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by Sarah Pritchard
Like most doctrines of international law which developed before 1945, self-determination has typically eurocentric origins. Beginning with the French revolution, the gradual recognition of rights of national groups coincided with developing nationalism in the Ottoman, Austrian, German and Russian empires of the 18th and 19th centuries. Without actually mentioning a right of self-determination, numerous international treaties of the 19th Century facilitated the realisation of national self-determination. State practice, however, was far from recognising a right to self-determination except for opportunistic reasons.
During the First World War, the principles of nationalities and of self-determination were the subject of Declarations by Governments as well as of manifestos of nationalist movements. In 1916, the Allies declared the conclusion of peace possible only under recognition of the principles of nationalities[1] and at the conclusion of the War, the principle of self-determination of nationalities emerged as the basis for the territorial reconstruction of Europe. However, at the Peace Conference of Versailles, territorial adjustments in accordance with the right of self-determination encountered difficulties and a reference to it in a draft of the the League of Nations Covenant was omitted.[2] The geopolitical and strategic interests of the Great Powers ensured that the Versailles map-making frequently ignored the aspirations of peoples affected and that plebiscites were only conducted in relation to small and economically insignificant areas. The Conference envisaged, as a palliative, the introduction of a system for the protection of minorities.[3] Minorities treaties concluded with new or enlarged States, peace treaties concluded with defeated States and a series of declarations and bilateral treaties contained provisions on such protection.
In its broadest sense, self-determination was considered to embrace not only the creation of independent States but where, for geographical reasons this could not be realised, minority rights or internal self-determination to ensure the greatest possible degree of autonomy to the affected people. The case of the Aaland Islands - where guarantees for the maintenance of the social, ethnic and religious character of the Aalanders, including a measure of autonomy, were recommended[4] - is an important precedent because, like the UN Charter, the Covenant of the League of Nations was premised upon the paramountcy of State sovereignty. This case is evidence that internal self-determination can be achieved without hampering the working and integrity of the State itself and that the right to self-determination embraces a comprehensive scale of realisation-possibilities, including: the creation of a State, secession, self-government and self-administration.
The right to self-determination on the part of the subject nationalities during the time of the League of Nations did not attain the status of a positive legal right. The United Nations Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO), in preparing a final version of the UN Charter in 1945, adopted a formulation of the right to self-determination suggested by the Soviet Union[5] and specific references to it are to be found in Art.1(2) and 55 of the Charter. These Articles both refer to the concept of "friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples."
At the time of the Charter's drafting, self-government or independence were envisaged only for trust territories, ie., those detached from enemy States as a result of WW2. Member States responsible for the administration of non-self-governing territories were required simply to accept as "a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost .... the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories" and to provide information regarding conditions therein (Chapter XI, Art.73). Chapter XI, through the imposition of an obligation on States to provide information on conditions therein, removed the question of conditions in territories from those matters essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of States (Art.2(7)).
The legal character of the right to self-determination at the time of the Charter's adoption is for present purposes of no particular importance. It will be more useful to evaluate legally the right to self-determination in light of subsequent treaty developments and practice of the General Assembly. However, it is important to consider what position the Charter takes on the application of self-determination to groups, particularly of indigenous peoples, within sovereign States. The self-determination formula adopted in Art.1(2) was discussed in Commission I, which drafted the 'General Provisions' of the Charter. A technical committee appointed by this body emphasised two points: first, the universal geographical applicability of self-determination to 'peoples everywhere'; and second, that the principle "conformed to the purpose of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right to secession."[6]
The Belgian delegation proposed an amendment in which reference was made to the equal rights of 'States' and not 'peoples', and to the 'self-determination of peoples' and not 'friendly relations among nations'.[7] This was rejected because it was intended with the Charter to extend equal rights to States, nations and peoples. A Memorandum prepared by the UN Secretariat came to the following conclusions:
The word 'nation' is broad and general enough to include colonies, mandates, protectorates, and quasi-states as well as states .... 'nations' is used in the sense of all political entities, states and non-states, whereas 'peoples' refers to groups of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or nations.[8]
Here 'peoples' is given its widest possible meaning.[9] It can be concluded that self-determination in the sense of Art.1(2) and 55 was intended to apply to all peoples and that support for the criterion of geographical separateness, later introduced to deny claims to self-determination by peoples not separated by salt water, cannot be derived from the Charter.
