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In 2006, Parliament made major amendments to the Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) ('Family Law Act') to encourage a greater level of shared parenting, and to give greater emphasis to the importance of children maintaining a relationship with both parents in the absence of violence or abuse. There are major differences between trial judges in how to apply the new laws to the problem of parental relocation — where the primary caregiver wants to move a long way from the other. The central problem is determining how much importance should be given to a parent's freedom of movement given this greater emphasis on the involvement of both parents. There are stark differences in the policy and approach of different trial judges, which have yet to be resolved by an authoritative and carefully reasoned decision of an appellate court.
This article examines these substantial differences in view between judges on this issue since the 2006 amendments, and proposes a way forward based upon revisiting the leading judgment of Kirby J in the High Court in AMS v AIF.[1]
Relocation disputes arise when the primary carer of the child, following separation, wants to move a long way from the other parent, making it much more difficult for that parent to spend time with the children, and that move is opposed by the other parent. Relocation is widely regarded as one of the most controversial and difficult issues for family courts.[2] A New York court wrote in a leading case that relocation cases 'present some of the knottiest and most disturbing problems that our courts are called upon to resolve.'[3]
At the heart of the problem of relocation is the tension between the children's right to maintain a relationship with both parents, and the freedom of movement of the children's primary carer. Major amendments to the Family Law Act by the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth) which came into effect on 1 July 2006, have meant that the resolution of this tension by judges now occurs in a different context from before. These amendments, taken together, place a primary importance on the benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with both parents and require judges to consider making orders that have the effect of sharing the parenting — substantially if not equally.
Major differences have emerged between trial judges on how to interpret and apply the new law to relocation cases. In particular, there are very different views about how to evaluate the importance of freedom of movement when that freedom would disrupt a meaningful relationship between the child and the other parent. A full bench of the Full Court has yet to offer any clear guidance on the fundamental issues of policy and statutory interpretation involved.
In this article, the different approaches to this issue that have emerged are reviewed, and solutions identified consistently with the statements of principle in High Court authorities, and in particular, the leading judgment of Kirby J in AMS v AIF.[4]
Under the law prior to 1 July 2006, the legislation did not accord a particular priority to any factor or group of factors, leaving it to the court to give the various factors whatever weight seemed appropriate in the circumstances of each case.[5] The law of relocation, under this statutory regime, was reasonably well settled, as a result of two High Court decisions.[6]
However, Kirby J made it clear in the first of those cases, AMS v AIF, that 'each case depends on the application of the governing legislation which, in turn, is in a constant state of amendment and re-expression.'[7]
The 2006 legislation represents the latest move by Parliament to amend and re-express the part of the Family Law Act concerned with parenting arrangements. It divides the relevant considerations into primary and additional ones (s 60CC of the Family Law Act). The primary considerations are '(a) the benefit to the child
of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child
's parents
; and (b) the need to protect the child
from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence
.'[8] The best interests of the child remain, of course, paramount, but they are not at large. The assessment of the best interests of the child in a given case relies upon a reasoned assessment of the primary and additional considerations in s 60CC, taking into account the objects and principles of Part VII of the Family Law Act.[9]
The distinction between the primary and additional considerations is very relevant to relocation cases. There need not always be a conflict between the benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with both parents and a parent's freedom of movement. In CH and TW,[10] Sexton FM considered that the father's relationship with his child might improve if the mother were allowed to relocate, given the high levels of conflict and poor communication between the parents. However, in cases where there are no issues of violence or abuse which would require the court to give weight to the other primary consideration under the Act; where there is a close relationship between the non-resident parent and the child from which the child derives a benefit; and where it is not reasonable nor practicable to expect the non-resident parent to relocate with the primary carer, there will often be a conflict between the legislation's encouragement of the active involvement of both parents, and the desire of the primary caregiver to move elsewhere.
Other provisions in the legislation, apart from the primary and additional considerations, also impact on relocation decisions. These include the need to consider whether equal time, or substantial and significant time, are in the best interests of the child and reasonably practicable in cases where the parents will share equal parental responsibility.[11]
It follows, as has been widely observed, that given the change in the factors that the court must consider in determining where the best interests of the child lie, there may well be different outcomes after 1 July 2006 to those that occurred before in similar fact situations.[12]
A full bench of the Full Court has determined several relocation cases on a final basis,[13] as well as dealing with interim issues.[14] It has given some guidance on the sequence in which matters should be considered,[15] and the orders that a court can make, including the question of whether a parent can be ordered to relocate.[16] There have also been some expressions of opinion on the legislation from single judges of the Full Court.[17] However, there has been little guidance on the principles which trial judges should apply in exercising their discretion concerning the outcome of the relocation issue in the light of the changes to the law. The tendency has been to determine the appeals on as narrow a basis as possible, dealing only with the issues raised by the appeal to the extent necessary to do so.[18]
Crucially, the impact of the s 60CC primary considerations on relocation has yet to be determined. Indeed, there is to date no decision which even discusses the relationship between the primary and additional considerations generally.[19] The Full Court seems to be at pains to avoid the issue.[20]
The reported decisions on relocation since 1 July 2006 indicate some starkly different approaches to the application of the 2006 legislation in relation to relocation cases, as a consequence perhaps, of the lack of an authoritative decision from a full bench of the Full Court.[21] There are, for example, significant differences between judges in the process used to analyse the primary and additional considerations in relocation cases. In some cases, judges do not specify how it is that they are giving effect to the requirements of the Family Law Act that certain considerations should be primary and others additional.[22] Having reviewed the primary and additional considerations as if they were one list, the judge announces his or her conclusion without explaining whether he or she is using a series of additional considerations as outweighing the primary consideration of the benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with both parents. In contrast, other judges complete the circle of legal reasoning by referring to how the decision fits with the objects and principles of Part VII of the Family Law Act,[23] or make clear their reasoning process by signifying the weight they give to the primary considerations and any additional considerations that weigh heavily in the balance.[24]
An indication of the differences in approach is that significant differences may be observed in the patterns of outcomes between judges in different cities. The outcomes of reported cases suggest that it is very much easier to relocate to another part of Australia from Melbourne, Perth and Darwin than it is from Sydney.[25] This may reflect different interpretations of the law and beliefs about the best interests of children among clusters of judges who work together in the same location.
In the first case to be determined by a full bench since July 2006, Bale and Jenkins,[26] Finn, Warnick and May JJ quoted the legal principles set out in A v A (Relocation Approach)[27] but without mentioning the 2005 decision in Bolitho v Cohen[28] in which Bryant CJ, May and Boland JJ had stated that 'the decision in U v U has ameliorated the somewhat rigid and/or formulaic suggested approach set out in A v A.'[29] In Taylor v Barker,[30] the Full Court dealt with the grounds of appeal without offering much guidance about the extent to which the principles set out in the pre-2006 case law remained applicable after 2006. The case, involving a particularly difficult factual situation, has very little to say of general application to relocation cases.[31]
The impact of the 2006 legislation on relocation cases was considered by Dessau J in M v S,[32] and her analysis was endorsed by Kay J, exercising the jurisdiction of the Full Court as a single judge, in Godfrey and Sanders.[33] Dessau J noted in that case that:
The legislature has not explicitly prohibited the relocation of a child away from one parent. It has not introduced a specific presumption against it, nor an onus of proof on the moving party. Nor has it suggested that just because the relationship between a child and a parent will inevitably be affected by a move away, that in itself should preclude the court from permitting the relocation.[34]
The approach to relocation cases has also been considered by Boland J, exercising the jurisdiction of the Full Court as a single judge, in Morgan v Miles.[35] In reviewing the case law prior to 2006 and the effect of the amending legislation, she concluded that it remains the position that the child's best interests are the paramount but not sole consideration; a parent wishing to move does not need to demonstrate 'compelling' reasons; a judicial officer must consider all proposals, and may himself or herself be required to formulate proposals in the child's best interests; and the child's best interests must be weighed and balanced with the 'right' of the proposed relocating parent's freedom of movement.[36]
Her Honour also noted that in determining relocation cases, the court must be
guided in its determination by the objects and principles underpinning the legislation. This requires a judicial officer when considering the primary and additional considerations to inform that consideration against a background of the objects including having regard to both parents having a meaningful involvement to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests of the child.[37]
While these propositions are generally uncontroversial, and are not affected by the changes to the legislation, Boland J's statement in Morgan v Miles that the child's best interests must be weighed and balanced with the 'right' of the proposed relocating parent's freedom of movement, requires further consideration. She is not alone in referring to a balance between competing rights. Sometimes, indeed, judges write about the best interests of the child and freedom of movement as if they weigh in the balance equally. For example, Brown FM wrote in P and P:
Relocation cases are invariably very difficult for all concerned, involving as they do two competing and irreconcilable claims of right. These claims of right arise when the parents of a child have separated and for legitimate reasons wish to take different directions as to where they will live in future. On the one hand, there is the right of a parent to live how and where he or she wishes and to get on with life as he or she sees fit, both as a parent and as an individual, separate from the other parent concerned. On the other hand, it is the right of a child to maintain a meaningful relationship with both his or her parents, in the now changed circumstances of his or her parents' separation.[38]
Altobelli FM has noted that only one of these competing and irreconcilable claims of 'right' has been supported by the legislature:
It is possible that in some cases the notion of freedom of movement on the one hand, and the paramount considerations of the child's best interest on the other hand, have been put in the metaphorical balance which occurs as judgment is being exercised in these very difficult cases. If that is the case there must be serious concern about putting such different notions 'in the balance'. It is more akin to comparing apples to oranges, than apples to apples. Indeed, there is no comparison because the High Court and the Full Court have repeatedly stated that the notion of freedom of movement defers to the paramount consideration of the best interests of a child. There is a place for considering freedom of movement in the difficult exercise of judgment that occurs in relocation cases. However, the consideration is not a weighty one. Far more weight must be attributed to the expressly articulated considerations referred to in s 60CC
, than to the unarticulated interest of the parent's' [sic] freedom of mobility that has somehow crept into the Part VII
exercise of judgment. If the legislature had intended to somehow elevate parental mobility to an equivalent status with the existing considerations in s 60CC
it could have done so. Clearly the post 1 July 2006 amendments do not.[39]
Altobelli FM's view is entirely consistent with both the legislation and the High Court authorities. Freedom of movement can only have any weight at all in the balancing scales to the extent that the paramount consideration of the child's best interests has to be qualified by reference to a constitutional right of freedom of movement within Australia. In evaluating the extent to which the Family Law Act must be read down to remain within constitutional limits, it is important to go back to what the High Court has said about freedom of movement, and to examine what the implications are of this in the context of Parliament giving new emphasis to the importance of a relationship with both parents, when there are no issues of violence or abuse, in determining where the best interests of the child lie.
