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New Zealand Legal Complaints Review Officer |
Last Updated: 6 May 2025
LEGAL COMPLAINTS REVIEW OFFICER
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Ref: LCRO 13/2023
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CONCERNING
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an application for review pursuant to section 193 of the Lawyers and
Conveyancers Act 2006
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AND
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CONCERNING
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a decision of the [Area] Standards Committee [X]
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BETWEEN
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DG
Applicant
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AND
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PS
Respondent
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DECISION
The names and identifying details of the parties in this decision have been changed.
[1] Mr DG has applied for a review of a decision by the [Area] Standards Committee [X].
Background
[2] The background to the events which prompted Mr DG to file complaints with the New Zealand Law Society Complaints Service (Complaints Service) against Mr PS, can be briefly summarised.
[3] In 2017, a teacher at the school then attended by Mr DG’s daughter, wrote a letter in support of an application Mr DG’s daughter had made to [Government Agency] for a [redacted] benefit.
[4] Mr DG considered that comments made by the teacher in that correspondence were defamatory of him.
[5] In late 2017, Mr DG instructed Mr PS to bring defamation proceedings against the teacher.
[6] Mr PS is a partner in the [Suburb] based law firm, [law firm].
[7] Proceedings were filed in the [Suburb] District Court on 15 December 2017.
[8] The proceedings were robustly defended.
[9] In March 2019, [law firm] advised the District Court registry that Mr DG was proposing to file an interlocutory application for non-party discovery. Request was made that the proceedings be scheduled for a call over in April 2019.
[10] A pre-trial settlement conference (to proceed by telephone) was scheduled for 8 April 2019. The parties were directed to file memoranda 3 days in advance of the conference.
[11] Neither counsel complied with that direction.
[12] Mr PS did not attend the conference.
[13] The judge managing the conference, directed that the proceedings be set down for a firm fixture in the period 27 to 31 May 2019. The judge’s direction recorded that that if the plaintiff had any issues, they were to raise these with the registry immediately. The direction reinforced to the parties that timetable orders that had previously been made by the court on 15 October 2018, were to be complied with.
[14] On receipt of the court’s directions, Mr PS applied to have the fixture adjourned.
[15] That application was advanced through the vehicle of a memorandum Mr PS filed with the court.
[16] Mr PS sought an adjournment on grounds that:
- (a) there was insufficient time to prepare and exchange briefs; and
- (b) there was insufficient time for the parties to comply with the court’s 15 October 2018 pre-trial directions; and
- (c) there were outstanding issues to resolve in respect to completing party and non-party discovery/inspection.
[17] An application for non-party discovery orders was filed by Mr PS.
[18] The defendant opposed the request for adjournment.
[19] Mr PS’s adjournment request was considered by the court on 1 May 2019. His application to have the trial adjourned was declined as was the request for non-party discovery orders.
[20] Mr PS wrote to Mr DG (1 May 2019) to advise that his adjournment request had been unsuccessful. At the same time, Mr PS informed Mr DG that [law firm] had decided to terminate its retainer on grounds that Mr DG had failed to pay outstanding fees.
[21] Mr DG instructed fresh counsel.
[22] Newly instructed counsel made formal application to the court to have the impending fixture adjourned.
[23] The application was successful but significant costs were incurred by Mr DG in advancing the adjournment application.
The complaint and the Standards Committee decision
[24] Mr DG lodged a complaint with the Complaints Service on 2 March 2021. The substance of his complaint was that:
- (a) the retainer had been terminated as a consequence of Mr PS’s failure to appear at the pre-trial conference and his inability to remediate the consequences of that oversight; and
- (b) that failure had resulted in substantial additional legal costs being incurred; and
- (c) Mr PS had failed to engage constructively with requests made of him to compensate for loss suffered; and
- (d) Mr PS had attempted to divert responsibility for his errors to his client, opposing counsel, and the court; and
- (e) Mr PS had been on extended leave from his office in late 2018 and had left responsibility for the stewardship of Mr DG’s file in the care of a junior lawyer; and
Mr PS had failed to immediately inform him of the court’s direction; and
(k) he became aware of the fixture date on being provided by Mr PS with a copy of the memorandum Mr PS was proposing to file with the court seeking an adjournment; and
(l) the memorandum filed did not refer to Mr PS’s failure to appear at the 8 April 2019 conference; and
(m) costs incurred as a consequence of Mr PS’s failure included:
- (i) counsel’s costs in advancing an adjournment application, ($11,837.41 inclusive of GST and disbursements); and
- (ii) court directed costs $2,225; and
- (iii) costs incurred by freshly instructed counsel on coming up to speed on the file estimated at $5,000 plus GST; and
- (iv) costs incurred for raising concerns with [law firm], $1,725 inclusive of GST (note: further detailed in his complaint as comprising
$4,743.75 (inclusive of GST);
(n) Mr PS had breached rr 3 and 7 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Conduct and Client Care) Rules 2008 (the Rules) in that he had failed to act competently, disclose information, and take reasonable steps to ensure that his client understood the nature of the retainer and was fully informed in respect to matters affecting the retainer.
