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New Zealand Yearbook of New Zealand Jurisprudence |
Last Updated: 25 April 2015
Terrorism, Protest and the Law: In a Maritime Context
Dr Ron Smith*
I. IntroductIon
The following discussion has its genesis in a study by this author of the
supposed terrorist threat to shipments of nuclear materials
by sea (and
particularly on dedicated ships),1 which examined a wide range of
imagined scenarios with a view to determining their plausibility in the context
of what is known about
the security arrangements that attend such shipments.
Broadly, it was concluded that the likelihood of an attack of the kind envisaged
resulting in a significant release of radioactive material was extremely small.
Equally, it was noted that all recent examples of
interference (or attempted
interference) with the transportation of nuclear materials (both maritime and
overland) had involved the
activity of protest groups, rather than that of
persons seriously intent on diversion or theft, or the deliberate release of
radioactive
material.
With the strengthening of the law in respect of international terrorism,
there arose a question as to what extent some of this ‘protest’
activity might fall within its ambit. Insofar as this is so, it is taken to be
undesirable, since protesters do not generally intend
diversion, theft, or
environmental contamination, although they may be careless in regard to these
possibilities. On the other hand,
it is argued that some activities of these
protest groups constitute such a danger to the public, and to the interests of
citizens
and organisations, that they ought to be restrained, or ought to accept
some degree of self-restraint. In the maritime context, this
protest activity
extends beyond the more direct manifestations of opposition to nuclear power, to
protests concerning fisheries (and
especially whaling), forestry and mineral
extraction. It is accepted that limitation in regard to this sort of activity is
not likely
to become a matter of law but the development and acceptance of a
code of conduct may be desirable.2
* Senior Lecturer, Political Science & Public Policy, University of Waikato.
1 R C Smith, ‘Terrorism and Maritime Shipment of Nuclear Material’, Packaging, Transport, Storage and Security of Radioactive Material, Vol 18, No 4 (February 2008).
2 The issue has been under consideration by the Sub-committee on Safety
of Navigation of the International Maritime Organisation
for several years but
it now appears that this consideration is unlikely to result in anything beyond
a general resolution calling
upon governments to urge better behaviour on the
part of those involved.
II. ProteSt And the nucleAr terrorISM conVentIon
As noted above, none of the terrorist scenarios envisaged in an extensive
study of the supposed terrorist threat to maritime nuclear
cargoes has actually
been exemplified but it is nonetheless clear that the actions described (which
included attempts at diversion
or sabotage, as well as other kinds of
interference) would be terrorism under the International Convention for the
Suppression of
Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,3 which has been in force
since July 2007. More particularly for present purposes, it is arguable that the
terms of the Convention might
cover some kinds of maritime protest action. The
crucial feature of the Convention as far as this is concerned, is that Art
1(3)(b)
defines ‘nuclear facility’ as ‘any plant or conveyance
used for the transport of radioactive material.’ This
definition would
clearly include dedicated nuclear transport ships, as well as specialist
vehicles (both road and rail) which carry
nuclear materials over land. The
following is amongst the Convention’s schedule of
‘offences’:
Any person commits an offence within the meaning of this Convention if that
person unlawfully and intentionally .... uses or damages
a nuclear facility in a
manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material
(emphasis added):
(i) With the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or
(ii) With the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the
environment; or
(iii) With intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international
organisation or a State to do or refrain from doing an act.
(Art 2,
1(b))
From this we might take the offence of using ... a nuclear facility in
a manner which ... risks the release of radioactive material ... with intent to
compel a natural or legal
person, an international organisation or a State, to
do or refrain from doing an act.
The concept of recklessness with regard to outcomes, which is inherent in
this form of words, was made more explicit in the original
drafting of New
Zealand legislation to implement its obligations under the Convention. Clause
13(3) of the Terrorism Suppression Amendment Bill 2007, section 13C(1) of the
Act was amended resulting in expanded offence which could be committed by
someone who:
3 44 ILM 2005, 815.
