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Orica Australia Pty Ltd v Garard Chemical Engineering Pty Ltd [2013] NSWSC 1426 (29 January 2013)
Last Updated: 27 September 2013
Case Title:
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Orica Australia Pty Ltd v Garard Chemical Engineering Pty Ltd
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Medium Neutral Citation:
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Hearing Date(s):
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29 January 2013
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Decision Date:
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29 January 2013
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Jurisdiction:
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Equity Division - Commercial List
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Before:
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Stevenson J
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Decision:
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Cross-claimant provide security for costs
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Catchwords:
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - civil - interlocutory application - security for
costs sought against cross-claimant - threshold question
satisfied - whether
Court should exercise discretion to order security - whether cross-claim
'natural response' to claim - personal
undertaking to be liable for costs -
quantum
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Legislation Cited:
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Cases Cited:
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Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Dalma Formwork Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 16
Dunnet Properties Pty Ltd v Cussen [2009] NSWSC 961 Epping Plaza Fresh
Fruit & Vegetables Pty Ltd v Bevendale Pty Ltd [1999] 2 VR Jazabas Pty
Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291
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Category:
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Interlocutory applications
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Parties:
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Orica Australia Pty Limited (plaintiff / cross defendant) Garard
Chemical Engineering Pty Ltd (first defendant) Garard Moulded Pre-Cast Pty
Limited (second defendant / cross claimant)
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Representation
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- Counsel:
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Counsel: C N Bova (plaintiff / cross defendant) J S Emmett
(defendant / cross claimant)
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- Solicitors:
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Solicitors: Marque Lawyers (plaintiff / cross defendant) Low
Doherty & Stratford (defendant / cross claimant)
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File Number(s):
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SC 2012/194650
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Publication Restriction:
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Nil
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EX TEMPORE
JUDGMENT
- I
propose to order that security be provided in the sum of $75,000. These are my
reasons.
Background
- These
proceedings were commenced on 21 June 2012 in the Equity Division. The
proceedings concern the competing claims of the plaintiff/cross-defendant
("Orica") and the defendant/cross-claimant ("Garard") to certain intellectual
property relevant to chlorine valve shut down mechanisms
which the parties have
described as New ChlorGuard Units or the New ChlorGuard Intellectual Property
("the IP").
- Garard
filed its defence and cross-claim on 13 August 2012. On 27 August 2012 detailed
orders were made resolving certain interlocutory
disputes and at that point the
matter was entered into the Commercial List.
Notice of Motion for security
- By
notice of motion filed on 2 November 2012 Orica seeks the following orders: -
(1) Pursuant to rule 42.21(1)(d) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, section
1335(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and/or the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court, the cross-claimant give security in such amount as
the Court deems appropriate
for the costs of the cross-defendant up to the date
of the making of this order and to be incurred up to and including the hearing
of this matter.
(2) Until the security referred to in order 1 is provided, the proceedings be
stayed.
(3) The second cross-defendant have liberty to apply to increase the amount of
the security ordered pursuant to order 1, should that
amount prove
inadequate.
- The
motion came before me in the Commercial List on 16 November 2012, on which date
I set it down for hearing before me today.
The competing claims
- Orica
claims that it and Garard developed the IP. Orica contends that by reason of an
agreement called "Confidentiality Agreement"
made between the parties and dated
28 January 2011, the IP developed between Orica and Garard during the period
July 2010 and December
2011 belongs to it.
- There
is a dispute on the pleadings as to whether this construction of the
Confidentiality Agreement is correct. I do not express
any view about that
matter today. For present purposes, the point is that Orica's claim, as pleaded,
does not require a determination
of who (Orica or Garard) developed the IP.
Orica's case simply involves proof that the IP was developed and that its
construction
of the Confidentiality Agreement is correct.
- On
the pleadings, there is no dispute of any substance as to the fact of the
development of the IP or its nature (see statement of
claim par 21 and the
response to that paragraph in the defence). What is in dispute, in addition to
the proper construction of the
Confidentiality Agreement, is whether, as a
matter of fact, as Garard pleads, Orica played only a limited role in the
development
of the IP. However, that is irrelevant to Orica, assuming that its
construction of the confidentiality agreement is correct.
- By
its cross-claim, Garard claims that it is the legal or equitable owner of the
IP, either solely or jointly with Orica.
- Allied
to its claim to be joint equitable owner of the IP, Garard claims that each of
Orica and Garard hold the IP (and related components
and commercial
opportunities) on a constructive trust for each other in shares commensurate to
their financial and non-financial
contribution ("the Constructive Trust Claim").
- Alternatively,
Garard claims entitlement to payment on a quantum meruit basis for a reasonable
amount for the time, labour, expertise
and costs incurred by it in relation to
the IP ("the Quantum Meruit Claim").