There has been limited analysis in the Family Court and Federal Magistrates Court cases of what it means to say that parents have a 'right' of freedom of movement. From where does this right derive in the context of relocation? The issue was discussed by the High Court in AMS v AIF,[40] in which the mother wanted to move from Perth to Darwin. One of the arguments in the case was about the right given in s 92 of the Constitution concerning movement across state borders. Callinan J summed up the state of the authorities on this matter. He wrote:
The principle which the authorities state is that movement by people between states should be able to take place without regard to state borders. Various formulations have been adopted. Satisfaction of the guarantee of freedom does not require that every form of movement or intercourse must be left unrestricted or unregulated. The freedom of which s 92 speaks must be balanced 'against ... other interests in an ordered society which must be recognised by the law'.[41]
A determination of what (if any) burden might be validly imposed on intercourse or movement depends on the form and circumstances of the intercourse or movement involved.[42]
While Callinan J, in expressing the general principle, said that freedom of movement must be balanced against other interests in an ordered society, the High Court was in agreement in this case that freedom of movement had to be subordinated to the interests and needs of children. Whatever right there may be to cross state borders within the Australian Commonwealth, it had to give way to what is in the best interests of the child.[43]
Kirby J, whose judgment is often cited as the leading exposition of principle in AMS v AIF,[44] was clear that a restraint upon freedom of movement that was 'proportionate to the achievement of the object of the law (and order) in question, viz the attainment of the welfare of a child and the protection of the child's best interests', did not violate s 92 of the Constitution.[45] He noted too that the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child[46] obliges states to ensure that, 'where the child's parents are separated, the child's right to "maintain personal relations and direct contact with both parents on a regular basis, except if it is contrary to the child's best interests" shall be respected.'[47] He was particularly cautious in his expression of the significance of freedom of movement. He did not speak in terms of a 'right' of freedom of movement but rather of a right of adults to decide where they will live (a right which, logically, belongs in equal measure to each parent). He wrote that:
[T]he applicable legislation is enacted, and the relevant discretions exercised, for a society which attaches high importance to freedom of movement and the right of adults to decide where they will live. That is doubtless why courts have expressed themselves as reluctant to make orders which interfere in the freedom of custodial (or residence) parents to reside with the child where they wish, at least where such parent is the unchallenged custodian or has been designated the sole guardian of the child.[48]
In this passage, he indicated that the reluctance of courts to interfere with the freedom of a parent to reside where they wish is a qualified one. At least where a parent is unchallenged custodian or sole guardian, the courts are reluctant to proscribe the parent's freedom of movement. However, that suggests that different considerations might apply where there is some form of shared parenting arrangement as there was, for example, in Taylor v Barker,[49] rather than an unchallenged custodian.
The notion that the parent's right to freedom of movement is subordinated to the best interests of the child has also been applied to international relocation. In U v U,[50] a case of international relocation to which s 92 of the Constitution has no application, Gummow and Callinan JJ (with whom Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Hayne JJ agreed) said:
… whatever weight should be accorded to a right of freedom of mobility of a parent, it must defer to the expressed paramount consideration, the welfare of the child if that were to be adversely affected by a movement of a parent …
The reality is that maternity and paternity always have an impact upon the wishes and mobility of parents: obligations both legal and moral, the latter sometimes lasting a lifetime, restrictive of personal choice and movement have been incurred.[51]
What then, does it mean to say that a parent has a 'right' to freedom of movement? The language of rights in this context is almost entirely derived from authorities beneath the High Court.[52] In B and B,[53] Warnick J identified with great clarity, the logical conundrum. He noted that there are two legal principles that are in competition. The first is the principle that the best interests of the child are the paramount consideration. The second is the right of freedom of movement. He wrote that:
A need for a court to address two legal principles, even if they are in competition, is not unusual. But, in my view, when one is said to be 'paramount' and what is paramount is also superlative, namely the 'best' interests of a child, application of the other principle presents a major challenge to reason…
These two principles and that one is subordinate to the other may be expressed plainly enough. But their application often defies cogent explanation. When put to work, their theoretical relationship disintegrates.[54]
One question he asked was whether the references to the right to freedom of movement 'only make sense if it is acknowledged that in some cases, in the realities of life for separated families to give effect to a parent's freedom of movement, the optimum for the children may not be achieved?'[55]
Kay J, it seems, would answer that question in the affirmative. In Godfrey and Sanders,[56] when exercising the jurisdiction of the Full Court as a single member on an appeal from a Federal Magistrate, he overturned the trial judge's decision not to permit the mother to relocate from a small town about an hour and a half from Melbourne, to Brisbane. The mother and her new husband wanted to move to a warmer climate for her health, and to a city where there was an established congregation of her church. There was a large congregation in Melbourne as well as Brisbane. She and her husband also sought better employment opportunities, although the appellate judgment is silent on why Brisbane would be better than Melbourne (which would mean being in close proximity to the father).
Kay J, in overturning the decision of the trial judge, wrote:
The Act sets out in s 60CC several matters for the Court to consider in determining what is in the child's best interests but does not seek to mandate that any one or other matter becomes determinative in any particular case. For the purposes of this case the legislation requires that there be a primary consideration given to the benefit of the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents but it does not purport to prescribe how that meaningful relationship is best promoted in the circumstances of any one case…
Even if the move results in a diminution of quality of the relationship, what the legislation aspires to promote is a meaningful relationship, not an optimal relationship.[57]
In practice, this approach gives primacy to a parent's freedom of movement unless there are compelling reasons not to allow it. As Warnick J has observed in B and B:
[R]ecognition of the right [to freedom of movement] as a relevant consideration pervades the authorities, here and overseas. In my view, that promotes the impression that the principle really being applied is along the lines of; a move will be permitted if the children will be alright.[58]
On this view, as long as the children are 'alright', even if the move of the parent would not be as good for them as if she remained in close proximity to the other parent, the relocation should be permitted. This, in essence, is the presumption in favour of relocation.
Although presumptions are generally frowned upon in children's matters,[59] this de facto presumption in favour of relocation has a long history. A clear statement of a presumption in favour of relocation is to be found in a 1976 decision of the Full Court in Craven v Craven[60] which was quoted with approval by the Full Court of the Family Court as recently as 2003.[61] In Craven, the Full Court gave primacy to the parent's freedom of movement unless there was clear evidence that this was not in the best interests of the child. The Full Court wrote:
In our view an order restricting the freedom of movement of the custodial parent should be made only if the welfare of the children clearly indicates that the other parent should have regular weekly access rather than less frequent but longer periods of access… when alternatives are considered, there is no preponderance in favour of weekly access provided that it is practical and reasonable to arrange for less frequent but longer periods of access; e.g. 3 or 4 visits each year of one or two weeks duration.[62]
On this approach, unless it can be shown that there will be some harm done to the child by the move, it should be allowed, as long as the non-resident parent could have reasonable blocks of contact three or four times per year. Judges who appear to apply a presumption in favour of a primary carer's freedom of movement tend to treat the primary consideration of a meaningful relationship with both parents as representing a very low threshold.