(g) without lawful authority, commits an act, or threatens to commit an
act against a nuclear facility, or interferes with [the
operation of] a nuclear
facility with intent to cause, or being reckless as to whether it causes[,]
death[ or] serious injury[ to
any person] or substantial damage to property or
to the environment [by exposure to radiation or release of radioactive
substances].
This form of words gave rise to a fear that the legislation might
inappropriately categorise ‘genuine protest action’
as criminal and
terrorist, and might expose activists to the risk of serious penalties, in the
event of conviction (up to 10 years
imprisonment, or a fine of up to $500,000,
or both).
The issue was raised explicitly in a New Zealand newspaper article, from a
local Greenpeace writer:
.... a shipment of nuclear materials heads through the Tasman Sea, full of hundreds of kilograms of plutonium from France, posing a terrorist risk and also an environmental threat to the Pacific Ocean. A peace flotilla of New Zealanders decides to carry out a peaceful protest. Under the new law, the shipment would be called a ‘nuclear facility’ and the protest could be considered
‘interference’ with the ‘nuclear facility’ and could,
therefore, be considered an act of nuclear terrorism.
In defining terrorism like this, the bill loses its legitimacy, opens up the potential
for abuse and interferes with our civil rights.4
Despite such concerns, the amended legislation was passed. The wording of the
Bill can be found in its entirety in section 13C(1)(g)
of the Terrorism
Suppression Act 2007.
III. ProteSt And the lAW
Assuming that there was no intent to cause death, serious injury, or
substantial damage to property or the environment, the issue
would turn on
whether the protesters could be said to have been ‘reckless’ with
regard to such consequences of their
actions, or, in relation to the words of
the Convention, whether the protestors had ‘used’ the facility in
such a manner
as to risk significant environmental contamination.5
Whether an offence had been committed would clearly depend on,
specifically, what was done in a particular case. In the maritime context,
merely standing off a nuclear vessel and displaying banners, etc, could hardly
be anticipated to have such a
4 Bunny McDiarmid, ‘Right way to tackle terror is not to trample over civilians’, The New
Zealand Herald, 20 August 2007.
5 It is taken that protestors do generally have an intent to
compel parties to ‘do or refrain from doing’ certain things. That is
the point of the activity.
The matter is taken up below, under the heading
‘Civil Protest’.
consequence but what might be said of deliberately obstructing navigation
with the possibility of collision or grounding of a nuclear
cargo vessel?
Something along these latter lines seems to have occurred in July 1999, when the
Pacific Nuclear Transport vessel,
Pacific Teal, carrying a cargo of MOX
fuel bound for Japan, was forced to turn back to the English port of Barrow
because of safety concerns arising
from a Greenpeace protest. In this case, the
protesters towed a raft (on which there was a large inflatable white elephant!)
across
the ship’s path.6
To take a different example, the ships of the Nuclear-free Tasman Flotilla, which set sail from Opua in the Bay of Islands in February 2001, planned to form a ‘symbolic chain’ (with Australian yachts) but said that they would not ‘stop or obstruct’ the ships.7 In the event, they failed to find the nuclear cargo ships at all, so it cannot be known what they might have done had they succeeded in intercepting their quarry. Objectively speaking, however, what was intended would not have fallen within the New Zealand definition of terrorism, as originally proposed. As it happened, the same MOX cargo passed though the Tasman Sea again some 18 months later on its way back to the United Kingdom. In this case Australian Greenpeace protesters ‘buzzed’ the ships for some hours using Zodiacs. Two protesters (one a New South Wales Senator) also threw themselves into the water just ahead of the ships. Again, whatever else might be said of these activities, they would not have been
‘terrorism’. Although there is a clear risk of harm here, that risk is largely to
the protesters and thus could not have significant coercive intent.
