Complaint No C10445 [2017] NZREAA 150 (10 August 2017)

1.1. On 5 August 2016 the Real Estate Agents Authority (the Authority) received a complaint against Licensee 1 and Licensee 2 (the Licensees) from the Complainant.

1.2. Licensee 1 is a licensed Agent under the Real Estate Agents Act 2008 (the Act).

1.5. The complaint does not relate to real estate agency work in relation to a property. It is about the conduct of the Licensees and arises from a dispute about whether the Complainant is liable to pay a commission to the Agency for the sale of the Property owned by the Company where the Complainant is the sole director and shareholder. Licensee 1 is the owner/licensee of the Agency and Licensee 2 was the selling agent for the sale of the Property from which the disputed debt arises.

(a) Licensee 1 arranged for the Gang to collect the disputed debt and the debt collector(s)

(d) Licensee 1 “fraudulently and illegally” lodged a caveat registration against the title to the Property (Complaint 4).

a) Licensee 1 said “...He was gonna employ some pretty serious debt collectors...” if the

i) on 18 June 2016 when he was in the High Court a man he now knows to be the Debt Collector threw a business card at him, and said “do I look like im fucking stupid” and then got evicted from the court by the judge;

j) the Debt Collector said “... Have I got fucking stupid written on my fucking head?”;

m) several days later he spoke to the CEO of the Agency about what had happened;

n) Licensee 1 told a person that he was not calling the Debt Collector or the Gang off the

r) in mid-February 2016 Licensee 2 tried to “...ram him in his car...” while the Complainant was driving on the Property. The Complainant was towing a trailer with two workers on it. Licensee 2 screamed abuse at him and told him to “fuck off my land”;

s) on 12 June 2016 while Licensee 2 was at the Property conducting an open home “... he smashed four golf balls at me before I got to him and told him to stop it as I could have been killed.”

v) prior to Licensee 1 lodging the caveat the Complainant’s lawyer had agreed to pay

$500,000 into court pending the outcome of an appeal against a High Court decision granting the Agency summary judgement for the commission, the subject of the disputed debt;

w) Licensee 1 caveated the Property with the intention of frustrating the sale which was due to settle the next day.

e) The Agency sent Company A an invoice for commission (including GST) of $446,775.00 dated 9 March 2015. Shortly after, a lawyer acting for Company A wrote to the Agency advising Company A had no liability to pay the commission invoice;

h) Licensee 1 had previously been recommended the Debt Collector as a debt collector;

a) in his interactions with the Complainant the Complainant has been “...consistently abusive and aggressive”;

b) he was assisting the purchaser to tidy up the Property prior to the purchaser offering it for sale. The ASP gave the purchaser and its agents access to the land. He considers (by this time) he was an agent of the purchaser and entitled to restrict access onto the Property;

d) he had approximately one ton of weight on the trailer and two men standing on the drawbar holding onto the roof rack of his vehicle when he saw an unknown vehicle drive onto the Property. He drove towards the unknown vehicle at 10 to 15 km/h and pulled

up alongside it. He recognised the Complainant. He asked the Complainant why he was there because the Complainant had been asked not to be there during working hours;

h) during quiet periods it was common practice to hit golf balls off the grassed area at the back of a deck behind an old house on the Property towards the river;

j) the Complainant threatened to kill him and the lady from another agency told him to

k) he met the Complainant’s wife once outside the courtroom. She said to him “... I hate all

this and feel sick about it all or words to that effect, to which I replied I feel genuinely sorry for you, as I’m told you are a nice person”;

2.3 Licensee 1 confirms he was at the High Court with Licensee 2 on 15 August 2016 and “.... although attempted to talk to the “long suffering wife” of the Complainant, nothing was said to her by either Licensee 2 or myself...the Complainant... referred to Licensee 2’s recent operation commenting that he must be a homosexual”.

b) Company B appealed to Court of Appeal - but the appeal was not determined until 10

e) he and his lawyers were threatened with court action by the Complainant (through

3.1. On 19 September 2016 the Complaints Assessment Committee (the Committee) considered the complaint and decided to inquire into it under section 79(2)(e) of the Act.

3.2. On 21 April 2017 the Committee held a hearing on the papers and considered all the information gathered during the inquiry.

3.4. This decision was made under section 89(2)(c) of the Act. The decision was also made with reference to section 73 of the Act.

4.1. The Committee will discuss the nature of its investigation/the law and then outline the reasons for its decision to take no further action.

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4.2. The Act deals with two types of conduct. Unsatisfactory conduct1 and misconduct2.

4.3. Unsatisfactory conduct only arises in the context of a licensee carrying out “real estate agency work” or “agency work””.

4.4. “Real estate agency work” or “agency work”3 is a cornerstone definition in the Act. The relevant part of the definition for this complaint is the first part of the definition:

(a) means any work done or services provided, in trade, on behalf of another person for bringing about a transaction;”

4.5. “Transaction” is also defined in the Act. The relevant part of the definition for this Complaint is:

(a) The sale, purchase, or other disposal or acquisition of a freehold estate or interest in land;”

4.6. Unsatisfactory conduct is the province of a Complaints Assessment Committee (CAC) and is only dealt with by the Real Estate Agents Disciplinary Tribunal (READT) on an appeal. Misconduct is the province of the READT and only it has jurisdiction to deal with misconduct4.

4.7. A CAC is the gatekeeper and has responsibility for deciding whether to refer an allegation of misconduct to the READT5. The READT has jurisdiction to hear an appeal against a decision by a CAC not to refer a charge of misconduct to it. If a CAC refers an allegation of misconduct to the READT it becomes the prosecutor.

4.8. Misconduct is not limited to real estate agency work. Conduct by a licensee which “... would reasonably be regarded by agents of good standing, or reasonable members of the public, as disgraceful...” or “...which constitutes an offence for which the licensee has been convicted, being an offence that reflects adversely on the licensee’s fitness to be a licensee” is misconduct6.

4.9. The allegations made by the Complainant do not relate to real estate agency work (or agency work). The conduct on which the allegations are based was not work done or services provided in trade to bring about a transaction.