[25] Mr PS responded to the complaint on 3 May 2021.
[26] He submitted that:
- (a) Mr DG had been cautioned against commencing proceedings, that caution repeated at many procedural stages as the matter progressed, however Mr DG had chosen to ignore this “prudent” advice; and
- (b) the retainer had been terminated following repeated demands for payment of outstanding fees; and
- (c) fees had been discounted in the sum of around $4,100 (excluding any time expended as a consequence of the failure to attend the conference); and
- (d) it was his understanding that concerns Mr DG had raised had been resolved; and
- (e) Mr DG’s complaints (filed two years after the retainer had terminated) had been filed with purpose to “seek money”; and
- (f) Mr DG sought compensation from [law firm] for events which were “of his own making”; and
- (g) apology had been provided to Mr DG for the oversight in failing to attend the conference, and Mr DG had, at the time, appeared to have accepted the apology; and
- (h) the apology had been offered contemporaneously with offer to reduce Mr DG’s account in the sum of $4,100; and
- (i) making application to vacate the allocated fixture date through the vehicle of a memorandum filed with the court was appropriate and consistent with the court’s direction that it was open to counsel to follow-up with the court; and
- (j) the inability of both parties to comply with the court’s directions of 15 October 2018, made it inevitable that the matter would be unable to proceed in terms of the later direction made by the court; and
- (k) Mr DG had been kept promptly informed on all matters; and
- (l) Mr DG’s fee complaint was out of time; and
[27] Mr DG provided a reply to Mr PS’s response to his complaint on 19 May 2021.
[28] His response in significant part reiterated and reinforced the concerns he had raised in his initial complaint. His view of Mr PS’s response was that Mr PS had regrettably endeavoured to portray him as a difficult and eccentric client.
[29] Mr DG submitted that:
- (a) Mr PS’s failure to attend the conference had significant consequence; and
- (b) Mr PS should have lodged a formal application to adjourn the proceedings; and
- (c) oversight on the part of the defendant in failing a memorandum with the court had no relevance to the question as to whether Mr PS had breached his duty of care; and
(d) Mr PS’s assertion that prompt attention had been given to advising of the oversight in failing to appear was disputed; and
(e) funds paid to [law firm] with purpose to effect the uplift of his files, were paid “reluctantly”, and with clear indication of him reserving his right to challenge the accounts; and
- (f) a breakdown of costs incurred subsequent to termination of the retainer had been provided to Mr PS; and
- (g) Mr PS’s failings were significant; and
- (h) suggestion that his complaint had not been filed in good faith was emphatically rejected.
[30] The Committee determined to proceed an investigation into the complaints and issued the parties with a notice of hearing on 8 November 2021.
[31] That notice invited the parties to respond to the following issues:
- (a) did Mr PS’s failure to attend the scheduled conference on 8 April 2019 (and to file a memorandum as directed by the court prior to that conference) constitute a breach of r 3 of the Rules; and
(b) did Mr PS fail to promptly inform Mr DG that the conference had been scheduled and did he fail to consult Mr DG and seek his instructions concerning the conference (rr 7, 7.1 and 13.3); and
- (c) when and how did Mr PS advise Mr DG that he had failed to appear at the conference (r 7); and
- (d) did Mr PS consult Mr DG prior to seeking an adjournment (r 7.1, 13.3); and
- (e) did Mr PS’s failure to formally apply for an adjournment constitute a breach of rule 3; and
- (f) did any of Mr PS’s conduct, in the course of the retainer, amount to unsatisfactory conduct or misconduct?
[32] Both Mr PS and Mr DG provided submissions in response to the Committee’s notice of hearing.
[33] I do not propose to summarise those submissions. They have been read and considered.
[34] The Standards Committee delivered its decision on 20 December 2022.