The July 1999 (Pacific Teal) case, above, is different. Here it might
be argued that the protest group were at least careless (‘reckless’)
as to
the consequences of their actions, which could have resulted in injury or
damage to property, or, particularly, in this kind of case,
damage to the
environment through the release of radioactive material. It might even be said
that they were ‘using’ the
ship and the ‘risk’ to
achieve their ends. Of course, such an argument would crucially turn on the
facts of the case.
Ironically, the best defence that activists would have, would
be to argue that the conditions of transportation of MOX fuel on PNTL
ships are
such, that the possibility of the release of radioactive material (even in the
event of collision or grounding) is in the
highest degree remote. They were not,
in this sense, reckless, since they knew this very well (even if they did not
publically acknowledge
it). The argument strikes this writer as very plausible,
especially in the Barrow 1999 (Pacific Teal) case. The defence might not
work so well in the case of damage to property, or harm to individuals, both of
which are easily foreseeable
in a situation where
6 NZPA-Reuters, 19 July 1999. Bizarrely, this is not the only use of this whimsical tactic.
Inflated animals were also used by Greenpeace in a timber protest in Spain in 2002.
7 New Zealand Herald, 19 February 2001, p A 7.
navigation is obstructed in confined waters. In this case, it is arguable
that the offence would have been terrorism under New Zealand
law as proposed,
notwithstanding the fact that there was no nuclear threat.
In relation to New Zealand domestic law, some of the above discussion is
moot. The wording of the relevant paragraph (section 13 of
the Terrorism
Suppression Act 2002, as amended) now follows much more closely that of the
Convention. More particularly, section
5(5) of the Act also provides:
To avoid doubt, the fact that a person engages in any protest, advocacy, or
dissent, or engages in any strike, lockout, or other industrial
action, is not,
by itself, a sufficient basis for inferring that the person ... intends ... to
compel (actions or abstentions) ...
or cause outcomes (such as contamination
with radioactive materials).8
All of this is not to say that the protestors in the Barrow 1999 case, above,
do no wrong. Arguably, actions of this kind have the
potential to do
considerable damage, not only to commercial interests but also to individuals
and the environment.
It is also arguable that section 5(5) of the New Zealand Terrorism
Suppression Act (cited above) actually fails in its purpose, in
that persons
engaged in protest, etc, frequently do intend to compel actions or abstentions.
This, as noted earlier, is precisely
their purpose. The protesters at Barrow
were intending to prevent the ship from sailing, just as picketers blocking the
entrance
to a New Zealand supermarket or port, over pay or the use of (say)
non-union labour, are intending to compel owners to comply with
their demands.
Similarly in the maritime context, the activities of Sea Shepherd can hardly be
interpreted as other than having the
objective of forcing the whaling companies
to desist.
The second part of the clause is more difficult to interpret. If certain
‘outcomes’ are plausible consequences of certain
actions, how can it
be inferred that they were not intended?
8 It may also be noted in passing that protest action would generally not be terrorism under British law. In this case, the relevant provision can be found in section 10(2) of the Terrorism Act 2006 (UK) which provides:
A person commits an offence, if in the course of or in connection with the commission of an act of terrorism or for the purpose of terrorism, he uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which –
(a) causes a release of radioactive material; or
(b) creates or increases a risk that such material will be released. (UK
Terrorism Act 2006, Part I, 10 (2).
IV. ‘cIVIl’ ProteSt
Civil disobedience is commonly seen as occupying a position somewhere between
legitimate political activity in a civil society and
manifest illegality.
Following Held, it is taken to be ‘violation of law justified in terms of
conscience, rather than personal
gain’.9 Arguably, this is an
empty category in democratic societies, since such societies provide civil means
to change law and policy. Of
course, this does not apply where (for whatever
reason) the concept of civil order does not apply and institutions do not supply
opportunities for the free expression of opinion, or positively suppress them.
The case of the oceans is different, again. Here it
may be additionally argued
that the issue is not one of freedom of speech but rather one of lack of
interpretation and enforcement
of existing laws.
The general problem with political activists is that they tend to be unable
to tolerate a world that does not conform to their ideals,
so they cannot limit
themselves to persuasion. This is what activists have in common with terrorists.