4.10. The allegations made by the Complainant here (if true) will only be misconduct if the conduct

of the Licensees “... would reasonably be regarded by agents of good standing, or reasonable members of the public, as disgraceful...”7

4.11. The assessment of conduct as disgraceful (or not) is an objective assessment by the READT and the READT must be satisfied the conduct “... represented a marked or serious departure from the standards of an agent of good standing or a reasonable member of the public”.8

Further, “...Conduct which involves a marked and serious departure from the requisite standards must be assessed as “disgraceful’...”9

4.12. A failure by a licensee to meet contractual obligations alone will not amount to misconduct and “...disciplinary procedures are not the appropriate places to deal with failures of

licensees to meet their ordinary contractual obligations unless those failures are so gross and perverse as to amount to disgraceful conduct”.10

4.13. The Committee does not need to be satisfied an allegation of misconduct is proved before referring it to the READT. If it is satisfied there is a prima facie case, then it will refer an allegation of misconduct to the READT. There will be a prima facie case when there is “... some evidence not inherently incredible which, if we were to accept it is accurate, would establish each essential element in the alleged offending conduct...”11

4.14. The Committee has also taken some assistance from well-known Court of Appeal authorities dealing with what is required for there to be a prima facie case in criminal proceedings.

4.15. In the Court of Appeal case of W v Attorney General the Court discussed the approach to be taken by Justices or Judges conducting a preliminary hearing where a decision there was a prima facie case was required before a defendant was committed for trial. The Court said “...a defendant who does not bear the onus of proof of can go into the witness box and persuade the Court that he should not be committed for trial because, comparing the complainant’s evidence with his own, no reasonable jury would convict.”12

4.16. In the Court of Appeal case of AG v District Court at Christchurch the Court discussed credibility and creditableness in the context of a prima facie case. The Court said “The Judges or Justices conducting any preliminary hearing are concerned only with the creditableness as distinct from the credibility of the evidence. That is not to say that they are not to be concerned with the overall quality of the evidence. But it means that where a case turns on whether a witness is to be believed, a discharge may be ordered only where the evidence of the witness is incapable of belief by any reasonable person. If it is reasonably capable of belief, then it is for the jury, not the Judge or Justices to decide whether it should be believed”.13

4.17. The Committee has assessed the Complainant’s evidence in the following ways;

a) whether the evidence, if unanswered, establishes a prima facie case of misconduct;

b) whether evidence which is answered and which otherwise establishes a prima facie case of misconduct is capable of belief such that the allegation should be referred to the

4.18. The complaint arises in the context of a dispute between the Licensees and the Complainant about whether the Companies associated with the Complainant are liable to pay the Agency a significant commission relevant to a sale of the Property.

4.19. Company A signed an agency agreement whereby it engaged the Agency to sell the Property.

The Complainant is the sole director and shareholder of Company A. At that time, the Property was not yet owned by Company A. Company A was the purchaser under an ASP for purchase of the Property. The Agency introduced a purchaser (the Purchaser).

4.20. Company A was unable to complete its purchase of the Property. Company B entered into an agreement to purchase the Property. The Complainant is the sole director and shareholder of Company B.

4.21. In August 2014 a deed of novation was entered into between Company A as vendor, the Purchaser as purchaser and Company B. Company B acquired the rights and obligations as vendor from Company A and became the vendor for the sale to the Purchaser.

4.22. When the Agency discovered the connection between Company B and Company A and the novation of the agreement between Company A and the Purchaser and that the Company B sale to the Purchaser had become unconditional, Licensee 1 invoiced Company A for a significant commission on the basis that the Agency introduced the purchaser.

4.23. After the Complainant denied any liability for the payment of commission and the debt collector ceased to be involved, the Agency took a summary judgement proceeding in the High Court against Company B and obtained judgment for its commission and costs. A summary judgement is only granted if the court is satisfied a defendant has no arguable defence.

4.24. Company B appealed to the Court of Appeal. Pending the appeal being determined the ASP for sale to the Purchaser fell over and Company B signed an ASP for sale to a different party (the Buyer) and the allegations of an attempt to ram and hitting golf balls at the Complainant arose. Also, Licensee 1 lodged a caveat for registration against the title to the Property the day before the sale to the Buyer was due to settle.

4.25. In September 2016 the Court of Appeal quashed the High Court decision which granted summary judgement to the Agency. It quashed the decision because it considered Company B had an arguable defence to the claim.

4.26. It is not necessary for the Committee to discuss the legal issues traversed in the High Court and Court of Appeal. They are not relevant to its task here.

4.27. The following chronology provides a context in which to place the Complainant’s allegations:

5/9/14	ASP Company B to the Purchaser
9/3/15	The Agency invoice to Company A for commission of $446,775 (including GST)
17/3/15	Company A lawyer letter to the Agency advising Company A has no liability to pay commission to the Agency
15/6/15	Licensee 1 signs instruction for the Debt Collector to collect the commission the Agency considers it is owed
17/6/15	The Gang members/the Debt Collector visit Complaints father and nephew(s)/niece
17/6/15	Initial complaint to police about debt collector harassment
18/6/15	The Debt Collector approaches the Complainant at/in the High Court
19/6/15	Complainant complaint to police about debt collector harassment in/at High Court
9/12/15	The Agency obtains summary judgment against Company B for its commission and costs
13/1/16	Company B ASP for sale to the Buyer
Mid-February 2016	Allegation Licensee 2 tries to ram Complainant
12/6/16	Golf ball incident
5/7/16	Complainant signs an authority for Company B’s conveyancing solicitor to pay $483,172.55 into the High Court
28/7/16	Caveat lodged for registration against title to the Property
15/8/16	Interaction between Complainant and Licensees at the High Court
29/9/16	Court of Appeal quashes summary judgment

4.28. It is clear from the evidence that both Licensee 1 and Licensee 2 have a genuine and strongly held belief that the Agency is entitled to a commission for introducing the Purchaser as a purchaser of the Property.

4.29. It is also clear that both Licensees and the Complainant are strongly emotionally connected to and affected by the dispute and that each party to the dispute has used strong words,

swear words or abusive comments when communicating about it (or is likely to have done so).

4.30. In a follow-up to his complaint when speaking with a REAA facilitator the Complainant refers to “...half a dozen or so threats made...” and then goes on to specify the attempt to ram, the hitting golf ball allegations and comments made by License 2 in the High Court about his wife. The Complainant has provided further information about these allegations in the statement he made to the Committee’s investigator as well as making an allegation Licensee 1 threatened to run him over but he has not provided any specific details of other threats made by the Licensees.