In contrast, s 60B provides that one of the objects of Part VII is 'ensuring that children
have the benefit of both of their parents
having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests
of the child
.'[63] This suggests that in the absence of competing objects or principles, the outcome ought to be that which allows for the maximum involvement of both parents that is reasonably possible in the circumstances, unless the best interests of the child would be harmed by such involvement. This is the opposite of the approach in Craven. It is, however, entirely consistent with the Full Court's statement in Goode v Goode:
In our view, it can be fairly said there is a legislative intent evinced in favour of substantial involvement of both parents in their children's lives, both as to parental responsibility and as to time spent with the children, subject to the need to protect children from harm, from abuse and family violence and provided it is in their best interests and reasonably practicable.[64]
Notwithstanding the clear statement of legislative intent in Goode v Goode, some judicial officers appear in practice to be applying something like a Craven presumption under the new legislation.[65] These cases are consistent with the view of Kay J that a relationship can remain meaningful even where there is a significant diminution in the quality of the relationship.
An example is Brewster FM's decision in Taylor v Barker, which was upheld on appeal.[66] In this case, the magistrate permitted a mother to relocate with her 9 year old son from Canberra to North Queensland. She had plans to marry a man who was living there and who had two children by his former relationship. These children also lived in that region, and that was a reason why the mother's new partner said he could not move to Canberra. The mother had given birth to a baby from the new relationship.
Prior to the application to relocate to North Queensland, the mother had a shared parenting arrangement with the father. The father was spending 6 out of 14 nights a fortnight with the child. This was not therefore a case where there was an 'unchallenged custodian'. Indeed, when the parenting is shared on a substantially equal basis as in this case, neither parent can be classified as the 'custodian' within the old custody and access paradigm considered in AMS v AIF.
Brewster FM allowed the application. The father was given substantial school holiday time contact. Brewster FM took the view that given the son was nine and a-half years of age 'he will continue to have a meaningful relationship with his father even if face to face contact is confined to school holiday periods.'[67] Surprisingly, perhaps, there was no appeal from that aspect of the decision and therefore the Full Court was not called upon specifically to consider whether such a substantial diminution in the time that the father would spend with his child was consistent with the objects, principles and primary considerations of the legislation.
By contrast, there are other decisions where trial judges have prohibited parents from relocating children on the basis that the move would disrupt a meaningful relationship between the parent and the child. One example of this is the decision of Sexton FM in PBC and LMC.[68] The case concerned parenting arrangements for two children aged 10 and 8 respectively. The mother wanted to relocate from Sydney to Brisbane with the children. The children were living with the mother and spending time with the father 5 nights each fortnight and half the school holidays. The mother proposed that the children spend one weekend a month and half the school holidays with the father. The mother considered that she could provide a better lifestyle for the children in Brisbane. The mother reported to the family reporter, that she was 'lonely and unhappy in Sydney'. The 8 year old girl told the reporter that her mother feels 'very stressed' in Sydney. The option of the father moving to Brisbane was not regarded as a viable one by either parent, and nor was either party proposing that the children live with the father, so the choices for the magistrate involved the children living primarily with the mother either in Sydney or Brisbane. The family reporter suggested that the mother may be unhappy, possibly depressed, if she is forced to live in Sydney and that the mother's unhappiness is likely to impact adversely on the children.
Sexton FM said:
The law provides that the benefit to the children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents is a primary consideration. In the event the children lived in Brisbane, they would not see their father on weekdays and only twice during school terms for short weekends. Even though the father may travel to Brisbane on business occasionally… I find there would be long periods when the children would not see their father. I find in these circumstances, there is a likelihood the children's relationships with the father will become less meaningful.[69]
She was therefore satisfied that the father's proposal best promoted a meaningful relationship between the children and both parents, and as a primary consideration, she gave this factor significant weight. After reviewing all the additional considerations, she found none of them outweighed the primary consideration that children benefit from having a meaningful relationship with both parents. The relocation was refused. This and other cases decided both before and after Godfrey v Sanders which take a similar view of the law[70] illustrate the starkly different approaches of different judges to relocation cases.
How long will the family courts waver between these two very different opinions? The continuing de facto presumption in favour of relocation, applied by some judges, stands in stark contrast to the approach taken, perhaps by the majority of trial judges, but unsupported by the appellate division, in favour of an interpretation of the legislation that places a high value on the benefit to children of maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents.
A starting point in evaluating the debate is to see whether Kay J's approach, and the presumption in favour of relocation which is implicit in it, can be defended after the amendments of 2006. The only plausible basis for such a defence would be that the legislation has to be read down to conform to the Constitution in relation to issues of movement between States. This, in turn, could only be so if the High Court were to endorse Gaudron J's interpretation of the effect of s 92 of the Constitution, rather than the majority's view. She wrote in AMS v AIF that
a law which incidentally and non-discriminately affects interstate intercourse in the course of regulating some general activity…will not contravene s 92 if its incidental effect on interstate intercourse does not go beyond what is necessary or appropriate and adapted for the preservation of an ordered society or the protection or vindication of the legitimate claims of individuals in such a society…[71]
She went on:
there is a difference between what is necessary to protect the welfare of a child or, which is the same thing, to avert a risk of harm to his or her wellbeing, and an order designed to achieve what is thought to be in his or her best interests. An order necessary to protect his or her welfare would not infringe s 92, notwithstanding that it incidentally affected interstate intercourse. On the other hand, an order designed to achieve what is thought to be in his or her best interests cannot, in any sense, be described as necessary.[72]
On that view, it is unconstitutional for a court to promote what is best for the child if to do so places a limitation on a primary carer's freedom of movement across state lines within Australia. The only limitation that can survive constitutional scrutiny is one which is necessary to prevent harm to a child.
Gaudron J was alone in this view among members of the High Court, and it must therefore be seen as very much a minority opinion.
The leading judgment of Kirby J AMS v AIF offers a much better way forward in resolving the stark difference of opinion between judges in the family courts. Kirby J explains how to assess a parent's desire to relocate when determining what is best for the child. That judgment nonetheless requires fresh interpretation in the light of the changes to the law concerning parenting arrangements, because in that case, the mother had sole custody under an order made before the Family Law Reform Act 1995 (Cth) came into effect. Its application to a situation where the parenting is substantially shared, whether or not on an equal basis, requires careful analysis.
A parent who wants to relocate needs to put proposals for how the other parent will be able to spend time with the child. In AMS v AIF, Kirby J set out an approach to the evaluation of the parent's proposals which clearly keeps the focus on what is best for the child. He wrote that the mother's desire to relocate to the Northern Territory
required consideration in that context, of the acceptability of the alternative proposals which she advanced for different, but longer, periods of contact between the child and the father. If this was not judged satisfactory, it possibly necessitated consideration of whether a different regime, devised by the Family Court, would adequately fulfil the child's rights to regular contact with his father although no longer living permanently in close physical proximity. If such arrangements were still judged insufficient for the welfare of the child, that might necessitate, despite the life-long role of the mother as the primary care-giver, reconsideration of the entire issue of custody (or residence) and whether some joint arrangement was not appropriate.[73]
Kirby J's reference to arrangements that are 'sufficient' for the welfare of the child should not be taken to mean that the court may approve an arrangement which is merely adequate rather than optimal in the circumstances. In the context of the whole of his judgment, the welfare of the child must be understood in terms of what is best for the child, for Kirby J used these terms interchangeably.[74] He was clear that what is best for the child overrides a competing claim to freedom of movement.[75]
On Kirby J's formulation, the court must determine whether the relocating parent's proposals for a long-distance relationship between the child and the non-resident parent, or other alternative arrangements for contact that the court can devise, are acceptable in terms of what is best for the child. That in turn must depend upon the relationship between the other parent and the child.
There are no longer sole custody orders under the Family Law Act, and, if the parents have equal shared parental responsibility, the change is far more than just in nomenclature. That makes the principles of AMS v AIF less easy to apply to the law after 2006, but the broad ideas that informed Kirby J's approach remain valid.
Where it is not reasonably practicable to expect the other parent to move, the first question to ask on Kirby J's approach is whether the arrangement which exists prior to the issue of relocation emerging approximates the custody and access regimes of old, in which there is a clear primary carer who looks after the child for the great majority of the time. If so, then the next question to be asked is whether there will be any significant diminution in the quality of the relationship between the non-resident parent and the child if the child were to spend time with the non-resident parent in longer blocks, for example, during the school holidays. That may in turn depend on the distance of the move and the age of the child. Moves of a modest distance may not make much difference to the quality of the relationship between the child and the other parent, even if the move results in some diminution in the amount of time they spend together.[76] Furthermore, there is some evidence from American research that adolescents can sustain close relationships with a non-resident parent if they stay with a non-resident parent for an extensive period during the summer holidays, even if they do not see that parent during the school year.[77] Nonetheless, for many children the loss of frequent contact will be experienced as a diminution of the quality of that parent's involvement in their lives.