Neither were the provisions of Chapter XI conceived to exclude indigenous people
incorporated within the metropolitan territories of Member States from the non-self-governing territories in respect of which the Charter imposes obligations.[10] At first glance, the text of Art.74 - which opposes 'the territories to which this chapter applies' to the 'metropolitan areas' of Members of the UN - suggests the opposite conclusion. Chapter XI, however, gives expression to the doctrine of Guardianship, first elaborated by the Spanish jurist Vitoria in relation to the Indians of Latin America. For the US Delegation to the Versailles Peace Conference, the international lawyer, Snow, examined the laws and practice of European and American States with respect to indigenous peoples within their territories. He concluded that a positive duty arose under customary international law,[11] characterised in the English-speaking world as 'Trusteeship', resembling the civil law relationship of 'Guardianship' and requiring "not only defence but active and continuous education and guidance."[12] This view was widely endorsed at Versailles and resulted in the inclusion, in the Covenant of the League of Nations, of Art.23(b), by which Member States undertook to secure the just treatment of the inhabitants of their territories. 'Guardianship' was always conceived to apply equally to indigenous peoples within the metropolitan territories of Member States. Chapter XI was thus always intended to apply to indigenous peoples who fulfilled the characteristics of non-selfgoverning territories, irrespective of whether located within the metropolitan territories of a Member State or not.[13]
Upon these 'meagre and tentative' foundations, the UN proceeded to construct an edifice of practice in which full 'external' self-determination, preferably resulting in independence, was viewed as an imperative and immediate goal for all peoples "under colonial or alien domination."[14] This process was formalised by the adoption, by the General Assembly in 1960, of the two 'Decolonisation Resolutions' - Res.1514 (XV) and 1541 (XV) - which form the cornerstone of the "new UN Law of Self-Determination."[15] Res.1514 (XV) proclaims the necessity of bringing colonialism to an end and declares that:
"All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."
It expresses a clear preference for independence as the outcome of an exercise of self-determination. According to Res.1541(XV), non-self-governing territories reach a full measure of self-govemment, in the sense of Chapter XI, by association, integration or emergence as sovereign independent States. It stipulates that there is an obligation to transmit information (Art.73 UN Charter) in respect of non-self-governing territories 'geographically separate' from the administering country.
In immediate post-war UN self-determination practice, the salt-water thesis restricted the right to self-determination to those non-self-governing territories separated by salt-water from the administering power and denied the protection of Res.1514 and 1541 to those peoples engulfed by the contiguous territory of a metropolitan State. This was a distortion of the legal foundations of the UN Charter and did not detract from rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination. The similar language of 'metropolitan areas' is contained in Art.74 of Chapter XI and was not considered to present an obstacle to the applicability of Art.74 to indigenous peoples. There is a strong case for a duty to report in respect of indigenous peoples separated from Member States by salt-water - eg., the Torres Strait Islanders and the Inuits of Greenland. It is also arguable that indigenous peoples isolated from the dominant society by vast tracts of land, mountains, lakes, rivers, deserts and other barriers[16] - eg., the Inuit of Northern Canada[17] or remote Aboriginal communities in Australia - satisfy the criterion of geographical separateness. Further, the criterion 'geographically separate' is relevant only in delimiting situations in which a duty to report arises. The imposition in Art.73 of a sacred trust to promote the well-being of the inhabitants of non-self-governing territories, as well as the two general statements of the principle of self-determination in Art.1(2) and 55 are in no way qualified by the language of Res.1541. Finally, to the extent that State practice in the early years of the UN may have restricted the exercise of self-determination to the dismantling of European colonial empires abroad[18], subsequent developments have affirmed the applicability of the right to self-determination to all peoples. As the era of UN Decolonisation draws to an end, it is evident this right is by no means of limited historical application or a spent force.
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in 1976, contain as Art.1 (1) the following provision:
1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.
