in this decision to “the Act” are to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 and to “the Rules” are to the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008.

Background

[4] The applicant was married to Mr DC (Mr DC). It was a second marriage for both.

[5] Mr LB says that in 2016, the applicant signed Enduring Powers of Attorney (EPAs) under the Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 (the PPPR Act) in favour of him and his siblings.

[6] In December 2021, the applicant signed new EPAs in favour of Mr DC. Mr LB says that the applicant subsequently became concerned about the circumstances of the 2021 EPAs being signed and about their effect and implications.

[7] The 2021 EPAs were prepared by the respondent on the instructions of Mr DC. The respondent did not act for the applicant and had no instructions from her. Another law firm had acted for the applicant for many years and had prepared the 2016 EPAs.

[8] Mr LB says that the applicant told him that Mr DC and the respondent:

... with no prior warning, presented in person at [her] shop with a new will to sign, and that she had to talk to someone on the phone to explain to her what it was she was signing. [Mr DC and the respondent] waited in the shop while she had this conversation. I understand the person she spoke to was an employee of [the respondent’s firm]. The time between being presented with the document, having the conversation, and signing was around half an hour.

[9] Mr LB also states that the applicant “...was clearly very upset and not a little confused about how she had somehow agreed to sign whatever it was she had signed”.

[10] Mr LB says that, after he learned of these events in October 2022, the 2021 EPAs were revoked and fresh EPAs and a new will for the applicant were prepared by her usual lawyers and signed.

[11] The person who witnessed the applicant’s signature on the 2021 EPAs and provided the necessary certificates under s 94A of the PPPR was Ms XU, an employed solicitor in the respondent’s firm. In providing her certificate pursuant to s 94A(7) of the PPPR, Ms XU certified that:

• (a) she was independent of each of the attorneys without any need to depend on the special rules in s 94A(4A) of the PPPR; and
  
• (b) she was independent by virtue of the special rule in s 94A(4A)(a) of the PPPR; and

• (c) she was independent by virtue of the special rule in s 94A(4A)(b) of the PPPR.
  

The complaint

[12] The essence of the complaint is that, in Mr LB’s assessment, the applicant “... was blindsided with documents she was not expecting, did not understand, were not adequately or independently explained to her and which conflicted with documents she had already had prepared by her lawyers”. The complaint is that the respondent’s role in the matter was professionally inappropriate.

[13] In response to the complaint, the respondent initially explained that:

• (a) the EPAs were “mutual” EPAs, Mr DC signing EPAs in favour of the applicant at the same time;
  
• (b) Ms XU “attended on” the applicant when she signed the documents, as both donor in favour of Mr DC and donee of Mr DC’s EPAs;
  
• (c) in the case of spouses granting EPAs to each other, “the law now recognises that two witnesses can be lawyers in the same firm”.
  

[14] In response to further enquiry by the New Zealand Lawyers Complaints Service (LCS), the respondent advised further that:

• (a) his firm had only ever acted for Mr DC; and
  
• (b) no letter of engagement was presented to or signed by the applicant;
  
• (c) he had spoken to Ms XU and she recalled that:
  

... the attorney documentation was signed during a period of COVID restriction. The attendance on [the applicant] was by zoom call as [the applicant] was unable to leave the [redacted] business that she owns with [Mr] DC. Ms XU went through both sets of documents with [the applicant] in some detail and has no doubt that she understood that she and Mr DC were both appointing each other as attorneys. She also understood that the appointment of one another only came into effect should it be established that either had become mentally incapable and the power of attorney was accordingly invoked.

[15] In reply to the respondent’s response, Mr LB expressed the view (summarised) that:

• (a) there should at the very least have been a conversation with the applicant to refresh her understanding of what an EPA was and whether or not she should enter into EPAs with Mr DC;
  
• (b) it cannot necessarily be assumed that there is “...good faith from both donors to the EPAs” where the spouses are on their second marriages and have children from a previous marriage;
  
• (c) an assumption had been made that the applicant was aware that the EPAs were mutual, the applicant thought she was signing a will and did not understand what she was signing;
  
• (d) the respondent’s position was premised on an assumption that he acted for both the applicant and Mr DC;
  
• (e) advance notice should have been given before the applicant was presented with legal documentation to sign.
  