On Kirby J's formulation, in a situation where the relationship between the child and the non-resident parent can as well be fostered by longer and more infrequent blocks of time together, as by frequent but shorter visits, and the proposals for such arrangements are realistic and do not impose an adverse burden on the child,[78] then the best interests of the child may not stand in the way of a relocation.[79] It is otherwise where there would be a significant diminution from the optimal if the parent were allowed to relocate with the child. In other words, if the relocation has a fairly neutral effect on the capacity of the child to maintain the relationship with the other parent, being a restructuring of the arrangements rather than leading to a substantial diminution in the quality of the relationship, it should be allowed in the absence of any other reasons why the relocation would be contraindicated. If it will involve a significant diminution from the optimal, it should not.
Kirby J's approach was directed to the situation in AMS v AIF that the mother had sole custody. Indeed, the parents in that case had never married. Where there is a parenting arrangement involving substantially shared care prior to the issue of relocation emerging, different considerations apply. In this situation, to use Kirby J's words in AMS v AIF, the relocating parent is not the 'unchallenged custodian' and has certainly not been designated the 'sole guardian'.[80] On an extrapolation of Kirby J's approach, where there is already a shared parenting arrangement in place, or one for substantial and significant time which presupposes some proximity between the parents so that each parent can be involved with the child during the school week, it would not be appropriate to allow one parent to move a long way from the other unless the court considered (without reference to the parent's freedom of movement) that the child would be better off in the sole care of one parent, and that the child's needs to spend time with the other parent could be adequately met by holiday contact arrangements.
There is nothing in the judgments of the High Court, other than Gaudron J's judgment in AMS v AIF, to suggest that the optimal arrangement for the child can be displaced by the adequate for the sake of allowing a parent's freedom of movement. The best interests of the child are the paramount, if not the sole consideration.[81] As Kirby J put it, 'parents enjoy as much freedom as is compatible with their obligations with regard to the child.'[82]
A further issue on which there are irreconcilable differences of opinion between trial judges is on how the courts are meant to apply s 65DAA of the Family Law Act when a relocation is being proposed.[83] On this at least, the Full Court has offered some guidance, however there remain differences of approach between trial judges, and it is far from clear what the Full Court's guidance means.
Section 65DAA requires the court to consider whether equal time or substantial and significant time are in the best interests of the child and reasonably practicable if the parents are to have equal shared parental responsibility.
That gives rise to a logical problem. If equal time or substantial and significant time are in the best interests of the child and would be reasonably practicable if the primary carer did not relocate, should the proposed relocation lead the court to a decision which is not best for the child? There is nothing in the High Court authorities to suggest this ought to be the result. The parent's freedom of movement is clearly subject to the child's best interests.
In Taylor v Barker[84] Bryant CJ and Finn J stated that the order of analysis ought to be first to consider whether equal time or substantial and significant time are in the best interests of the child and then, if either of these are in the best interests of the child, to consider whether they are reasonably practicable.[85]
They then appeared to indicate that the court must 'balance' the best interests of the child against the relocation proposal. Their Honours wrote:
We acknowledge that his Honour's approach to the application of s 65DAA, which we have endorsed, does require that the matters which the court has to consider under that section (being 'equal time' or 'substantial and significant time'), must initially be considered without regard to any relocation proposal which might also be before the court. However any relocation proposal will then have to be balanced against the option of 'equal time' or of 'substantial and significant time' if either of those options has been found to be in the child's best interests, with the outcome normally emerging from a consideration of whether such an arrangement was 'reasonably practicable'.[86]
There are at least two possible interpretations of this rather delphic paragraph. The first, which is consistent with the outcome of the case, is that even where the trial judge considers that either an equal time arrangement or one for substantial and significant time is in the best interests of the child, the court will not be able to make an order to give effect to the child's best interests if it is not reasonably practicable to do so because the other parent wants to relocate. The difficulty with this interpretation is that it treats as already determined the very issue the court has to decide, which is whether a parent should be permitted to move the children to a location which is far distant from the other parent. Freedom of movement would then trump the judge's determination of what is in the best interests of the child, a clear violation of the statutory requirement to treat the child's best interests as paramount, and the reversal of the position adopted consistently by the High Court. The relocation should not be treated as a given if the relocating parent makes it clear that she or he will not move without the child, as most parents do.
The second interpretation is that their Honours meant that the judge should consider whether it is reasonably practicable for the parent who wants to relocate to remain in the original location or for the other parent to relocate as well, thus allowing the shared parenting arrangement to continue. This view has, for example, been expressed by Thackray CJ of the Family Court of Western Australia. In M and M,[87] his Honour said:
There is nothing in the legislation which indicates there should be any presumption in favour of both parents residing in the current location. The clear thrust of the legislation is that it is ordinarily desirable for both parents to retain meaningful involvement in their children's lives and for each parent to spend as much time with their children as is reasonably practicable. This can usually be achieved wherever the children happen to be living, especially when the relocation is within Australia…
[W]hen considering making orders that will allow the parents to spend equal or 'substantial and significant' time with the children, I am not bound to do so in the context of a mindset that this can only occur in Perth. It could just as easily occur if both parents moved to [the Eastern states]. If it were in the children's best interests, I could make an order that permits [Mrs M] to move to [the Eastern states], but at the same time make an order for [Mr M] to have equal or 'substantial and significant' time with the children. It will then be a matter for him to decide if he wants to avail himself of the benefit of the order by moving to [the Eastern states].[88]
His Honour considered that it was in the best interests of the children to spend substantial and significant time with the father, and this was also reasonably practicable if either he refused permission to the mother to relocate from Perth, or if the father moved to the Eastern states. In the end result, he allowed the mother to move with the children, but postponed it until nearly two years after the hearing had concluded.
The second interpretation is the only one that is consistent with principle and authority. If equal time or substantial and significant time is best for the child, and that can only be attained by restraining the child's relocation, then that should be the end of the matter. Freedom of movement cannot prevail over the child's best interests. This is the view taken by Altobelli FM in M and K.[89] He wrote:
Even in a relocation case, if the presumption [of equal shared parental responsibility] is not rebutted or negated, the court must consider the practicality of equal time if it is consistent with the child's best interest and reasonably practicable, and following that, substantial and significant time. There are probably few relocation applications that are consistent with maintaining equal time or substantial and significant time after relocation unless both parents move…[90]
He went on to say that in such a case, if 'the evidence is that the non-relocating parent cannot move, or it is not reasonable to expect them to move, then it is hard to imagine how relocation could be allowed.'[91]
This approach has also been adopted by Coleman J, another member of the Full Court, in his first instance decision in Corrochio and Corrochio.[92] In this case, Coleman J had to determine whether the mother should be allowed to move from Sydney to the Central Coast with a 5 year old girl. The move was not a substantial distance from the father, but it was sufficient that midweek contact would be impracticable. Coleman J concluded, on the evidence and in particular, on the basis of a clear recommendation in the Family Report, that the father should have substantial and significant time with his daughter, and indeed an increase on the amount of time that he was spending with her before the trial began. Having determined, on the basis of the evidence, that this was in the best interests of the child, the mother's freedom of movement could not outweigh the paramount consideration. His Honour said that only by elevating the mother's freedom of movement to a status above the statutory provisions relating to the welfare of the child could the wife be successful in the parenting dispute.[93] That was not an option available to the Court.
Whatever the majority of the Full Court may have meant in Taylor v Barker, the practice of the majority of trial judges appears to be that, like Coleman J, they consider whether equal time or substantial and significant time is in the best interests of the child and if it is, then it does not cease to be reasonably practicable just because one parent wants to relocate.[94] This is, as has been noted, consistent with Kirby J's reasoning in AMS v AIF. An arrangement for equal or substantial and significant time only becomes impracticable in situations where the evidence of the parent who wants to relocate (or has already done so) is that he or she will not remain in close proximity to the other whatever the judge decides. In these situations, the judge is forced to a choice.
In a situation where the parent who wants to relocate says that she or he will go anyway, with or without the child, the court may be placed in a predicament. It might be best for the child to have both parents living close to one another, but this will not be possible if one parent is adamant about the decision to move, unless the other parent can move also. Any assessment of what is best for the child must take into account the realistic alternatives if the parent decides to relocate with or without the child. An outcome which is not optimal may still be best in the circumstances if there is no realistic alternative parenting arrangement should the primary caregiver choose to relocate without the child. That is why, as Kirby J said in AMS v AIF, the issue of relocation cannot be separated from that of residence.[95]
Kirby J's reference in AMS v AIF to the 'unchallenged custodian' is helpful in this regard.[96] Such a situation needs to be differentiated from the situation where both parents are actively involved and either parent would be able to meet the child's needs. Where both parents are fit caregivers, and it is not reasonably practicable for the other parent to relocate, the court has realistic alternatives and can examine the extent to which the parent who wants to relocate is being child-focused in making that decision. In a situation where either parent can care for the child properly, and one parent's stance in the case is incompatible with what is best for the child, the court may appropriately draw conclusions about who is the most appropriate parent to be the primary caregiver in the long-term. It cannot be held to ransom by one parent's decision to make a choice that the court considers is not in the child's best interests, and it would be incompatible with the court's statutory obligations under Part VII of the Family Law Act to support such a choice.