Terrorists cannot accept a
world in which Islam, for example, is not dominant.
Equally, some environmental activists, Greenpeace for example, cannot accept
a
world in which civilian nuclear activities (or the killing of whales or the
felling of native forests) continue. Both are thus
driven to activities which
are (in their various ways) coercive, and the reason why, even in the case of
protest groups, this is
unacceptable is that it is subversive of the whole
notion of a civil order. Attempts to coerce persons whose activities are not
illegal
(and who cannot be persuaded), inevitably risk harm and loss. This
arises either through the resistance of the persons concerned,
or through the
defensive activities of law enforcement or security agencies. Notwithstanding
that it is hard to accept, the principle
here is that, in a civil society, if we
cannot persuade our fellow citizens, then we must accept that things will not
change. The
principle has a familiar utilitarian basis, in that it will be
generally in the interests of citizens (even those with minority interests)
to
accept policies or practices of which they disapprove, rather than to live in a
society where matters of public policy are determined
by trials of
strength.
Of course, this principle is difficult to accept where we have strong
opinions on the substantive matter. Here, we may be inclined
to think that some
latitude should be accorded where the cause is manifestly a ‘good’
one and where those who support
it are relatively weak in their capacity to
influence events. This is sometimes described as the application of a
‘sliding-scale’
and the concept
was dramatically illustrated in the Kingsnorth Power Station case
(2008).10 In this case Greenpeace activists scaled a power station
chimney to paint a slogan against coal-fired power generation. They were
removed
from the chimney before they were able to complete the job and prosecuted in
Maidstone Crown Court (England). In a surprising
turn of events, they were
acquitted by the jury on grounds of ‘lawful excuse’, specifically,
that they acted against
the greater damage of anthropogenic global
warming.11
Even if we are persuaded by an apparent consensus on the dangers of human
induced climate change (and this author is not) we might
wonder about the
desirability of allowing such extra-legal activity and, especially, in a
democracy. It must surely encourage a perception
that all campaigners, for
whatever cause, may claim ‘lawful excuse’ to impose harm (costs or
damage to interests) on
individuals, organisations, or society as a whole in the
pursuance of that cause. On the other hand, if we don’t wish to do
this,
we need to take a strong line with the ‘sliding-scale’, especially
in the context of a stable, democratic society.
This may be a more difficult
project in the relative anarchy of the oceans but if we wish to lessen that
anarchy, it may be worth
the attempt.
V. A MArItIMe code
A maritime code12 would concern all sea areas beyond the
territorial waters around states and would govern all activities directed
towards securing
political ends in the maritime environment, where at least one
of the parties is not a state party. It would thus not encompass piracy
(where
the motivation is taken to be criminal, rather than political), nor would it
encompass acts of war. Instead, it would aim
to regulate what might be termed
‘maritime civil disobedience’, where the term ‘civil’
denotes what has been
called in the context of action within states, a
‘partial claim’ of justification. The claim of (morally) justified
lawbreaking
is thus based on an ‘exception’ principle. The specific
cause is exceptionally morally worthy and the law-breaking is
an exception to
the general acceptance of an obligation to obey the laws of
the
10 Full details of the case available at <www.sourcewatch.org/index.php?title=Kingsnorth_ Power_Station> accessed 23 October 2008.
11 J Vidal, Not guilty: the Greenpeace activists who used climate change as a legal defence, The Guardian, Thursday 11 September 2008, available at <www.guardian. co.uk/environment/2008/sep/11/activists.kingsnorthclimatecamp> accessed 17 November
2009.
12 The word ‘code’ is used here to indicate that the
provisions of such a document would not be legally binding but would
rather set out an ideal of behaviour for all parties.
land.13 The civil disobedient is thus neither an anarchist nor a
revolutionary, since both of these make a total claim with respect to the
authority of the state, though the reasoning in each case is different. The
anarchist denies any authority to the state on the grounds
that it takes from
his personal (moral) authority. The revolutionary, on the other hand, merely
denies the status of a particular
sovereign administration. He does not deny
state authority per se. Indeed, he may aspire to become such an authority
himself.
