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Steven White[*]
[T]he cruel treatment of animals seems to me one of the great unaddressed legal problems of our time. Laws now on the books could do a great deal to address the resulting suffering. A large task for the future is to enact better laws, ones that will be taken seriously, and to do what can be done to promote implementation of existing law.
Cass Sunstein [1]
How does Australian law address the welfare of animals? The precise answer will depend on the state or territory in question, as regulation of animal welfare is fragmented between the six states and two territories. Queensland and Western Australia have recently revamped animal welfare legislation, while in other jurisdictions significant legislative changes occurred during the 1980s and early 1990s. The Commonwealth also has an important role in animal welfare, especially in agriculture, fisheries and the scientific use of animals.
In all of the state and territory jurisdictions, animal welfare legislation performs an important practical, and highly significant symbolic, social role. The legislation criminalises animal cruelty, establishes enforcement and prosecution procedures, and sets out penalties for convictions. A proscription on cruelty has underpinned legislation in this area for a century or more, with the extent of the proscription expanding with improved scientific understanding of how animals can suffer pain.[2] A commitment to animal welfare is seen as a hallmark of a 'civilised society'. The recent distressing saga of the Cormo Express, on which live sheep exported from Australia were stranded for many weeks in stifling conditions in the Middle East, prompted a flurry of letters to newspapers, correspondents suggesting that such cruelty should not be allowed by a 'civilised nation'.[3]
In recent years, the aspirational nature of animal welfare legislation has been made transparent in some jurisdictions by the inclusion of a duty of care, imposing a positive obligation on those in charge of animals to take reasonable steps to meet their welfare needs.[4] This is a significant development, since it reflects a broadening of the aims of the legislation. It suggests that such legislation is concerned not only to protect animals from the worst excesses of human behaviour, but also to provide guidance, in a positive sense, as to what is required to properly care for an animal.
The introduction of concepts such as 'duty of care' in this legislation shows that regulation of animal welfare continues to develop in interesting and important ways. However, it is worth interrogating core aspects of the legislation, and its underlying assumptions. Do the qualifications on the prohibition against cruelty strike the right balance between human and animal interests? Do the exemptions from the prohibitions on cruelty undermine animal protection? Is enforcement adequate? After a brief review of state and territory legislation, this article considers some of the justifications for animal welfare legislation, potential problems with existing legislation, and offers some suggestions for further reform.
While legislation in each jurisdiction is differently worded broad similarities in approach can be identified.
In broad terms, Western Australia, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania and the Northern Territory establish a bare offence of cruelty- for example, 'a person must not be cruel to an animal' -followed by a non-inclusive list of practices constituting cruelty.[5] Those practices are wide ranging, although frequently qualified by 'unnecessary' or unreasonable' (in Queensland, animal cruelty is causing pain that, m the circumstances, is unjustifiable, unnecessary or unreasonable'). In Victoria, the offence of cruelty is exclusively defined by listed practices, including acts or omissions leading to 'unnecessary, unreasonable or unjustifiable pain'.[6] In the ACT, cruelty 'without reasonable excuse' is prohibited, and it is prohibited, again without reasonable excuse, to deliberately cause an animal 'unnecessary pain'.[7] In NSW, there is a prohibition on cruelty, without any accompanying definition.[8]
What is an 'animal'? In most states and territories it is at least a member of a vertebrate species,[9] including an amphibian, bird, fish, mammal or reptile.[10] But in South Australia and Western Australia, fish are excluded.[11]
All jurisdictions havan exemption from offences under the legislation where there is compliance with relevant codes of conduct. Codes are especially important in the areas of farm animal production and transportation, and the use of animals in scientific experiments. In most jurisdictions, a person who complies with an applicable code in their dealings with an animal will be exempted from the offence provisions. [12] Codes take the form of delegated legislation and compliance may or may not be compulsory. Other exemptions in some of the statutes include Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander custom or tradition, [13] slaughter of an animal as part of religious faith,[14] self-defence against an animal,[15] normal animal husbandry,[16] hunting,[17] and acts controlling feral animals and pests (although in the latter case there is usually a requirement that as little pain as reasonable be caused). [18] In the NT it is not a defence to a charge of cruelty that an act or omission was in accordance with cultural, religious or traditional practices.[19]
In each state and territory, provision is made for the appointment f inspectors. Inspectors are generally public servant, police, officers of the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (RSPCA) or a class of persons nominated by regulation.[20] In practice, the RSPCA plays a central role in all jurisdictions, in investigating and prosecuting alleged breaches. Wide-ranging powers are conferred on inspectors. Generally, they may enter premises with the consent of the occupier, or with a search warrant. Importantly, in the absence of consent or a warrant inspectors are empowered to enter premises where there is reasonable suspicion that n animal has been, for example, severely injured or there is an imminent risk of injury or death, or a risk of concealment or destruction of evidence of an offence. Once on the premises, inspectors have the power, with slight jurisdictional variations, to do things such as inspect the premises, seize animals, seize other evidence (for example, documents), question and take photos or otherwise record evidence.