[35] The Committee concluded that it had no jurisdiction to consider Mr DG’s complaints concerning invoices rendered, as its inquiry was barred by Regulation 29 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act (Lawyers: Complaints Service and Standards Committees) Regulations 2008, which provides that a Standards Committee must not, unless special circumstances are established, deal with a fee complaint if the bills are rendered more than two years prior to the date of the complaint.
[36] The Committee concluded that Mr PS’s failure to attend the conference (and file the required memorandum) amounted to a “clear breach” of r 3.
[37] A further breach was established in respect to complaint that Mr PS had failed to keep Mr DG informed and seek instructions, in respect to the conduct of the litigation.
[38] The Committee considered that each of the breaches established merited separate unsatisfactory conduct findings.
[39] The Committee did not consider that Mr PS’s failure to formally apply for an adjournment of the fixture presented as a failure to competently represent Mr DG. The Committee was satisfied that it was appropriate for Mr PS to submit a memorandum requesting an adjournment. In reaching that view, the Committee observed that the lawyer members of the Committee were all experienced litigators, this to reinforce the Committee’s view that it was acceptable practice in the circumstances for Mr PS to have filed a memorandum with the court rather than to proceed a formal application.
[40] In considering a matter critical to Mr DG (his claim for compensation) the Standards Committee concluded that:
The Committee did not consider that it was in any position to make a finding on whether Mr PS’s conduct had caused Mr DG to incur loss, and, if so, the quantum of that loss. The Committee considers that if Mr DG believes Mr PS has acted negligently causing him to sustain loss, it would be more appropriate for him to pursue his claim through the civil courts, given the allegations being made and the outcome sought.1
[41] The Committee ordered that:
- (i) Mr PS be censured;
1 Standards Committee decision (20 December 2022) at [79].
(ii) that he pay a fine of $1,000 in respect to the r 3 breach (described by the Committee as inadvertent and at the lower end of the scale);
(iii) that he pay a fine of $4,000 (described by the Committee as moderately serious) in respect to rr 7, 7.1 and 13.3 breaches; and
(iv) pay costs in the sum of $1,000.
Application for review
[42] Mr DG filed an application for review on 7 February 2023.
[43] He submits that:
- (a) the Committee erred in not awarding compensation for loss that was directly caused by Mr PS’s conduct; and
- (b) publication of the Committee’s determination was in the interest of the public and the profession.
[44] Mr PS was invited to comment on Mr DG’s review application.
[45] It was Mr PS’s contention that the application filed by Mr DG had not raised any new matters of fact or law.
[46] Mr PS advised that he had accepted the Committee’s decision and in recognition of that, had ensured that fines and costs ordered by the Committee had been paid in full.
[47] Mr PS submitted that the reasoning adopted by the Committee in respect to the compensation claim was sound and that there would be little public or professional interest in directing publication of the Committee’s decision.
Review on the papers
[48] Direction was initially made that the review would proceed as a formal hearing.
[49] Mr DG advised the LCRO that he considered that his arguments had been comprehensively rehearsed in the written submissions filed.
[50] In the face of that indication, the parties were advised that the review would proceed “on the papers”.
[51] I record that having carefully read the complaint, the response to the complaint, the Committee’s decision and the submissions filed in support of and in opposition to the application for review, there are no additional issues or questions in my mind that necessitate any further submission from either party.
[52] On the basis of the information available, I have concluded that the review can be adequately determined in the absence of the parties.
Nature and scope of review
[53] The nature and scope of a review have been discussed by the High Court, which said of the process of review under the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 (the Act):2
... the power of review conferred upon Review Officers is not appropriately equated with a general appeal. The obligations and powers of the Review Officer as described in the Act create a very particular statutory process.
The Review Officer has broad powers to conduct his or her own investigations including the power to exercise for that purpose all the powers of a Standards Committee or an investigator and seek and receive evidence. These powers extend to “any review” ...
... the power of review is much broader than an appeal. It gives the Review Officer discretion as to the approach to be taken on any particular review as to the extent of the investigations necessary to conduct that review, and therefore clearly contemplates the Review Officer reaching his or her own view on the evidence before her. Nevertheless, as the Guidelines properly recognise, where the review is of the exercise of a discretion, it is appropriate for the Review Officer to exercise some particular caution before substituting his or her own judgment without good reason.
