[1] On 18 November 2005, Warren Arthur Wilson was found guilty by Judge J R Callander on two charges laid under s 80(1)(a) of the Building Act 1991 associated with building works completed by him at 72 Upper Queen Street in Auckland in 2004. The allegation was that this work had been carried out otherwise than in accordance with a current building consent. A subsequent appeal to the High Court was dismissed by Venning J who later refused leave to appeal to this Court.
[2] Venning J also heard and dismissed judicial review proceedings which addressed a number of issues broadly associated with the prosecution and the Council’s policy and practices in relation to building work carried out without a consent.
[3] In support of his application to this Court for special leave to appeal against the dismissal of his conviction appeal, Mr Wilson advanced a series of extremely general questions. An example is the first question:

What lawful process is required to be followed by the High Court and the District Court when there are Summary Proceeding [sic] before the District Court pursuant to provisions of the [sic] s80 of the Building Act 1991 and those proceedings cover essentially the same subject matter and issues included in Judicial Review/Bill of Rights proceedings commenced at the High Court at an earlier date. If the Court of Appeal would go so far, as to whether the failure to adopt a fair process was a breach of the lawful considerations for a fair trial and s25 or other sections of the New Zealand Bill of Rights.

[4] Although a significant number of issues underly this and Mr Wilson’s similarly broadly expressed questions, his oral argument focused primarily on his contention that the Council’s practices associated with unconsented building works were inconsistent. This was said to give rise to a defence of officially induced error.
[5] The primary problem for Mr Wilson is that his contentions were not supported by the evidence. This was the conclusion (albeit summarily expressed) of the District Court Judge, and in his judgment Venning J analysed carefully the evidence which was led before reaching the same conclusion. No arguable error on the part of Venning J was demonstrated.
[6] An associated complaint was that this aspect (and perhaps other aspects) of his defence were “hived off” to the judicial review proceedings. In advancing this argument, Mr Wilson had the advantage of a comment to this effect from Baragwanath J in a minute which recorded case management directions associated with the review and appeal. A related complaint is that the District Court Judge was disinterested in the broader issues raised by Mr Wilson. There certainly are signs in the transcript (particularly as it relates to a later rehearing application) that the Judge became somewhat exasperated with Mr Wilson’s arguments. The reality, however, is that the case in the District Court took five days, most of which was devoted to attempts by Mr Wilson to develop an evidential basis for his complaints against the Council. It was the District Court Judge who first suggested that Mr Wilson’s concerns might invoke the defence of officially induced error and he did, albeit in general terms, discuss the point in his judgment. There was, as we have noted, a distinct absence of evidential foundation for Mr Wilson’s arguments.
[7] We are satisfied that these aspects of the case do not give rise to a question of law which warrants special leave to appeal.
[8] The same is true of the other issues raised by Mr Wilson in written material involving:

(a) Procedural arguments about the way in which the criminal and civil proceedings were dealt with. (Such complexities as there were in relation to the case seemed to us to have been largely initiated by Mr Wilson).

(b) A complaint as to the absence of a proved delegation of a power to prosecute in favour of the Auckland City Council officer who swore the information. (Irrespective of the validity of this argument, no such delegation was required as any person was entitled to lay information under the Building Act).

(c) Possible arguments relating to s 83 of the Building Act and associated arguments as to defences and exemptions. (These are insufficiently based in the evidence to warrant a further appeal).

(d) An assertion that there was some mistake in conclusions of fact associated with the location of some of the works. (This is immaterial given that it is perfectly clear that unconsented work was carried out at 72 Upper Queen Street).

(e) An allegation of institutional bias against both the District and High Court judges. (We see no substantiation of these allegations).

(f) A complaint relating to documents discovered from the Auckland City Council which were present at the District Court hearing, but absent from the High Court hearing. (This complaint, standing alone and in the absence of an arguable issue to which it relates, does not give rise to an appeal point).

[9] The application for special leave to appeal is dismissed.

Solicitors:
Meredith Connell, Auckland, for the Respondent

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