This may be illustrated by Sealey and Archer.[97] In this case, the father was living in Sydney and the mother was spending much of her time in Melbourne with a new partner. Having considered that it was in the children's best interests to have an equal time arrangement, the judge had to conclude that it was not reasonably practicable given the mother's circumstances. He therefore made orders that the children live primarily with the father and allowed her as much time with the children as was consistent with her capacity to be in Sydney.[98]
As has been widely noted, the relocation issue is gendered.[99] While non-resident parents may be free to move, a primary carer does not have the same freedom if the relocation is opposed by the non-resident parent, at least if she wants to remain the primary carer of the children.[100] One answer that the courts have given to this, quite appropriately, is that the judge should consider whether it is reasonable to expect the non-resident parent to move as well, even if he is very reluctant to do so. Relocation cases are sometimes resolved on this basis.[101] If the other parent can move as well, allowing the primary carer to move need not disrupt the child's relationship with the non-resident parent.[102] However, this resolution to the problem is not as simple as it may first appear.
First, the proposition that only one parent's freedom of movement is limited must be questioned. Both parents are tied to one another by the indissolubility of parenthood.[103] Certainly, only one parent's freedom of movement is restrained as a matter of law. The equality of restraint may, however, be more evident when one considers the practical restraints on a non-resident parent who wants to remain closely involved with the children. To remain close to the children means staying within a reasonable distance of the children's primary carer, and that is a restraint that a great many non-resident parents accept. A recent study in the Netherlands found that when non-resident fathers moved, they moved the least distance of any of the groups in the study. This was hypothesised to be because of their desire to stay near to their children. The estimated moving distance of single mothers with children did not differ from women with children in a first intact family relationship.[104]
Indeed, it may be that the non-resident parent's freedom of movement is more constrained than that of the resident parent. He (or she) cannot move away and compel the children's primary carer to follow.
Secondly, the issue of freedom of movement applies to both parents, since the converse of the freedom to move is the freedom to stay. Both are a subset of the wider principle that parents should be able to choose where they will live — to which Kirby J referred in AMS v AIF.[105] This point was made by Thackray J, as he then was, in G and A.[106] His Honour had to consider whether the mother of a young child should be allowed to move interstate from Perth. The father had very good reasons for wanting to remain in Perth:
It is also worth observing that if I proceeded on the assumption that Peter could and would move to live in [another capital city], and I allowed the relocation on that basis, I would be impinging upon Peter's right of freedom of mobility as much as I would be impinging upon Carol's right of freedom of mobility by making orders that, in effect, force her to remain in Perth. His desire to remain in Perth is as least as strongly felt as is Carol's desire to move. It might also be fairly said that Peter's reasons for wishing to stay in Perth are at least as strong, and arguably far stronger, than Carol's reasons for wishing to move.[107]
If freedom not to move is the converse of the right of freedom of movement then it places each parent's choice of location on an equal footing.
Thirdly, discussion of the issue of the non-resident parent's mobility often assumes that the primary caregiver would want the other parent to move. This is not necessarily the case. Asher and Bloom found that 40 per cent of both male and female movers stated that they left the community in which they had lived while married in order to create physical distance between themselves and their former spouse.[108] If a motivation for relocation is to put distance between mother and father, for whatever reason, then the last thing that a relocating parent will want is for the other parent to move as well.
Fourthly, it will be unreasonable to expect a non-resident parent to move if the evidence indicates that the relocating parent may not settle for long in the new location.[109] This is an issue in particular, for parents or partners of parents in the Defence Force, for whom postings are a regular part of life.
If a case is to be resolved on the basis that it is reasonably practicable for the non-resident parent to move, is this sufficient, or must the court be satisfied also that on the balance of probabilities the non-resident parent will move if the primary carer's relocation is allowed? It may be argued that the latter is necessary in order for the court to ensure 'that children
have the benefit of both of their parents
having a meaningful involvement in their lives, to the maximum extent consistent with the best interests
of the child
.'[110] However, courts cannot by order, ensure that parents have meaningful relationships with their children; they can only create or maintain the circumstances that make meaningful relationships possible.[111] Giving a parent the opportunity to continue to spend substantial and significant time with a child by moving location, when there are very good reasons to allow a primary carer to relocate, may be as much as a court can do to fulfil the statutory objective. It could only do more by taking the draconian step of ordering a parent to relocate.[112]
Furthermore, seeking to determine the probability, as a question of evidence, that the non-resident parent will relocate to be closer to the children is to encourage strategic position-taking in litigation which is counterproductive to the ascertainment of the truth. Determining the reasonableness of a move by the relocating parent, rather than the reasonable prospects of such a move actually occurring, is all that judges, who are not blessed with omniscience or prophetic foresight, can realistically do.
One of the other major issues in relocation cases has long been the weight to be given to the happiness of the primary carer. It is not one of the factors to which judges are required to give consideration under s 60CC. In the post-July 2006 cases, judges vary considerably in their approach. While judges have sometimes decided the issue of relocation on the basis that this was the most significant factor where there was evidence of an adverse impact on the mother if the relocation were not permitted,[113] in other cases, the happiness of the relocating parent has been the determinative factor based upon little more than speculation about how the parent would respond to an adverse decision.[114] These latter cases illustrate the observation of Warnick J, exercising the jurisdiction of the Full Court in B and B, that in the attempt 'to demonstrate that paramountcy has been given to a child's best interests, a formulaic approach may be perceived; traditionally, findings (on what seems often more in the nature of pleadings than evidence) that the denial of freedom to move will diminish the parenting capacity of the party wishing to relocate.'[115]
Clearly, the happiness of the child's primary carer is a significant factor in the wellbeing of children, as Kirby J noted in AMS v AIF.[116] However, there are problems with the way in which speculation concerning the future unhappiness of the applicant for relocation is used as the trump card in resolving these difficult relocation cases. If the happiness of the applicant for relocation were the decisive factor in all such cases, and if it were sufficient for the judge or a family consultant to be able to speculate that she or he would become unhappy if the relocation were not permitted,[117] then no relocation application could ever be refused. Furthermore, the effect on the child of the unhappiness of either parent is likely to depend on how the parents adjust to whatever decision is made. One parent may indeed be deeply unhappy with the result and be unable to cope with whatever decision the judge has made. Another parent may move on, make the best of the situation and find contentment. Adults, like children, vary greatly in their resilience and capacity to get over difficulties and disappointments.[118] There is more than one pathway to happiness.
Furthermore, the possible effects of an adverse decision upon the happiness of the parent who wants to relocate, and how that unhappiness might flow on to the quality of the child's life, needs to be considered in the context of all the other factors that affect children's wellbeing. There is, for example, a great deal of research evidence that many children want more time with the non-resident parent than they have,[119] and as young adults, grieve the loss of father involvement.[120] These factors also are relevant to the happiness of the child, as are the issues for the child in changing school and community.[121]
The Family Law Act, following the amendments of 2006, places a greater emphasis than before on the importance of involving both parents in the life of the child. In many cases, there will be a direct conflict between the best interests of the child as discerned by application of the s 60CC considerations, and a relocating parent's freedom of movement. This is particularly likely where there are no issues of violence, abuse or intractable conflict, it is not reasonable or practicable to expect the other parent to move, and the proposed move is a substantial distance away. As Warnick J put it in B v B, 'the reality is, in my view, that in most cases the right to freedom of movement is a factor that pulls against the best interests of children, as otherwise assessed.'[122]
Section 92 of the Constitution does not require courts to place a parent's freedom of movement ahead of the best interests of the child. The High Court has made that clear in domestic relocation cases, and the best interests of the child were said to prevail over freedom of movement in international relocation cases as well. However, the circumstances of a relocation case at least require the court to explore all the ways in which the parent's freedom of movement can be reconciled with the best interests of the child, before deciding that those interests should prevail over the parent's right to move with the children.
It is far from clear that the courts exercising jurisdiction under the Family Law Act are consistently applying the law either as enacted by Parliament or as laid down (with respect to the constitutional issue) by the High Court. There are differences in approach between judges in relation to almost every aspect of the legislation; whether and how to explain in judgments the weight which has been given to the primary considerations; the weight to be given in practice to the freedom of movement of a primary caregiver; whether a very substantial diminution in the involvement of a fit parent to whom a child has a close attachment is consistent with the objects and primary considerations of the legislation; and what the significance is of the requirement to positively consider equal time or substantial and significant time in cases where equal shared parental responsibility is appropriate. A definitive judgment on the approach to relocation cases is urgently needed.