Of course, the anarchistic impulse to accord primacy to individual moral
authority is a matter of degree. In the maritime context,
this is illustrated by
the activities of Paul Watson and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society.
In formulating such a code, general principles of civil conduct apply and the
foremost of these is that, where differences of opinion
exist with regard to
policies or practices, these differences are resolved by processes which are
essentially persuasive, rather
than coercive, and that this requirement applies
to all parties, both informal and institutional.
Adoption of such a principle may be justified by reference to what may be taken as the fundamental principle of moral action: the principle of non- malevolence. This states that all members of a moral community have a duty to avoid intentional harm to other members of that community. For present purposes it is taken that the moral community in question is the whole of humanity. It does not include the animal or natural world. It is thus taken that practices to which there may be objection, such as certain kinds of exploitation of the oceans (whaling, mineral extraction), or the transportation of what may perceived as dangerous materials (oil, nuclear materials), or transportation in connection with undesirable practices, such as logging, may be seen as
‘harms’ to human interests, rather than (from a moral point of
view) harms to the natural world.
13 This is essentially the position of Gandhi and followers such as Martin Luther King:
The lawbreaker breaks the law surreptitiously and tries to avoid the penalty, not so the civil resister. He ever obeys the laws of the state to which he belongs, not out of fear of sanctions but because he considers them to be good for the welfare of society. But there come occasions, generally rare, when he considers certain laws to be so unjust as to render obedience to them a dishonour. He then openly and civilly breaks them and quietly suffers the penalty.
D Dalton (1996) Mahatma Ghandi: Selected Political Writings, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc, at 61.
For present purposes it is taken that the principle may be applied to the
breaking of civil order or trespass laws in order to protest
against policies or
practices which may be taken as obnoxious.
From this starting point we may seek to establish a set of secondary moral
principles, which effectively lay out a code of conduct
for the international
maritime environment by analogy with the Geneva Convention rules for
international conflict.14 Further down the track, it may be
envisaged that such a code could evolve into a convention, which might, in turn,
be taken up into
domestic law, which would make the citizens of a particular
country liable to legal sanction in their own country in respect of their
activities in the international domain.
It is also worth noting that international humanitarian law distinguishes jus ad bellum from jus in bello. It is proposed to follow this practice by distinguishing
‘causes’ (say opposition to whaling, or the international
transportation of nuclear materials), from what may or may not
be done in the
maritime environment to promote the cause. Thus, any supposed right to political
action is limited by a general requirement
to do no intentional (or reckless)
harm.
A. Greenpeace Opposition
As indicated earlier,15 limitations of the sort envisaged here are
likely to be seen by protest groups as an infringement of their human rights.
Greenpeace
has already signalled this in a memorandum to the International
Maritime Organisation, in which they say that even a non-binding
code would be
an unwarranted limitation on freedom of expression. The extent of the freedom of
expression that they claim is illustrated
in the example that they give of
legitimate (‘non-violent’) protest (‘a fundamental tenet of
all Greenpeace activities’)
as apparently sanctioned in a 1998 judgement
of the European Court of Human Rights. In this leading case a group of
grouse-shooting
protesters are said to have deliberately walked into the line of
fire of the shooters and were subsequently restrained. The Court
held:
It is true that these protests took the form of physically impeding the
activities of which the applicants disapproved, but the Court
considers
nonetheless that they constituted expressions of opinion ... The measures taken
against the applicants were, therefore,
interferences with their right to
freedom of expression.16
This is a judgment that might be politely called
‘counter-intuitive’. The situation clearly risks serious harm to
protesters,
even if it is a risk they are apparently willing to take. It also
risks harm to grouse-shooters, in that they
14 Available at <www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/CONVPRES?OpenView> as viewed 17 November
2009.