4.31. The Committee has not investigated (and does not investigate) unspecified allegations of threats and has confined its investigation and decision to the specific allegations for which the Complainant has provided details. In respect of the unspecified allegations of threats it considers no further action is necessary pursuant to section 80(2) of the Act.

4.32. This ground of complaint only concerns Licensee 1 who describes himself as “Broker/Owner”

4.33. There are three parts to this ground of complaint. The engagement of the Debt Collector, the conduct of the Debt Collector and the response of Licensee 1 to a complaint or complaints about the conduct of the Debt Collector and its agents.

4.34. The instruction issued by Licensee 1 to the debt collector is addressed to the Debt Collector.

A note to the Complainant accompanies the instruction. There is nothing inappropriate in the wording of the instruction or the note.

4.35. The complaint as stated in the REAA complaint form is that the Agency knowingly organised for the Gang debt collectors to collect the disputed debt. When interviewed by the Committee’s investigator the Complainant says that during a telephone call with Licensee 1, Licensee 1 said he was going to “...employ some pretty serious debt collectors...” and “...he would bankrupt me”

4.36. The Committee’s investigator carried out a company search of the Debt Collector ’s company.

The sole director of the company is the Debt Collector. Further online searches by the investigator disclose information about the Debt Collector being connected with a business which was connected with the Gang.

4.37. Licensee 1 says he had used the Debt Collector on a previous occasion to collect a debt and that the Debt Collector had been referred to him by another agent (the Agent). He had met with the Debt Collector and “He was a big guy who made his presence felt...” but there was no indication he was associated with any gang or the Gang. The Debt Collector was not wearing any gang patches or colours. No complaint arose out of the prior debt collection.

4.38. The Committee’s investigator took a statement from the Agent. She learnt about the Debt Collector from one of her colleagues who had heard him being interviewed on the radio and she was told the interviewer had said that the Debt Collector was “...a big guy and intimidating”. She was not aware he had any gang connections when she referred Licensee 1 to him.

4.39. When the CEO (who provided a statement to the investigation) spoke with Licensee 1 about complaints made to him by the Complainant about the actions of the debt collector(s), Licensee 1 said “...he did not know they were gang related”.

4.40. From the evidence (including the evidence of the actions of persons associated with the Debt

Collector) the Committee is satisfied the Debt Collector has a connection to the Gang.

However, there is insufficient evidence for any reasonable inference to be made that Licensee

1 knew the Debt Collector had a connection to the Gang at the time he engaged the Debt Collector to collect the disputed debt. Licensee 1 denies any such knowledge and if it is accepted (for the purposes of a prima facie case) that he told the Complainant he was going to employ some “pretty serious debt collectors” it is not possible to make an inference of knowledge of the Debt Collector’s association with the Gang from that statement.

4.41. If Licensee 1 knowingly instructed someone connected with the Gang to collect the disputed debt it may well be reasonable to infer an expectation of intimidation in the collection of the debt, and such conduct could reach the threshold for misconduct – on the basis it “...would reasonably be regarded by agents of good standing, or reasonable members of the public, as disgraceful.” It is not reasonable to make such an inference from the fact the Debt Collector was a big man and had tattoos.

4.42. The evidence of the Complainant (even if undisputed) is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of misconduct because the evidence is not capable of proving Licensee 1 knowingly instructed a debt collector associated with the Gang to collect the disputed debt.

4.43. Although the Complainant does not say the Debt Collector and those acting on his behalf engaged in intimidating behaviour towards the Complainant and his family, the Committee interprets his allegation to be of intimidating conduct by the Debt Collector. Two issues arise. Firstly, did the debt collector intimidate the Complainant and his family and secondly was Licensee 1 aware of this.

4.44. The allegation stated on the REAA complaint form is that the Agency “...organised for the

Gang debt collectors to visit my 80 year old father in a retirement home, my 22 year old niece

in another suburb and my nephew’s house”. In a telephone discussion with an REAA facilitator on 15 September 2015 the Complainant also referred to gang members turning up simultaneously at his father’s, his niece’s and his nephew’s properties.

4.45. In a statement made to the police in support of a harassment complaint (which he provided to the Committee) the Complainant says “... Three gang members and the Debt Collector visited my father and nephews making enquiries as to my whereabouts” and they were distressed.

4.46. During an interview with the Committee’s investigator the Complainant says:

a) he received a call from his father saying four member of the Gang were looking for him;

b) shortly after, he received a call from his 22 year old niece in a different suburb saying that four members of the Gang had turned up asking where the Complainant lived, and that they intimidated her to the point where his nephew came home from work to calm her down;

c) shortly after he received a call from his nephew, saying four of them turned up at his

4.47. The Committee’s investigator interviewed the Complainant’s Father. He says he is 80 years old and lives in a unit at the Retirement Village. In 2015 he answered his door to find “... two blokes standing at the doorway...” who asked where the Complainant lived “... They were polite and I told them where he was living...” When they walked away he saw they had gang patches on.

4.48. The Manager of the Retirement Village was also interviewed. She had an interaction with some people who were looking for the Complainant’s Father and observed two of them at his door talking to him. One of them had gang patch for the Gang. She “... mouthed to the Complainant’s Father, ‘are you okay?’ and he indicated he was by nodding his head”.

4.49. The Complainant’s Nephew was spoken to by the Committee’s investigator. He did not provide a statement. He is reported to have said that in 2015, when he was overseas, he received a call from a contractor doing work on his home. The contractor advised him one of his workers had informed him some members from the Gang had turned up at the site (his home). He could not recall any further details.

4.50. There are inconsistencies in what the Complainant says happened and inconsistencies between what he says and what third-party witnesses say. In his initial complaint he says the Gang members visited a 22 year old niece and his nephew. In a statement to the police he says the Gang members visited his nephews. He says his father and two nephews were distressed.

4.51. Neither his father nor the Complainant’s Nephew says they were distressed. The Complainant’s Father says the men who visited him were polite. The Complainant’s could not be distressed because he was overseas. Referring to a 22 year old niece being visited is inconsistent with referring to nephews (plural) being visited. These inconsistencies will be referred to later in this decision as they are relevant to the overall creditableness of the Complainant.

4.52. There is no evidence the Gang members took any active steps to intimidate any witness they visited. The evidence does not establish the witnesses were intimidated. Further, the evidence does not establish Licensee 1 was aware of any association between the Debt Collector and the Gang or that the Debt Collector would arrange for the Gang members to visit the Complainant’s family. What Licensee 1 did when he learnt of the involvement of the Gang members will be discussed shortly.