[16] Mr LB proceeded to provide an extensive commentary on his view of various factual and legal issues pertaining to family trust, relationship and succession arrangements between the applicant and Mr DC. Mr LB speculated that the respondent would have known some of these background details and expressed a view that a lawyer should not have presented without notice an unsolicited EPA to someone without giving them time and space to take proper advice. The essential point was that he “...thought it critical that a lawyer insists that the donor take time and proper independent advice on the EPA”.

[17] The outcomes sought by the applicant were expressed in a general way as an “appropriate sanction for breach of relevant rules/code of conduct” and a request for compensation for the legal costs incurred by the applicant in doing a fresh Will and EPAs.

The Standards Committee’s decision

[18] The complaint was referred to the Committee for consideration by way of a memo from the LCS dated 14 December 2023. The Committee approached its consideration of the complaint from a reasonably narrow perspective. It considered the issues to be:

• (a) Did the respondent obtain instructions or provide a letter of engagement to the applicant and, if not, was this a breach of any professional rules?

(b) Did the respondent breach any of his professional obligations regarding conflicts of duty when preparing the EPAs and arranging for their execution (r 6.1 of the Rules)?

(c) Did the respondent breach any professional obligations regarding the witnessing of the applicant’s EPA?

(d) Did the respondent take reasonable steps to ensure that the applicant understood the nature of the retainer (if there was a retainer) (r 7.1 of the Rules)?

[19] Expressed in that way, three of the four stated issues depended on there being a solicitor-client relationship between the respondent and the applicant. There was no such relationship. The fourth issue depended on the respondent having witnessed the applicant’s signature. There was no suggestion that he had witnessed the applicant’s signature.

[20] Unsurprisingly, the Committee therefore decided to take no further action on the complaint. It stated that it did so “...following deliberations, and after inquiring into the complaint under s 137(1)(a) [of the Act]”. It made its determination under s 138(2) of the Act, which enables a standards committee to decide to take no further action if, in the course of its investigation of the complaint, it appears to the committee that, having regard to all of the circumstances, any further action is unnecessary or inappropriate.

[21] I note that the Committee’s determination was a summary one, in that its resolution under s 137(1)(a) of the Act to inquire into the complaint, its inquiry and its decision to take no further action under s 138(2) following its deliberations all occurred on the same day, which was also the day the complaint was referred to the Committee for consideration, 14 December 2023.

Application for review

[22] Mr LB on behalf of the applicant seeks review of the whole of the Committee’s decision and the same outcomes. He submits that:

The [Committee] erred in finding that [the respondent] did not breach his professional duties including that:

(a) he failed to ask [the applicant] if she already had an EPA (she did);

(b) he failed to give [the applicant] reasonable advance notice that she would be presented with an EPA;

(c) he failed to offer [the applicant] the opportunity to take time and advice before signing the EPA.

Further the [Committee] erred in finding that [the applicant] understood what she was signing. That finding is inconsistent with the fact of her already having an existing EPA recently entered into.

Review on the papers

[23] This review has been undertaken on the papers pursuant to s 206(2) of the Act, which allows a Legal Complaints Review Officer (LCRO or Review Officer) to conduct the review on the basis of all information available if the LCRO considers that the review can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties. The parties have agreed to this course of action.

[24] I record that having carefully read the complaint, the response to the complaint, the Committee’s decision and the submissions filed in support of and in opposition to the application for review, there are no additional issues or questions in my mind that necessitate any further submission from either party. On the basis of the information available, I have concluded that the review can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties.

Nature and scope of review

[25] The nature and scope of a review have been discussed by the High Court, which said of the process of review under the Act:1

... the power of review conferred upon Review Officers is not appropriately equated with a general appeal. The obligations and powers of the Review Officer as described in the Act create a very particular statutory process.

The Review Officer has broad powers to conduct his or her own investigations including the power to exercise for that purpose all the powers of a Standards Committee or an investigator and seek and receive evidence. These powers extend to “any review” ...

... the power of review is much broader than an appeal. It gives the Review Officer discretion as to the approach to be taken on any particular review as to the extent of the investigations necessary to conduct that review, and therefore clearly contemplates the Review Officer reaching his or her own view on the evidence before her. Nevertheless, as the Guidelines properly recognise, where the review is of the exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate for the Review Officer to exercise some particular caution before substituting his or her own judgment without good reason.