15 Refer to Protest and the Law p 63.
16 Case of Steel and Others v The United Kingdom, Strasbourg, 23 September 1998, paragraph
92 (67/1997/851/1058), accessed date.
may inadvertently shoot a protester and this may result in serious harm to
themselves by way of post-traumatic distress order, for
example. In this case
there is nothing to signify that the grouse shooters were willing to take this
risk. Again, the details of
the situation remind us of the fundamental
similarities between Greenpeace activists and terrorists. The episode has some
of the
hallmarks of what has come to be called, in another context,
‘martyrdom operations’.
More particularly, the general principle of allowing a party to
‘physically impede’ the legal activities of another on
the grounds
of moral objection, is an extraordinary one. It would be productive of
considerable harm and damage (and, indeed, violence)
as parties so impeded
attempt to carry on their lawful business. It is thus not recognised in the
suggested code below.
VI. SoMe eleMentS oF A MArItIMe code
On the model of the original Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field 1864,17 the suggested
‘Maritime Code for the Regulation of Protest Activity on the High
Seas’ (carried as an appendix), is a very brief document,
which is
intended to be suggestive, rather than comprehensive. In what follows, some
justification for the principle elements of
the proposed code is offered. It is
also recognised that many of the activities referred to below are already
proscribed (directly,
or by inference) under international agreements, such as
the SOLAS18 and COLREGS19 conventions, concerned with
the safety of life at sea and the prevention of collisions.
A. Problems of Close Approach
The principle here must be that protest vessels may approach the vessels or
equipment of other parties for the purpose of securing
evidence, or displaying
their opposition to practices or activities but they may not, in relation to
such parties, approach closer
than a distance, which should be specified.
Incidents such as the 2002 attack on the USS Cole and the French oil-tanker
Limburg illustrate
the dangers of allowing inflatable speedboats of the kind
also favoured by protest groups, to approach unchallenged. In these sorts
of
circumstance, ships that do allow close approach may risk serious damage if the
approaching
17 Available at <www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/FULL/120?OpenDocument> accessed 3 December
2009.
18 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (1974), 1 United Nations, Treaty
Series, vol 1184, p 2.
19 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972), United
Nations, Treaty Series, vol 1050, p 16.
vessels are not challenged (and they turn out to be terrorists). On the other
hand, protesters may risk being mis-identified as terrorists
and subjected to
lethal fire, where the subjects of their protest are capable of responding in
this way. More generally, too close
an approach by protest vessels will tend to
prejudice safe navigation and risk harm to both parties, and even to third
parties. The
suggested prohibition applies a fortiori to attempts to
actually cause damage to other vessels, or their equipment, or to their
personnel and should also encompass the fitting
on protest vessels of devices or
attachments designed specifically to damage other vessels or their
equipment.
B. Boarding or attempting to board
There have been several examples of this in both the nuclear transportation
and the whaling context. On the face of it, merely getting
on board a ship and
unfurling a banner, for example, before being taken away by the authorities as
occurred in the case of antinuclear
protesters in the Baltic in 2007, might seem
a minimal harm in relation to the major issue with which the protesters are
concerned.
On the other hand, serious danger could arise, if crew attempts to
interfere with this process result in would-be boarders falling
into the sea and
coming close to the propellers. Again, boarding may be an essential part of a
wider action which is intended to
be more damaging, or which risks such damage,
whatever the protesters may be intending. Recently, whaling protesters in the
Southern
Ocean left behind a tracking device, intended to enable the protesters
to find the fleet at a later date.20 If this happened to a nuclear
cargo ship, protesting boarders (wittingly or not) might leave behind the means
for terrorists to find
the ship at sea, which could result in a quite different
threat.21
C. Obligation to persons in difficulty
It is a self-evident requirement of any code of this kind, that persons in
difficulty, either because they are in the water or because
their boat is
disabled, must be given assistance by the nearest party able to give such
assistance, and that such persons should
be returned to the vessel or vessels
from which they came. On the other hand, to deliberately contrive the
‘persons in difficulty’
situation, such as by jumping into the water
ahead of another vessel, ought
20 R Taylor, Protesters say they have bugged Japanese whalers, Reuters, 24 February 2008, available at <www.reuters.com/article/environmentNews/idUSSYD23429520080225> accessed 3 December 2009.