Subsequent paragraphs (2) and (3) express the principle of the sovereignty of all peoples over their natural wealth and resources and call on States Parties to take steps both to promote and respect the right to self-determination. In Art.1(1), the expression - 'right to self-determination' - finally puts to rest any doubt which existed during the League of Nations era and first years of the UN surrounding the status of self-determination as a binding norm of international law. According to the dominant view, self-determination has attained, with its inclusion in the Covenants, the status not only of binding international law for the parties to the Covenants, but also of international customary law - on some views jus cogens or a peremptory norm of general international law from which no derogation is permitted.[19] In addition to free determination of political status in an external sense, Art.1(1) articulates the idea of internal self-determination - the right of a people to freely develop its own system within the State.[20] Finally, self-determination is posited as a right of all peoples, a construction reinforced by the merely inclusive reference to Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories in Art.1(3).[21]
UN practice has increasingly seen a rejection of a narrow interpretation of the peoples entitled to self-determination and accepted that its exercise can embrace a range of options other than independence. As self-determination is increasingly posited in connection with the goals of maintaining peace and preventing conflicts, distinctions between 'colonised' and 'indigenous' peoples and salt-water arguments lose all functional meaning.[22] Particular reference should be made to Res.2625 (XXV) adopted by consensus by the General Assembly in 1970. It enumerates the Seven Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the UN Charter and provides that 'free association' with an independent State or "any other political status freely determined by a people constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination of that people." This Declaration seeks to clarify the relationship between the principles of self-determination, territorial integrity and national unity which was left unclear in the Charter and the Decolonisation Resolutions. Whilst no unlimited right of secession is recognised, the Declaration evokes the approach of the Aaland Islands Report in recognising limitations upon the deference to be accorded to territorial integrity and affirming that violations of the internal aspect of self-determination may legitimise separatist claims in the realisation of the external aspect of self-determination.
Further, the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, (or Helsinki Declaration) of 1975, affirms the right to selfdetermination as a right of 'all peoples always' (whether in a sovereign and independent State or not), 'when and as they wish' (a continuing right), to determine 'in full freedom their internal and external political status, without external interference'. While neither the Friendly Relations Declaration nor the Helsinki Declaration are binding international instruments, they are important affirmations of the Charter's original conception of self-determination and not without all normative influence. Also, the Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara (1979), in which the International Court of justice rejected the concept of terra nullius to justify conquest and acquisition of indigenous lands, is regarded as a step towards the accommodation of indigenous aspirations within the doctrines of classical international law. Judge Dillard's opinion heralds the demise of the salt-water doctrine and thus the applicability of the right to self-determination to indigenous peoples:
"It seemed hardly necessary to make more explicit the cardinal restraints which the legal right of self-determination imposes. That restraint may be captured in a single sentence. It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people."[23]
Finally, in his Study on the Right to Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis of United Nations Instruments (1981), Special Rapporteur Cristescu noted that, with regard to the application of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, the UN had pursued a policy of broadening rights to "avoid any discrimination between peoples."[24] He notes that in the context of the elimination of colonialism, difficulties of defining 'peoples' had been easier to resolve.
In the final analysis, attempts to distinguish between 'colonial' peoples entitled to self-determination and 'non-colonial' peoples not, are subjective and incapable of objective resolution. Increasingly, self-determination is posited as a 'technique or method' or a 'plethora of possible solutions', rather than as a rigid, absolute right to full external self-determination in the form of complete independence.[25] It encompasses a range of alternatives to independent statehood, including: some form of associated statehood; creation of an internationalised territory; federal schemes; autonomy; ethnic, linguistic and religious minority rights; guarantees of non-discrimination; and integration. The basic requirement is a procedure - a genuinely and freely made choice and the possibility of reconsidering present arrangements after a suitable interval.[26] Interpretations of self-determination deferring in every case to the paramountcy of territorial integrity and national unity are being rejected in favour of a more differentiated view which regards secession as a remedy for continued abuse of human rights and denial of political freedoms. Recent dramatic developments in the Baltics, Slovenia, Croatia and the republics of the former USSR demonstrate the importance of forms of internal self-determination to prevent peoples' desires for meaningful control over their own affairs escalating into demands for secession.
Despite difficulties in arriving at a precise definition of 'peoples' in international law, indigenous peoples easily satisfy the criteria generally set forth.[27] Indigenous self-determination is also seen as a procedural mechanism enabling peoples to select from a variety of political structural arrangements and means of economic, social and cultural development and to consent to the terms of their relationship with the hitherto dominant structures.