[54] More recently, the High Court has described a review by this Office in the following way:3
A review by the LCRO is neither a judicial review nor an appeal. Those seeking a review of a Committee determination are entitled to a review based on the LCRO’s own opinion rather than on deference to the view of the Committee. A review by the LCRO is informal, inquisitorial and robust. It involves the LCRO coming to his or her own view of the fairness of the substance and process of a Committee’s determination.
[55] Given those directions, the approach on this review, based on my own view of the fairness of the substance and process of the Committee’s determination, has been to:
- (a) Consider all of the available material afresh, including the Committee’s decision; and
2 Deliu v Hong [2012] NZHC 158, [2012] NZAR 209 at [39]–[41].
3 Deliu v Connell [2016] NZHC 361, [2016] NZAR 475 at [2].
(b) Provide an independent opinion based on those materials.
Discussion
[56] This review is sharply focused on two issues, compensation and publication.
[57] When an application for review is filed with the LCRO, it is open to the LCRO to consider “afresh” all of the issues considered by the Standards Committee.
[58] Section 156(1)(d) of the Act provides:
Where it appears to the Standards Committee that any person has suffered loss by reason of any act or omission of a practitioner or former practitioner or an incorporated firm or former incorporated firm or an employee or former employee of a practitioner or an incorporated firm, order the practitioner or former practitioner or incorporated firm or former incorporated firm, or employee or former employee of a practitioner or an incorporated firm, to pay to that person such sum by way of compensation as is specified in the order, being a sum not exceeding, as the case may require, the amount that is from time to time prescribed for the purposes of this paragraph by rules made under this Act by the New Zealand Law Society or the New Zealand Society of Conveyancers:
[59] The causative link between the conduct of the lawyer and the loss is expressed somewhat loosely in terms of the loss being suffered “by reason of any act or omission” of the lawyer.4
[60] The principles of legal causation require a meticulous examination of whether the client's losses were reasonably foreseeable and directly attributable to the lawyer's breach of professional duties.
[61] Argument that a lawyer’s oversight or omission has compromised a party’s case before the court to the extent that the error has resulted in the incurring of costs (including legal costs) that would not have resulted, but for the failure on the part of the lawyer, raises the possibility that the lawyer’s actions may be addressed not by reference to argument of a lack of competence, but rather a consideration as to whether the lawyer’s conduct amounted to negligence.
[62] The relationship between the tort of negligence and unsatisfactory conduct as defined in s 12(a) is close. In the Introduction to the chapter on negligence in The Law of Torts the authors state:5
4 Sandy v Khan (orders) [2009] NZLCRO 73 (9 December 2009) at [6].
5 The Law of Torts in New Zealand, Todd (ed) (online edition, Thomson Reuters) at [5.1].
Negligence is a relatively straightforward and well-understood concept in lay terms. It is defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary simply as a lack of proper care and attention or carelessness. This broad notion of carelessness is undoubtedly an integral part of negligence as a foundation for legal liability, but other elements are also involved. If one or more of those elements is lacking, then an action will fail, even though the defendant may have been careless, even grossly so, in a popular sense.
[63] Negligence is a cause of action that is well-understood by traditional civil courts. Its ingredients include a duty of care, a breach of that duty, and a measurable loss that has been caused by the breach of duty. Findings of negligence may only be arrived at after comprehensive — sometimes expert — evidence has been given. Issues that often arise in claims of negligence include whether a person has breached their duty of care, or whether there is a connection between the alleged loss and the breach of duty.
Complex arguments often arise about whether any loss has been suffered.6
[64] The Standards Committee concluded that it was not in a position to make a finding on whether Mr PS’s conduct had caused Mr DG to incur loss and, if so, the quantum of that loss. The Committee concluded that “... if Mr DG believes Mr PS has acted negligently causing him to sustain loss it would be more appropriate for to pursue a claim through the civil courts, given the allegations being made and the outcome sought”.7
[65] Neither a Standards Committee nor the LCRO is equipped to make findings of negligence.
[66] A claim for compensation under statutory provisions governing lawyers' professional discipline operates within a specific regulatory framework designed to maintain professional standards and protect clients.
[67] Professional discipline claims focus on the lawyer's conduct in relation to professional standards, whereas negligence claims centre on the quality of the legal service provided and its consequences.
[68] A negligence claim often provides broader scope for compensation as it can cover all losses flowing from the breach (subject to remoteness principles), while statutory compensation schemes may be more limited in scope.