Security application - the threshold question
- There
is no dispute on this application that there is credible testimony that in
relation to the cross-claim, Garard may be unable
to pay Orica's costs, as
cross-defendant, in the event that the cross-claim is unsuccessful. Part of the
evidence before me relevant
to that aspect of the matter is that there is
pending in the Federal Court of Australia a winding up application filed in
September
2012 at the suit of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. There are two
supporting creditors. Mr Emmett, who appeared for Garard,
informed me that the
application is currently returnable in early February 2013, that negotiations
are taking place with the Deputy
Commissioner of Taxation and that those
negotiations may resolve the matter. Negotiations with the supporting creditors
are also
said to be taking place or about to take place.
- Nonetheless,
as I say, the parties do not dispute the Court's discretion to order security
has been triggered. It thus falls on Garard
to satisfy the Court that, taking
into account all relevant factors, the Court should exercise its discretion by
either refusing
the security, or by ordering security in a lesser amount than is
sought by Orica.
Defensive cross-claim
- The
primary basis relied upon by Mr Emmett to resist an order for security was his
submission that the cross-claim was "a natural
response" to Orica's claim and
arose from the same factual matrix as that claim. Mr Emmett drew my attention to
the observations
of Rolfe J approved by the Court of Appeal at [15] in
Concrete Constructions Pty Ltd v Dalma Formwork Pty Ltd [1999] NSWCA 16
as follows: -
"In circumstances where the claim and the cross-claim arise out of the same,
or essentially the same, factual matrix this, in my opinion,
is a very important
consideration. It has been frequently and consistently said by Judges sitting in
this Division that an order
for security will not generally be made in such
circumstances, in the exercise of the Court's discretion. It would, in my view,
be
quite wrong to preclude a party from litigating matters by way of a defence
to a cross-claim merely because that party has been the
initial institutor of
the proceedings. The conduct of the other party may have forced the allegedly
impecunious party to take the
litigious initiative, whilst not constituting
misconduct. Put simply if [Concrete] seeks to recover any party of the debt
issues
raised by Dalma in its claim would be available to it as a defence, and
there has never been any suggestion that a party could be
precluded from
defending proceedings, where the defence is bona fide, by reason of
impecuniosity. It is, therefore, a somewhat [arid]
exercise to be considering an
application for security for costs if the plaintiff can be cast in the role of a
defendant and can
litigate the very matters the subject of its claim by way of
defence."
- In
a general sense, Garard's cross-claim does arise out of the same factual matrix
as Orica's claim. However, as Mr Bova, who appeared
for Orica, submitted there
is a significant difference in the way that Orica puts its claim on the one
hand, and as to the way Garard
seeks to develop its cross-claim on the other. As
I have said, Orica simply claims that it and Garard developed the IP in the
relevant
period and that, by reason of the Confidentiality Agreement, Orica owns
the IP.
- Garard
claims it (not Orica) developed the IP and contends that the Confidentiality
Agreement does not apply. One of Garard's claims
is that it is the legal owner
of the IP. To that extent it can perhaps be said that the cross-claim is a
"reflex" (to adopt the language
of McDougall J in Dunnet Properties Pty Ltd v
Cussen [2009] NSWSC 961 at [35]) of Orica's claim.
- However,
Garard also propounds separate bases for relief, namely the Constructive Trust
Claim and the Quantum Meruit Claim.
- These
may be a "natural response" to Orica's claim, but on the evidence of Mr Bova's
instructing solicitor, Mr Bradley, they would
require a detailed consideration
of events between May 2010 and December 2011. Such consideration would not be
necessary, according
to Mr Bradley, had the Constructive Trust and Quantum
Meruit Claims not been brought. I understand Mr Bradley's evidence to be to
the
effect that detailed consideration of the events between May 2010 and December
2011 would not be necessary to make out Orica's
claims.
- Mr
Bradley's evidence in support of this contention was given in a careful and
detailed manner. It was not answered by evidence from
Garard's solicitor, Mr
Doherty, or challenged in cross-examination. I accept it.
- I
accept Mr Bova's submission that, for these reasons, this aspect of the
cross-claim should be seen as a "sword" not arising out
of the factual matrix
raised by Orica's claim, but, rather, giving rise to its own factual matrix.
- For
these reasons, I am not persuaded that I should refuse security on this ground.
- However,
I accept that such common ground as may emerge between the exploration of the
facts on the claim and cross-claim may be relevant
to the quantum of any order.