4.53. In his complaint as outlined on the REAA complaint form the Complainant says the debt collectors “...threatened me inside the High Court whilst Court was in session...” and generally harassed him.

4.54. In a telephone call with an REAA facilitator on 15 September 2015 the Complainant says he received “random calls in the night and general intimidation.”

4.55. A friend of Licensee 1 was interviewed and provided a statement to the investigation. In response to being told by the Complainant that the Debt Collector’s debt collection services were camped outside the Complainant’s property he drove past the house and observed a

car parked to the side of the gate with people in it. He could not recall what sort of car it was and what the people looked like.

4.56. In his statement to the police the Complainant says a person we know to be the Debt Collector threw a business card at him inside a court room and said “... do I look like im fucking stupid”. They had further interaction outside the courtroom about the disputed debt. The statement contains the allegation about a car reversing towards the Complainant. When interviewed by the Committee’s investigator on 4 October 2016 the Complainant said:

a) The Debt Collector pushed past him and sat down - he describes the Debt Collector as a big man;

b) The Debt Collector initially asks Licensee 2 (who is also in court) “...Are you the fucking Complainant?” and the Complainant laughed to himself because “He shit himself” (Licensee 2);

d) There was a further interaction with the Debt Collector outside the courtroom which, as described by the Complainant, has him giving as good as he gets;

e) there is a further interaction with the vehicle containing four members of the Gang with one having a “...softball bat or something” where they reverse towards the Complainant, “... they come screaming down reversing. I would have thought doing 80kms as fast as they could from the top of the street, 300 metres away...”;

g) after leaving the High Court and returning home he finds another vehicle outside his gate with four members of the Gang in it and he says “... Has the organ grinder told you guys what to do yet?” They didn’t know what to do and they did not take up his invitation to come in to the Property and have a chat and “...they hung around the property for about four days”;

h) he assumes that people he saw/interacted with, were the Gang because he didn’t see any gang patches;

i) they kicked in his window at work and he received hang up phone calls in the night;

j) various neighbours told him “they” were outside the gate for four or five days

4.57. The only evidence about what the Debt Collector (or his associates) did or said at the High Court is the evidence of the Complainant. From how he describes what happened it would appear he was not intimidated. There are inconsistencies in his accounts which impact on his overall creditableness (to be discussed further shortly). The complaint to the REAA does not include an allegation that a vehicle with the Debt Collector and the Gang members in it reversed towards the Complainant in a dangerous way. The police statement provided with the initial complaint does not include the page dealing with the allegation of the vehicle reversing towards him. What the Debt Collector first said to the Complainant in the

courtroom is described differently as between the complaint to the police and the statement taken by the Committee’s investigator.

4.58. The evidence about “they” (by inference the Gang) breaking a window, making hang up

phone calls to the Complainant and hanging around the Property for several days is too vague to be of any value. Also, during his interview with the Committee’s investigator the Complainant backtracks from saying, or from the inference he made, about being personally aware of people outside his gate and explains it as the neighbours saying this to be the case.

4.59. Assessing the Complainant’s evidence about what happened at the High Court based on it being unanswered, the evidence is capable of proving the Debt Collector behaved in an intimidating way towards the Complainant. However, there is no evidence which is capable of proving Licensee 1 was aware that the Debt Collector would behave in this way, so Licensee 1 cannot be responsible for the conduct of the Debt Collector and his associates at the High Court.

4.60. The Complainant says that he phoned the CEO of the Agency. He says he did this the day after the incident in the High Court (which occurred on 18 June 2015). He also made complaints to the police on 17 and 19 June 2015.

4.61. He says he complained to the CEO and the CEO phoned Licensee 1 to tell him to stop what was happening. The CEO told him Licensee 1 said “... he will call off the Gang or the debt collectors from visiting your extended family but he’s not gonna call him off you unless you pay the money”.

4.62. He also complained to a Mutual Acquaintance, who spoke with Licensee 1 and Licensee 1 told the Mutual Acquaintance “...I’m not calling him off the Complainant until the money’s paid”.

4.63. In a telephone call with an REAA facilitator on 25 August 2016 the Complainant is reported as saying “multiple people” spoke with Licensee 1 about calling the Gang off.

4.64. The Complainant says after speaking with the CEO and the Mutual Acquaintance Licensee 1 must have paid the debt collector something to make the Debt Collector go away.

4.65. Licensee 1 says after he was advised by the CEO and a member of the police of the complaints made by the Complainant “...the Debt Collector was immediately advised that their assistance was no longer required”.

4.66. No statement has been taken from the CEO. In his statement, the Mutual Acquaintance says he made about three calls to Licensee 1 with the Complainant in the room as well and using a speakerphone. When he asked about gang members and harassment Licensee 1 told him he did not know that the collector was gang-related and “...he would call them off the Complainant’s family, however said to tell the Complainant to give the money and he would

4.67. Licensee 1 says the alleged connection of the Gang with the Debt Collector only became an issue when the matter was brought to his attention by complaints made by the Complainant. As stated above, the Committee does not accept it can be inferred Licensee 1 knew the Debt Collector was associated with the Gang and had an expectation they would be used to intimidate the Complainant and his family, even if he referred to the Debt Collector as a “serious” debt collector. However, after the police and the CEO had contacted him about the complaints, he was aware of the connection.

4.68. Because of the consistency between what the Complainant and the Mutual Acquaintance say about Licensee 1 saying he would not call the debt collector off the Complainant, and

because Licensee 1 did not specifically respond to this factual allegation, the Committee

accepts it as proved that Licensee 1 told the Mutual Acquaintance he would not call the debt collector off the Complainant after he became aware of the gang connection.

4.69. If the Debt Collector and/or the Gang had been involved in any further activities in pursuit of collecting the disputed debt after Licensee 1 became aware of the Gang connection the Committee would find a prima facie case of misconduct for referral to the READT. However, Licensee 1 says he discontinued the Debt Collector’s debt collection “immediately” upon learning of the complaints and the evidence does not establish there were any further debt collection activities by the Debt Collector or the Gang after Licensee 1 became aware of the connection.

4.70. There is a difference between Licensee 1 saying he was not going to call the “dogs” off, to the Complainant and the Debt Collector and the Gang continuing to try and collect the disputed debt. The Committee does not consider Licensee 1 telling the Mutual Acquaintance (or others) he was not going to call the Debt Collector and the Gang off the Complainant as reaching the threshold for misconduct.