The political aspect of self-determination expresses itself internally and externally. The latter addresses the right of a people to determine its political status by democratic means under international supervision as well as the right for an independent connection to the international community enabling presentation of grievances in arenas outside the national legal system. Too often it is equated with independence, resulting in cautious formulations of self-determination which omit the political aspect altogether. Whilst in most cases indigenous peoples seek simply to develop their political institutions and order their communal life in accordance with their own values, the option of independence cannot be denied to those who satisfy the criteria for Statehood.[28] Recently, autonomy or internal self-determination have been seen as flexible responses to indigenous self-determination aspirations. Whilst the term 'autonomy' indicates neither a specific amount of independence from central government, nor any particular political structures, consensus has crystallised as to the minimum governmental powers a territory needs to be considered autonomous in international law.[29]
Not surprisingly, the most eloquent treatises on indigenous self-determination have been advanced by indigenous peoples themselves - in the pages of law journals, at meetings of international law societies and in international fora. In the standard-setting activities of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP), indigenous peoples have reiterated the importance of the international community's recognition of their right to self-determination. The following principle was contained in draft standards prepared by 90 indigenous participants and submitted to WGIP's 4th session in 1985 by 6 indigenous NGOs with consultative status in the UN's Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC):
All indigenous nations and peoples have the right to self-determination, by virtue of which they have the right to whatever degree of autonomy or self-government they choose. This includes the right to freely determine their political status, freely pursue their own economic, social, religious and cultural development, and determine their own membership and/or citizenship, without external interference.[30]
At WGIP's 6th session in 1988, the Chairperson tabled a draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights.[31] At the 7th in 1989, a revised draft was published[32] and its preamble provided that nothing in the Declaration could be used to deny any people, satisfying the criteria established by human rights instruments and international law, its right to self-determination. In 1990, at WGIP's 8th session, the elaboration of standards continued in drafting groups, one of which proposed the following paragraph:
Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination, by virtue of which they may freely determine their political status and institutions and pursue their own economic, social, religious and cultural development[33].
At the 1991 session, the preamble and first three operative parts of the Declaration were submitted by the members of WGIP at first reading. Operative para.l provides:
Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination, in accordance with international law. By virtue of this right, they freely determine their relationship with the States in which they live, in a spirit of coexistence with other citizens, and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural and spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity.[34]
This formulation omits any explicit reference to political aspects of self-determination. Fearing threats to the territorial integrity and national unity of States, indigenous self-determination is limited to operate within the framework of coexistence with other citizens in existing States. Whilst this formula will adequately accommodate the internal aspects of self-determination, including autonomy schemes, it leaves external aspects uncovered. A close analysis of post-war developments in the right of self-determination reveal that the fears, noted above, are based on two misconceptions:
With salt-water distinctions exposed as arbitrary and conceptually indefensible, it is unfortunate that WGIP has sought to introduce an untenable distinction between peoples entitled to self-determination under general international law and indigenous peoples, for whom qualifications are necessary. This relegation of indigenous self-determination to an inferior category is discriminatory and contrary to Art.1(2) of the Charter, which posits the principle of equality and self-determination of peoples as "two complementary parts of one standard of conduct."[35] Of interest here is the UN Meeting o f Experts to Review the Experiences of Countries in the Operation of Schemes of Internal Self-Government for Indigenous Populations (1991), which reached the following conclusion:
"Indigenous peoples have the right of self-determination as provided for in the international covenants on human rights and public international law and as a consequence of their continued existence as distinct peoples. This right will be implemented with due consideration to other basic principles of international law. An integral part of this is the inherent and fundamental right of autonomy and self-government."
This formulation is more successful in making the important points: location of indigenous self-determination in the mainstream of international law; acknowledgment of other principles of international law; and emphasis on internal aspects of self-determination without precluding an external dimension.