The Family Law Council made certain recommendations for legislative reform in its 2006 report on relocation.[123] However, much water has flowed under the bridge since then, and the recommendations of the Council will not resolve the major differences between trial judges on how to apply the new law to relocation. It would be preferable for the Full Court of the Family Court to give clear leadership on these issues, as it did in Goode v Goode[124] in relation to interim orders. There is also a very strong case for special leave to be granted by the High Court given the differences of approach between members of the Full Court and the lack of any guidance on key aspects of the legislation after two years.
If the issues cannot be resolved by clear guidance from the appellate courts, then there may be no option but for a more prescriptive approach to be enacted by Parliament. The Family Law Council was correct to say that there should not be a presumption for or against relocation. Such a presumption would be too crude, and sweep up too many disparate fact situations in its wake. There could, however, be a more narrowly drafted provision to protect regular contact and shared care arrangements that are of benefit to the children. One way that this could be expressed is to provide that:
In determining whether a parent's proposed change of location is in the best interests of the child in cases where:
the parents have or will have equal shared parental responsibility
(i) the child has been consistently spending time on a frequent basis with both parents, and
(ii) the child will benefit from maintaining a meaningful relationship with both parents,
(iii) an outcome that allows the child to continue to form and maintain strong attachments with both parents, and to spend time on a frequent basis with both parents, even if it is not as frequent as before, shall be preferred to one that does not.
This recommendation involves giving guidance on outcomes of some relocation cases to trial judges, whereas the Family Law Council recommendations were only aimed at giving the courts more factors to consider.[125]
The proposal above is entirely consistent with the objects and principles of Part VII and with the primary considerations of s 60CC. In cases where there has been a history of violence and abuse, the presumption in favour of equal shared parental responsibility will be rebutted and questions would need to be raised about the benefit to the child of a meaningful relationship with a violent parent. It would also allow for some differentiation between the actively involved non-resident parent and the parent who has not shown a great deal of interest. The provision would only apply where the parent has been frequently and reliably spending time with the children (many fathers with orders for regular contact would fail that test). The provision also recognises that young children will need more regular time than every other weekend in order to form strong attachments. 'Frequent' could be defined in legislation if need be, although the term is used in legislation in the United States without the need for such precise definition.[126] The stipulation that the time spent with the other parent need not be as frequent as before is necessary to ensure that the provision is not used to prevent any diminution in the time that the children spend with a non-relocating parent in a situation where the relocation is not far away, there are good reasons for the move, and it remains possible for the child to still have frequent contact with that parent.[127]
Such a provision would not act as a presumption against relocation even in the cases to which it applies. The test could be satisfied if the relocation was not too far distant, so that Friday afternoon to Monday morning time on alternate weekends is still feasible, or substantial and significant time remains feasible, even if more travel is involved. A provision of this kind would also leave open the option that the non-resident parent could relocate with the resident parent, so that the child continues to see both parents frequently.
A similar approach could emerge from appellate decisions, for such an approach is entirely consistent with the legislation as currently enacted. Judicial guidance is preferable, not least because of the extent of amendments to the Family Law Act in recent years. Judicial guidelines also allow for more nuanced decision-making. However, in the absence of judicial leadership, parliamentary intervention may be necessary to bring consistency and clarity to the law so that people know where they stand, and if possible, litigation can be avoided.
* Professor of Law, University of Sydney and Special Counsel, Watts McCray Lawyers. This research was supported under Australian Research Council's Discovery Projects funding scheme (project number DP0665676). Thanks to Professor Richard Chisholm and to the reviewer for comments on an earlier draft of this article.
[2] W Dennis Duggan, 'Rock-paper-scissors: Playing the Odds with the Law of Child Relocation' (2007) 45 Family Court Review 193; Tim Carmody, 'Child Relocation: an Intractable International Family Law Problem' (2007) 45 Family Court Review 214; John Croker, 'Relocation — Can I Go or Must I Stay?', Handbook of the 13th National Family Law Conference, Adelaide, 2008, 13.
[3] Tropea v Tropea, 87 NY 2d 727, 736 (NY, 1996). See also the comments of the present Chief Justice of the Family Court of Australia, the Hon Diana Bryant, quoting the observation that relocation cases 'pose a dilemma rather than a problem: a problem can be solved: a dilemma is insoluble': House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs, Parliament of Australia, Report on the Exposure Draft of the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Bill 2005, (2005) 22.
[5] Family Law Act s 68F(2) as it was prior to the Family Law Amendment (Shared Parental Responsibility) Act 2006 (Cth).
[6] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
; U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238. A succinct summary of the law was given by the Full Court of the Family Court in Bolitho v Cohen [2005] FamCA 458; (2005) 33 Fam LR 471, 472 explaining the effect of the High Court's decision in U v U: 'The proper approach to be adopted in a relocation case is a weighing of competing proposals, having regard to relevant factors in s 68F(2) of the Act, and consideration of other relevant factors, including the right of freedom of movement of the parent who wishes to relocate, bearing in mind that ultimately the decision must be one that is in the best interests of the child.' There was neither a presumption for nor against relocation. The parent who wished to move did not bear any onus of proving that the relocation was bona fide or reasonable: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
.
[7] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160
, 206.
[9] Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346; (2006) 36 Fam LR 422. As Murphy J has written (in Pitken and Hendry [2008] FamCA 186, [22]), the Act 'prescribes but one method for determining best interests and that is the making of findings in respect of the matters specified in s 60CC.'
[10] [2006] FMCAfam 607, [35]-[36].
[12] See, eg, Eddington and Eddington (No 2) [2007] FamCA 1299, [52], in which Finn, Coleman and Collier JJ, allowing an appeal from a discretionary decision concerning the allocation of time between parents, said: 'Were this appeal to be determined by reference to the statutory framework of Part VII
of the Act as it existed prior to 1 July 2006, the prospects of success would be remote.' See also Bryans and Franks-Bryans [2007] FamCA 377, [70] (Strickland J); M v S [2006] FamCA 1408; (2006) 37 Fam LR 32 (Dessau J) (relocation cases).
[13] Bale and Jenkins [2007] FamCA 809; Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461; Lamereaux and Noirot [2008] FamCAFC 22. See also Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260.
[14] See, eg, Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) [2007] FamCA 1365; (2007) 38 Fam LR 315.
[15] Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.
[16] Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) [2007] FamCA 1365; (2007) 38 Fam LR 315.
[17] See, eg, Morgan v Miles (2007) 38 Fam LR 275 (Boland J); Godfrey and Sanders [2007] FamCA 102 (Kay J). See also McAdam and McAdam [2008] FamCAFC 91.
[18] See, eg, Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461; Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260.
[19] For the author's analysis, see Patrick Parkinson, 'Decision-Making about the Best Interests of the Child: The Impact of the Two Tiers' (2006) 20 Australian Journal of Family Law 179.
[20] The issues concerning the impact of the primary and additional considerations were very helpfully presented to a full bench of the Full Court by Peter Murphy SC as he then was, in Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260. However, the Full Court chose not to deal with them as it considered it did not need to do so on the facts of that case. Murphy SC argued, in the context of a case where the mother had already relocated with the child, that the trial judge had erred in law in concluding that the Orders made by him provided for the father to have a 'meaningful relationship' with the children within the meaning of s 60CC
of the Family Law Act
. In spite of this, the Full Court said that 'no argument based on principle was raised which required us to examine the meaning or parameters of the term "meaningful relationship"': Goldrick and Goldrick [2007] FamCA 1260, [21].
[21] For an analysis of the 58 reported decisions (determined on a final basis) between 1 July 2006 and early April 2008 in the Federal Magistrates Court, the Family Court of Australia and the Family Court of Western Australia, see Patrick Parkinson, 'The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions' (2008) 22 Australian Journal of Family Law 35.
[22] See, eg, D and D [2006] FMCAfam 458; W and P [2007] FMCAfam 105; Gordon and Gordon [2007] FamCA 361.
[23] Kenneth and Kenneth [2007] FamCA 535.
[24] See, eg, MAS and SLC [2007] FMCAfam 28; Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926.
[25] See Parkinson, 'The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions', above n 21. Differences in outcome between cities have also been observed in previous research: Patricia Easteal, Juliet Behrens and Lisa Young, 'Relocation Decisions in Canberra and Perth: A Blurry Snapshot' (2000) 14 Australian Journal of Family Law 234.
[26] [2007] FamCA 809, [62].
[27] [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) 26 Fam LR 382, 408.
[28] [2005] FamCA 458; (2005) 33 Fam LR 471.