[26] More recently, the High Court has described a review by this Office in the following way:2

A review by the LCRO is neither a judicial review nor an appeal. Those seeking a review of a Committee determination are entitled to a review based on the

1 Deliu v Hong [2012] NZHC 158, [2012] NZAR 209 at [39]–[41].

2 Deliu v Connell [2016] NZHC 361, [2016] NZAR 475 at [2].

LCRO’s own opinion rather than on deference to the view of the Committee. A review by the LCRO is informal, inquisitorial and robust. It involves the LCRO coming to his or her own view of the fairness of the substance and process of a Committee’s determination.

[27] Given those directions, the approach on this review, based on my own view of the fairness of the substance and process of the Committee’s determination, has been to consider all of the available material afresh, including the Committee’s decision, and provide an independent opinion based on those materials.

The issues

[28] The issues for consideration in this review are:

• (a) Who is the complaint made by?
  
• (b) Did the respondent act for the applicant in the preparation of the EPAs?
  
• (c) What professional duties did the respondent owe the applicant in the circumstances?
  
• (d) Is there evidence that the respondent breached any such duty?
  
• (e) Do I have any concerns about the substance and process of the Committee’s inquiry?
  
• (f) What other professional duties might be relevant in the circumstances?
  
• (g) Is there evidence that the EPAs were either properly or improperly witnessed and certified?
  
• (h) Whose responsibility was the proper witnessing and certification of the applicant’s EPAs?
  
• (i) What is the appropriate outcome of the review?
  

Discussion

(a) Who is the complaint made by?

[29] The complaint was expressed to have been made by Mr LB on behalf of the applicant and I have intituled this review decision accordingly. I record for the benefit of both the applicant and Mr LB that anyone with a sufficient personal interest can make a complaint about the professional conduct of a lawyer. In this instance, it was of no

significance whether the complaint was made by the applicant or by Mr LB because neither of them was the respondent’s client. I appreciate that Mr LB may not have known the technical position in this regard when preparing the complaint.

[30] The more pertinent issue in this instance is the reliability of hearsay evidence. A standards committee can take into account any evidence, regardless of whether the evidence would be admissible in a court, but the applicant and Mr LB should take note that something Mr LB says about what the applicant says, thinks or feels is inherently less probative than what the applicant herself has to say.

[31] This is particularly so where, as here, Mr LB has given evidence about what the applicant felt or thought ten months before Mr LB first heard about the matter. Mr LB also says that the applicant thought she was signing a will when it seems she was actually presented with 4 separate printed form documents. The reported recollection seems surprising.

[32] Mr LB should not interpret that comment as impliedly expressing any doubt on my part about what he has to say about the applicant’s reported concerns well after the event but only that a standards committee will have greater regard for more direct evidence. This is particularly so where the contextual information provided by Mr LB appears to indicate a material level of distrust on his part of Mr DC.

(b) Did the respondent act for the applicant in the preparation of the EPAs?

[33] It is clear that the respondent did not act for the applicant in relation to preparation of the EPAs. I confirm the Committee’s finding in that respect.

(c) What professional duties did the respondent owe the applicant in the circumstances?

[34] I also confirm the Committee’s finding that the primary professional duty the respondent owed directly to the applicant was to conduct his dealings with her with integrity, respect and courtesy.3 I interpret the complaint as partly one of an arguable lack of integrity in preparing an EPA other than on the instructions of the donor (which could be argued to be a “dealing with” the applicant) and partly one of an arguable lack of courtesy in allegedly turning up without notice or other prior communication at the applicant’s place of work with important legal documents to sign.

3 Rules 10.1 and 12 of the Rules.

(d) Is there evidence that the respondent breached any such duty?

[35] I am not necessarily surprised that a lawyer would accept instructions from one of two spouses to prepare mutual EPAs. I have no information, and nor did the Committee, as to what Mr DC told the respondent about the circumstances giving rise to his instructions to have the mutual EPAs prepared. It is not appropriate to make any assumptions about that matter.

[36] I am surprised, however, that a lawyer would reach the point of attending at the workplace of the spouse for whom he did not act, allegedly without prior notice and in the company of the spouse for whom he did act, to have such documents executed. This is simply not something a sensible lawyer would do, possibly depending on the circumstances. The situation invites the sort of concerns expressed by Mr LB in this instance about his mother being taken by surprise or feeling under pressure.