21 But note the formidable problems that terrorists would still have in
taking the ship or cargo, Smith, above n 1.
to be forbidden. Apart from the inherent danger of this situation, both to
the protester and potential rescuers, it might also be
seen as the maritime
equivalent of Geneva’s ‘perfidy’.
D. Obligations on relevant states
There ought to be a general obligation on Flag States and States within whose
territorial waters proscribed events occur, to take
firm action with regard to
protesters who infringe these rules. Domestic authorities have frequently failed
to discharge these responsibilities
adequately, as in the 2007 situation of the
Atlantic Osprey which was carrying a cargo of nuclear material from the Swedish
port
of Studsvik. The vessel was boarded twice in twenty-four hours, as Swedish
magistrates had released arrested protesters so quickly,
they had time to return
before the ship left Swedish territorial waters.22
Littoral states also need to accept responsibility for ensuring adherence to
the principles of ‘civil’ protest by refusing
to provision and
refuel ships engaged in the sorts of illicit activity described above.
VII. concluSIon
There is a problem with the behaviour of extremist protestors in the maritime
context when it has the potential to cause considerable
harm and loss. This
problem should be dealt with by the promulgation of a code of conduct, which is
supported by the relevant international
and domestic authorities. It is also
noteworthy that the nature of some of these protest activities is such, as to
render the maritime
transportation of materials such as nuclear fuel or waste
potentially more vulnerable than it otherwise would be. This provides a
second
reason for limiting the behaviour of genuine protesters. General acceptance by
the protest community of a range of activities,
which are essentially
non-coercive, would also have the effect of eliminating the possibility that
their actions could be considered
as falling within the legal definition of
terrorism. None of this would infringe the inherent right of all persons to
represent their
views on the better ordering of human society both forcefully
and persistently.
22 R Edwards, Greenpeace activists ‘risk their lives’, Herald
Scotland, 16 August 2008, available at <www.heraldscotland.com/greenpeace-activists-risk-their-lives-1.828444>
accessed 3 December 2009; Greenpeace activists arrested on board nuclear waste
ship, The Local: Sweden’s News in English,
6 October 2007, available at <www.thelocal.se/article.
php?ID=8708&print=true> accessed 17/12/2007).
APPendIx
MArItIMe code For the regulAtIon oF
ProteSt ActIVIty on the hIgh SeAS
1. Protest vessels may approach the vessels or equipment of other parties
for the purpose of securing evidence, or displaying their
opposition to
practices or activities but they may not, in relation to such parties:
a) Approach closer than 500 metres;
b) Interfere with the safe navigation or the equipment of any other
vessel;
c) Intentionally or recklessly harm, or attempt to harm individuals, or
damage or attempt to damage property or the environment;
d) Attempt to remove or release materials from another vessel;
e) Be equipped, or fitted with devices or attachments designed specifically
to damage other vessels or their equipment;
f) Board, or attempt to board.
2. Persons in difficulty, either because they are in the water or because
their boat is disabled, must be given assistance by the
nearest party able to
give such assistance. After any such incident, persons thus aided (and their
boat, or boats, if any) are to
be returned to the vessel or vessels from which
they came. It is forbidden to deliberately contrive the ‘persons in
difficulty’
situation, such as by jumping into the water ahead of another
vessel.
3. Where medical, or other assistance, is offered, parties so helped should
be returned to their own vessel as soon as practicable.
4. In no case may persons be held as a hostage to coerce the future
behaviour of another party.
5. There is a general obligation on Flag States and States within whose territorial waters proscribed events occur to take firm action with regard to protesters who infringe these rules.
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URL: http://www.nzlii.org/nz/journals/NZYbkNZJur/2009/6.html