In Australia, Aboriginal organisations have insisted on self-determination as the base for Aboriginal aspirations. They are adamant in their rejection of insubstantial political concepts - eg., self-management - which lack an internationally accepted meaning and only involve powers unilaterally revokable by the Australian Government. Despite initial hesitancy, self-determination has been enunciated as a key concept of Federal Government policy. The Minister for Aboriginal Affairs, Robert Tickner, in a statement to WGIP's 1991 session, referred to the establishment of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission (ATSIC) as a significant step toward Aboriginal self-determination and self-management.[36] The Final Report of the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody recommends that the 'self-determination principle' be applied in the design and implementation of policies and programs affecting Aboriginal people.[37] Tabling the Report in Parliament, Tickner stated that the Commission recognised, as did he, the importance of "concrete measures to tackle disadvantage and establish self-determination as being essential building blocks of the process of reconciliation."[38]
In his paper, Self-Determination for Aborigines: Limits and Possibilities under the Optional Protocol (1991), Frank Brennan SJ stated that:
"Self-determination subject to the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Australia ought now be seen as a non-controversial statement of the legitimate and recognisable aspirations of Aborigines seeking maximum community independence while remaining part of the nation state."[39]
He makes it clear, however, that the domestic meaning of self-determination is a political term with no guaranteed legal content.[40]
Whilst it is encouraging that there is now a domestic meaning of self-determination connoting more than self-management, it will be important, if the Government wishes to keep faith with Aboriginal organisations, that the use of the language of self-determination and its translation into policy accord with conceptual developments in its meaning in international law. The suggestion that ATSIC may be a move towards giving effect to self-determination has been rejected at WGIP by the National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Service Secretariat (NAILSS). NAILSS informed WGIP that real and lasting reconciliation between Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal Australia can be achieved, and Aboriginal claims for self-determination satisfied, only through the negotiation of an instrument independent of the institutions of all parties and the establishment of an impartial implementation mechanism.[41] Such an instrument would need to provide a comprehensive, equitable and lasting basis for relations between Aboriginals and nonAboriginals. Whether negotiated domestically or internationally, it could become binding in international law through a unilateral declaration made by the Australian Government with the intention to be bound.[42] Recourse to extra-national remedies will be necessary to ensure that any such instrument cannot be unilaterally modified or terminated by domestic legislation and for the resolution of serious disputes over compliance. Potential for the involvement of WGIP, or the forum which succeeds it, is apparent. Involvement of the Secretary-General of the UN or another international figure may be worth considering and also ECOSOC may perform services at the request of UN members (Charter Art.66(2)).
The Reconciliation Process certainly doesn't preclude any of these possibilities. Whilst it is much too soon to predict the nature and content of an instrument or form of international supervision which could result from the process, it is important that the exercise not be perceived as an unprecedented relinquishment of sovereignty by nonAboriginal Australia and the thin edge of the wedge as far as national unity is concerned. Through ratification of human rights treaties, Australia has already assumed extensive mandatory reporting obligations[43] and participation in WGIP involves acceptance of voluntary reporting. With accession to the Optional Protocol-to the ICCPR, Australia will recognise the jurisdiction of the Human Rights Committee to receive individual complaints of violations of the Covenant.
The international system is in a state of flux as it seeks to respond to the aspirations of diverse peoples to preserve their language, culture, laws and traditions and to regain greater autonomy, free from undue interference from central governments. The present international climate is extremely favourable to the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples to self-determination. It will be an enormous challenge to the Australian Government to keep abreast of these conceptual developments.
[1] Lowes Dickinson, C., Documents and Statements relating to Peace Proposals and War Aims, London 1919, p.116 f.
[2] Hunter Miller, D., The Drafting of the Covenant, Vol.2, New York 1928, p.12; Lansing, R., The Peace Negotiations: A Personal Narrative, London 1921, p.87.
[3] Rappard, W., International Relations as viewed from Geneva, New Haven 1925, p.45 f.
[4] Aaland Island Reports prepared for the Council of the League of Nations by: International Commission of Jurists - League of Nations, Official Journal, Suppl. No:3, October, 1920, p5 f Commission of Rapporteurs - League of Nations Doc. B.7.21/68/106 (1921), adopted by League of Nations Council, Official Journal, Suppl. No:5, July, 1921, p.24.
[5] UNCIO, Documents, Vo13, London/New York 1945, p.622.
[6] UNCIO, Documents, Vol.6, San Francisco 1945, p296.