Penalties vary widely between jurisdictions. At the lower end of the scale is Victoria, with a fine of$6000 or six months imprisonment for non-aggravated cruelty.[21] At the upper end, an individual guilty of cruelty in Queensland is liable to a maximum $75,000 fine and/or two years imprisonment,[22] while in Western Australia it is a maximum $50,000 fine and/or five years imprisonment.[23] The differences may reflect changing community expectations: Victoria's legislation is among the oldest on the books, whilst Queensland's and West Australia's are fairly recent.
Why should we be concerned about animal welfare at all? The objects clauses in animal welfare legislation ignore this question, when they tautologically nominate goals such as 'preventing cruelty to animals' and 'promot[ing] and protect[ing] the welfare, safety and health of animals'. Yet the answer to this question is important, since it will determine the boundaries of animal welfare legislation.
One important justification for animal welfare law is that harming animals indirectly harms the interests of humans. This justification has a strong philosophical pedigree. John Locke suggested that humans who were cruel to animals would not be likely to be compassionate towards fellow humans. Similarly, Immanuel Kant, who otherwise regarded animals as irrational and for that reason exerting no moral claim on humans, argued that cruelty to animals would lead to a loss of feelings or a hardness in dealing with other humans.[24]
This instrumental justification can find expression in a number of ways. For example, it might be argued that it is wrong to harm an animal that belongs to another person, since that violates another's property interests. By ensuring that the welfare of animals is protected, the State reinforces the importance of respect for personal property. This argument is consistent with the view that the best way to protect animals is to make them property, since people are likely to protect what they own.[25] But such an argument fails to explain why animal welfare legislation should apply to the owner of an animal, and not just to third parties. The owner of an item of furniture may deliberately damage or destroy it, without state intervention or punishment. Further, the owner does not owe the item of furniture a duty of care, as owners do to their animals, at least in some jurisdictions. If animals are a form of personal property, the rights of ownership are limited in important ways.
There is anecdotal and research evidence identifying a link between abuse of animals and other criminal behaviour committed by humans. Abuse of animals by young people may be a predictor of later violent crimes against humans, and families reported for animal abuse have been 'identified as at-risk families for child abuse and other violations'.[26] This research has implications for intervention by welfare agencies and others in cases of aggravated cruelty to animals by young people, as well as for the severity of penalties. It has been used to support an argument that we should strictly enforce animal cruelty offences to prevent later violent offences against humans.[27]
A second justification for animal welfare law, preferable to the instrumental justification, is that animals have an inherent value, so that proper treatment of animals is required regardless of the value this may have for humans. This justification is consistent with the idea that certain animals have a moral claim on humans because they are sentient, living creatures with a capacity to feel pain.
Acceptance of the argument that animals have inherent value might require that the interests of animals be recognised, but only to the extent that these do not impinge on the interests of humans. For example, although the quality of life experienced by chickens could be significantly improved by doubling the existing mandatory minimum size of the cages they are housed in, this would lead to increased costs for producers and consumers, which might be regarded by utilitarians as too great an imposition on human interests to be justified.