4.71. The Complaint says Licensee 1 threatened to bankrupt him. Licensee 1 did not make a specific response to this allegation. It would be misleading for Licensee 1 to threaten to bankrupt the Complainant because the Agency claim was against either Company A or Company B (or both) and not personally against the Complainant.

4.72. However, even if this allegation is undisputed and Licensee 1 said this to the Complainant, it does not reach the threshold for misconduct. In the context of a commercial dispute a threat to bankrupt the other party would not be seen by agents of good standing or reasonable members of the public as disgraceful.

4.73. The Complainant says Licensee 1 made a very specific threat to run him over if Licensee 1 was in a car and saw the Complainant riding his bike. Licensee 1 says he did not threaten the Complainant at any time and did not know he rode a bike. If this allegation is considered in isolation the Committee would find a prima facie case of misconduct and refer it to the

READT. This is so because it is not its task to decide who to believe. However, the Committee must be concerned with the overall quality of the Complainant ’s evidence and, for the reasons set out later in this decision, it has decided the Complainant is not a believable witness or, put another way, his evidence is not reasonably capable of belief. As a consequence, it takes no further action on this ground of complaint.

4.74. The allegations of bad conduct by Licensee 2 can be categorised as follows:

e) he said something to the Complainant’s wife in the High Court, which made her cry.

4.75. The investigation has disclosed several text messages from Licensee 2 to the Complainant

which include words which are abusive. The Committee has also considered whether these text messages can reach the threshold for misconduct (to be discussed shortly).

4.76. In the REAA complaint form the Complainant says he “... had three verbal threats...” from Licensee 2. In a follow-up note to an REAA facilitator dated 22 August 2016 the Complainant provides specific details of three incidents and says “... these are three of the half dozen or so threats made...” In a telephone call with an REAA facilitator on 25 August 2016 the Complainant says Licensee 2 made verbal threats to him.

4.77. The Complainant provides no detail about these other incidents involving verbal threats by Licensee 2. No incident where further details are provided includes evidence of a “threat” by Licensee 2.

4.78. As already stated, the Committee has not investigated (and does not investigate) unspecified allegations of threats and has confined its investigation and decision to the specific allegations for which the Complainant has provided details.

4.79. The Complainant alleges on two occasions Licensee 2 swore at him, telling him to “Get the fuck off” the land/my land (the Property).

4.80. The Committee accepts that both the Complainant and Licensee 2 used swear words when communicating with one another. It also accepts the disputed debt is a matter of strong emotion for both the Complainant and the Licensees.

4.81. A company controlled by the Complainant (Company B) was either the owner of the Property or a purchaser from the owner of the Property at relevant times.

4.82. Licensee 2 says he had been given authority to carry out various activities on the Property on behalf of a purchaser and believed there was agreement between the Complainant and the purchaser for the Complainant to restrict his access to parts of the Property.

4.83. Licensee 2 does not refute this allegation (although he generally disputes all allegations as fabricated).

4.84. It is likely Licensee 2 did order the Complainant off the Property and used a well-known swearword when doing so. When assessing whether a misconduct allegation should go to the READT the Committee is not required to decide who to believe when there is a disputed allegation of fact. Subject to an assessment of the overall quality of the evidence the issue is whether, if the allegation was unanswered, there is a prima facie case of misconduct.

4.85. In the context of an emotionally charged business dispute and where both parties are in the habit of using swear words the Committee does not consider Licensee 2 saying, “get the fuck off” the Property (if he did) reaches the threshold for misconduct.

4.86. The Complainant says Licensee 2 “...tried to ram me in his car...” at a time when Licensee 2 had a trailer on the vehicle with two workers on it. He offered to get a statement from one of the workers. Licensee 2 “...started to scream abuse...” This was one of the occasions when Licensee 2 allegedly told him to “...F off my land”.

4.87. Licensee 2 says he was travelling at 10-15 kmph when he pulled up beside a car, which he did not recognize, containing the Complainant. The Complainant told him to get off his land.

4.88. If Licensee 2 tried to ram the Complainant’s vehicle then Licensee 2 would have put the Complainant at risk of injury and would have put the workers riding on the trailer or tow bar at risk of injury. He would likely have committed several offences including the offence of attempted assault with a weapon (his vehicle being the weapon). An attempt to ram the

Complainant’s vehicle is capable of being misconduct and if the Complainant’s allegation is

believable (rather than believed) then it should be referred to the READT on the basis there is a prima facie case for misconduct.

4.89. However, the Committee does not consider the allegation to be believable. The Complainant provides no factual context to his allegation and the Committee does not find him to be a creditable witness. Looking at the overall quality of his evidence and of this allegation it considers the allegation to be incapable of belief by a reasonable person. Looking at the overall quality of the evidence the Committee has considered:

a) the sense of bravado (and swagger) with which the Complainant describes his response to his described threatening or intimidating behaviour;

b) the Committee detects a theme of exaggeration in the way the Complainant describes events;

d) The allegation that Licensee 1 threatened to run the Complainant over is serious but it was not stated in the original complaint or in the follow up information provided to the REAA and is only stated when the Complainant is interviewed by the Committee’s investigator on 4 October 2016. Also, the Complainant made a complaint to the police about the actions of the Debt Collector and his associates, which did not involve a direct threat of violence to the Complainant but he made no complaint when Licensee 1 threatened to run him over – a threat to do grievous bodily harm or to kill. The Committee considers the story to be growing with the telling;

e) the allegation the Debt Collector threatened him in the High Court, when nothing described by the Complainant amounts to a threat (although it might amount to intimidation, but the Complainant was not intimidated);

g) saying his father and nephews were distressed by their visit form the Gang, when clearly his father was not, and the one nephew spoken to was overseas at the time, getting a secondhand report of the visit, and was not distressed and could not have been distressed;

h) two inconsistent accounts of what the Debt Collector said to him at the High Court (they are similar but different);

m) implying he was aware from personal knowledge that a Gang vehicle was outside his gate for four or five days then saying the knowledge came from various neighbours who said that;

n) speculating about a conversation between the police officer or court officer and the persons in the Gang vehicle outside the High Court “... He’s leaning on the Debt Collector’s door saying, well I’m only lip reading this at this stage and heard a little bit of

it but I think it was along the lines of, ‘if you get out of that car right now you black

p) Not making a complaint to the police about Licensee 1 trying to ram him when he made a complaint about the actions of the Debt Collector and his associates;

q) saying the Licensees abused both him and his wife in the High Court when at worst, if the Complainant and his wife are believed, the evidence only establishes the Complainant being abused by Licensee 2 (and the Complainant’s wife not being abused at all);

r) having a perfect memory of some things, including word for word what was said to him and by him, but having no memory of what Licensee 2 said to him in the High Court (as reported by the Complainant’s wife).