[37] Further, the respondent presumably had no need to attend the applicant’s workplace in relation to her execution of the documents, as he was not able to witness them.

[38] In making those observations, I am not making any finding of fact as to what occurred. The respondent has made no comment about Mr LB’s factual assertions and I do not assume that silence indicates acceptance.

[39] If the assertions are correct, this does not necessarily mean that the respondent acted without professional integrity. If Mr DC instructed the respondent to attend with him at the applicant’s workplace, his obligation was to do so unless he was aware of circumstances that should reasonably have triggered concern about his compliance with his general professional duties. There is no evidence that the respondent subjectively had such concern but, as I have noted, the circumstances did appear to invite it.

[40] This highlights the primary difficulty with coming to reliable conclusions about the circumstances giving rise to the complaint and the application of relevant professional duties. There is no evidence from the applicant. Everything Mr LB says about the background circumstances and the course of events is hearsay. It may well be accurate hearsay but it is hearsay evidence all the same. The same difficulty affects the respondent’s comments about the advisory and witnessing process undertaken by Ms XU. There is no evidence from her. The respondent’s comments also constitute hearsay evidence. Inferences cannot reliably be drawn.

[41] I consider it possible that the respondent’s alleged attendance with Mr DC at the applicant’s workplace to arrange execution of the EPAs could be argued to have been discourteous, especially if the respondent knew that the applicant did not know that

he was coming with important legal documents for her to sign that she knew nothing about.

[42] There is no direct evidence from any of those present as to what actually occurred, however. There is not even confirmation from the respondent that he did accompany Mr DC to the applicant’s workplace, let alone any information about the factual understanding the respondent had in doing so. He is bound by solicitor-client confidentiality and privilege in respect of his instructions from and advice to Mr DC in that respect but not in relation to the factual course of events.

[43] The Committee expressed the view that the respondent “...did not need to provide [the applicant] with terms of engagement to prepare the mutual EPAs”. The statement is technically correct, in that the respondent did not act for the applicant and had no instructions from her. It does rather beg the question as to the propriety of a lawyer preparing EPAs when the lawyer does not act for the proposed donor and has not confirmed the instructions with the proposed donor (if that is so).

(e) Do I have any concerns about the substance and process of the Committee’s inquiry?

[44] The LCS is generally dogged by procedural delays. Expedition in dealing with complaints is therefore to be commended. Determining a complaint on the day of its receipt would normally indicate a demonstrably straightforward complaint and a reasonably clear and simple set of facts. I am not sure that either was the case in this instance. Consequently, I am not confident that the Committee gave itself sufficient time for a thorough consideration of the facts and a proper identification of potential issues.

[45] For example, the complaint was not about any retainer from the applicant or any allegation of conflict of duty. It was about the standard of professionalism demonstrated by the respondent in connection with the presentation of the EPAs to the applicant for signature and the consequent advisory process prior to execution.

[46] I acknowledge that it is not procedurally required of a standards committee to issue a notice of hearing setting out the issues it intends to address. Indeed, doing so would result in unnecessary delay where a complaint is in fact straightforward and the issues simple. Where that is not necessarily the case, however, there is potential benefit in issuing a notice of hearing to enable both parties to help the committee achieve clarity as to what the complaint is about from both a complainant’s perspective and a regulatory perspective.

[47] The Committee’s first comment in its reasoning was that the respondent never acted as the applicant’s lawyer. It also commented that “...at issue in this complaint is a

simple Enduring Power of Attorney (EPA), not something more complicated such as a Relationship Property Act contracting out agreement, which might be scrutinised in a different manner”.4 I am considerably surprised at this comment.

[48] An EPA is not a “simple” legal document from a client’s perspective, or from a legal perspective for that matter. This is why there are pages of explanations accompanying it as to what the EPA means. Nor does its supposed simplicity have any bearing on its importance, as evidenced by the frequency of professional conduct complaints (and Court disputes) about EPA issues. An EPA is a significant legal instrument.

[49] Nor does the alleged simplicity of a legal document have any bearing on a lawyer’s obligations in respect of its explanation and execution. It is correct that the explanation and witnessing requirements are different as between EPAs and contracting out agreements, but this is a matter of the application of the respective governing statutory provisions. Those provisions are in fact more prescriptive for an EPA than for a contracting out agreement.