[29] Ibid 484. The Court also did not consider whether any of the legal principles expounded in A v A or in the High Court authorities needed to be reconsidered in the light of the changes to the Act. Finn J observed that since the parties were both self-represented, the appeal was not a suitable vehicle for any significant statement of principle from the Court: Bale and Jenkins [2007] FamCA 809, [3].
[30] [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.
[31] The facts and decision in Taylor v Barker and the guidance for deciding relocation cases that may be discerned from the Full Court judgment, are considered further on in this article.
[32] [2006] FamCA 1408; (2006) 37 Fam LR 32.
[34] M v S [2006] FamCA 1408; (2006) 37 Fam LR 32, 38.
[35] (2007) 38 Fam LR 275.
[36] Ibid 276.
[37] Ibid 290.
[38] [2006] FMCA 518, [25]. See also C and C [2007] FMCAfam 1, [25], [28] (Brown FM).
[39] M and K [2007] FMCAfam 26, [56].
[41] Citing Levy v Victoria [1997] HCA 31; (1997) 189 CLR 579
, 607 (Dawson J).
[42] (1999) 199 CLR 160, 248.
[43] See also A v A (Relocation Approach) [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) 26 Fam LR 382, 383. The Full Court said as follows: 'the ultimate issue is the best interests of the children and to the extent that the freedom of a parent to move impinges upon those interests then it must give way.'
[44] Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ agreed with Kirby J's reasons for allowing the appeal: AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 179.
[45] Ibid 216.
[46] Opened for signature, 20 November 1989, 1577 UNTS 3 (entered into force 2 September 1990).
[47] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 217–18. Kirby J also observed that international conventions do little more than restate the problem of relocation, AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 218:
In a sense, the international conventions relevant to this subject merely express the sometimes conflicting principles which are already reflected in Australian law and court decisions: a general recognition of the importance of freedom of movement; an appreciation of the tendency of orders restraining the movement of custodial parents to fall unequally on women; and an acknowledgment that the right of access to the non-custodial parent is not only valuable to that parent but is an important right of the child concerned, to be upheld for that reason in all but exceptional circumstances… International law merely reflects, and repeats, the considerations which give rise to those problems. In this case, it does not throw much light on how they should be resolved.
[48] Ibid 208.
[49] [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.
[50] [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238.
[51] Ibid 262.
[52] See, eg, A v A (Relocation Approach) [2000] FamCA 751; (2000) 26 Fam LR 382, 384 ('The importance of a party's right to freedom of movement'). The language of a 'right' of freedom of movement is surprisingly absent from the leading High Court judgment on s 92 of the Constitution and family law, AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160. That language is only used in describing the mother's submissions. Gummow and Callinan JJ did refer to a 'right' of freedom of mobility in U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238, 262 in the passage quoted above, but in context they were not referring to any legal right under the Constitution (for this was an international case) or a right in international law.
[53] [2006] FamCA 1207. In this case, for some years following separation, the parents had lived in close proximity to one another in Rockhampton. The three children lived with the mother and had contact with the father from after school until early to mid-evening, on Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday in each alternate week of each fortnight and for each alternate weekend and half school holidays. The mother formed an attachment to a man in South-East Queensland and wanted to move there. The Federal Magistrate, applying the law prior to 1 July 2006, allowed the relocation and Warnick J, despite his misgivings about the result, did not interfere with the decision.
[54] Ibid [37], [40].
[55] Ibid [43].
[57] Ibid [33], [36]. Altobelli FM has written of this passage in Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926, [22]:
In Godfrey and Sanders (2007) FamCA 102
Kay J obviously found that any post-relocation diminution of relationship was not, on those facts, significant. I very much doubt if His Honour meant his comments to apply generally. The children in that case were 11 and 7. But if the children were much younger, for example, relocation might have caused a greater diminution in the quality of the relationship between them and the non-relocating parent. It is also unfortunate that His Honour did not have the benefit of contrary submissions as to what constituted a meaningful relationship on the facts of that case.
[58] B and B [2006] FamCA 1207, [46] (Warnick J) (emphasis in original).
[59] Kirby J wrote in AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 207: 'Preconceived notions as to the weight which must be given to particular factors are incompatible with the exercise of an individualised judicial discretion such as is mandated by Australian legislation'. See also McLachlin J in the Supreme Court of Canada in Goertz v Gordon (formerly Goertz): Women's Legal Education and Action Fund (LEAF) et al (1996) 134 DLR (4th) 321, 340: '[A] presumption in favour of the custodial parent has the potential to impair the inquiry into the best interests of the child. This inquiry should not be undertaken with a mind-set that defaults in favour of a pre-ordained outcome absent persuasion to the contrary'.
[60] (1976) 1 Fam LR 11, 276 ('Craven').
[61] D v SV [2003] FamCA 280; (2003) 30 Fam LR 91 (Nicholson CJ, and Kay and Monteith JJ).
[62] Craven (1976) 1 Fam LR 11, 276, 11, 278-9.
[63] Family Law Act s 60B(1)(a).
[64] Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346; (2006) 36 Fam LR 422, 424.
[65] See, eg, M v S [2006] FamCA 1408; (2006) 37 Fam LR 32; Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461; Shelton and Bloomfield [2007] FamCA 311; Mazorski v Albright [2007] FamCA 520; (2007) 37 Fam LR 518; R and M [2007] FCWA 76.
[66] Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.
[67] Ibid 471.
[69] Ibid [23].
[70] See, eg, Kenneth and Kenneth [2007] FamCA 535; MAS and SLC [2007] FMCAfam 28; M and K [2007] FMCAfam 26; Bryans and Franks-Bryans [2007] FamCA 377; Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926; Ryan and Ryan [2008] FMCAfam 92; White and White [2008] FMCAfam 62; Corrochio and Corrochio [2008] FamCA 220.
[71] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 193, quoting from Deane J in Cunliffe v The Commonwealth [1994] HCA 44; (1994) 182 CLR 272, 346.
[72] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 194.
[73] Ibid 226.
[74] Ibid 207–8, 216.
[75] Ibid 216.
[76] D v SV [2003] FamCA 280; (2003) 30 Fam LR 91.
[77] Eleanor Maccoby, Christy Buchanan, Robert Mnookin and Sanford Dornbusch, 'Postdivorce Roles of Mothers and Fathers in the Lives of their Children' (1993) 7 Journal of Family Psychology 24; Christy Buchanan, Eleanor Maccoby and Sanford Dornbusch, Adolescents after divorce (1996) 85.
[78] In evaluating a relocating parent's proposals for the children to spend time with the non-resident parent, it is important to determine how realistic those proposals are. Is the travel affordable in the long-term (particularly given the costs already associated with the court case)? Who will accompany the children if the distances are extensive? How will those travel arrangements be manageable given the likely work commitments of each parent? What burden will the travel impose upon the children? See Parkinson, 'The Realities of Relocation: Messages from Judicial Decisions', above n 21.
[79] The effect of relocation on a child's relationship with the non-resident parent needs to be considered also in the context of the large body of evidence which suggests that frequency of contact, in itself, is not associated with better outcomes for children. What matters most is the quality of the parenting that is made possible by that regular contact. In a meta-analysis of 63 prior studies on parent-child visitation, Amato and Gilbreth concluded that 'how often fathers see children is less important than what fathers do when they are with their children': Paul Amato and Joan Gilbreth, 'Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-Being: a Meta-Analysis' (1999) 61 Journal of Marriage and Family 557, 569. The authors found that emotional closeness, and in particular, authoritative parenting, is highly beneficial to children. On authoritative parenting, see Diana Baumrind, 'Authoritarian v Authoritative Control' (1968) 3 Adolescence 255.
[80] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 208.
[81] For an exploration of this, with particular reference to relocation cases, see Richard Chisholm, 'The Paramount Consideration: Children's Interests in Family Law' (2002) 16 Australian Journal of Family Law 87.
[82] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 224.
[83] For an astute analysis of the conceptual difficulties in the interpretation of s 65DAA, see Pitken and Hendry [2008] FamCA 186, [25]–[32] (Murphy J).
[84] [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.
[85] Ibid 479.
[86] Ibid 480.
[88] Ibid [28], [30].
[90] Ibid [35].
[91] Ibid [36]. See also BJZ and KEM [2007] FMCAfam 86, [47], [48], Lindsay FM agreeing with Altobelli FM. Consistently with that approach, in H and H [2007] FMCAfam 27, his Honour permitted a relocation from Brisbane to Cairns when the presumption of equal shared responsibility was rebutted on the facts of that case as being not in the best interests of the child. There was a very high level of conflict between the parents and his Honour considered that the proposed relocation would reduce the children's exposure to that conflict.
[93] Ibid [82].