[69] In this case, Mr DG’s claim proceeds from assumption that Mr PS’s failure to appear at the case management conference disrupted the projected timeframe for commencement of the trial, and argument that had Mr PS attended, all pre-trial matters
6 R and N Family Trust v EL LCRO 205/2015 at [96]–[98]. Preparation's case.
7 Standards Committee decision, above n 1, at [79].
would have progressed smoothly to completion in a manner that provided opportunity for Mr DG to complete the preparation of his case.
[70] The certainty of that projected outcome is not capable of being tested through the vehicle of review before the LCRO.
[71] It is argument that is capable of being more comprehensively examined in a jurisdiction which provides opportunity for evidence to be called and rebutted, for parties to be cross examined, and for the compensation claim to be measured by reference to the factors which are conventionally considered in a claim brought for negligence.
[72] I cannot be satisfied to the degree necessary such as could provide authority for the making of a compensation order, that costs incurred by Mr DG in advancing his application for an adjournment, were directly attributable to Mr PS’s oversight in failing to attend the case management conference.
[73] I cannot be certain as to what the outcome of the conference would or could have been if Mr PS had attended.
[74] It may have been the case that the presiding judge would have refrained from setting the matter down for trial if he had the benefit of submissions from Mr PS, but it is not open to a Review Officer to speculate as to what the outcome may have been.
[75] Mr DG’s argument presupposes that Mr PS’s absence from the case management conference was the sole determining factor that disrupted the trial's timeline, and that had Mr PS attended, all pre-trial matters would have progressed smoothly to completion.
[76] There will be cases where counsel’s failure to fulfil their professional obligations, by failing to appear at court mandated hearings, justify requirement that the practitioner reimburse their client for any costs directly resulting from their absence.
[77] But in these circumstances, it is not conclusively established on the evidence available to the Committee (and on review), that Mr PS’s omission was responsible for the events that followed.
[78] Mr PS says that Mr DG’s had impeded the progression of his case by adopting an obstructive approach to completing the necessary pre-trial preparation work.
[79] I have examined Mr PS’s file.
[80] I am satisfied that Mr DG’s approach to completing discovery had contributed to delay. I accept that Mr DG had a particular view as to what the scope of the discovery process should entail, but the correspondence on Mr PS’s file indicates that the approach adopted by Mr DG was compromising his ability to comply with court directed timelines.
[81] Mr DG was also being urged to complete preparation for a further application that was intended to be filed.
[82] Both parties were required to prepare memorandum for the conference that was scheduled to proceed on 8 April 2019. Neither party did so.
[83] Mr PS contends that the court’s approach in determining to set the matter down for hearing, was dictated in large part by the court’s concerns over Mr DG’s failure to comply with timetabling orders.
[84] It remains uncertain whether that was the case, nor can I definitively conclude that Mr PS’s attendance at the conference would have prevented the matter from proceeding to a hearing.
[85] And that is at the nub of the compensation claim.
[86] It cannot be established with the required degree of certainty, that Mr PS’s attendance at the conference would have discouraged the presiding judge from making orders to set the matter down for hearing.
[87] Mr PS considers that the judge’s decision to timetable the hearing was unusual and unexpected.
[88] I make no comment on that, but I agree with the Committee that there was nothing untoward in Mr PS endeavouring to rectify the problem by filing a memorandum with the court.
[89] Mr PS’s request that the allocated fixture date be vacated was rejected.
[90] A second judge concluded that the matter should be progressed to trial.
[91] The court’s decision to reinforce directions that the matter be progressed to trial reinforced, in Mr PS’s view, argument that the initial timetabling directions made by the court were quite unrelated to his failure to appear.
[92] It is understood that Mr DG, (in my view, genuinely) considers that but for Mr PS’s failure to appear at the conference, the matter would not have been timetabled
for hearing and costs incurred in seeking a necessary adjournment would not have resulted.
[93] But I am in agreement with the Standards Committee, that argument that Mr PS’s oversight had resulted in loss to Mr DG is more appropriately pursued as a claim in the civil court.
[94] Costs incurred by Mr DG in instructing fresh counsel resulted from the retainer being terminated.
[95] Mr DG did not take robust issue with the manner in which the retainer had ended.
[96] It is clear from Mr PS’s file that possibility of the retainer being terminated on grounds that costs were outstanding, had been signalled to Mr DG over a period of time.
[97] But I think it regrettable that Mr PS elected to advise Mr DG that the retainer was being terminated on the same day he received advice from the court that his request to have the trial adjourned had been declined. Productive discussions which addressed both the need for accounts to be put in order, and further steps that could be taken to delay the trial, may have avoided the need for Mr DG to engage fresh counsel.