[50] The Committee then had this to say about the EPA advisory and witnessing process:5

Section 94A of the [PPPR] says (in part) that two lawyers from the same law firm may witness the donors’ signatures in mutual EPAs in certain circumstances. The [PPPR] (Enduring Powers of Attorney Forms and Prescribed Information) Regulations 2008 also allow two lawyers from the same firm to witness the EPA signatures “if the witness is satisfied and certifies that doing so does not constitute more than a negligible risk of conflict of interest”.

[51] Those comments are not directly pertinent to the outcome of the review application. This is because the complaint is against the respondent, not against the lawyer responsible for the advisory and witnessing process for the applicant’s EPAs, Ms XU. I nevertheless observe that the second statement is incorrect and the first is correct in principle but not necessarily applicable to the circumstances.

[52] The PPPR regulations are not permissive. They simply prescribe the form and content of EPAs. Part of the prescribed form is a “glossary of terms”, which contains abbreviated explanations of terms defined in the PPPR itself. The explanation of “authorised witness” in the glossary is no more than that; it has no regulatory force of its own.

4 Standards Committee decision (9 February 2024) at [11].

5 At [12].

[53] Relevantly to the context of this complaint, s 94A(4) of the PPPR provides that the signature of the donor must be witnessed by a person who is independent of the attorney and who is a lawyer. Section 94A(4A) relevantly provides that:

If 2 people appoint each other as attorney, the witness to the signature of one person as donor (witness A) does not fail to be independent for the purposes of subsection (4) by reason only that the witness to the signature of the other person as donor—

(a) is a lawyer ... in the same firm, ... as witness A; ...

[54] It is not appropriate for me, in the context of this review, to express a view about the correct legal application of that provision to the present circumstances. This is a matter that would need be considered by a standards committee in the first instance if the need to do so were to arise.

[55] I have no reservation about commenting on the interpretational issue, however. The critical words in s 94A(4A) are: “...does not fail to be independent...by reason only that...”. This is quite a different thing from deeming the witness in those circumstances to be an independent witness. There may well be arguments that:

• (a) this section is intended to accommodate the common scenario of the same firm acting for both donors of mutual EPAs; and
  
• (b) the circumstance of the witnessing lawyer being with the firm that acts for one donor but not the other might well, depending on the circumstances, compromise the lawyer’s independence as a witness.
  

[56] The Committee’s next comment causes me concern as well. It stated that:6

The Committee accepted as fact [the respondent’s] explanation that his colleague, Ms XU, discussed the EPA documents with [the applicant] in detail and that [the applicant] understood at the time (December 2021) what she was signing. The Committee did not consider it had any evidence that [the applicant] was placed under duress at the time she executed the EPA. Likewise, the Committee did not find any evidence that [the applicant] did not understand what was happening when she signed her EPA on 2 December 2021.

[57] I have no problem with the Committee’s findings that it had no evidence of either duress or lack of understanding on the applicant’s part. The difficulty is that it had no evidence at all, or certainly no probative evidence, of what actually occurred. There is no evidence from any of the participants in the events that occurred on 2 December 2021 (the applicant, the respondent, Mr DC and Ms XU) other than the respondent’s hearsay evidence about Ms XU’s engagement with the applicant. There is plainly no evidentiary

6 At [13].

basis on which the Committee could “accept as fact” what the respondent says about the communications between Ms XU and the applicant.

[58] If the Committee’s comment constituted a finding of fact relevant to its determination of the complaint against the respondent, I would reverse it. It does not constitute such a finding, however. The matter would be relevant only on a complaint against Ms XU. I comment only that the Committee’s acceptance of the supposed fact would not preclude a different standards committee making a different finding of fact regarding the matter should the need to do so arise.

[59] I make the same comment about the Committee’s further statement that it did not “...find any errors by [Ms] XU (who was not a subject of this complaint) witnessing [the applicant’s] signature”. No complaint has been made regarding Ms XU’s witnessing of the applicant’s signature. Consequently, there was no evidence before the Committee, other than the respondent’s hearsay statement, on which it could make any finding.

[60] I observe that Ms XU seems to have been somewhat confused as to the basis on which she was an independent witness of the applicant’s signature of the EPAs in favour of Mr DC. She gave (by not crossing out the inapplicable alternatives) three different, mutually exclusive explanations of the regulatory basis of her independence as a witness when only one of them could be applicable.7

[61] This might indicate a lack of understanding on her part of at least the EPA form itself if not also the effect of s 94A of the PPPR. Alternatively, it might indicate that she did not know whether or not the applicant was a client of her firm. There is no evidence from her or from the respondent or from the applicant as to how she came to be having the telephone conversation and Zoom call with the applicant or as to what the respondent’s prior instructions to her, if any, might have been.