[94] See, eg, the decision of Howard FM in Duggan and Starr [2008] FMCAfam 187. Having determined that the child's best interests would be served by the child spending substantial and significant time with the father, the Federal Magistrate then analysed whether it would be possible if the mother relocated to New Zealand. Unsurprisingly, the answer was no. Relocation was refused. See also Blair and Blair [2007] FamCA 253; Eltham and Eltham [2007] FamCA 657; Ryan and Ryan [2008] FMCAfam 92; Ruston and Byford [2007] FamCA 406.
[95] AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 207–8.
[96] Ibid 208.
[98] See also Chatwin and Eales [2007] FamCA 816, [113]–[114]; Glover and Taylor [2007] FMCAfam 926.
[99] See, eg, Kirby J in AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 206: 'overwhelmingly, women constitute the residence parent to whom, in the old nomenclature, "custody" is granted. Of single parent families, the mother is reportedly the residence parent in approximately 84 per cent of cases. Accordingly, in practical terms, court orders restraining movement of a custodial (or residence) parent ordinarily exert inhibitions on the freedom of movement of women, not men'; Gaudron J in U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238, 248: 'it is noteworthy that in this case there was no consideration of the possibility that the father could return to India permanently to avail himself of frequent and regular contact with his daughter. The failure to explore that possibility, particularly given the father's origins, his professional qualifications and family contacts in India, seems to me to be explicable only on the basis of an assumption, inherently sexist, that a father's choice as to where he lives is beyond challenge in a way that a mother's is not.' See also Juliet Behrens, 'A Feminist Perspective on B and B (The Family Court and Mobility)' (1997) 2 Sister in Law 65; Family Law Council, Relocation (2006) 25–8; Chris Ford, 'Untying the Relocation Knot: Recent Developments and a Model for Change' (1997) 7 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 1.
[100] An order with respect to restraining a relocation does not prohibit a parent moving. Rather, it restrains moving the residence of the child. This may be a distinction without a difference where the parent has what used to be called sole custody (see, eg, AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 175 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh and Gummow JJ)), however the position may be otherwise in an era of shared parenting when both parents are involved in caring for the child and if either parent could well meet the needs of the child as primary caregiver.
[101] This was a factor, for example, in the decision of Brown FM to allow a relocation from Darwin to Adelaide in P and P [2006] FMCAfam 518. The cities were not actually named, but 'D' was in the Northern Territory and 'A' was in South Australia. In that case, the parents had moved to Darwin from NSW in order for the father to take up a lucrative employment opportunity. After the breakdown of the marriage, the mother found herself in a situation where she had no reason, independent of the father, to remain in Darwin and had little support. She wanted to move to Adelaide to be close to her family. The father did not think he could get such a good job in Adelaide and didn't want to move. However, there was no real impediment to him doing so and if he chose to do so then he could maintain and develop his relationship with his child. See also T and O [2006] FMCAfam 709.
[102] This option ought to be considered by the court. See U v U [2002] HCA 36; (2002) 211 CLR 238, 248 (Gaudron J), 285 (Hayne J, with Gleeson CJ (at 240) and McHugh J (at 249) agreeing). For commentary on this case, see Juliet Behrens, 'U v U: The High Court on Relocation' [2003] MelbULawRw 20; (2003) 27 Melbourne University Law Review 572. For an argument that the non-resident parent's mobility should always be considered in the American jurisprudence, see Merle Weiner, 'Inertia and Inequality: Reconceptualizing Disputes over Parental Relocation' (2007) 40 UC Davis Law Review 1747.
[103] Patrick Parkinson, 'Family Law and the Indissolubility of Parenthood' (2006) 40 Family Law Quarterly 237.
[104] Peteke Feijten and Maarten Van Ham, 'Residential Mobility and Migration of the Divorced and Separated' (2007) 17 Demographic Research 623.
[105] (1999) 199 CLR 160, 208.
[107] Ibid [92].
[108] Shirley J Asher and Bernard L Bloom, 'Geographic Mobility as a Factor in Adjustment to Divorce' (1983) 6 Journal of Divorce 69, 73.
[109] In G and A [2007] FCWA 11, [61], Thackray J took account of the fact that if he were to decide the case concerning a young child on the basis that the father could follow the mother, it might be the first of a number of moves he would have to make because the mother's previous lifestyle indicated that she was unlikely to settle for a long time in the next location.
[110] Family Law Act s 60B(1)(a).
[111] Parkinson, 'Decision-Making about the Best Interests of the Child: The Impact of the Two Tiers', above n 19, 185.
[112] Sampson v Hartnett (No 10) [2007] FamCA 1365; (2007) 38 Fam LR 315, 328-9. On the application of the injunctive power to ex-nuptial children, see Mills v Watson [2008] FMCAfam 2; (2008) 39 Fam LR 52.
[113] See, eg, Noirot and Lamereaux [2007] FamCA 422, [177], Trench J observed: 'Were it not for the mother's current state of depression and more importantly the prospect of her progressing into severe depression, I would have concluded that the best interests of the son dictated that the mother not remove him from Australia at this time.' This decision has been overturned on appeal and a re-trial ordered, inter alia, because of issues concerning the assessment of the psychologist's evidence: Lamereaux and Noirot [2008] FamCAFC 22.
[114] See, eg, D and D [2006] FMCAfam 458; Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461.
[115] [2006] FamCA 1207, [47].
[116] In AMS v AIF (1999) 199 CLR 160, 208, Kirby J stated:
Courts recognise that unwarranted interference in the life of a custodial parent may itself occasion bitterness towards the former spouse or partner which may be transmitted to the child or otherwise impinge on the happiness of the custodial (or residence) parent in a way likely to affect the welfare or best interests of the child.
[117] See, eg, Taylor v Barker [2007] Fam CA 1236; (2007) 37 Fam LR 461, 484-5.
[118] The likelihood that both parents would be able and willing to cope with an adverse decision was specifically taken into account by Thackray CJ in M and M [2007] FCWA 47, [76]. Thackray CJ said:
I also consider it important to say that I consider [Mrs M] would do a good job in endeavouring to conceal her unhappiness and frustration in the event she was forced to remain in Perth. In this regard, it should also be kept in mind that if [Mr M] did decide to move to [the Eastern states] to follow [Mrs M] and the children, there is a possibility he would be unhappy, having been forced to leave his home town and his family. Nevertheless, I am satisfied that he too would do a good job in ensuring that this did not unduly interfere with his capacity to care for the children during the times that they would spend with him.
[119] Patrick Parkinson, Judy Cashmore and Judi Single, 'Adolescents' Views on the Fairness of Parenting and Financial Arrangements After Separation' (2005) 43 Family Court Review 429; Anne Smith and Megan Gollop, 'Children's Perspectives on Access Visits' [2001] Butterworths Family Law Journal 259; R Neugebauer, 'Divorce, Custody and Visitation: The Child's Point of View' (1989) 12 Journal of Divorce 153; Yvette Walczak and Sheila Burns, Divorce: The Child's Point of View (1984).
[120] Lisa Laumann-Billings and Robert Emery, 'Distress Among Young Adults From Divorced Families' (2000) 14 Journal of Family Psychology 671. See also William Fabricius and Jeffrey Hall, 'Young Adults' Perspectives on Divorce: Living Arrangements' (2000) 38 Family and Conciliation Courts Review 446.
[121] Residential mobility is a risk factor for children after separation. For a review, see William Austin, 'Relocation, Research and Forensic Evaluation, Part 1: Effects of Residential Mobility on Children of Divorce' (2008) 46 Family Court Review 137. McLanahan and Sandfur reported that residential mobility explained two thirds of the difference between children in single-parent families and two-parent families in high school drop-out rates, and all of the difference between step-families and two parent families. The researchers also found that residential mobility accounts for 30 per cent of the increase in the risk of a teen birth compared with two parent families: Sara McLanahan and Garry Sandefur, Growing Up with a Single Parent: What Hurts, What Helps (1994) 129–31. See also Nan Marie Astone and Sara McLanahan, 'Family Structure, Residential Mobility and School Dropout: A Research Note' (1994) 31 Demography 575.
[122] [2006] FamCA 1207, [48].
[123] Family Law Council, Relocation (2006).
[124] Goode v Goode [2006] FamCA 1346; (2006) 36 Fam LR 422.
[125] The author was chair of the Council at the time of this Report, but was not a member of the subcommittee of the Council that had responsibility for the report's preparation.
[126] See, eg, Missouri Annotated Statutes § 452.375 (West, 2004): 'The general assembly finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state that frequent, continuing and meaningful contact with both parents after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage is in the best interest of the child, except for cases where the court specifically finds that such contact is not in the best interest of the child…'; see also California Family Code §3020; Florida Statutes Annotated §61.13(3)(a) (West, 2004); Maine Revised Statutes Annotated §1653(1)(C) (West, 2004); Oklahoma Statutes §43–110.1 (West, 2004).
[127] D v SV [2003] FamCA 280; (2003) 30 Fam LR 91.
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