A stronger conception of the inherent value of animals, according equal weight to animal and human interests, would draw into question practices such as scientific research using animals, and the farming of animals for meat and other products. Or it might suggest recognition of particular rights for animals, such as a right to a natural life free from abuse and exploitation. The issue of rights for animals is a controversial one. If animals do have rights, in the fullest sense, there is no question of balancing human and animal interests. Rights demand respect, regardless of the inconvenience this may cause. On the other hand, rights can be difficult to pin down. How do we identify the rights animals are entitled to enjoy? What happens when human rights and animals rights come into conflict? Are different types of animals, such as monkeys and crustaceans, entitled to different types of rights? If both animals and humans are recognised as rights bearers, could this lead to humans being treated more like animals, rather than an improvement in the treatment of animals?
At best, existing animal welfare legislation is consistent with a weak acceptance of the inherent value of animals, given the qualifications that are placed on the obligation to avoid inflicting pain and suffering, and the range of legislative exemptions. Limitations in animal welfare legislation are considered in more detail below.
As mentioned, many of the prohibitions on cruelty are qualified, so that the infliction of pain and suffering may be justified, so long as it is not 'unnecessary', 'unjustifiable' or 'unreasonable'. These qualifications place an important limit on the extent of the legislative protection. They mark the borderline between human interests and animal interests. They may be questioned on at least two grounds.
First, it is not clear, on the face of the legislation, what should be regarded as unreasonable, unnecessary or unjustifiable. The flexibility inherent in the terms unreasonable, unnecessary and unjustifiable opens the possibility of a balancing exercise that will serve human interests at the expense of animal interests.[28] Of course the meaning of these words is a matter for the courts. However, higher court jurisprudence on animal cruelty offences is virtually non-existent. Most matters go no further than the Magistrates Court. In the absence of binding precedent, there is a risk that the meaning given to these qualifications will vary from court district to court district, and that generally the interests of animals will be downplayed.
Further, the vagueness of the qualifications on cruelty offences raises additional questions, some relatively straightforward, some problematic. For example:
Was there some type of legal justification or excuse? What was the severity and duration of the pain or other distress? What is the perceived legitimacy (by society as a whole) of the particular activity? Was the pain completely avoidable, or the level of pain greater than required?[29]
Finally, the qualifications on cruelty offences place an onus on the prosecutor to show that not only was cruelty present, but that the pain and suffering caused was unacceptable. Expressed in negative terms, this test surreptitiously accepts that there is such a thing as reasonable, justifiable or necessary pain and suffering to which animals may be subject. Whether pain and suffering is necessary or unnecessary, an animal bears it and its consequences. This important point can be lost when legislation is expressed in terms that few would object to, but which nonetheless leaves considerable room for the imposition of pain and suffering.
Exemptions have the potential to seriously undermine animal welfare legislation, depending on their scope and the regulation of exempted activities.
Code exemptions, particularly those covering the welfare of farm animals and the use of animals in scientific research, ensure that large numbers of animals are removed from the realm of cruelty offences. The extent to which code exemptions may undermine the welfare of those animals depends on the welfare standards incorporated into the codes and how the codes are administered and enforced.
There is good reason to be sceptical about the effectiveness of codes in properly protecting the interest of animals. For example, most jurisdictions have adopted the Australian Code of Practice for the Care and Use of Animals for Scientific Purposes (Scientific Use Code). [30] Under this Code, uses of animals which may otherwise be legally 'cruel' are permitted - including acts causing severe suffering and noxiousness requiring euthanasia-so long as the expected benefits of the research outweigh the costs to the animals involved. This is an explicitly utilitarian approach, but one in which all the claimed benefits accrue to humans and all the costs fall on animals.