[62] It is also unclear, at least to me, what the “Covid restriction” was at the relevant time (if that is what was meant by the reference, which is also far from clear), why it applied to either Ms XU or the applicant but not to the respondent and Mr DC and what relevance it had to the circumstances giving rise to the complaint.

(f) What other, general professional duties might be relevant in the circumstances?

[63] The respondent’s primary professional duty, which has regulatory expression in r 6 of the Rules, was to promote and protect Mr DC’s interests to the exclusion of the interests of third parties, including those of the applicant.

7 See paragraph [11].

[64] The respondent also had general professional duties, including those to uphold the rule of law and to promote and maintain professional standards, in addition to his duty to deal with the applicant with integrity, respect and courtesy.

(g) Is there evidence that the EPAs signed by the applicant as donor were either properly or improperly witnessed and certified?

[65] For the reasons stated earlier, no conclusion could properly be drawn on this issue, either way, on the information before the Committee.

(h) Whose responsibility was the proper witnessing and certification of the applicant’s EPAs?

[66] It was Ms XU who was responsible for the proper witnessing and certification of those EPAs and for the prescribed advisory process that necessarily preceded it, although it is possible there might be an issue of adequate supervision.

(i) What is the appropriate outcome of the review?

[67] In all the circumstances, I am not satisfied that there has been adequate inquiry into the respondent’s professional conduct and consider it appropriate for aspects of it to be reconsidered.

[68] Given the views I have expressed on both the correctness and relevance of some of the statements made by the Committee in reaching its conclusions, I consider it preferable that a different standards committee undertake the reconsideration.

[69] I emphasise that the directions I make are prompted primarily by my concerns about the robustness of the Committee’s decision-making process and should not be interpreted as impliedly expressing any opinion about the appropriate outcome of any issue of professional conduct arising in the course of reconsideration.

[70] In referring the matter for reconsideration, I do not consider it appropriate to constrain the scope of the new committee’s inquiry. This is because my own consideration of the issues on review has been impacted by the absence of direct evidence from any of the involved parties and it is possible that, once such evidence is available, there may be aspects of the matter that are not currently apparent.

Decision

[71] Pursuant to s 211(1)(a) of the Act, I confirm the Committee’s finding that the respondent did not act for the applicant in respect of the preparation of EPAs in favour of Mr DC and accordingly that no issue of breach of any of rr 3.4, 3.5 or 6.1 arises.

[72] Pursuant to s 209(1)(a) of the Act, I direct that a different standards committee inquire into any and all other aspects of the respondent’s professional conduct that it considers to be pertinent on inquiring into the course of events.

[73] It would be a matter for that committee to consider whether or not the circumstances, at least on the information available at present, might warrant the commencement of an own-motion investigation into the propriety of Ms XU’s witnessing of the applicant’s signature on the EPAs and/or the standard of her advice to the applicant before providing her certificates under s 94A(7) of the PPPR.

[74] If either the applicant or Mr LB were to make a complaint about either of those matters, I express the view that it should be considered by the same committee.

Publication

[75] Section 206(1) of the Act requires that every review must be conducted in private. Section 213(1) of the Act requires a Review Officer to report the outcome of the review, with reasons for any orders made to each of the persons listed at the foot of this decision.

[76] Pursuant to s 206(4) of the Act, a Review Officer may direct such publication of his or her decision as the Review Officer considers necessary or desirable in the public interest. “Public interest” engages issues such as consumer protection, public confidence in legal services and the interests and privacy of individuals.

[77] Having had regard to the issues raised by this review, I have concluded that it is desirable in the public interest that this decision be published in a form that does not identify the parties or others involved in the matter and otherwise in accordance with the LCRO Publication Guidelines.

DATED this 30TH day of May 2024

FR Goldsmith

Legal Complaints Review Officer

In accordance with s 213 of the Act, copies of this decision are to be provided to: Ms EB as the applicant

Mr LB as her authorised representative Mr FI as the respondent

[Area] Standards Committee [X] New Zealand Law Society