The undertaking given by Mr Szkirpan
- The
other matter put forward by Mr Emmett as being a reason why the discretion to
order security should not be exercised is the giving
of an undertaking to the
Court by Mr Szkirpan to "guarantee" the payment of any costs ordered to be paid
by Garard on the cross-claim.
- Mr
Szkirpan is one of two directors of Garard. He has been a director since about
November 2012. He is not one of the three shareholders
of Garard, none of whom,
it seems, are prepared to come out from under the "skirts" of Garard to make any
offer concerning costs.
Nonetheless, the fact is that Mr Szkirpan is willing to
put his assets into play and risk bankruptcy if a costs order is made and
he
does not pay it.
- The
fact that Mr Szkirpan is prepared to put his assets into play is obviously a
factor I must take into account. However, the authorities
make clear that it is
not a decisive or necessarily critical factor; see for example, the observations
of Winneke P and Phillips
JA in Epping Plaza Fresh Fruit & Vegetables Pty
Ltd v Bevendale Pty Ltd [1999] VSCA 43; [1999] 2 VR 191 at [23-24]; cited with approval in
Jazabas Pty Ltd v Haddad [2007] NSWCA 291 per McClellan CJ at CL
at [79] and Mason P at [2].
- Further,
although Mr Szkirpan has given this undertaking, there is no evidence before me
as to Mr Szkirpan's ability to meet the undertaking.
That is, there is no
evidence of Mr Szkirpan's financial position, and thus no evidence as to whether
he could meet any costs order
made.
- In
my opinion, the offer of an unconditional undertaking of the kind proffered by
Mr Szkirpan must be approached with some caution
when it is not supported by any
evidence as to his ability to make good on the undertaking.
- Not
only that, the evidence shows that Garard itself has $50,000 on deposit with the
National Australia Bank and further "deposits"
of $40,441. These matters are
revealed in Garard's balance sheet as at 30 September 2012. No reason has been
advanced as to why Garard
does not make this sum, or any part of it, available
for security. There is no suggestion, and certainly no evidence, that the use
of
this sum to provide security would stultify the litigation or impede the pursuit
by Garard of its business interests.
- Mr
Emmett pointed to the relatively thin nature of the profit made by Garard in the
30 September 2012 accounts, especially when compared
to its turnover. Mr Emmett
suggested there may be a basis to apprehend that some need may arise for these
sums on deposit. However,
I am not prepared to speculate about that matter.
Those who know the true position, namely the directors and shareholders of
Garard,
have elected not to adduce any evidence about the matter. If there was
any need for the money, no doubt evidence would have been
adduced.
- I
take into account Mr Szkirpan's offer. It is a factor that I must consider. But
in the light of Garard's demonstrated ability to
itself provide some kind of
security, and the absence of any evidence as to Mr Szkirpan's ability to make
good the undertaking, I
do not consider it a reason to decline the security.
Quantum
- Mr
Bradley has estimated that the prosecution of the Constructive Trust and Quantum
Meruit Claims will cause Orica to incur further
costs in the sum of $131,245. Mr
Bradley gives detailed reasons for coming to that conclusion. Included in those
reasons is an estimate
that the case will take hearing three days and that 80
per cent of that time will be taken up by defending the Constructive Trust
and
Quantum Meruit Claims. This is to be contrasted with Mr Doherty who opined that
the Constructive Trust and Qantum Meruit Claims
would add two days additional
preparation but would not add anything to the hearing time.
- Mr
Emmett submitted Mr Bradley's figures were "out of proportion". But Mr Bradley's
evidence reveals he is a very experienced solicitor,
and that he has given
careful and detailed reasons for his conclusions. Mr Doherty's opinions were
more briefly expressed and he
gave no evidence of his background or experience.
In the circumstances I accept Mr Bradley's evidence.
- I
take into account the possibility of the overlap between the time spent on the
cross-claim, and the time which will have to be spent
in any event dealing with
Orica's claim. It is not possible for me to be scientific about this but, doing
the best I can, it appears
to me the appropriate order I should make is that
there be security but it be in a figure less than the sum of Mr Bradley's
estimates.
- The
conclusion to which I have come is that I should order security in the sum of
$75,000. I invite the claimant to bring in short
minutes to give effect to those
reasons.
- The
exhibits on the motion may be returned.
Costs
- It
is common ground that following upon the reasons I have just delivered there
should be an order that Garard pay Orica's costs of
the motion of 2 December
2012.
- Orica
seeks a special order for costs based upon offers made by its solicitors on 19
December 2012 and 24 January 2013. Both those
offers were to accept security in
amounts slightly less than I have indicated I will order.
- Notwithstanding
that fact, I am not able to come to the conclusion it was unreasonable of Garard
not to accept either offer. I do
not propose to make any special order as to
costs of the exhibit on that application.
**********
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