[98] It is understood that Mr PS would have been anxious to ensure that outstanding costs were paid, but the abrupt termination of the retainer in circumstances (as acknowledged by Mr PS) where his failure to attend the conference had caused distress to Mr DG could, in my view have been better managed.
Publication
[99] Mr DG contends that the severity of the conduct breaches warrant publication of the practitioner’s name. This measure, he contends, would both safeguard the public interest and reinforce to the profession the seriousness of conduct breaches of this nature.
[100] When contemplating the publication of a disciplinary decision concerning a lawyer's conduct, several factors and principles must be carefully weighed.
[101] The question of publication of professional disciplinary proceedings has been considered by the courts on a number of occasions. In S v Wellington District Law Society [2001] NZAR 465 (which concerned an appeal from a decision of the Disciplinary Tribunal not to suppress a name) it was noted that the question of publication:
requires consideration of the extent to which publication of the proceedings would provide some degree of protection to the public, the profession, or the court. It is the public interest in that sense that must be weighed against the interests of other persons, including the practitioner, when exercising the discretion whether or not to prohibit publication.
[102] In Director of Proceedings v Nursing Council of New Zealand [1999] 3 NZLR 360 in which the High Court was considering the basis upon which presumptively private proceedings against a nurse should be open to the public. It was observed in that case (at 383 / 384) that public accountability was an important consideration which must be taken into account when considering such matters. Baragwanath J in that case also identified that values of public education and alerting to risk are related and also of significance. His honour also recognised the privacy interests of the practitioner complained against.
[103] The LCRO has issued guidelines on publication. Factors to be considered include:
- (a) the extent to which publication would provide protection to the public including consumers of legal and conveyancing services;
- (b) the extent to which publication will enhance public confidence in the provision of legal and conveyancing services;
- (c) the impact of publication on the interests and privacy of the complainant, the practitioner or any other person;
- (d) the seriousness of any professional breaches; and
- (e) whether the practitioner has previously been found to have breached professional standards.
[104] Having carefully considered these factors, I am not persuaded that it is necessary that the details of Mr PS’s identity and the circumstances of the complaint be published in a form which identifies Mr PS.
[105] I do not consider that Mr PS’s failure to attend the conference is a breach of such severity or consequence that publication is required to provide cautionary protection to the public or guidance to the profession.
[106] It is understood that Mr DG is concerned at Mr PS’s oversight, and it is approaching the trite to emphasise that it can be expected of lawyers that they conscientiously comply with court directions.
[107] But inevitably on occasions mistakes will be made.
[108] Mr PS says that the mistake was made as a consequence of him being diverted by another matter which resulted in him failing to diarise the impending court date.
[109] Mistakes of this nature, whilst regrettable, will in the best managed practice, happen on rare occasions.
[110] The Committee concluded, (and I agree with its position) that Mr PS’s breach (failure to attend the conference) was inadvertent and at the lower end of the scale.
[111] I do not consider that the Committee’s decision not to publish its conduct findings were prejudicial to the public’s interests as the conduct investigation did not traverse matters of significant public concern.
[112] Mr PS is an experienced practitioner.
[113] He has not, in the course of a very lengthy career, previously been the subject of a disciplinary finding.
[114] Mr PS accepted the Committee’s decision and promptly complied with the orders directed.
[115] He does not on review (as he would be entitled to do in responding to Mr DG’s application) set out to challenge the Committee’s findings that were adverse to him.
[116] I do not consider that a publication order identifying Mr PS is necessary.
[117] To the extent that the issues engaged by this conduct investigation have utility for the profession particularly to remind and reinforce the importance of ensuring compliance with court ordered directions, that objective can be adequately met with direction that this decision be published in a form which conceals the identity of the parties.
[118] I see no grounds which could persuade me to depart from the Committee’s decision.
[119] Pursuant to s 206(4) of the Act, I direct that this decision be published so as to be accessible to the wider profession in a form anonymising the parties and bereft of anything as might lead to their identification.
Decision
Pursuant to s 211(1)(a) of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 the decision of the Standards Committee is confirmed.
DATED this 26TH day of FEBRUARY 2025
R Maidment
Legal Complaints Review Officer
In accordance with s 213 of the Lawyers and Conveyancers Act 2006 copies of this decision are to be provided to:
Mr DG as the Applicant Mr PS as the Respondent Mr FL as a related person
[Area] Standards Committee [X] New Zealand Law Society Secretary for Justice
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