Of course, there may well be a social consensus supporting the use of animals in these circumstances. It is difficult to be confident about this though. Generally, codes approved under animal welfare legislation take the form of delegated legislation, their development is coordinated by industries with a vested interest in how animals are used, and they are not subject to wide public scrutiny. And the accountability mechanisms that are put in place may not be as effective as they should be. Under the Scientific Use Code, for example, Animal Ethics Committees (AECs) consider applications for the use of animals in scientific research. Committees must include at least one veterinarian, one scientist/researcher, one animal welfare representative and one layperson. Animals Australia, a representative body for various animal rights and welfare organizations, conducted a survey of AEC animal welfare representatives in 1998. Concerningly, it found that 'half of them experienced 'animosity or aggression from researchers' when making decisions and felt pressured to 'go with the status quo'. The effectiveness of AECs thus remains controversial.'[31]
Non-code exemptions are also important, although the number of animals involved is far fewer. For example, an important exemption exists in most statutes for slaughtering animals for religious purposes. The exemption is unqualified, so that slaughter, even by the most cruel of methods, could be justified if soundly based in a religious faith. Practices that would be protected by this exemption include Halal (Muslim) and Shechita (Jewish) slaughter. These methods of slaughter are similar, and are notable for not permitting the stunning of an ·animal before its throat is cut. This greatly increases the risk of the animal experiencing significant pain and suffering, particularly in the case of cattle, which may remain conscious for as long as two minutes after assault. In Britain, the Farm Animal Welfare Council, a Government advisory group, has reportedly recommended a ban on such slaughter practices.[32]
The approach to regulation of animal welfare is piecemeal, with legislative provisions varying across Australia, sometimes significantly. Consider the wide disparity in penalities described above: does this mean Victorians are less concerned about animal welfare than Queenslanders? This would be surprising, and there is no rational reason for having such vastly differing penalties according to the happenstance of geography. Other examples of inconsistency can be found across offences, exemptions and enforcement.
There is no central database of animal cruelty investigations, prosecutions and penalties, although RSPCA Australia does collect statistics from its state and territory bodies on investigation and prosecutions. This general lack of information makes it difficult to gain national perspective on the effectiveness of animal welfare legislation. In countries where such information is available, important insights have been uncovered. For example, in Germany imprisonment rates, sentence duration and convictions are significantly lower for animal cruelty prosecutions than for other criminal prosecutions.[33] Some data is available for NSW, similarly suggesting that a generally lenient approach is taken to sentencing in cases of animal cruelty.[34]
The effectiveness of animal welfare legislation is critically dependent on enforcement. Increased maximum penalties, such as those recently introduced in Queensland and Western Australia, provide a symbolic legislative statement about the seriousness of cruelty offences. However, the deterrent effect of the legislation will depend on both public education, and certain and consistent enforcement, including appropriate sentencing practices.
RSPCA inspectors play a crucial role in all jurisdictions in educating members of the public about their responsibilities for animals, investigating complaints and gathering evidence for prosecutions. Lack of funding significantly constrains the RSPCA's ability to provide adequate numbers of inspectors. As RSPCA Australia suggests:
The Inspectorate plays a vital role within the RSPCA and maintaining their presence is essential in providing continuity of animal welfare services to the community ... The associated costs of funding just one RSPCA Inspector can be as much as $100,000 each year, which constitutes a large part of each Society's annual budget. Whilst each state and territory RSPCA struggles to raise enough funds for its existing Inspectors, the sad reality is that, more Inspectors are desperately needed.[35]
Figures collated by RSPCA Australia show that in 2001-2002, RSPCA inspectors investigated a total of 51,216 cruelty complaints, with 339 prosecutions and 290 convictions.[36] The prosecution/conviction to investigation ratio is low. Limited resources mean that only those cases that are almost certain to succeed are prosecuted, since, in the words of RSPCA Victoria, 'the RSPCA cannot afford to lose'.[37]
Apart from lack of funding, the other significant limitation on prosecuting is that enforcement of compliance with the legislation is generally confined to those individuals authorised to act as inspectors.[38] Worthy of an article in itself, the rules of standing are such that it will be difficult for others to establish a right to bring an action on behalf of an animal.[39]
Even in those relatively few cases that are successfully prosecuted, enforcement is arguably being undermined by the courts. Although more research is required on this point before reaching firm conclusions, as noted above, the limited sentencing data suggests that animal cruelty offences are not treated as seriously by the courts as other criminal offences.