4.90. The Committee finds no prima facie case of misconduct because the Complainant’s evidence is not believable and is incapable of belief by a reasonable person.

4.91. This reasoning applies to any other ground of complaint where, but for the Committee’s assessment of the overall quality of the evidence and the believability of the Complainant, it would have found a prima facie case.

4.92. The Complainant says Licensee 2 saw him walking on the Property and “... smashed 4 golf balls at him”. This was witnessed by the Complainant’s wife and a lady from another agency.

4.93. The Complainant points to a text exchange between him and the Buyer as an admission by Licensee 2 that he was deliberately hitting golf balls towards the Complainant. There is a message in response to a question about whether the Buyer has spoken to License 2 with the response being “... I have spoken to Licensee 2 and he did not disagree with what happened the other day...”

4.94. The Buyer has provided a statutory declaration to the investigation. He says Licensee 2 “... did acknowledge he was hitting golf balls but was not aware of the Complainant’s presence...” and his text to the Complainant was to “mollify him”.

4.95. The Complainant’s wife was interviewed by the Committee’s investigator on 14 December

2016 (around 6 months after the incident). She went to look for the Complainant. She was standing on a hill looking down and she could see golf balls being hit in his direction. She was not sure who was hitting the balls (it could have been Licensee 2 or someone else who was also there). She does not know if Licensee 2 could see the Complainant.

4.96. The lady from the other agency provided a written statement to the investigation. She is a new home consultant and assisted Licensee 2 when running what she describes as open homes on the Property. She would often see the Complainant walking on the Property. She was present during the incident when Licensee 2 was hitting golf balls towards the scrub near a creek. She says the Complainant “... emerged from the scrub and accused Licensee 2 of deliberately trying to hit him with golf balls. Words were exchanged including Licensee 2 advising the Complainant he should not have been on the land in any event, at which point I advised them both to settle down”. She says no other person was present.

4.97. Licensee 2 denies deliberately hitting golf balls towards the Complainant. He was not aware the Complainant was in the area where he was hitting the golf balls and “... When he appeared out of the scrub area (some 20 feet lower than my location and protected by trees and consequently unable to be seen) he accused me of trying to hit him”. He says during their verbal exchange the Complainant threatened to kill him and lady from the other agency told the Complainant to “settle down”.

4.98. If Licensee 2 deliberately hit golf balls towards the Complainant, then that action would be an assault and the commission of a criminal offence. If the allegation is capable of belief then it reaches the threshold of a prima facie case for misconduct.

4.99. The independent witnesses do not describe what happened in a way where it can be inferred that Licensee 2 was deliberately hitting golf balls at the Complainant. With the context provided by the statutory declaration of the Buyer, the text message from the Buyer to the Complainant cannot be interpreted as Licensee 2 admitting to the Buyer that he had deliberately hit golf balls at the Complainant.

4.100. The Complainant’s account lacks factual context - he does not say how close the golf balls came to him.

4.101. Considering that the accounts of the independent witnesses do not support an allegation of deliberately hitting golf balls at the Complainant and because the Committee does not find the Complainant to be a creditable witness (as outlined at paragraph 4.89) and because the Committee finds the Complainant’s evidence not capable of belief by a reasonable person it finds there is no prima facie case of misconduct for this ground of complaint.

4.102. The Complainant says in the High Court on 15 August 2016 Licensee 2 made the

Complainant’s wife cry “... Calling her the long suffering wife and me a fraudster”.

4.103. In his interview with the Committee’s investigator the Complainant says when he and his wife walked into court “... they abused me and my wife” (they, being the Licensees). He talks

about Licensee 2 having a crack at him but not being able to remember what he said and that one of them (not specified) referred to the long suffering wife and her crying.

4.104. The Complainant’s wife was interviewed. She says that as she and the Complainant walked past the Licensees inside the courtroom before court commenced, Licensee 2 said words to the effect of “...you are a fucken bitch-we are going to get you – you are a spineless bitch”. The Complainant responded by saying words to the effect of “...you are fucken dicks - you are not worth it”. She did cry. Later outside the courtroom she heard one of the Licensees refer

to her as the “...long suffering wife...” She does not know which one said this. Later again she had a verbal interaction with Licensee 2 where he referred to the Complainant as getting out of jail free and they expressed a mutual sentiment that they did not like what was happening. She says there was no animosity in his voice.

4.105. Licensee 1 says nothing was said to the Complainant’s wife by either him or Licensee 2.

4.106. Licensee 2 says that when they first saw the Complainant at the High Court he abused Licensee 2 in “vile” terms. He set out the words in his statement to the investigation - and if said, they are abusive and demeaning.

4.107. Licensee 2 says the entire complaint is a “...baseless fabrication...” and describes the interaction at the High Court with the Complainant’s wife on the basis that she said she hated what was happening, was sick about it and he told her he felt genuinely sorry for her. It

would have been preferable for Licensee 2 to respond to the specific allegations made, including the allegation by the Complainant’s wife that he called the Complainant a “bitch” and a “spineless bitch”.

4.108. What the Complainant and his wife say Licensee 2 said at the High Court is different. The complaint is that Licensee 2 referred to the Complainant’s wife as the long-suffering wife and called him as a fraudster. The Complainant’s wife says Licensee 2 called him a “bitch” and a “spineless bitch”.

4.109. If Licensee 2 referred to the Complainant’s wife as a long-suffering wife and called him a fraudster the Committee does not consider such comments reach the threshold for misconduct. They are not abusive of the Complainant’s wife and Licensee 2 had a genuine belief the Complainant had defrauded the Agency of a commission which was justifiably due and payable.

4.110. It is puzzling that the Complainant, who has often a very good memory of what people have said to him and who quotes word for word what was said at times, has no memory of Licensee 2 calling him a “fucken bitch” and a “spineless bitch” and threatening to get him.