[7] Ibid., p.705; also Buchheit, L., Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination, New Haven/London 1978, p.74 f.
[8] bid., vol.18, p.657 f.
[9] Rigo Sureda, A., The Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination A Study of United Nations Practice, Leiden 1973, p.100.
[10] Ibid., p.104.
[11] Snow, A., The Question of Aborigines in the Law and Practice of Nations, New York/London 1921, p.108 If, 173.
[12] Ibid., p.110.
[13] Bennett, C., Aboriginal Rights in International Law, Occasional Paper No37, Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, 1978, p.12.
[14] Pomerance, M., Self-Determination in Law and Practice: The New Doctrine in the United Nations, The Hague/Boston/London 1982, p.10.
[15] Pomerance, op. cit., p.12.
[16] Wright, Q., Recognition and Self-Determination, Proc. ASIL, Vol.48, 1954, p.30.
[17] Bennett G., op. cit., p.12.
[18] The examples of the application of self-determination to the Palestinians and to facilitate the creation of the State of Bangladesh by the Bengalis of East Pakistan frequently cited in support of the contention that the blue-water doctrine was never consistently applied.
[19] Art .53 of the Vienna Convention on the law of Treaties of 23 April 1969. Among the many international lawyers who advance this view: Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law, 4.Ed, Oxford 1990, p.512.
[20] That Art.1 also embraces internal self-determination was confirmed in "General Comments", UN, Report of Human Rights Committee, GAOR; 39. less, Suppl. 40 (A/39/40), p.142 f, published in accordance with Art.40(4) of the ICCPR
[21] Crawford, J., Aboriginal Self-Government in Canada, Research Report for the Canadian Bar Association, Committee on Native Justice, January 1988, p.52. There is a strong argument - bolstered by Art.25 ICESCR and Art.47 ICCPR - that Art.1(2) is of general application. It would be difficult to argue that 'all peoples' has a different and narrower meaning in Art.1(1) than in Art.1(2).
[22] Barsh, R., "Indigenous Peoples and the Right to Self-Determination", in Hocking, B., (ed.), International Law and Aboriginal Human Rights, Sydney 1988, p.72.
[23] .[1975] ICJ Rep., p.114.
[24] E/CN.4/Sub.2/404/Rev.1, Para.267, p39.
[25] Pomerance, M., op cit.; Chen, L., Self-determination: an important dimension of the demand for freedom, Proc. ASIL, vol.75,1981, p.90.
[26] Ibid, pp.75 and 90 respectively.
[27] Berman, H., Are Indigenous Populations entitled to International Juridical Personality, Proc. ASIL, vol.79, 1985, p.192
[28] Anderson, E., "The Saskatchewan Indians and Canada's New Constitution", 11. Intl. Affairs, vol.36, 1982, p.125; Barsh, R, op cit., p.71.
[29] Hannum, H and Lillich, R, "The Concept of Autonomy in International Law", AJIL,1980, p.858.
[30] E/CN.4/Sub.2/ /AC.4/1985/22, annex IV.
[31] E/CN.4/Sub.2/1988.
[32] E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/33.
[33] Report of Informal Drafting Group II, E/CN.4/1990/42, annex IV; and Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its 8th session, E/CN.4/1990/42. para.72.
[34] Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations on 8s 9th session, E/CN.4/Sub2/1991/Rev.1, annex E.
[35] Report of Commission I to Committee I: see UNCIO, Documents, vol.6, p.455.
[36] 31 July 1991.
[37] Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody (RCIADIC), National Report, vol.5., AGPS, Canberra 1991, p.111 ff.
[38] Hon. Robert Tickner, Ministerial Statement: Report of the RCIADIC, p.10.
[39] Brennan, F., Self-Determination for Aborigines: Limits and Possibilities under the Optional Protocol, Paper delivered at University of Melbourne, 10-12-91, p5.
[40] lbid, p.1.
[41] NAILSS, Review of Developments, Geneva, 30-6-91, p5.
[42] Nuclear Tests Case (Australia v. France), 1974 ICJ Reports 253; see Lawrey, A., "Contemporary Efforts to Guarantee Indigenous Rights under International Law", Vand,JTL, vol.23,1990, p.763.
[43] Inter alia, the UN Human Rights Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women.
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