To consider the possibility of further ameliorative reforms is not to be dismissive of recent amendments, most notably those in Queensland and Western Australia. Changes such as the statutory recognition of a duty of care to animals and increased penalties for cruelty are welcome. But a great deal remains to be done before we should feel satisfied that the interests of animals are adequately addressed by the legislation. What follows is a brief, schematic account of some of the steps that could be taken to strengthen the law.
Rather than requiring prosecutors to establish that an act of cruelty was 'unnecessary', 'unjustifiable' or 'unnecessary', once cruelty is established the onus should be placed on the defendant to establish the necessity, justification or reasonableness of the cruelty. That is, issues of necessity, justification and reasonableness should be defences, rather than a component of the offence. The legislation should also more clearly define the type of conduct that constitutes an acceptable defence in these circumstances. This would have the virtue of placing policy-makers in the uncomfortable position of being more explicit about the circumstances in which cruelty will be sanctioned.
The role of code and other exemptions needs to be reviewed. The balance struck between human and animal interests in the codes is skewed against the interests of animals to an even greater extent than that fashioned in the head legislation. General code exemptions and specific exemptions sanctioning cruel practices, such as for hunting or religious slaughter, should be significantly revised if not removed. And accountability in relation to those exemptions needs to be improved. For example, it is essential that animal welfare representatives on AECs feel able to independently discharge their responsibilities, free from any coercion by vested interests. Regular feedback from such representatives, along the lines of the Animals Australia survey referred to earlier, would be a useful monitoring exercise. This may serve to highlight particular AECs that are not functioning properly, allowing timely intervention, including additional education for committee members on their roles and responsibilities.
A national approach to animal welfare, including uniform legislation, may effect an overall improvement in animal welfare standards, provided agreement between the states, territories and Commonwealth could be obtained on a best practice basis, rather than resorting to a lowest-common denominator approach. There would be great value in establishing a national database of consistent, reliable and publicly accessible information on the application of animal welfare legislation, including information about investigations, prosecutions and sentences, and matters such as the number of animals used for research, the numbers subjected to 'necessary' suffering in research and the extent of that suffering, and so on. Data of this sort would be valuable in educating the public about animal welfare, and would provide reliable information for use by the judiciary and policy reformers.
The investigation and prosecution of animal welfare offences could also be improved in various ways. One practical measure would be to legislate for fines to be directed to the RSPCA for investigation and prosecution purposes, rather than being paid into general revenue.
Another useful measure would be to impose a duty on veterinarians to report suspected cases of animal abuse to investigating authorities. This occurs in some United States jurisdictions, where the duty is accompanied by an immunity for veterinarians from legal action.[40]
But perhaps the single most effective measure to improve enforcement would be to liberalise the rules relating to standing. As noted above, the RSPCA has limited funds and generally only prosecutes the worst cases of cruelty. Others authorised under the legislation to initiate actions, such as the police and government-appointed inspectors (for example, Department of Primary Industry officers in Queensland) may not place a high priority on animal welfare cases or may be under-resourced. A significant gap exists between the aspirational nature of the legislation and the cruelty that is allowed to occur in practice.[41] Liberalising the rules of standing to allow those with a special interest in animal welfare to bring actions in animal cruelty cases, including representatives of animal welfare/rights organisations, would improve the vigour with which the legislation is applied to particular instances of cruelty, and provide a stronger deterrent to future misconduct.
[*] Steven White teaches law at Griffith University. Brisbane.
© 2003 Steven White (text)
© 2003 Stuart Roth (cartoon)
[1] Cass Sunstein, 'Standing for Animals' (2000) 47 UCLA Law Review 1333, 1368.
[2] Simon Brooman and Debbie Legge, Law Relating to Animals (1997) 72.
[3] See, eg, The Australian, 23 September 2003, 10.
[4] See, eg, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 18 and Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) s 6.