4.111. The Committee’s preferred way of approaching this ground of complaint is to only consider the complaint made by the Complainant and not the evidence of his wife. On the evidence of the Complainant there is no allegation he was called a “bitch” and a “spineless bitch” or that there was a threat to get him. In the absence of an allegation by him, and focusing on his allegation of a reference to a long-suffering wife and of him being a fraudster, the Committee is not satisfied there is a prima facie case for misconduct.

4.112. If the Committee is wrong and it should consider the evidence of the Complainant’s wife as a further allegation of misconduct then, based on the allegation being unanswered, the Committee finds by a narrow margin the comments made in the circumstances do not reach the threshold for misconduct.

4.113. The relevant circumstances are that the parties are involved in a commercial dispute of some intensity where the parties mutually communicate using swear words. Also, in the circumstances the Committee does not consider a threat to “get” the Complainant to be a threat of physical violence - it more likely reflects the ongoing litigation between the Agency and the Complainant.

4.114. When assessing whether calling the Complainant a “fucken bitch” and “a spineless bitch” is disgraceful and would be regarded as a marked or serious departure from the standards of an agent of good standing or of a reasonable member of the public, the Committee has taken some guidance from the READT decision of REAA v Subritzky14. A process server going about his normal business had served documents on licensee Subritzky. The licensee had threatened to assault the process server and shortly after sent a text with swear words and

which demeaned him because of his race (South African). The Tribunal found misconduct in the circumstances and said “... agents of good standing and reasonable members of the public would, nevertheless, consider it disgraceful for a licensee to threaten a process server in the manner alleged and, particularly, to send a racially abusive text messages to a person attempting to do his job...” and in the circumstances “The recourse to personal abuse by the defendant was disgraceful”.15

4.115. The circumstances of this complaint are not as serious as those in the Subritzky case. Here there is no threat of physical violence. The abuse (if accepted) is directed to a party to a commercial dispute who gives as good as he gets, rather than a person going about their normal job. There is no racially derogatory element to the abuse.

4.116. The Committee is not required to decide if it is more probable than not that Licensee 2 made the statements alleged by the Complainant’s wife. For the purpose of deciding if the allegation should be referred to the READT it proceeds on the basis the allegation is unanswered. As indicated above, by a fine margin, it takes no further action on this ground

4.117. During the investigation, the Complainant provided the Committee’s investigator with a screen dump of several text messages the Complainant received from Licensee 2 on 13

December 2016. Licensee 2 acknowledged sending the text messages and implies he did so because the Complainant “stalked” his house by sitting outside in a car.

4.118. The text messages accuse the Complainant of being a liar, cheat, fraudster, welsher, that a tsunami is coming his way, that he is a fool, challenges the Complainant to come onto Licensee 2’s property and calls him a “turd”.

4.119. The Complainant has not complained about these text messages. So again, the Committee has a situation where it must decide how to treat evidence disclosed during its investigation which is not specifically part of the complaint made. Again, the Committee prefers only to make findings specific to the allegations made. In the absence of a complaint about this text message the Committee does not find a prima facie case of misconduct.

4.120. If the Committee is wrong and it should consider whether the text messaging raises a prima facie case of misconduct the Committee considers, again by a narrow margin, that in the circumstances the text messages would not be considered by agents of good standing and reasonable members of the public as disgraceful. In the context of the dispute between the Agency and the Complainant it might be fair to describe the Complainant as a liar, cheat, fraudster and welsher. Calling him a “turd” is purely abusive but it is less serious abuse than that in the Subritzky case and arises in the context of an emotionally charged commercial dispute.

4.121. The text messages are not denied by Licensee 2 and he is warned of the risk that if, in the future and in different circumstances, he behaves in a similar way, his conduct may reach the threshold for a prima facie case of misconduct.

Complaint 4: Licensee 1 fraudulently and illegally lodging a caveat on the Property

4.122. The essence of the complaint is that Licensee 1 caveated the title to the Property to prevent a purchaser (the Buyer) from being able to settle. The caveat was lodged the day before settlement and after it was lodged Licensee 1 went overseas and was out of contact for 10 days.

4.123. The Complainant says, “We he had to spend $30,000 to get the caveat removed”.

4.124. The Committee understands the Complainant to be saying in his interview with the Committee’s investigator that the purchaser was not able to settle anyway and the caveat was a conspiracy with Licensee 1 and others to delay settlement and to give the purchaser time to be able to settle.

4.125. The investigation file includes a letter from the lawyer acting for the Buyer which alleges the Complainant “... has waged a campaign to prevent our clients from being able to settle the transaction in order to retain our clients deposit...”

4.126. The Complainant also talks about there being a charging order over the ASP and agreeing to pay $500,000 into the High Court pending the outcome of the appeal. His understanding being that if the appeal failed the money would go to Licensee 1.

4.127. Licensee 1 justifies caveating the Property because the charging order on the ASP was “...being treated with flagrant disregard...” by the Complainant and the purchaser. It was being treated with disregard because some money from the deposit had been paid to the Complainant and Licensee 1 feared the funds which are the subject of the commission dispute might “escape” while he was away overseas. He says an application to the High Court to remove the caveat failed.

4.128. The application to the High Court was not to remove the caveat, rather for an injunction preventing its registration, modified during the hearing to a request for a declaration that the Agency had no proper basis for lodging the caveat. The application failed primarily because the Court considered it was premature as the caveat had not yet been accepted by the Registrar General for registration - it was pending. The caveat was rejected for registration.

4.129. After its successful summary judgement, the Agency obtained a charging order over the

4.130. The investigation file includes an exchange of correspondence between the lawyers acting for the Agency and the Complainant. There is discussion about a charging order over the Property being withdrawn. There is reference to a charging order against the sale proceeds. There is a letter from a lawyer acting for the Complainant to the lawyer acting for the Agency dated 4 July 2016 referring to a charging order against the sale proceeds and advising that following settlement of the sale “... we intend to pay the amount set out in the interim charging order... to your trust account...” The letter goes on to say an undertaking to make the payment will be provided. There is a response from the lawyer acting for the Agency indicating no problem with the proposed course of action.

4.131. There is a further letter from the lawyer acting for the Complainant dated 29 July 2016, after the caveat has been lodged, asking for an explanation and confirming “... The amount of the interim charging order will be paid into Court today by the Purchaser’s Solicitors from the sale proceeds”.

4.132. The lawyer acting for the Complainant makes several requests for information about what caveatable interest is being claimed. The lawyer for the Agency responds saying he is unable to get instructions.