[5] Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 19; Animal Care and Protection Act
2001 (Qld)s I8;PreventionofCrueltytoAnimalsAct 1985(SA)s 13; Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) ss8 and 9;andAnimal WelfareAct(NT) s 6.
[6] Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) s 9(1)(c).
[7] Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) ss 7 and 8.
[8] Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) ss 5 and 6.
[9] Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) s 3.
[10] Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s II; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s 4; Animal Welfare Act (NT) s 4; Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s 2; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) s 3.
[11] Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (SA) s 3;Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 5. For a brief summary of recent, conflicting research on whether fish can feel pain, see Colin Johnston, 'Welfare Considerations in Aquatic Animals' (2003) 16(2) ANZCART News 1.
[12] Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 19; Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) ss 38-40; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (SA) s 43; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) s 6(1); Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) s 4(3); Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s 20; and Animal Welfare Act (NT) s 79(1)(a).
[13] See, eg, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld), s 8.
[14] See, eg, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 45; and Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1979 (NSW) s 24(1)(c).
[15] See, eg, Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 20; and Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (Vic) s 11.
[16] See, eg, Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 23.
[17] See, eg, Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) s 4(1).
[18] See, eg, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 42.
[19] Animal Welfare Act (NT) s 79(2).
[20] Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 19; Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 114; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (SA) s 28; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (Vic) s 18; Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (NSW) s 4; Animal Welfare Act 1993 (Tas) s 13; Animal Welfare Act 1992 (ACT) s 76; and Animal Welfare Act (NT) s 57.
[21] Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1985 (Vic) s 9. Aggravated cruelty in Victoria carries a maximum fine of$12,000 or 12 months imprisonment.
[22] Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s 18.
[23] Animal Welfare Act 2002 (WA) s 19.
[24] For a detailed account of differing philosophical approaches to animal welfare see Brooman and Legge, above n 2, ch 1. For an account of the shifting philosophical foundations of Australian animal welfare law since colonisation see Philip Jamieson, 'Duty and the Beast: The Movement in Reform of Animal Welfare Law' (I 991) 16 University of Queensland Law Journal238.
[25] Richard A Posner, 'Animal Rights' (2000) II 0 Yale Law Journal 527, 539.
[26] Katrina Sharman, 'Sentencing Under Our Anti-Cruelty Statutes: Why Our Leniency Will Come Back To Bite Us' (2002) 13 Current Issues In Criminal Justice 333, 334.
[27] Ibid.
[28] For an extended account of this argument see Gary L Francione, Rain Without Thunder: the Ideology of the Animal Rights Movement (1996).
[29] Elaine L Hughes and Christiane Meyer, 'Animal Welfare Law in Canada and Europe' (2000) 6 Animal Law 23, 55 (citations omitted).
[30] National Health & Medical Research Council, 6th edition, 1997. The code is under review.
[31] Animals Australia, Animal Experimentation, Fact Sheet 11, <http://www.animalsaustralia.org/> .
[32] 'Britain may ban Muslim and Jewish ritual animal slaughter', The World Today, ABC Radio, II June 2003, <http://www.abc.net.aulworldtoday/content/2003/s877530.htm> .
[33] Hughes and Meyer, above n 29, 69.
[34] Sharman, above n 26, 333.
[35] RSPCA Australia, <http://www.rspca.org.au> .
[36] Ibid.
[37] RSPCA Victoria, Annual Report 2001-2002, 38.
[38] See, eg, Animal Care and Protection Act 2001 (Qld) s115.
[39] See Butterworths, Halsbury’s Laws of Australia, Philip Jamieson et al, Animals, [20-445].
[40] Pamela D Frasch et a!, 'State Animal Anti-Cruelty Statutes: An Overview' (1999) 5 Animal Law 69, 71.
[41] See Cass Sunstein, above n I for an excellent discussion of the issues raised by standing for animals in a United States context. The suggestion that standing be liberalised to enhance the application of animal welfare legislation is not novel in Australia: see, eg, Mark Gregory, 'Commerce & Cruelty' (1994) 19 Alternative Law Journal 186, 188.
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