4.133. Licensee 1 talks about lodging the caveat himself because his lawyers were threatened with being sued. However, the decision of the Justice on the application for an injunction/declaration refers to the caveat being lodged the day before settlement then being withdrawn and re-lodged on 4 August 2016 and then a further caveat being lodged on 10

August 2016. The party identified as lodging the caveats is the lawyer acting for the Agency.

4.134. It is not necessary for the Committee to determine why several caveats were lodged or who lodged them (who was responsible on the face of the document(s)). It accepts Licensee 1 physically lodged one of the caveats and notes his explanation for so doing.

4.135. The Committee is satisfied there was no justification for lodging a caveat. The caveat was rejected. Further, arrangements had been made and agreed to by the lawyers for the payment of the disputed debt into the High Court from the proceeds of sale. That some of the deposit had been paid out to Company B and/or the Complainant is not relevant - there were sufficient funds from the proceeds of sale to cover the disputed debt. The Committee must move on to consider whether the actions of Licensee 1 are misconduct.

4.136. The caveat was not registered because the district land registrar did not consider there to be a caveatable interest. The lawyer acting for the Agency in the injunction proceeding taken by Company B argued that the Agency had a caveatable interest.

4.137. Both the Complainant and the purchaser of the Property allege there were conspiracies designed to prevent either party settling the transaction. The Committee is not required to address this as part of its decision-making here.

4.138. The Agency may have lodged the caveat to prevent the sale settling. It may have been lodged to put additional pressure on the Complainant to settle the disputed debt. Licensee 1 may have had a genuine belief that because some money had been paid to Company B from the deposit on the sale, the rest of the money may somehow have been at risk, although in the circumstances the genuineness of such a belief is questionable.

4.139. Clearly on any interpretation of the evidence the caveat was not lodged “fraudulently” and it cannot be said it was lodged “illegally”. There was a legal issue as to whether the Agency had a caveatable interest which is something different from the caveat being lodged illegally.

4.140. The Agency was legally advised, and its lawyer argued in the High Court, that it had a caveatable interest. In the context of a commercial dispute where the Agency had a

summary judgment against Company B for the disputed debt (albeit under appeal) and where it was acting on legal advice when lodging a caveat and irrespective of whether there were

any ancillary motivations by the Agency or Licensee 1 for lodging the caveat, the Committee

5.1. If you are affected by this decision of the Committee, you may appeal in writing to the Real Estate Agents Disciplinary Tribunal (the Tribunal) within 20 working days after the date of this decision (no later than Thursday, 7 September 2017) (Section 111).

5.2. For further information on filing an appeal, read Guide to Filing an Appeal at Mi ni stry of

6.1. At the Committee’s discretion, the decision will be published without the names or identifying details of the Complainant (including the address of the Property), the Licensee and any third parties.

6.2. The Authority will publish the Committee’s decision after the period for filing an appeal has ended, unless the Tribunal receives an application for an order preventing publication. The Authority will not publish the Committee’s decision until the Tribunal has made a decision on the application.

6.3. Publishing the Committee’s decision supports the purpose of the Act by ensuring that the disciplinary process remains transparent, independent and effective. The Committee also considers that publishing this decision helps to set industry standards and that is in the public interest.

(a) means any work done or services provided, in trade, on behalf of another person for the purpose of bringing about a transaction;

For the purposes of this Act, a licensee is guilty of unsatisfactory conduct if the licensee carries out real estate agency work that—

(a) falls short of the standard that a reasonable member of the public is entitled to expect from a reasonably competent licensee; or

(b) contravenes a provision of this Act or of any regulations or rules made under this Act;

(d) would reasonably be regarded by agents of good standing as being unacceptable.

For the purposes of this Act, a licensee is guilty of misconduct if the licensee’s conduct—

(a) would reasonably be regarded by agents of good standing, or reasonable members of the public, as disgraceful; or

(b) constitutes seriously incompetent or seriously negligent real estate agency work; or

(d) constitutes an offence for which the licensee has been convicted, being an offence that reflects adversely on the licensee’s fitness to be a licensee.

(1) A Committee may, in its discretion, decide to take no action or, as the case may require, no further action on any complaint if, in the opinion of the Committee,—

(a) the length of time that has elapsed between the date when the subject matter of the complaint arose and the date when the complaint was made is such that an investigation of the complaint is no longer practicable or desirable; or

(2) Despite anything in subsection (1), the Committee may, in its discretion, decide not to take any further action on a complaint if, in the course of the investigation of the complaint, it appears to the Committee that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, any further action is unnecessary or inappropriate.

(1) A hearing conducted under section 89(1) by a Committee is to be a hearing on the papers, unless the Committee otherwise directs.

(2) If the Committee conducts the hearing on the papers, the Committee must make its determination on the basis of the written material before it.

(3) Consideration of the written material may be undertaken in whatever manner the

(1) A Committee may make 1 or more of the determinations described in subsection (2) after both inquiring into a complaint or allegation and conducting a hearing with regard to that complaint or allegation.

(a) a determination that the complaint or allegation be considered by the Disciplinary

(b) a determination that it has been proved, on the balance of probabilities, that the licensee has engaged in unsatisfactory conduct:

(c) a determination that the Committee take no further action with regard to the complaint or allegation or any issue involved in the complaint or allegation.

(3) Nothing in this section limits the power of the Committee to make, at any time, a decision under section 80 with regard to a complaint.

(a) to hear and determine any application made by a Complaints Assessment Committee for the suspension of the licence of a licensee pending the determination of a charge that the Committee has laid against the licensee:

(b) to hear and determine any charge against a licensee brought by the Committee:

(1) A person affected by a determination of a Committee may appeal to the Tribunal against a determination of the Committee within 20 working days after the date of the notice given under section 81 or 94.

(2) The appeal is by way of written notice to the Tribunal of the appellant's intention to appeal, accompanied by—

(b) any other information that the appellant wishes the Tribunal to consider in relation to the appeal.

(4) After considering the appeal, the Tribunal may confirm, reverse, or modify the determination of the Committee.

(5) If the Tribunal reverses or modifies a determination of the Committee, it may exercise any of the powers that the Committee could have exercised.

23/5/14	Company A signs the Agency agency agreement
11/6/14	ASP Company A to the Purchaser
12/8/14	Deed of novation

New Zealand Real Estate Agents Authority

Complaint No C10445 [2017] NZREAA 150 (10 August 2017)